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Abstract 
Japanese tuna longline vessels have fished in the eastern Australian area since the 1950s 
and under access agreements with the Australian government since the establishment of 
the Australian Fishing Zone in 1979. The development of the domestic Yellowfin tuna 
fishery in the 1980s revealed the need for an economic analysis of the fishery. 
A Generalized Leontief revenue function was used to estimate the multispecies 
production of the Japanese vessels in the 1984-1989 period. Input scaled supply 
equations were estimated for the supply of each species, at the vessel level, and 
likeUhood ratio tests were used for specification and technology tests. Shift variables 
captured the seasonal, annual and spatial variations in fish stock, for which no direct 
variations were available, and the influence of the East Australian Current. The revenue 
function enabled identification of joint and nonjoint vessel technologies through 
likeUhood ratio tests and the calculation of own price, cross price, and product specific 
scale elasticities. A direct Cobb-Douglas production function was used to estimate 
production in the single species domestic Yellowfin fishery. Sustainability of the 
fisheries was estimated in the 1962-1989 period using a linear depletion model and the 
Gordon-Schaefer production model. 
Revenue function estimation and likelihood ratio test results showed that the final 
estimations should be for small and large Japanese vessels in the northern and southern 
fisheries (around 25°S). The production technology in the northern fishery was nonjoint 
(catches were independent of output prices), whereas the southern vessel technology was 
joint. Input-output separability - the species mix is independent of the level of effort-
could not be rejected in the north, but was rejected for large vessels in the south. In the 
south the production of Albacore, Yellowfin, Bigeye and Swordfish was individually 
joint. Own price and cross price elasticities of supply confirmed that Bigeye and 
Yellowfm were produced as complements, whereas Bigeye and Albacore, and Bigeye 
and Swordfish were substitutes. Marlin were individually nonjoint in all areas and may 
be an incidental catch. Yellowfin and Bigeye were most available inshore, whereas 
Albacore, Marlin and Swordfish had higher availability with distance from shore. 
The revenue function comparisons of Japanese and domestic vessels inshore revealed 
significant differences in technology. The domestic vessels concentrated on surface 
species such as Yellowfm tuna, whereas the Japanese fished for the deeper swimming 
species in the same area. The direct analysis of the domestic Yellowfin vessels indicated 
significant differences in Yellowfin production in the areas north and south of Sydney. 
Average Revenue of Effort estimates and comparisons suggested there were three 
groups of Japanese vessel offshore: smaller tropical longliners in the north; large 
viii 
Southern Bluefm Tuna longliners in the south; and vessels that move between the 
northern and southern areas. The long-run viability of large vessels in the south was 
questioned, and only small vessels in the northern area were earning greater returns than 
in an open access fishery. The representative domestic vessel had a comparative 
advantage over the representative Japanese vessel, but only in the inshore area. 
The sustainability analysis indicated no diminution in the Japanese vessel catch rates 
since the commencement of the domestic and Western Pacific tuna fisheries, though 
depletion of Albacore, Yellowfin and Blue Marlin was noted in the 1962-1989 period. 
Production modelling indicated that effort levels in 1989 would need to be reduced by 
28% and 41%, for Swordfish and Black Marlin respectively, to achieve maximum 
economic yield. The production analysis was not applicable to the other species. 
The examination of technology and management indicated that output based regulations, 
such as individual quota and royalty per unit of catch, would not be appropriate for the 
nonjoint technology of the Japanese vessels in the northern fishery and for the domestic 
fishery. However the joint technology of the Japanese vessels in the southern area could 
be managed by a separate royalty or output regime. Effort regulations are recommended 
for all areas, but managers should monitor the relative prices of jointly produced species. 
Modelling recommends an effort limit of between 7 and 9 million hooks per annum and 
area specific effort regulations in the north and south to enhance fishery rent. The 
Japanese fleet should be kept in the offshore fishery due to the access fees received and 
the inability of the domestic fleet to displace the Japanese vessels. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction. 
1.1 Overview of the study. 
This study examines the bioeconomics of Japanese and Australian tuna longlining activity 
in the eastem Australian region. Chapter 1 introduces the reader to tuna longlining, the 
tuna and billfish stocks available in the region, and provides some background on the 
Japanese distant water longline industry, the domestic longline fleet, and markets for east 
Australian tuna. 
Chapter 2 examines the theoretical altematives for estimation of production technology 
in the fishery. The different production functions that have been used in empirical 
fisheries economics studies are reviewed and altemative functional forms are compared. 
A dual approach is recommended using a revenue function to estimate the multispecies 
fishing activity. However a direct production function approach is proposed for the 
Australian fishery which depends mainly on a single species of tuna. 
Chapter 3 estimates the revenue function for the multispecies Japanese fishery in the 
years 1984-1989 and contains the central part of the thesis. The estimations detail the 
vessel technology for different vessels, regions, years and seasons. Jointness and 
separabiUty in the technology are examined and price, product specific scale, and Allen 
partial elasticities are calculated to reveal production inter-relationships. The study also 
examines the spatial aspects of fish availabiUty in sub-zones at various distances from the 
coast. The revenue function is also used to compare AustraUan and Japanese technology 
in a limited area where both fleets fished in the years 1988-1989. 
A direct production function approach is taken to the estimation of the Australian 
Yellowfin tuna fishery where a temperature variable is used as a proxy for stock. The 
technology of the fishery is estimated taking features of the fishery such as years, 
seasons, vessel class, moonphase, patrolling, water temperature, soaktime and fishing 
effort into account. Chapter 3 ends with a discussion of the technologies in the east 
Australian region. 
Chapter'4 presents the results of a survey undertaken to establish the cost of operation 
and incomes of domestic vessels that operate in the inshore fishery. The economic cost 
data obtained for the domestic fishery and the Japanese cost data available in the 
literature are combined with information on vessel effort in the fishery to estimate the 
cost of effort for domestic and Japanese vessels. Chapter 4 concludes by comparing the 
cost of effort data between the Japanese and domestic vessels. 
Chapter 5 evaluates the economic performance of the vessels in the fishery and the 
sustainability of the species in the east Australian area. The revenue function estimates 
obtained in Chapter 3 are used to examine the efficiency of allocation of effort inside the 
Australian Fishing Zone compared with altemative fishing opportunities. Estimates of 
the Value of the Marginal Product of effort and the Value of the Average Product of 
effort are compared to establish how vessels may allocate their effort. The long-mn 
performance of the representative vessel in the different areas of the fishery is also 
estimated. Similarly the long-mn equilibrium effort level is calculated for the 
representative vessel and compared with the effort being applied by vessels in the fishery. 
The revenue function is also used to determine the comparative advantage between 
Japanese and Australian vessels in the inshore fishery. The cost of effort estimates from 
Chapter 4 are used to determine the long-mn equilibrium level of vessel effort, long-mn 
viability estimates, and to calculate rent in the Japanese and Australian fisheries using 
observed data. Rent in the Japanese fishery is calculated for the years 1984-1989 and for 
the years 1988 and 1989 in the Australian fishery when cost data were available. 
The six year period under consideration in the revenue function analysis is not adequate 
for estimating depletion and sustainability through time. Catch and effort data for an 
area greater than the eastem Australian Fishing Zone are used to estimate the 
sustainability of the species in the Japanese fishery. Tests are also performed to examine 
the influence of the development of the domestic and Westem Pacific tuna fisheries on 
catch rates in the eastem Australian Fishing Zone. 
Chapter 6 investigates the policy implications of the results obtained in Chapters 3, 4, 
and 5. The economics of foreign fishing literature is reviewed and the results from the 
revenue function are evaluated. The management options for the fishery take account of 
the differing vessel technologies that have previously been identified in Chapter 3 of the 
study. Regulations and differing policy instmments are considered for implementation in 
the fishery and a policy regime is suggested in the light of the modelling results. The 
fmal Chapter also includes the impUcations of the models for the management of the 
foreign and domestic fisheries. All policies account for the long-mn sustainability of the 
resource and the study recommends effort levels for the conservative management of the 
fishery. 
The thesis concludes with a review of the study and an evaluation of the different 
approaches taken to fishery economic modelUng in the thesis. This discusses the 
strengths and weaknesses of the revenue function approach for assessing fishing vessel 
production technology, policy and management altematives in a multispecies fishery. 
1.2 Introduction to Chapter 1. 
This Chapter introduces the tuna longline fishery in the east Australian region. The 
fishing activity of the Japanese and domestic fleets in the region is described by catch and 
effort data and the gross value of the fishery is estimated. The management of foreign 
and domestic fisheries is reviewed and the tuna fishing methods used by both 
nationalities are examined and the differences highlighted. The tuna and billfish stocks 
available in the region are also introduced and the fisheries literature is reviewed for 
indications of stock stmcture. 
The fishing activity of the Japanese vessels in the east Australian area is only a small part 
of the intemational distant water fishing activity undertaken by the Japanese tuna 
longline industry. The origins and recent history of the Japanese longline industry are an 
important background to this study of tuna fishing in eastem Australian waters. The 
Chapter concludes with a brief review of the tuna markets for the eastem Australian 
product. It should be noted that this introduction is an overview of a large literature and 
references are provided for anyone seeking greater detail than in this introductory 
review. 
1.3 The Australian east coast tuna longline fishery. 
The AustraUan east coast region is the area bounded by 10°S 145°E and 10°S 170°E to 
the southem limit of 40°S 145°E and 40°S 170°E as presented in Figure 1.1. The tuna 
longhne activity in the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) is managed by the Australian 
Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) and extends from Cape York in the North to 
the New South Wales (NSW) and Victorian state border in the south Figure 1.2. 
The foreign fishing activity for tuna is exclusively Japanese, with longlining vessels in the 
area north of 34° South as reported in Figure 1.2. The study uses the Une of latitude 25° 
South to divide the northem and southem Japanese fishing activity. Some Japanese 
vessels participate seasonally in a small handline fishery in Box '171' in the north of the 
fishery, but this limited amount of fishing activity was excluded from the study. 
The domestic fishery is primarily in the inshore area closed to the Japanese in the first 
fifty miles adjacent to the coast from Brisbane south to the NSW / Victorian state 
border. Both the domestic and foreign fisheries are subject to the southerly flowing East 
Austraha Current. At the leading edge of the current the Tasman front is a significant 
thermal gradient which influences tuna distribution (Diplock and Watkins, 1990). 
The east coast tuna longhne fishery exploits the following species: Albacore tuna, 
Thunnus alalunga, Bigeye tuna, Thunnus obesus, Yellowfin tuna, Thunnus albacares, 
and Marlin and Billfish such as Broadbill Swordfish, Xiphias gladius, Blue Marlin, 
Solomon Islands . / ^ Vv 
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Figure 1.1: The east AustraUan area showing the AustraUan Fishing Zone and adjacent 
countries: Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and New Caledonia. 
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Figure 1.2: The east Australian Fishing Zone. The area south of 34° South and 
adjacent to the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park , Box '171' have been closed to Japanese 
longline activity during the years 1984-1989. The line of latitude 25°S is indicated and is 
used to divide the offshore fishery into northem and southem regions. The domestic 
fishing activity is along the New South Wales coast (see Figure 4.1). 
Makaira nigricans. Black Marlin, Makaira indica. Striped Marlin, Tetrapturus audax. 
There is also a small by-catch of Wahoo, Acanthocybium solandri. Dolphin fish, 
Coryphaena hippos and Skipjack tuna Katsuwonus pelamis (Caton and Hampton, 1985). 
The biological status of these stocks is considered in section 1.5. 
1.3.1 The Japanese and the east coast tuna longline fishery. 
The Japanese have been longlining in what is now the eastem AFZ since the early 1950's 
when large catches of Yellowfin tuna, Albacore tuna, and Black Marlin were noted in the 
southem Coral Sea (Hisada, 1973; Matsuda and Ouchi, 1984). In the years 1960 and 
1961, Matsuda and Ouchi (1984) note that as many as 70 Japanese tuna fishing vessels 
were operating along the Australian east coast. Following the declaration of the AFZ in 
1979, Japanese vessels have been admitted to the area by negotiated access agreements. 
The Japanese fishing fleet operating in the area consists of groups of longliners related by 
port of origin, commonly sought target species, and corporate or fishing co-operative 
links (Caton and Ward, 1989a). Japanese distant water tuna longliners operate on year 
long voyages called "campaigns" with many of the vessels on the east coast being 
tropical mixed tuna and billfish longliners from the northem islands of Japan (Caton and 
Ward, 1989a). 
However larger tuna longliners also access the east coast region prior to or after fishing 
in the Southem Ocean for Southem Bluefin Tuna (SBT). The specific pattems of 
operation for many Japanese vessels on the east coast are not known though Caton and 
Ward (1989a) suggest that campaigns are probably influenced by Japanese market prices, 
catch rates and operational decisions to move fishing areas when expected catch rates are 
not realised. Apparently Japanese fishing masters place a heavy reliance on past catch 
rates and on fishing in specific areas at precise times of the year. There is radio 
communication within the Japanese fleet and some information sharing on catch 
locations (Caton and Ward, 1989a). The Japanese tuna longlining in the AustraUan east 
coast region is an established fishery unlike the recently developed AustraUan domestic 
longline industry. 
The gross value of the Japanese fishery is reported in Table 1.1a. The fishery had its 
highest catch value in 1988 when its nominal value was A$33.6 milUon. Table 1.1b 
reports the value of the northem and southem region as a percentage of total value. The 
overall mean percentages of revenue indicate that over the 1984-1989 period 62% of 
total revenue was obtained from the southem region of the fishery and 38% of revenue 
from the area north of 25°S. 
1.3.2 The Australian fishery. 
The domestic longline fishery has developed since 1983 with smaller vessels, below 20 
metres in length, fishing for tuna for export to the Japanese sashimi market. Most of the 
domestic tuna fishing activity is in the innermost fifty miles of New South Wales. The 
major areas fished by the domestic fishers are shown in Figure 4.1. 
The domestic fishery had an estimated revenue at first sale of $6-$7 million dollars in 
1989 (DPIE, 1990). The domestic fishery is almost single species as Yellowfin catches 
are greater than the combined catches of Bigeye, Albacore and Swordfish. With the 
movement of the Tasman front northwards in winter, Yellowfin are caught in the 
northem section of the fishery off Coffs Harbour around September. Some Yellowfin 
are also taken in the far north of the fishery from the port of Caims in October and 
November. 
1.3.3 Catch and effort data in the east Australian fishery. 
Catch and effort data for both the Japanese and domestic fisheries were provided in 
individual record form by the Australian Fisheries Management Authority. The data and 
data sets available for the east Australian area are described below. 
1.3.3.1 Data sets. 
Japanese catch effort data in the Australian Fishing Zone, (AFZ). 
Japanese tuna longUne vessels over twenty tonnes have been required to submit logbook 
reports of fishing activity to the Fisheries Agency of Japan since a ministerial directive of 
1963 (Kume, 1984). The publicly released form of this data set is referred to as the 
Fisheries Agency of Japan (FAJ) data and the variables in this set are reported in Table 
1.2a. Details of the compilation and validity of the Fishery Agency of Japan data sets 
compiled by the Far Seas Fisheries Laboratory, can be seen in Majkowski and Morris, 
(1986). 
After the declaration of the AFZ in 1979 this logbook format was adopted by the 
AustraUan Fisheries Service and was renamed as the TLOl logbook (Majkowski and 
Morris, 1986). The Australian govemment's data system, the Australian Fishing Zone 
Information System (AFZIS), was developed after 1979 and replaced the TLOl logbooks 
with TL02 logbooks in the 1979-1983 period. The variables recorded were found to be 
inadequate for management needs and the more comprehensive TL04 logbooks were 
introduced in November, 1983. The variables avaUable for each data set are reported in 
Table 1.2a. The data set used to estimate Japanese production technology in the eastem 
AFZ was the TL04 logbook data in the 1984-1989 period. This was preferable to the 
more aggregated radio report data which were also available to this study. 
Japanese vessel licensing data. 
Each Japanese boat intending to fish in the AFZ has to forward specific details of basic 
information on vessel characteristics to the Australian Fisheries Management Authority. 
Details include: name of vessel, call sign, length, tonnage (GRT), crew numbers, engine 
capacity, freezer hold capacity, navigational equipment, safety equipment and crew 
numbers. These records were obtained from the AFMA, with the assistance of the 
Bureau of Rural Resources who arranged for hard copy records to be entered onto 
computer disc for the vessels fishing in the 1984-1989 period. These data form part of 
the wider regional vessel database records held by the South Pacific Fomm Fisheries 
Agency. 
Japanese tuna market price data. 
Tuna market data were supplied by the Australian Fisheries Management Authority in 
the form of tuna prices for the 1984-1989 period for the port of Yaizu in Japan. These 
data were considered the appropriate price data set for the Japanese vessels in the east 
coast fishery. 
The domestic fishery data set. 
The domestic fishery developed in the mid 1980s. In 1986 •AL02' catch and effort 
logbooks were introduced to the domestic fishery. The quality and coverage of the data 
improved during the 1986-1990 period and by 1990 the data covered over 90% of the 
fishing activity in New South Wales (DPIE, 1990). The variables recorded in the 
logbooks can be produced in either domestic or in South Pacific Commission (SPC) 
formats in Table 1.2b. The domestic record set is more detailed than the SPC regional 
format. 
1.3.3.2 Japanese catch and effort. 
The annual Japanese catch and effort data were summed from daily observations of 
fishing activity in the east Australian area. Effort was recorded in hooks set per day. 
Table 1.3 reports the numbers of each vessel class in the fishery and the average number 
of hooks set per day in the 1984-89 period. There were 12,705 observations available 
on the Japanese fleet in the six years considered. Catch and effort have risen during the 
study period with the total weight of all species of fish reaching 7486 tonnes in 1988 as 
reported in Table 1.4a. From Table 1.4b (i) and (u) it can be seen that there is greater 
fishing activity and catch in the southem area of the Japanese fishery. Table 1.4c reports 
the mean effort and mean catch of each species from the north and south as a percentage 
of the total Japanese catch over the 1984-1989 period. Over the six years 1984-89 the 
Japanese expended 69% of effort in the southem region which yielded 80% of the total 
catch of Bigeye, 82% of the total catch of Swordfish, and 68% of the total catch of 
Striped Marlin. Low percentages of the total catches of Black and Blue Marlin were 
taken in the southem region. Yellowfin and Albacore catch rates were higher in the 
northem region, but the absolute sizes of the catches were generally higher in the 
southem region (see Table 1.4b(i) and (ii)). Albacore, Yellowfin, Black MarUn and Blue 
Marlin have higher catch rates in the northem area whereas in the south Bigeye, 
Swordfish and Striped Marlin have higher catch rates. 
Table 1.5a reports the effort and catch in the northem and southem fisheries by vessel 
class. Table 1.5b reports that large vessels are responsible for higher effort levels than 
smaller vessels in both the northem and southem fisheries. The distribution of catch and 
effort by vessel size in the area inside and outside of 200 miles from shore are reported in 
Table 1.6a. From Table 1.6b it is apparent that in the north 80% of the effort is applied 
in the inner 200 miles and only 20% of effort in the outer area. However in the southem 
fishery 59% of effort in the fishery is applied to the area within 200 miles from shore. 
Table 1.6c reports the effort and catch in the inner and outer area by vessel size. The 
smaller Japanese vessels have less activity and catch in aU areas, whereas large vessels 
have high catches in the northem inshore area. 
1.3.3.3 Domestic catch and effort. 
In the domestic fishery Yellowfin, Albacore and Bigeye are the most frequentiy caught 
species. Marlins are protected and few Swordfish are landed due to fish market mercury 
content regulations. Occasionally some Southem Bluefin Tuna (SBT) are captured in 
the southem area of the domestic fishery, south of 34°S. Table 1.7a reports the total 
catch in the domestic fishery by species, total effort, and the number of catch and effort 
database observations available for the 1986-1990 period. The rise in reported catch and 
effort may be misleading as the database coverage was poorest in the 1986 period, but by 
1990 was approximately 90% of activity in the study area (DPIE, 1990). The figures 
reported here do not include joint venture vessels or two Japanese style vessels operating 
in the domestic fishery. The domestic data can be divided into two fisheries north and 
south of 34°S, referred to as the northem and southem domestic fisheries as shown in 
Figure 4.1. The domestic fishery catch and effort data are reported in Table 1.7b, and 
the catches and effort as a percentage of the total catch and effort in the domestic fishery 
are reported in Table 1.7c. The northem domestic fishery area had 36% of the total 
effort in the domestic fishery, whereas the fishery south of Sydney had the majority of 
the domestic effort, 63% over the 1986-1990 period. Table 1.8 reports the average daily 
catch and effort for vessels in the domestic fishery for the 1986-1990 period, as weU as 
information on soak time, water temperature, and the total number of observations 
available. 
The zonal distribution of the catch and effort in the domestic fishery is reported in Table 
1.9. The mean effort and catch of the most important species, YeUowfin, was calculated 
for each of the years 1987-1990. In the total fishery 25% of the effort and Yellowfin 
catch occur in the innermost 12 miles. However, the area of prime importance is the 
zone 12-50 miles from shore where 64% of the domestic effort takes 67% of the 
domestic catch. This confirms the inshore nature of the domestic fishing activity. 
1.3.4 Management of the east coast tuna longline fishery. 
The management of the east Australian fishery is the responsibility of the Australian 
Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA). Scientific advice is received from the Bureau 
of Rural Sciences (BRS) and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation, (CSIRO) and intemational bodies such as the South Pacific Commission 
(SPC). 
1.3.4.1 The management of the domestic tuna fishery. 
AFMA devolves responsibility for the management of the domestic fishery to the East 
Coast Tuna Management Advisory Committee (ECTUNAMAC) which was established 
in 1986 and has advocated a rational and orderly development of the domestic fishery 
(DPIE, 1987). 
In the 1985-1990 period the domestic fishery was subject to the following management 
measures: limited entry; zonation by area such as the 50 nautical mile deUneation 
between inshore and offshore fisheries and the closure of the Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Park section (under fisheries notice 171); the establishment of three categories of 
domestic access, inshore historical, inshore developmental and offshore developmental; a 
vessel length Umit of 20 metres for inshore vessels, but no length Umit for offshore 
developmental vessels; and a management levy on domestic fishers, introduced in 1989 
(DPIE, 1986; DPIE, 1987; AFMA, 1992). 
The stated objectives of management are; "to protect the resources (including baitfish) 
from over-exploitation and to ensure, as far as is possible, the availabiUty of high 
sustainable yield levels from the resource"; and "to maximise economic and social 
benefits from the resource for fishermen and the local general community through the 
establishment and maintenance of a balance between the catching capacity and the yield 
obtainable from the tuna and billfish resource off the east coast of Australia" (DPIE, 
1987, pi 1). 
DPIE (1986) gives a broader view of possible management plan objectives including: the 
optimum utilisation of available resources; the orderly development of the fishery, should 
it prove viable for AustraUan operators; the maintenance of high quality market 
standards; allowance for the multispecies nature of the fishery; allowance for other trawl 
and recreational interests; seeking to minimise government involvement in the operations 
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of the fishery; provision of scientific and other data so that management decisions can be 
based on a sound understanding of biological and operational characteristics of the 
fishery; the relationship between AFZ tuna fisheries and the S.W. Pacific; and the long 
term involvement of the Japanese, and possibly other foreign fishers, in the fishery. 
Six possible mechanisms for management were proposed in DPIE (1986) with a plan 
incorporating a combination of the following measures being recommended: Umited 
entry; open catch quotas; per vessel catch quotas; gear restrictions; area controls; and 
financial controls. More recentiy Individual Transferable Quotas have been suggested, 
though their adoption is far from certain and has not been analysed (AFMA, 1992; 
AFMA, 1993a). 
Future Management of the east coast resource wUl be within the guidelines of the 
Federal govemment policy statement, "New directions for Commonwealth fisheries 
management in the 1990's" and contains the following objectives: 
(a) To ensure the conservation of fisheries resources and the environment which 
sustains those resources. 
(b) To maximise economic efficiency in the exploitation of those resources. 
(c) To collect an appropriate charge from individual fishermen exploiting a 
community resource for private gain (DPIE, 1989). 
ECTUNAMAC have been engaged in (a), but (b) and (c) have yet to be sufficiently 
addressed in the management strategy (Mcllgorm, 1990). 
1.3.4.2 The management of the foreign fishery. 
The foreign fishery is managed by AFMA who negotiate with the Japanese industry on 
licensing and access arrangements. Management of the Japanese fishery has depended 
on area closures within the AFZ in order to protect stocks and domestic access to tuna. 
The area exclusion of the Japanese fishers developed through the 1980's untU in late 
1990 a fifty nautical mile zone from the Australian coastiine was reserved for Australian 
vessels only (Figure 1.2). Details and maps of annual closures and management changes 
are given in Caton and Ward (1989a). 
In declaring the AFZ, Australia became obliged to offer surplus fish stocks to the 
Japanese and other foreign fishing nations. Bilateral policy agreements were used by 
Australia to admit foreign vessels with the intention of maximising benefits to Australia. 
A former director of the Australian Fisheries Service, observed that "there has been no 
attempt to analyse how maximum retums from foreign vessels in the AFZ can be 
achieved" (Bain, 1985, p21). The profitabiUty of foreign vessel access to the Southem 
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Bluefin Tuna and east coast tuna fisheries were addressed in studies by Geen (1990), and 
Brown and Dann (1991). 
The Australian Govemment's policy statement for the 1990's indicates the govemment 
will undertake periodic reviews of foreign fishing access fees to ensure that retums are 
maximised (DPIE, 1989). An assessment of the economic performance of the domestic 
fishery is a priority and the potential integration of policy for the domestic and foreign 
fisheries has been hindered by a lack of economic analysis (Mcllgorm, 1990). A more 
integrated understanding of the domestic and foreign fisheries is needed in future policy 
development. 
1.4 Tuna fishing. 
Longlining is one of the three main methods of tuna fishing, the others being purse 
seining and pole and Une fishing. Hayasi and Kikawa, (1970) regard the Japanese 
oceanic longline as exploiting tuna scattered in the mid-layer as opposed to purse seine 
and pole and Une methods exploiting tuna in the upper layer of the sea. The Japanese 
oceanic tuna longline has remained reasonably similar since its development in the 1950's 
(Kume, 1984). The mainline is usually hard laid tar treated synthetic fibre (Kuralon 6-7 
mm diameter) and is 45-60 nautical miles in length. From the mainline come buoy Unes 
to the surface floats and branchlines to the hooks. The shape of the oceanic longline is 
shown in Figure 1.3. 
1.4.1 Japanese longlining in the Australian Fishing Zone. 
After negotiating entry to the AFZ the Japanese forward details of the vessels that will be 
fishing in the prospective season. From the licence information and observer reports of 
individual cmises, such as Aaltonen (1982), we know the crew on a 300 GRT (Gross 
Registered Tonnes) longliner varies between 18 and 22 men and consists of: a fishing 
master; captain; radio operator; chief engineer, second and third engineers, bosun, 
icemaster; cook and 9-13 crew. The fishing master is usually the oldest, having 10-15 
years experience as a captain and 5-10 years crewing experience. He is in charge of all 
fishing whereas the captain is responsible for the vessel while transiting between 
grounds, and whilst in port providoring (Baron, 1990). 
The vessels are extremely weU equipped and carry aU the latest navigation and fishing 
aids such as "Radio telephone, radio telegraph and emergency equipment, a facsimile 
receiver, radar (sometimes two), two radio direction finders, gyro compass, echo 
sounders, satellite navigation equipment, and a course plotter on occasions" (Aaltonen, 
1982, pi). Baron (1990) notes that some vessels have two satellite navigators, whilst 
most have the Omega navigational system, video track plotter with tape recording 
memory, colour video sounder, hard copy sounder, and sea water temperature sensors. 
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Figure 1.3: A cross section of a Japanese oceanic longline. The Une can be set at 
varying depths by altering distance between buoys. The deep set longline is also 
shown.(After Suzuki et al. 1977, and Sakagawa et al. 1987). 
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Baron notes that colour sonar facsimile receivers and weather satellite receivers are a 
must on all vessels, with a recent innovation being oceanographic colour display units 
and high resolution radar. The colour display unit receives signals from National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) satellites and show real time 
meteorological and sea surface temperature contours over an area of up to two milUon 
square miles. The high resolution radar is capable of detecting a flock of birds at a range 
of ten nautical miles or more (Baron, 1990). All this technology is far removed from the 
Japanese skipper quoted by Uyemae (1975, p4); "In the past the fishing master would 
scoop some water and taste it, or even smell it, for tuna's presence". 
The installation of high technology equipment in the 1980's may have altered the 
production process although the extent is unknown. The longline fishing gear did not 
change significantly in the 1970s, though "deep set" longlines were introduced to catch 
Bigeye tuna (Suzuki et al., 1977; Suzuki and Kume, 1981). In the Australian region the 
standard longline gear is set in different arrangements to capture different species of tuna 
(Baron, 1990). 
The fishing master determines the fishing ground based on previous experience and 
current vessel reports (Caton and Ward, 1989a). Satellite technology enables 
temperature and thermal stmcture to be investigated revealing plankton layers and water 
temperature gradients where tuna often aggregate. The Japanese do not normally fish in 
areas shallower than 100 m due to the high likelihood of gear damage from the seabed as 
the line drifts. 
The fishing operation consists of two phases: setting the Une and the hauling it aboard 
again. Preferably aU hooks should be in the water at dawn and dusk, the peak feeding 
times. Baron (1990) notes that the setting operation is performed at 9.5 to 11.5 knots 
with snoods and buoys being clipped to the main Une by crew listening to a system of 
automatically generated loudspeakers signals. By varying the timing of these signals to 
the crew, the fishing master can set the desired longline configuration for the targeted 
species. As the Une is set, approximately every 40th buoy has radio transmitting 
capability. Each radio buoy has a unique morse signal, so in the eventuality of Une 
breakage the line can be located and retrieved in sequence. The end of the Une is marked 
with identification flags. As the longline is set different baits are attached in a recorded 
sequence in an attempt to attract different species in the water column. The setting 
process takes 5 to 6 hours setting 2500-3000 hooks. After the Une is set the crew retire 
for 4-5 hours rest (Baron, 1990). 
The hauling operation is more time consuming due to retrieving the mainline, undoing 
many tangled hook lines, storing hook lines, storing mainlines, landing fish, removing old 
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bait and having aU gear stored ready for the next set (Baron, 1990). In both setting and 
hauling bad weather will delay the operation, and the normal pattern of one set and haul 
in a 24 hour period may not be achieved. 
Lx)ngliners take bait aboard before leaving Japan or collect desired bait species from 
foreign ports. Bait species are Saury, Torpedo Squid, Jack Mackerel, Japanese 
Mackerel, Pilchard, artificial Squid, Herrings, and small Trevally or Carangids are used 
on occasions (Aaltonen, 1982; Baron, 1990). 
On landing aboard the Japanese longliners the tuna are killed, using standard procedures 
to ensure blood loss, cleaned and frozen at Ultra Low Temperatures (ULT). In some 
cases nylon cord is inserted in the tail of large fish for identification recording the fishing 
ground and condition of the fish prior to freezing (Baron, 1990). This enables tuna 
carcases to be identified for individual sale where they often command high prices. 
1.4.2 Domestic longlining in the Australian Fishing Zone. 
The AustraUan longUne tuna fishing vessels are much smaller than the Japanese vessels 
and have a different mode of operation. The AustraUan vessel lays between 50 and 400 
hooks per day, usually within 50 miles of the coast. Some Australian fishermen use 
reconditioned Japanese fishing gear, though the majority have made their own 
(Alexander and Harada, 1988). Two gear types are most popular: reconditioned heavy 
duty Japanese gear or the more common Australian monofilament gear (Alexander and 
Harada, 1988). 
The domestic Australian vessels are usually below 15 metres in length and do not have 
the stability, fuel storage and space required for fishing trips of longer duration offshore 
(Alexander and Harada, 1988). There are only a few domestic Australian vessels which 
are over 20 metres and can compete in the offshore fishery with the Japanese vessels that 
are in excess of 35 metres in length. 
The Australians also recognise dawn and dusk as preferred fishing times due to feeding 
and the chance of YeUowfin tuna encountering gear during vertical migrations. The 
average number of hooks set by the Australian vessels in the sample was 319.8 hooks 
(S.D.= 147.7) as reported in Table 1.8. The setting time for the average Australian 
operation, is about 2-3 hours, gear being in place one hour before dusk. The depth of 
water is checked to avoid reefs and hazards, and sea state factors such as tides, winds 
and currents, must be observed. Gear is set in straight, U or V pattems, the hook depth 
being determined by buoy and branchline spacings. Australian fishermen are known to 
fish deeper lines for colder water Bigeye with hook depths varying between 93m and 
164m. 
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Some Australian fishers tend or patrol the longline when it has been set watching for 
buoys disappearing due to tuna striking. In this procedure the fish on the line are 
retrieved and the hook rebaited. Patrolling does not occur in the Japanese industrial 
fishery where the line is set and later winched aboard. Austtalian fishers generally leave 
their line out for shorter time periods than the Japanese. 
In summary the domestic tuna longline fishing operation is different to the larger 
industrial Japanese fishery. The fishing operations will be compared later in the thesis. 
1.4.3 Targeting. 
Japanese fishing masters place great store on the knowledge of seasons and the areas in 
which the desired species occur (Caton and Ward, 1989a). Over time the Japanese have 
set lines deeper for Bigeye tuna and shallower for surface BUlfish (Suzuki, Warashina 
and Kishada, 1977; Suzuki and Kume, 1981). Japanese fishers believe the species caught 
is related to bait type, although the correlation has been low, suggesting this is not a very 
predictable process (Kume, 1984; Sakagawa et al, 1987). It is not clear the extent to 
which fishermen can target above these known parameters. 
The catch of different species may be driven by market prices (Caton and Ward, 1989a). 
There have been no previous studies Unking catches in the east Australian area to 
Japanese market prices. High seas longliners are known to make daily radio reports of 
their noon positions and catches to vessel owners in Japan using coded messages to 
avoid an influx of vessels to good fishing locations (Uyemae, 1975). The capture of 
different species in relation to market prices will be investigated later in this study. 
Ward, Ramirez and Caton, (1991) have used clustering analysis of catch and vessel effort 
data to assess targeting in the fishery, concluding that the fleet is not homogeneous, with 
the species captured varying with area. 
1.5 The biological status of the tuna species. 
1.5.1. The biological status of the species. 
In the South West Pacific and Australian region biological research and monitoring of 
ttina stocks have been carried out by the South Pacific Commission (SPC), Bureau of 
Rural Science (BRS, formeriy the Bureau of Rural Resources, BRR) and the New South 
Wales and Queensland State fisheries departments. AU agencies have been collecting 
and analysing data on catch and effort in the fishery via log book and observer 
programmes. The SPC is the regional centre for intemational co-operation in scientific 
advice for fisheries. 
The tuna and bUlfish species in the fishery are highly migratory with little known about 
their stock stmcture and movements. Most of the existing information comes from the 
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South Pacific Commission's Tuna and Billfish Assessment Programme (TBAP) tagging 
(mark and recapture) studies on the different species of tuna (Sibert, 1986; and the SPC-
TBAP literature) and Japanese sources (Suzuki, 1994). To date the limited tagging of 
Yellowfin in the east Australian area has not yielded any definite conclusions on probable 
links to the wider Pacific stocks (Caton and Hampton, 1985; Hampton, 1994). 
1.5.1.1 Yellowfin tuna. 
The initial Tuna and Billfish tagging programme by the South Pacific Commission tagged 
limited numbers of Yellowfin, concentrating on Skipjack resource surveys. Biological 
parameter estimates for Yellowfin are from research and are reported in Table 1.10 and 
in Suzuki (1994). 
Caton and Hampton (1985) note the MSY estimates in the Westem Pacific Yellowfin 
stock in the early 1980's were between 60,000-90,000 tonnes. These estimates are now 
considered low as SPC tagging estimates suggest a stock of 600,000 tonnes in the SPC 
area (Hampton, 1993). Caton and Hampton (1985) note that most population analyses 
have assumed the Pacific Yellowfin resource to be composed of east and west stocks 
with possibly a third stock in the central Pacific. The westem stock is hypothesised to Ue 
between 120° and 170° East, but it is unknown whether this stock is homogeneous or is 
comprised of a number of independent sub-populations (Caton and Hampton, 1985). 
Electrophoretic research suggests that YeUowfin tuna from eastem AustraUan waters 
belong to a sub-population separate from those sampled in other Pacific and Indian 
Ocean islands (BRR, 1989). 
The relationship between the Yellowfin tuna on the east coast of Australia and the wider 
Pacific stock is unclear. A specific detailed study of the biological Yellowfin fishery on 
the Australian east coast concluded that "preliminary assessment suggests low levels of 
interaction between east coast YeUowfin tuna fisheries and other Westem Pacific tuna 
fisheries" and that conclusions as to the relationship between YeUowfin in the northem 
and southem regions of the east coast fishery "should not be drawn" (BRR, 1989, pl2). 
The movement of local groups of YeUowfm tuna along the NSW coast have been 
investigated by Diplock and Watkins, (1988 and 1990). 
Tuna physiologists, such as Cole (1980), have studied the distribution of YeUowfin tuna 
and related it to temperature suggesting that the thermal boundaries for commercial 
concentrations of YeUowfin tuna are between 20° and 28° C. In east Australian studies 
Diplock and Watkins, (1988) note the movement of the 22° isotherm and the associated 
catches of Yellowfin tuna. Ward (1989) confirms that in NSW and Southem 
Queensland, Yellowfin movements are correlated with sea surface temperatures of 
between 21-22°C. These observations of catches at lower temperature ranges than other 
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stocks of Yellowfin are consistent with Cole's observation that temperature is an 
important determinant of the horizontal distribution of Yellowfin, particularly at the 
northem and southem limits of its range in the eastem Pacific (Cole, 1980). 
The lack of any firm information or data on Yellowfin stock stmcture precludes 
modelling approaches where an explicit stock variable is required. A significantiy 
different approach is needed. 
1.5.1.2 Bigeye tuna. 
From the biological research on Bigeye tuna completed by the Japanese Far Seas 
Research Laboratory it appears that there is "some evidence of extensive migrations, 
indicating stock homogeneity" (Caton and Hampton, 1985, p4). Bigeye are known as a 
deeper swimming fish and have been targeted by specially developed Japanese longlines 
(Suzuki et al., 1977; Suzuki and Kume, 1982). The stock in the Westem Pacific was 
considered to be under-exploited by Caton and Hampton (1985). Bigeye population 
characteristics are reported in Table 1.10. Kailola et al. (1993) suggest Bigeye tuna 
taken in Australian waters are members of larger trans-oceanic stocks. 
1.5.1.3 Albacore tuna. 
Albacore are generally accepted to be divided into northem and southem hemisphere 
populations (Caton and Hampton, 1985). Little information is available on the 
population stmcture of South Pacific Albacore although it is believed to be a discrete 
unit stock (Caton and Ward, 1989b; Lewis, 1990). The known population 
characteristics are reported in Table 1.10. Albacore are considered to be a colder water 
tuna than the tropical Yellowfin and Bigeye species (Caton and Ward, 1989b). 
1.5.1.4 Southern Bluefin Tuna. 
The Southem Bluefin Tuna (SBT) occurs on the southem margin of the east coast 
fishery. The amount caught north of 34° south is insignificant and wUl not be considered 
in the present study. The biology of Southem Bluefin Tuna has been extensively studied 
and studies are reviewed in Caton et al. (1990), and Kailola et al. (1993). 
1.5.1.5 Marlin and Swordfish. 
BiUfish research has been undertaken by Japanese, U.S., and AustraUan research 
organisations as weU as the South Pacific Commission. The interest of game fishermen 
has led to several intemational BUlfish stock assessment workshops where several 
hypotheses about stock stmcture for the BUlfish species in the Westem Pacific area have 
been suggested (Shomura, 1978; Skillmann,1989; Suzuki, 1989). 
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Caton and Hampton (1985, p5) noted the following points on BiUfish stocks in the 
Pacific region: "Blue Marlin and Striped Marlin are thought to be comprised of either 
single Pacific-wide stocks, or separate north and south Pacific stocks. Westem and 
eastem Pacific, or north-west, south-west and eastem Pacific stocks have been proposed 
for Black Marlin. For BroadbiU Swordfish, a single Pacific-wide stock, or north-west, 
south and eastem Pacific stocks have been suggested as possibilities". Even if Swordfish 
constitute a whole Pacific stock there are thought to be areas of significant abundance, 
such as the east AustraUan area (Kailola et al., 1993). 
Caton and Hampton (1985, p5) also report that "No reUable estimates of natural 
mortality for BUlfish could be found, although it is reasonable to assume that it would be 
relatively low for such large, mobile apex predators. This being the case, their 
vulnerability to overfishing could be high, and the view is commonly expressed that there 
is very limited potential for expansion of commercial fisheries for bUlfish in the Pacific". 
Blue, Black and Striped Marlin may have been overfished in the Pacific as longline catch 
rates of these species fell substantially in the 1950-1970 period (Caton and Hampton, 
1985). Black Marlin are regarded as having been over exploited in the east Australian 
region and hence capture was banned in 1988 under a voluntary arrangement with the 
Japanese (DPIE, 1989). 
1.5.2 Highly Migratory Species. 
The species in the east coast fishery are all termed Highly Migratory Species in the third 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). However from 
tagging work in the region there have been only a few Yellowfin tagged in the Solomon 
Islands and recaptured in the east AustraUan area. There is possibly movement between 
stocks or just highly mobile individuals. Intemationally there has been substantial debate 
as to the mobUity of Yellowfin tuna (Mullen, 1990). Several authors have questioned 
whether tuna are the "highly migratory species" that UNCLOS HI has assumed (Hilbom 
and Sibert, 1988), however they addressed Skipjack tuna rather than the species in the 
east AustraUan fishery. Migration has been of concem in assessing the interaction 
between Purse seining and tuna longlining. Suzuki (1988), Polacheck (1988), Medley 
(1990), Hampton (1994), and CampbeU (1994) have investigated interaction between 
purse seining and longlining fishing in the Westem Pacific tuna fisheries. The east 
Australian area has longUning activity only and interaction with purse seining may be an 
issue only if tuna are migrating between the Westem Pacific and the east Australian area. 
1.6 The Japanese tuna fishing industry. 
1.6.1 The development of the Japanese tuna longline industry. 
Matsuda and Ouchi (1984) trace the start of the Japanese tuna fishing industry to the 
Meiji Era (1868-1912). The first Japanese govemment legislation was the Distant-Water 
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Fisheries Promotion Act of 1897 which set a precedent for govemment help to the tuna 
industry in the decades to follow. In 1914 mechanically driven tuna longliners enabled 
the Japanese to move into the Westem Pacific occupying many Micronesian islands. 
After Worid War 1 the area bordered by 130°E, 170°E, 0°N, and 22°N, was put under 
Japanese tmsteeship and only with the Japanese surrender in Worid War II in 1945 did 
the tmsteeship cease (Moriya, 1983). 
In 1922 the Japanese govemment undertook promotion measures for distant water 
fishing development providing subsidies for fishing and vessel constmction and for 
Katsuobushi (smoked dried skipjack) export to Japan (Matsuda and Ouchi, 1984). 
Govemment initiated tuna fisheries research was undertaken by the Japanese as early as 
1920 with research vessels in the Westem Central Pacific in 1924 from Sumatra to the 
Solomon Islands (Matsuda and Ouchi, 1984). Ban (1941) suggests the tuna research 
went only as far as Southeast New Guinea. 
During World War II 60% of Japanese tuna fishing vessels were lost and after the war 
the MacArthur occupation policy was to regenerate food supply and export trade. Soft 
loans enabled fishers to constmct new vessels and initial prohibitions on the movement of 
Japanese vessels, the MacArthur lines, were lifted in five phases from 1945 -1952 
enabling diversification into offshore and distant water tuna fisheries (Matsuda, 1987). 
By 1955 there had been a notable increase in tuna production (Fujinami,1987). A special 
act was enacted by the Japanese Govemment in 1957 to promote distant water tuna 
fishing and licensing of distant water fishers. The act referred to "Coastal fisheries", 
"Offshore fisheries" and "Deep sea fisheries" which incorporated distant water tuna 
longlining (Moriya, 1983). The longline fishery rapidly expanded in the 1950's with 
Dcematsu (1984, p i l l ) referring to the 1955-1965 period as the "golden age of tuna 
fishing", with boats being built, fishing gear being enhanced and high catch rates being 
obtained. 
Japan's rapid economic growth in the early 1960s led to a rise in the demand for 
"sashimi" mna which the distant water fleets could potentially supply. The advent of 
Ultta Low Temperattire (ULT) freezing technology (-55 to -60°C) in the late 1960s 
enabled Japanese distant water fleets to deliver high quality sashimi direct to Japanese 
ports, and vessel campaigns in excess of one year became commonplace (Fujinami, 
1987). 
The 1950s was a period of untroubled exploitation for the Japanese industry, though by 
the early 1960s many regarded the tuna longUne fisheries as waning (Comitini and 
Huang, 1971). By the 1970's the Japanese tuna industry was confronted with lower 
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catch rates, inflationary pressures increasing costs, and high fuel prices due to the first oil 
crisis in 1973 (Matsuda and Ouchi, 1984). Labour also became more expensive and 
difficult to recmit despite enhanced remuneration and the attempts of vessel owners to 
improve the attractiveness of spending long periods at sea (Uyemae, 1975). 
In the 1970s competition was also experienced from the Taiwanese and Korean fleets in 
tuna fishing and marketing. The Korean industry had purchased ex-Japanese longliners 
from a restmcturing of the Japanese industry and was thought to have had a competitive 
cost advantage due to cheaper labour (Uyemae, 1975). All these factors led to poor 
profitability in the Japanese tuna industry with profits declining in the 1971-1984 period 
(Matsuda and Ouchi, 1984; Waugh, 1987). The second oU crisis in 1978, due to the 
Iranian revolution, put the industry into further decline. A result of the cost increase was 
to make the readily accessible Pacific region more popular (Matsuda and Ouchi, 1984). 
It was against this background that the already troubled Japanese tuna industry had to 
face Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction (EFJ). 
1.6.2 The Japanese tuna industry response to Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction. 
Japan resisted the extension of fisheries jurisdiction from 3 to 12 miles and in UNCLOS 
in were the sole opponent of the 200 mUe Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) proposal. 
The Japanese claimed historical tuna fishing rights in Southeast Asian and Westem 
Pacific waters based on: their discovery of these tuna grounds; risk-taking in the 
development of these fisheries; continuous and habitual Japanese fishing activity in the 
region; long standing legal practices under the Japanese fisheries licensing system; and 
the importance of the fishery to Japan (Fujinami, 1983; Friedheim et al., 1984; Matsuda 
and Ouchi, 1984). 
The Japanese were also concemed about their potential rights in accessing foreign 
exclusive economic zones (Fujinami, 1983; Friedheim et al., 1984). Japan declared a 200 
nautical mile EEZ in 1977 and accepted the highly migratory species provisions of article 
64 of UNCLOS in, thus recognising the sovereignty of the coastal state over the highly 
migratory tunas and biUfish. In foreign fishing policy Japan accepted the right of coastal 
states to declare a Total Allowable Catch, but did not accept that only the surplus should 
be available to foreign countries as stated in article 62 of UNCLOS HI. 
In 1977 48% of total Japanese tuna production was taken in the EEZ's of 54 foreign 
nations. Imposition by coastal states of stringent fishing regulations compeUed 
companies to reduce fleets, discharge crew and receive diminished profit margins. 
Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction had a severe effect on the tuna industry: Moriya (1983) 
indicated that 1,600 vessels were withdrawn from service and 13,000 fisherman 
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discharged following the introduction of EFJ. Socio-economic dislocation in many 
regional communities was severe. 
The Japanese response to EFJ was a period of domestic adjustment and development of 
extemal strategies to deal with coastal states. Matsuda and Ouchi (1984) note that in the 
1976-1980 EFJ transition period, tuna and skipjack fisheries received subsidised low 
interest loans of US $202,598,000 (698 cases) to help cope with transition. In the 
1970's and early 1980's the industry made the following adjustments: fuel and energy 
saving measures; a mna price support program; and withdrawing fishing vessels from the 
fleet. The Fisheries Reconstmction and Adjustment Act, 1976 enabled loans and 
subsidies to be provided for withdrawals of vessels from the fleet. Poor financial rettims 
led to 164 longliners (47,400 GRT) out of 887 co-operative distant water longliners 
(237,075 GRT) being withdrawn in the 1980-82 period (Matsuda and Ouchi, 1984). 
Compensation was paid in 1980 apparentiy being sourced from co-operative vessels 
remaining in the fleet. Matsuda and Ouchi (1984) suggest bankmptcies were 
commonplace in the mna industry with 90 tuna vessels going bankmpt in the 1981-82 
period. More industry help came with the Fisheries Special Reconstmction and 
Adjustment Act in April, 1982. A tax benefit of 30% extra depreciation was allowed for 
vessels with energy saving features. Matsuda and Ouchi (1984) indicate that 353 new 
distant water ttina and skipjack vessels were built in the 1982-1986 period. According to 
licensing records accessed by this study many of these vessels are currentiy fishing on the 
Australian east coast. 
In 1982 there were govemment subsidies to unemployed fishermen, vessel reduction 
programmes and schemes to help vessels operating amounting to ¥150 billion (Moriya, 
1983). The Japanese govemment instigated a mutual assistance program with foreign 
fishers contributing to support the discharged fishermen. The Japanese govemment was 
also aware of the need for stmctural adjustment with a total of ¥296 biUion being set 
aside for industry adjustment schemes in 1987 (Smith and Wilks, 1988). Funds were 
avaUable as low interest loans to assist with boat scrapping (¥60 bUlion), loans for 
rehabiUtation of distant water fishers (¥80 bilUon), and the modemisation of the fishing 
industry (¥125 billion). Substantial funds in excess of these were directed towards the 
promotion of fishery products (¥524 milUon), price stabilisation (¥1.4 bUUon) and 
rationaUsation of the distribution scheme (¥21.8 billion) (Smith and Wilks, 1988). 
It is not clear whether these are annual subsidies, though in 1988 the adjustment funds 
"all remained unchanged from 1987" (Neimeier and Walsh, 1988, p66). Details on this 
subsidisation are not clear enough to establish the long-mn economic consequences of 
this policy, although the level of the subsidy if received on an annual basis is regarded as 
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being sufficient compensation for industry losses (Campbell and NichoU, 1992a and b, 
1994a and b). 
Having restmctured, the Japanese industry started to look at new extemal strategies such 
as fee fishing, joint ventures and technical/economic co-operation. Fee fishing was 
preferred by the traditional tuna longline fishermen belonging to the Zengyoren (Japanese 
Federation of Fisheries Co-operatives), whereas large trading companies (Maguro 
Shosha) preferred joint ventures in processing, fishing and trading (Matsuda and Ouchi, 
1984). 
Japanese fee fishing involves payment of a lump sum access fee for a permitted number 
of vessels to fish in a foreign EEZ, although on occasions fee fishing can refer to a 
royalty payment for taking a specified amount of catch (Matsuda and Ouchi, 1984). The 
Japanese industry would prefer a per vessel fee in proportion to the catch taken as the 
lump sum fee for fleet access prior to fishing means they bear the risk of uncertain 
catches (Matsuda and Ouchi, op. cit). 
Joint ventures were also established in tuna processing and tuna marketing between 
Japanese and local companies in South west Asia and in the Westem Pacific. These have 
had limited success as local partners wanted to participate in profit sharing and 
management, whereas the Japanese companies wanted profits to be related to initial 
capital contribution (Matsuda and Ouchi, op. cit.). Many of these joint ventures are 
reviewed in Doulman (1991). 
1.6.3 Japanese tuna fisheries management. 
Govemment intervention in fisheries management is usually due to the open access 
nature of the fishery. However Japanese fisheries management policy has been driven by 
the need to maintain the fishing industry and meet food security objectives - maintaining 
existing enterprises to ensure maximum industry ouput (Smith and WiUcs, 1988). 
Management thus stabiUses fishery incomes and employment conditions, preserves 
traditional fishing rights and tries to minimise economic losses in the industry. 
Conservation is only an issue where the industry suffers economic dislocation due to 
deteriorating resources (Smith and Wilks, 1988). 
Administration of fisheries management in Japan is shared between the Fisheries Agency 
Japan (FAJ), part of the Ministry of Agriculture Forests and Fisheries (MAFF), and 
fisheries co-operatives. MAFF, in consultation with co-operatives, decide on numbers of 
vessels to enter a fishery, although the co-operatives decide which vessels should enter 
(Smith and WiUcs, 1988). Limited entry is used by MAFF as a management method in 
both offshore and distant water fisheries. This licensing requires vessels capable of 
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fishing distant waters to pay a fee for operating in a designated fishery (Smith and Wilks, 
1988). 
In summary, the Japanese tuna longline industry is probably one of the worid's most 
mamre fishing industries, but in the last twenty years has come up against rising costs, 
declining catch rates, and hence diminishing profitability. Extemal Fisheries Jurisdiction 
involved an additional cost impost for the Japanese industry to adjust to. In adjustment 
there have been substantial Japanese govemment subsidies to the longline tuna industry 
driven by the tradition in Japanese agriculttiral policy of maintaining food supply. Given 
these subsidies the tme economic profitability of the Japanese fishing fleet is unclear 
(Campbell and NichoU, 1992a and b, 1994a and b). The long term future of the industry 
has been questioned by several authors and the future of this mode of fishing is unclear 
(Stokke, 1990; Bergin and Haward, 1992 and 1993). 
1.7 The economics of foreign fishing. 
The economics of foreign fishing has developed substantially since the third United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1983), Article 62, noted that an 
intemational obligation exists to offer foreign nations access to fish resources surplus to 
the coastal state's harvesting capacity. The literature on the economics of foreign fishing 
is substantial and is briefly reviewed below. 
The general economic issues in Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction (EFJ) were first 
addressed in the 1970s (Anderson, 1975; Munro, 1979 and 1982). The foreign fishing 
literature can be divide into three categories: the calculation of the benefits of foreign 
fishing, levels of access fees, and willingness to pay sttidies; long-mn comparative 
advantage and principal-agent analyses; and domestic fishery development. These will be 
briefly described below. 
1.7.1 The calculation of the benefits of foreign fishing, levels of access fees, and 
willingness to pay studies. 
At the onset of EFJ most coastal state govemments were concemed with gaining 
benefits from their newly acquired offshore areas. Foreign fishing gives direct and 
indirect benefits to the coastal state. The direct financial benefits are usually in the form 
of access fees and may be supplemented by fishing development assistance, such as the 
provision of fisheries data, access to markets for fishing products, and technical 
assistance, sometimes caUed technology transfer (Clark, 1983). However the most 
tangible direct benefits are access fees, as other promises may not eventuate (Doulman, 
1987). 
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The indirect benefits from foreign fishing are the financial benefits arising from 
provisioning and bunkering of foreign vessels and the rest and recreation activities of the 
foreign crew. Gates (1983) notes wider benefits from foreign fishing such as regional 
employment and foreign policy aspects of trade in fisheries access. 
Munro (1989) cautions that before a sensible analysis of coastal state and Distant Water 
Fishing Nation (DWFN) economic relations can take place several key questions have to 
be addressed on the objective of management of the resource. While many management 
authorities suggest "the maximisation of benefits from the resource through time" the 
real question is "whose benefits should be maximised?" (Munro, 1989, p4). It is 
suggested that the objective be clarified whether "the benefits to the nation as a whole 
are be maximised" or whether "the benefits of a fishing region or sector of an industry 
are to be maximised" (Munro, 1989, p4). Without answers to these questions there is 
obviously a lack of direction in any subsequent policy analysis. 
In the case of the east coast tuna longline fishery we wUl assume that the objective is the 
maximisation of the flow of national benefits from the fishery via the domestic and 
foreign fisheries. These can be measured in terms of net contributions to Australia's 
national income. 
Prior to EFJ Comitini and Huang (1971) produced an empirical study of the licensing of 
the Japanese tuna fishing industry in the Malaysian region. At the onset of EFJ several 
foreign fishing studies were published: Wilson and Anderson (1977) investigated fee 
management systems for the north west Atlantic; Cmtchfield (1983a and b) used demand 
side analysis to estimate the Japanese willingness to pay for access to Alaskan pollack; 
and Meuriot and Gates (1983) examined foreign fishing allocations and optimal fee levels 
by means of a single and multilevel programming analysis. 
In assessing the benefits of access to tuna fisheries Marten et al. (1982) analysed 
potential fishery goals of altemative tuna fishery arrangements between Indonesia and 
Japan, and Comitini and Hardjolukito (1986) quantitatively examined the economic 
benefits and costs of altemative arrangements for tuna fisheries development in the 
Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone under different institutional arrangements. 
In Australia studies to determine the value of access to the Southem Bluefin Tuna fishery 
and the east coast tuna fishery were undertaken by Geen (1990) and Brown and Dann 
(1991). These studies compared the revenues from access to the AustraUan zone to the 
revenues avaUable in altemative fisheries in a given month. This opportunity cost 
approach is short-mn and assumes the costs of fishing operations are recovered in aU 
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areas. Generally access fee appraisals yield little information for long-mn stock 
management or resource allocation decisions. 
1.7.2 Long-run comparative advantage and principal-agent analyses 
The short-mn and long-mn resource allocation issues for coastal states and foreign 
fishing nations have been extensively investigated by Munro (1984, 1985 and 1989). At 
the outset of EFJ "it seemed obvious that if a coastal state were to capture the fuU 
economic benefits from its EEZ, it should remove DWFN fleets from its 200-mile zone 
with all possible speed and replace their activities with domestic harvesting and 
processing" (Munro, 1989, p5). However long term access arrangements with foreign 
fishing nations may be advantageous to the coastal state (Munro, 1985). 
Munro (1985) used intemational trade theory to suggest the coastal state should use the 
harvesting or processing services of a DWFN, provided the foreigners have a 
comparative advantage in the provision of that service. The terms of the fishing 
agreement wUl thus depend on whether the comparative advantage the DWFN holds is 
short term or long term in namre (Munro, 1985). Where foreign fishing vessels possess 
substantial comparative advantage in harvesting, "fee" fishing by the foreign nation wUl 
eventuate. 
Comparative advantage is generally explained by relative factor proportions between two 
nationalities. In foreign fishing comparative advantage is given by comparing the 
average cost of production and access to capital and technology (Munro, 1986a). It is 
unclear to what extent having access to adjacent tuna stocks influences comparative 
advantage (Mcllgorm, 1989). Should the comparative advantage be held by the coastal 
state the poUcy that would maximise national income would be the phasing out of the 
foreign fishing activity. However poUcy outcomes are often hidden by the subsidisation 
practices of the foreign or coastal state govemment and industry associations. This takes 
the trade analogy a step further to protectionism and the infant industry argument. It is 
often suggested that the infant domestic fleet requkes protection from foreign 
competition, however the preferential access given to the domestic fleet may not 
encourage the efficiency of the infant industry (Munro, 1989). 
1.7.3 Domestic fishery development. 
Domestic fishery development and foreign fishing research has generally sought to 
aUocate access rights where stocks have been fished by both foreign and domestic 
fishers. One of the earlier papers examined optimal allocation between domestic and 
foreign fishers when stocks were fluctuating (Beddington and Clark, 1984). Charles 
(1986) developed an economic optimisation model to evaluate coastal state fishery 
development options. The objective was to determine the amount of capital investment 
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there should be in a domestic fishing fleet and the nature and extent of involvement by 
foreign vessels. Regulation was by a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for the domestic and 
foreign fleet and imposition of royalties on the foreign fleet's harvest. According to 
Charles, depending on the royalty rate, and specific combinations of discount rate and 
capital depreciation, the optimal pattem of fishery development may involve three 
outcomes: exclusion of one of the fleets from the fishery; transitory co-existence as one 
fleet depreciates over time; and the long term coexistence of both fleets. 
Further work by Charles and Yang (1991a and 1991b) focused on strategic questions for 
long range fisheries development. The model developed is bioeconomic, with explicit 
consideration of the fish stock, domestic fleet, harvest and investment rate controls. The 
development nature of the paper allows for multi-objective optimisation balancing direct 
rent received from the resource with indirect benefits of domestic fleet development. 
Charles and Yang conclude that optimal fisheries development policies depend on the 
profitability of the domestic fleet as well as on the extent to which an expUcit value is 
placed on employment and secondary benefits of domestic fleet development. 
Outside the three major categories of papers in the economics of foreign fishing are 
game theoretic approaches to foreign fishing issues (Plourde and Yeung, 1989; 
Campbell, 1988). Specific trans-boundary resource management theory and migratory 
species problems have been addressed by Munro (1979 and 1991) with reference to the 
tropical tuna stocks of the Pacific. 
1.8 The tuna markets. 
The intemational tuna industry is demand driven and the markets and price formation are 
briefly reviewed below. 
1.8.1 Japanese tuna markets. 
Since 1960 Japan has become increasingly dependent on imported fish and fish products, 
being the world's largest edible fish product importer accounting for over 25 percent of 
the total value of world fish imports (Smith and WiUcs, 1988). There are almost 1,000 
fish markets operating in Japan. Narasaki (1986) records three categories of fish market: 
Producing area markets (327) which are collecting points for fish and fish products; 
Consuming area markets (420) which serve the needs of wholesalers, retailers and 
consumers; and Central fish markets (52). Central fish markets are of most importance 
for tuna. 
1.8.2 Sashimi. 
The Japanese tuna market is distinct from other tuna markets in that consumption of high 
quality sashimi, predominates over the canned and other product forms popular in other 
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countries. Sashimi is raw fish which has been fully bled and refrigerated at the time of 
capture to reduce spoilage. The fish carcase is cut into "loins" and then thin slices for 
consumption with soy sauce and horse radish paste (wasabe). The beUy flap in a large 
tuna is the prime cut called "toro", whereas the bright red meat section is referred to as 
"akami" (WiUiams, 1986). Colder water tunas, such as Southern Bluefin can be 25% 
toro by weight and 75% akami, however tropical Yellowfm tuna is nearly always akami, 
and thus commands a poorer price. The need for prime quality sashimi leads to a strong 
market demand for large Bluefin, Bigeye and Yellowfin tuna with a premium being paid 
for species from cold water (Williams, 1986). 
Sashimi consumption increased rapidly in the 1960s with growth in the Japanese 
economy and the associated increase in per capita income (Ikematsu,1984). The 
development of Ultra Low Temperature (ULT) freezing led to large quantities of top 
quality sashimi and to the expansion of sushi bars and tuna sashimi as a popular dish. 
Until the ULT freezing development the sashimi market had been for fresh tuna from 
Japanese waters. The Japanese tuna market has subsequentiy developed into the major 
frozen mna market and the minor fresh and chilled tuna market. 
1.8.3 Market structure. 
Tuna markets in Japan are divided into the fresh/chilled and frozen markets (WUUams, 
1986). The major ports for supply of ULT frozen tuna to the Japanese markets are 
Shimizu, Yaizu and a smaller amount of landings at Misaki, a smaller port adjacent to 
Yaizu. 
In the 1970's tuna trading companies (Maguro Shosha) were formed by the large general 
trading companies (Sogo Shosha) and this made the frozen tuna market more complex 
with many transactions occurring outside the traditional auction market system. The 
practice of purchasing the entire contents of a distant water vessel, "issengai" (whole lot 
purchase), was conceived by vessel owners and trading companies (Uyemae, 1975). 
However WiUiams, (1986) notes that by the mid 1980s the practice of issengai was 
decreasing, constituting only 10% of aU frozen tuna transactions, the bulk loads going 
through the Central Wholesale Markets. It is recognised that the dominance of the 
Maguro Shosha improved the distribution and the availabiUty of sashimi to the consumer 
with band sawn frozen tuna loins being marketed dkectly to supermarkets and 
restaurants (WiUiams, 1989). 
The fresh/chiUed tuna market is smaUer than the frozen tuna market, though prices are 
generaUy higher for the chiUed product which arrives in Japan by air freight (WUUams, 
1986). 
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1.8.4 Demand in the Japanese tuna markets. 
The demand for sashimi has been studied for restaurant and household consumption by 
Taya, (1988). The significant price determinants are the retail price of tuna, the retail 
prices of substitute goods such as beef, Yellowtail (Seriola sp.), Skipjack tuna and the 
level of per capita income (Taya, 1988; Williams, 1989). 
The following features are also known to influence market price for frozen and 
fresh/chilled tuna: the species, whether Bluefin, Bigeye or Yellowfin; the fishing ground; 
the fat content; the colour; and the freshness of the product. Fish merchants are 
interested in proper gilling, gutting, blood draining, prompt freezing, and the 
consignment life history while frozen (WiUiams, 1986). Sumita, (1986) noted the 
demand pattem for sashimi was being influenced by the westemisation of the Japanese 
diet and the move away from seafood to competing products such as chicken and pork. 
Tuna price in the frozen market is also influenced by inventory levels (Sumita, 1986, 
Ashenden and Kitson, 1987 and Owen, 1989). Normal inventory levels of frozen red 
meat sashimi are 25,000 mt, although in 1985 inventories were as high as 40,000 mt to 
50,000 mt. At 50,000 tonnes aU cold storage is fuU and vessels must delay their arrival 
at port or be prepared not to discharge (Sumita, 1986, Narasaki, 1991). 
1.8.5 Sashimi tuna supplies. 
The annual Japanese domestic production of Bluefin, Bigeye and Yellowfin sashimi tunas 
was between 300,000 mt and 370,000 mt per annum in the 1980-89 period (Narasaki, 
1991). Approximately 80% of this was via deep sea longliners (Sumita, 1986). Between 
1985 and 1990 the imports of frozen sashimi tuna went up from 119,000 mt to 190,000 
mt and fresh chilled tuna imports by airfreight increased from 19,000 mt to 41,500 mt, a 
260% increase (Narasaki, 1991). Fresh and frozen YeUowfin tuna registered the highest 
increase in imports with a marked effect on prices (Narasaki, 1991). 
Taiwan and the PhUippines have been the largest suppliers of fresh/chilled YeUowfin and 
Bigeye, their products competing with the Australian domestic fishing industry tuna 
exports. The AustraUan contribution to the fresh/chiUed tuna market has grown from 79 
tonnes in 1984 to approximately 300-350 tonnes in 1990, which is only between one and 
two per cent of the market. On average the Australian YeUowfin tuna price is higher 
than the tropical competitors, but less than the prices received by United States' 
YeUowfin (Fortuna Daito, 1992). The fresh /chUled market rewards quality and 
fresh/chiUed Yellowfin and Bigeye tuna can obtain very high prices on occasions 
(WiUiams, 1986). 
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1.8.6 Market imperfections. 
The Japanese tuna markets have been suspected of having various market imperfections 
and restrictive practices (Dcematsu, 1984; WUUams, 1986; Anon., 1993). WUUams 
(1986) notes that four companies trading at three major ports account for two thirds of 
the trade in frozen tuna. Uncertainty and delays in the arrival of product and the cost of 
transport/transhipment can make buyers play safe and quote lower prices (Uyemae, 
1975). However it is recognised that the market recognises quality and will pay top 
prices for premium product, although this is not always predictable (Sumita, 1986; 
WUUams, 1986). 
Marketing practices, such as issengai, have led to a belief that trading companies can 
manipulate prices and that "the trading companies are making the profit, not the 
producers" (Uyemae, 1975, p6). Japanese policy suggests that all tuna auction 
transactions take place in the market place, but Maguro Sosha often negotiate with 
frozen tuna longliners before they arrive in port buying all the catch and thus by-pass the 
traditional marketing stmctures. A ship's master contacts discharging ports with details 
of species, size, places of catch, date of catch and then negotiates with potential 
purchasers (Baron, 1990). The fishermen may select bulk purchase (issengai) for the 
best price and for cash flow reasons rather than the sale of individual carcases (Uyemae, 
1975). The issengai practice is probably indicative of an oligopsony market, a common 
feature in fish markets (Lawson, 1984). 
The precarious nature of sashimi marketing may be a factor contributing to poor industry 
performance. Sumita (1986) recommended the establishment of mechanisms to regulate 
supply and keep inventories under control. The Japanese industry fear large quantities of 
low grade red ttina meat from other tuna producing nations in the region, flooding the 
Japanese market. 
In the chilled tuna market major fishing companies own the companies which operate in 
major consumption wholesale markets. When AustraUan chilled ttina are sent to Japan 
many fish do not receive a good price when expected to do so. The reasons, other than 
quality factors, for high and low prices are probably related to agency arrangements and 
market practices. High prices may be related to shortages of premium chiUed ttina on a 
day when several buyers have comnutments to fUl (Fortuna-Daito Fishing Co., pers. 
comm.). Hucttiations in prices, the difficulty in predicting prices, and dismformation 
make many Australian producers suspicious of trading in the Japanese chilled ttina 
market (WiUiams, 1989). 
The key concept pervading Japanese ttina marketing policy has been the need for 
"orderly marketing" in the face of over supply from Japan's regional foreign fishing 
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competitors. Govemment subsidisation policies and market practices probably lead to a 
more stable, but imperfect market. 
1.8.7 Australian tuna markets. 
The domestic Australian tuna catch is either exported or sold domestically. Export 
houses pack and act as agents for fishermen who want to export their Yellowfin mna 
(Goh and Skousen, 1989). "Total weights of fish are declared in the export permits, but 
individual weight are found in the packing slips or manifest which accompany the 
shipment. After overseas sales the packing slips are retumed by facsimile with additions 
of prices and re-weighing of fish" (Goh and Skousen, 1989, pl5). Comments are often 
written on such sheets indicating reason for the prices obtained in Japan. 
The main domestic markets for tuna are in Sydney and Melboume. From all over New 
South Wales (NSW) tuna are sold at the NSW Fish Marketing Authority (NSWFMA) in 
Sydney. Most tuna arrive either from the north or south coast by road transport, the 
cost depending on how far from Sydney the fisher resides. At the fish market the poorer 
quality YeUowfin, that have not been prepared for sashimi, are sold either as gutted fish 
or as head-on achieving lower prices than sashimi. The Melboume market is an 
altemative domestic market though comparatively little longUned tuna is sent there as 
exporting or the Sydney market is preferred by most operators (Goh and Skousen, 
1989). 
1.9 Background to the research. 
Since the seminal work of Gordon (1954), there have been numerous empUical fishery 
economic studies of single species fisheries (Bell, 1972; Carlson, 1973; Flagg, 1977; 
Henderson and Tugwell, 1979; Strand, Kirkley and McConnell, 1981; Cmtchfield, 
1983a; CampbeU and Hall, 1988; Bjomdal, 1989 and 1991; Campbell, 1991). However 
empuical investigations of the economics of multispecies fisheries management are less 
common (AgneUo and Anderson, 1981; Hannesson, Hanson and Dale, 1981; Flaaten, 
1986; and Kirkley, 1986). These studies have required the use of several different 
approaches, such as primal or dual production functions, to address the more complex 
nature of multispecies fisheries. 
In Australia there have been no attempts to use dual production theory to analyse 
management policy for any mutiispecies fisheries and the approaches taken to the 
analysis of foreign fishing have concentrated on valuation (Geen, 1990; Brown and 
Dann, 1991). This study wishes to address these inadequacies in empirical fisheries 
economic analysis and uses the multispecies east Australian tuna longline fishery as a 
case study. 
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The aim of the study is to take existing economic theory in production and bio-economic 
theory and apply it to the east Australian tuna longline fishery. This wUl address current 
deficiencies in knowledge and will be of benefit to the managers of the fishery. The 
approach will involve the estimation of multispecies production technology, at the vessel 
level, for several different classes of vessel. The differences in vessel technology 
between Japanese and Australian vessels will also be examined. 
The presence of the East Australian Current means that spatial considerations between 
northem and southem areas of the east coast and with distance from shore will be 
important. Spatial considerations have not previously been investigated in empirical 
multispecies fishery economic studies in the literattire. This study addresses this 
deficiency and uses the modelling results to analyse foreign fishing. The modelling wUl 
assist the management agencies charged with allocating access to the resource and 
regulating the catch of different species. 
The involvement of the Japanese vessels also give an opportunity to provide an analysis 
of foreign fishing in a detail not available elsewhere in the fishery econonucs literattire. 
This is the first application of dual estimation techniques to the foreign fishing problem 
and it should be useful to other researchers within Australia and in the intemational 
fishery economic community. 
In summary the research aims to be an empuical estimation which wUl use existing 
economic theory in several areas of economics to address the fisheries management 
issues faced in managing the east Australian tuna longUne fishery. The objective is to 
determine the significant economic features of the production of the vessels and the bio-
economic characteristics of the fishery. Foreign fishing activity in the area wUl be 
analysed and regulatory regimes will be recommended for management. 
This is an ambitious smdy which calls on several methods and approaches to address the 
diverse features of the fishery. However, it also illustrates the arsenal of tools required 
by the empirical fishery economic researcher in proposing policy solutions to complex 
multispecies fishery problems. This is undoubtedly a contribution to this area of applied 
fishery economics. 
1.10 Conclusions. 
The east coast tuna longline fishery is an established fishery for the Japanese distant 
water ttina longline fleet, and a developing fishery for smaU domestic Australian tuna 
longliners. The Japanese longUne fleet went through a period of great change, poor 
profitability and restmcturing in the early 1980s. In contrast the AustraUan fishery in the 
mid 1980s was expanding to supply the Japanese fresh sashimi tuna market. 
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This is the first economic analysis of the vessel technology and management of tuna and 
billfish in the east Australian area. Little is known of the production characteristics of 
either of the fleets. This study wUl address this lack of knowledge and examine the 
costs, production and profitability of vessels in each fleet, and will compare the efficiency 
of vessels in order to assist the future allocation of access in the east Australian area. 
The introductory Chapter has shown that any analysis must come to terms with the 
complexities of the east Australian fishery where little is known about the tuna stocks, 
and the distribution of the species which is influenced by oceanographic features such as 
the East Australian Current. The lack of expUcit stock information means that 
altemative approaches to fisheries economic analysis must be used to develop policy. 
The future management of the fishery has not previously been analysed in an economics 
of foreign fishing framework, and the development of the fishery must reconcile 
domestic fishery development and foreign fishing access (Mcllgorm, 1990). SimUarly 
the results from the in-depth analysis of vessel technology in Chapter 3 have implications 
for the management of vessels and stocks. Fisheries management policy is addressed in 
the fmal Chapter of the thesis. The study is an empuical examination of the multispecies 
production technology and the economics of the tuna longline fishery aimed at 
contributing to the development of management policies. The next Chapter reviews the 
economics of production literature to find a suitable method to estimate the production 
technology in the east Australian area. 
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Chapter 2: Production Theory. 
This Chapter reviews and discusses the theory of production in order to establish a 
method to estimate the technology of tuna fisheries production in the east Australian 
region. The Chapter reviews econonuc production functions, their use in fisheries 
economics, and the literature on estimation of multiproduct fisheries. The Chapter ends 
by recommending a dual approach to the estimation of multispecies fisheries production 
in the east Australian area. In the following Chapter the production theory is used to 
estimate the relationship between effort and the harvest of various species. This wUl 
enable the technology and cost of catching ttina to be established. 
2.1 The production function. 
2.1.1 General introduction. 
Production processes take inputs and convert them to outputs by means of technology. 
A production function is used to represent the technology in a given fum relating output 
to inputs. For the single product multiple input firm this can be represented as: 
Output = f (Inputs ) 
The economics of production concentrates on aspects of production such as distribution, 
where the income shares of factors of production are estimated, scale in production, and 
retums to scale. The use of factors of production and their substitutability is also a 
major area of concem, as is the separability or decomposition of production relationships 
into additive or nested forms. Studies of technical change are often pursued, particularly 
the modification of technical stmcture over time, technological flexibUity, efficiency of 
operation, homotheticity and consistent aggregation (Fuss, McFadden and Mundlak, 
1979). 
These aspects of production have led to the development of the microecononuc theory of 
production in which new or modified production functions have been developed and 
various functional forms have been used to estimate production relationships. 
Production functions and their forms used in general and in fisheries economics in 
particular wUl briefly be reviewed, with the aUn of selecting a production function and 
form for estimation in Chapter 3. 
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2.1.2 Production functions. 
2.1.2.1 Production functions in general economics. 
In the development of production functions there have been two main approaches, direct 
(primal) and indirect (dual). The primal approach estimates the technological 
relationship in the production process directiy, measuring inputs and output in physical 
quantities. Dual forms may incorporate output prices and the costs of factors of 
production and estimate a technical relationship between outputs and inputs indirectly by 
using assumptions such as cost minimisation or profit maximisation. Direct and indirect 
functions are illustrated below. 
i) The direct or Primal production function. 
y = f(x) (2.1a) 
Where y is the output vector, x is the input vector. 
ii) Indirect or Dual functions. 
a) The cost function 
c(w,y) = min { w-x: XG V(y)} (2.1b) 
x>0 
where w is the input cost vector, y is the output vector, x is the input quantity vector and 
V(y) is the input requirement set. 
b) The revenue function 
R(p,x) = max { py : y e Y(x),p>0} (2.1c) 
Where p is the output price vector and Y(x) the producible output set (Chambers, 1988). 
c) The profit function. 
n (p,w) = max {p f (x)- w-x} 
x>0 
=max{py-c(w,y) } 
(2. Id) 
y>0 
where aU symbols are as in other equations and n is profit. The properties of cost, 
revenue and profit functions can be seen in Diewert (1974), Varian (1978), and Fuss, 
McFadden and Mundlak, (1979). 
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Duality is part of microeconomic production theory and focuses on cost, revenue and 
profit functions. In principle a cost function is a dual to a production function. Direct 
estimation of production requires full information on input and output quantities whereas 
dual approaches enable production processes to be estimated using price and output 
data. In contrast, direct estimation of a production function does not permit input or 
output prices to have a role unless the production function is estimated as part of a 
system of equations including first order extremum conditions. 
The dual function is based on input prices and h^s the added advantage of avoiding a 
potential simultaneity bias in estimation, as prices are usually exogenous to the individual 
decision maker, whereas quantities are not (Bjomdal, 1985a; Dupont, 1988). The use of 
dual functions also allows the formation of demand and supply equations whereas this is 
not so readily achieved in the primal case. 
Douglas and Cobb (1928) pioneered estimation of direct production functions with their 
rather restrictive functional form. The restrictive properties of many functional forms led 
to the development of "flexible functional forms" (Diewert, 1973, 1974, 1982). These 
can now be used by researchers to estimate either direct or dual functions, overcoming 
the restrictions that were imposed on technology by previous forms. 
2.1.2.2 Production functions in fisheries economics. 
The production of fish has been viewed by Schaefer (1957) as the product of two 
production functions. The biological production is time related and determined by 
nature, although it is influenced by harvesting pattems. The economic production 
function describes the relationship between the harvest from the fish stock and fishing 
effort. 
The Schaefer (1957) production function is shown below: 
h = A E X (2.2) 
where harvest (h) is linear in effort (E) and stock size (X). The constant. A, is often 
referred to as the catchability coefficient. This was the production function used in the 
seminal work of Gordon (1954) and Scott (1955). The Schaefer production fiinction is 
highly restrictive, and is a special case of the Cobb-Douglas form: 
h=AE"X<5 a=6=l (2.3) 
This direct production function has been used in many empuical sttidies such as BeU 
(1972), Henderson and Tugwell (1979), and CampbeU and Hall (1988). 
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A general form of the production function is : 
h = F(y,X) (2.4) 
where y is a vector of inputs such as capital, labour, and other variable inputs 
(Campbell, 1991). In estimating this form Campbell notes the difficulties in obtaining 
estimates of the size of the fish stock. If a proxy for stock, such as catch per unit effort, 
is used in time series analysis this can create econometric problems (Uhler, 1979). 
When using cross section data Campbell notes that it is usually assumed that all vessels 
fish the same stock and thus the stock becomes part of the constant term in the 
regression equation. This implies that the production function is separable and of the 
form: 
h = F(g(y),X) (2.5) 
Hannesson, (1983a) in his study of the Lofoten cod fishery was unable to reject the 
hypothesis of separability. 
More generalized production functions have been proposed by Huang and Lee (1976) 
and Morey (1986). Huang and Lee (1976) and Campbell (1991) model substitution 
between capital and labour, and also cater for crowding and stock extemalities in 
production. 
Altemative approaches have applied cost, revenue and profit functions to empirical 
production studies (Squkes, 1984, 1987a, 1987b, 1987c). Squires (1984 and 1987a) 
used a restricted profit function model to examine the harvest technology of the New 
England otter trawl fishery. Dupont, (1988) used a restricted profit function to measure 
rent dissipation in the British Columbia Salmon fishery. 
Kirkley (1986) and Kirkley and Strand (1988) examined the output-maxinusing choices 
made by fishermen in the New England, Georges Bank fishery using a revenue function. 
The Kirkley and Strand paper discusses a cross sectional study based on output prices 
and a composite index of inputs. Asymmetric separability was assumed so that inputs 
are separable from outputs, though not the reverse. This study assumed fish stock to be 
constant and outputs were constmcted as linear aggregates. Squires and Kirkley (1991) 
used a revenue function in the examination of production quota regulation of a 
multiproduct fishery. 
2.1.3 Functional forms. 
For each production function there are different functional forms that may be used for 
estimation depending on the data available and the purpose of the study. Functional 
forms used in general and in fisheries economics are now reviewed. 
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2.1.3.1 Functional forms in general economics. 
There are many approaches that can be taken to the empirical estimation of production in 
an industry. Fuss, McFadden and Mundlak (1979) review functional forms commonly 
used in the economic analysis of production. The choice of functional form depends on 
the objectives of the study and the data available and several other considerations. 
Parsimony in parameters requires only essential parameters necessary for consistency 
with the maintained hypothesis to be included in the functional form. Excess parameters 
can cause problems such as multicolUnearity and do not lead to ease of interpretation, 
another desired feamre. Despite the increased computing capacity available to 
researchers, computational ease is still desirable. Linear in parameter forms are often 
preferred to non-linear estimation for this reason. The form chosen should also have 
intemal and extemal robustness. Interpolative robustness suggests the form should be 
well behaved, displaying consistency with maintained hypotheses such as convexity. The 
form should also readily allow the checking of regularity conditions. Extrapolative 
robustness is required for forecasting applications outside the region of the maintained 
hypothesis (Fuss et al., 1979). Three commonly used functional forms are shown below. 
These are the frontier production functions and do not incorporate the stochastic 
component. For estimation one should incorporate the random error term, usually 
denoted Ej which is assumed to be normal, with zero mean and constant variance. 
i) Cobb-Douglas (CD) 
n 
In y = In A + X aj In xj 
i=l 
where y is output, x is input and A is a constant. 
ii) Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) 
Arrow et al. (1961) developed the CES form of the Cobb-Douglas production form to 
address issues in factor substitution: 
n 
yP = ao + I ai xPj where ao= 0 
i=l " 
where p is the elasticity of substittition. The CES production function is an extended 
version of the Cobb-Douglas production fiinction and allows the elasticity of 
substitution, p, to be a value other than unity. 
Ui) Translog 
The ttanslog form was developed by Christensen, Jorgensen and Lau, (1973): 
n I n n 
In y = ao + Z ai In xj + — I I bii In x; In xi 
i=l 2 i=l j=l ^ ^ 
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n n 
Where bij=bji, I, a[ =1 Z bjj = 0 for i =l...n. 
i=l i=l 
For this form if aj > 0 for all &[, X a p l , and bij=0 for all i and j , then the translog 
collapses to the Cobb-Douglas function. 
If ao =1 and X aj =1, then the translog form becomes a Unear approximation to the CES 
form (Fuss et al., 1979). This can be seen by considering the CES formula and a first-
order Taylor expansion around p =0: 
n P n n 
In y = X aj In xj + — [ X aj (In x^  )2 -( X aj In Xj )2 ] 
i=l 2 i=l j=l 
This provides a linear-in-parameters translog form with second order terms: 
P P 
a n = — ^i (1" ^i) ^^^ ^ij = — ^i ^ j ' ^ '^  J ^^  ^ =1 ^^^ X aj =1. 
The linear expansion of the CES form was first suggested by Kmenta, (1967). The 
translog allows the elasticity of substitution to vary with the level of output and/or input 
proportions. 
Other forms of production function include the Generalized Leontief (Diewert, 1973), 
the quadratic (Cowing, 1978), and the normalised quadratic (Diewert and Ostensoe, 
1987; Diewert and Wales, 1988). Transcendental forms are also used (Halter, Carter 
and Hocking, 1957), but these are non-linear in parameters. The preceding forms are all 
linear approximations which facilitates their estimation (Varian, 1978; Fuss et al., 
1979). 
2.1.3.2 Functional forms in fisheries economics. 
Within fisheries economics studies the Cobb-Douglas form of production has been used 
to estimate fisheries production technology (BeU, 1972; AgneUo and Anderson, 1981; 
Hannesson, 1983a). However CES forms have also been applied to fisheries production 
problems. 
Comitini and Huang (1967) used Cobb-Douglas and CES forms, for the term g(y) in 
equation (2.4), addressing the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital inputs 
in the North Pacific Halibut Fishery. Campbell (1991) estimated versions of a ttanslog 
function and compared it with CES and Cobb-Douglas functional forms for the 
Tasmanian crayfish fishery. This illustrates the ability of functional forms to collapse to 
simpler forms under certain conditions, as seen above. 
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Kirkley (1986) specified a single fixed input model and estimated a multi-output 
Generalized Leontief form of a revenue function for the New England Georges Bank 
trawl fishery. Similarly Squires (1984 and 1987a), specified a translog restricted profit 
function with three inputs, three outputs and a dummy variable for technology, to 
examine the harvest technology of the New England otter ttawl fishery. Bjomdal (1989) 
estimated a ttanslog and Cobb-Douglas form of the effort production function for the 
North Sea herring fishery. Strand, Kkkley and McConneU (1981) used transcendental 
and Cobb-Douglas forms to examine Atiantic surf clam landings. They used hours fished 
and vessel gear to investigate substitution between these two inputs. 
In order to find a functional form appropriate for this study the fisheries production 
literature has been reviewed and possible functional forms examined. The choice of 
functional form will be influenced by the data available to the study as well as the 
principles for selection listed in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.3.1. 
2.2 The fisheries production function. 
2.2.1 The fisheries production function. 
In the review of the fisheries production theory we saw that the most elementary 
production function is the Schaefer (1957) form described by equation (2.2). The 
Schaefer function is a particular form of the Cobb-Douglas functional form: 
h=AE"x6 a=6=l (2.3) 
In this study we wish to determine the effectiveness of effort in catching tuna. In the 
Schaefer form effort (E) is a term used for an aggregate of inputs whereas stock (X), is 
another input which is important in the estimation of production. There are two cases 
that illustrate the importance of stock in production analysis: 
If the coefficient on a = 1 then if: 
h 
6=1 equation (2.3) becomes — = A X (2 3a) 
E 
but if 
h 
6=0 equation (2.3) becomes — = A (2 3b) 
E 
In equation 2.3a the left hand side represents catch per unit effort which is a constant 
proportion of the stock size. This form is consistent with the assumption that the volume 
of space the stock occupies is held fixed and as harvesting takes place the density of the 
fish stock goes down. Thus a decreasing catch per unit effort with increasing effort 
would be indicative of a reduced stcx^ k size. 
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In the altemative case equation 2.3b the catch per unit effort during exploitation would 
be constant and not indicative of decreasing stock size. This may reflect schooling 
behaviour when during exploitation the stock reduces in volume keeping fish stock 
density, and thus catch rate, constant. This is often referred to as the case of the pure 
schooling fishery (UUtang, 1976; Bjomdal, 1985a and 1985b) in which catch per unit 
effort is constant and independent of the stock size. 
2.2.2 Externalities. 
The effort coefficient a, (equation 2.3a) can also vary from a value of 1. Variation of 
the term is not indicative of scale economies, since it captures the effect of changes in 
effort with stock held constant, but rather of crowding and information extemalities. In 
equation 2.3a if a<l this indicates diminishing retums to effort and may be due to the 
existence of crowding extemalities (Hannesson, 1983a). Altematively when a>l this is 
indicative of more than proportional retums to increases in effort usually due to 
information extemalities such as sharing the location of fish aggregations in a search 
fishery. It is difficuU to determine the existence of crowding or information extemalities 
empirically due to the poor quality of information on absolute and local abundance of 
stock to the vessels in question. 
2.3 Multiproduct production. 
The previous sections discussed single product production models for the fishery. 
However since the east coast tuna longline fishery is multispecies, a multiproduct 
production approach will be necessary. 
2.3.1 Multiproduct production. 
The multiproduct production problem is usually presented as an extension of single 
product models in the standard economics of production literature (Varian, 1978; Beattie 
and Taylor, 1985). The standard approach views multiproduct production as the 
production of several single products, but with the products linked through resource 
constraints, non-allocatable factors of production or through jointness in production. 
The issues in multiproduct production wiU be reviewed from a fisheries perspective and 
the pertinent production issues will be addressed in section 2.3.2.2. 
2.3.2 Multispecies production. 
In the fisheries economics literature the term multispecies production denotes the fact 
that one input, effort, produces more than one fish species. Multispecies models are 
briefly reviewed and critically appraised in the light of more recent literature. 
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2.3.2.1 Multispecies models. 
Multispecies bioeconomic models have been developed within the literature and have 
usually been an extension of the single species production model, due to the complexity 
of other approaches (Mcllgorm, 1987). Often the emphasis has been on technical 
interaction, such as by-catch of species and ecological interdependencies in a biological 
framework, rather than on the economic aspects of multispecies production (May et al., 
1979). Predator-prey relationships, inter-specific competition and bio-technical 
productivity have been examined in a multispecies bioeconomic framework by Anderson 
(1975a and 1977), Hannesson (1983b), Munro and Scott (1985), and Clark (1985 and 
1991). Flaaten (1986) produced a comprehensive empirical multispecies model for seals, 
cod and capelin in the Barents Sea. The study used direct production estimation with a 
production possibiUty frontier approach and incorporated a hierarchical ecological 
predator prey relationship among the three species. A simUar approach was used by 
Hannesson et al. (1987). 
However despite the observation by ButUn (1974, p62) that "the theory of joint 
production is the obvious approach" it was not until the 1980s that empirical estimation 
of jointiy produced fish species was attempted. AgneUo and Anderson (1981) estimated 
production for five major commercial species in the north-west Atlantic using a direct 
multispecies production approach. This sought to determine fish targeted as opposed to 
incidentally caught species. 
Kirkley (1982 and 1986) and Squires (1984) reviewed bioeconomic multispecies 
production problems and used dual techniques for production function estimation. 
Kirkley (1986) reviewed theoretical and data requirements for estimation of a revenue 
function in the New England, St. George's Bank demersal fishery. The approach was 
consolidated by Kkkley and Strand (1988). Squires (1984) reviewed dual theory and 
estimated a profit function for the New England otter trawl fishery. 
From these studies the issues of separability and jointness were noted as being important 
in the estimation of multiproduct production. Squires (1984) notes two general 
approaches to multispecies production models, the aggregated and disaggregated 
methods. 
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In the aggregated method the price and quantity of fish species are used to generate an 
index of harvest in the fishery (Kirkley, 1982; Carison, 1973). Squires (1984 and 1988) 
notes that sknply adding together quantities or prices into weighted aggregates does not 
fuUU the conditions for proper aggregation. Squires (1988) recommends the use of the 
economic theory of index numbers and illustrates how index numbers can be used for 
situations where industry inputs or outputs are simply too complex to deal with by 
weighting or counting. Should indexing for aggregation not be used. Squires (1984 and 
1988) claims the conditions under which a revenue function can provide information on 
the multispecies production technology have not been met. Squires (1984, pi7) states 
that "aggregate or composite output and input indices are usually specified in order to 
incorporate population dynamics and allow analytical solutions to models. However, 
attention is not usually given to conditions of input and output separability and 
aggregation, or the proper formation of price or quantity indices." 
Squires (1988) addresses these issues and suggests the proper formation of indices in a 
multispecies context requires an index that wUl account for inter-temporal changes in the 
relative composition of the species mix in the fishery. As relative output prices change, it 
is reasonable to suppose that the individual producer wiU alter his production behaviour 
in response. An index number that does not accommodate such changes becomes 
increasingly biased over time as the errors in approximation increase. Squires (1988) 
indicates that Laspeyres and Paasche indices have traditionally been used, but that the 
Tomquist and Fisher ideal are now more accepted. This concurs with accepted practice 
for index numbers in general production economics (Diewert, 1976 and 1989). 
The second approach used in multispecies production studies disaggregates the 
composite product index and a priori specifies production that is nonjoint-in-inputs. 
Joint-in-inputs harvesting technology requires aU inputs to harvest aU outputs. Nonjoint-
in-inputs, (output independence) means that a separate production function should be 
specified for each species, or block of species (block independence, see Squires, 1987a). 
Where separate production processes have been specified for each species, Squires 
(1984) notes this is usually adopted without testing. Squires (1987b) wams of the 
consequences of the adoption of the nonjoint-in-inputs assumption if untme: "It is likely 
they wUl provide poUcy makers with misrepresentative optimum levels of total catch, 
effort or resource availability and probably invalidate the effectiveness of public 
legislation based on the results of the model" (Squires, 1987b, p269). 
2.3.2.2 Multiproduct production issues. 
In multiproduct fisheries production nonjointness-in-inputs and separability of production 
are two central production issues. 
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Nonjoint-in-inputs production. 
When a production process is joint-in-inputs it requires all inputs to produce all outputs. 
If production is nonjoint-in-inputs there exists a separate function for each output (Kohli, 
1983; Squires and Kirkley, 1991). Nonjointness-in-inputs implies that decisions about 
production of one product are independent of decisions about other products (Shumway, 
1983). Thus when production is nonjoint there are no technological or cost saving ttade 
offs between the output of one product and that of another. 
The concepts of joinmess and nonjointness are illustrated in Figure 2.1 for two outputs 
(species) Yj and Y2. In Figure 2.1 the production possibilities frontier (A) represents 
possible combinations of jointly produced products. Using a given amount of effort the 
producer can produce at a variety of points on A, such as a or 6. At point a, the 
quantity of species Y^ is greater than Y2, whereas at point 6, Y2 exceeds Y .^ 
The frontier (B) represents the case where Y^ and Y2 are jointiy produced, but are 
perfect substitutes. The curve, A is concave compared to the sttaight line B. The gap 
between A and B is a measure of the cost of not being perfectiy substittitable. This is 
often referred to as the law of increasing costs, where a greater production of Y^ on 
curve A has a higher opportunity cost than the previously produced unit of Y .^ The rate 
of change of the curve A is the Marginal Rate of Transformation (MRT) of Y^ for Y2. 
In line B the MRT is constant where as in A the MRT changes along the concave line. 
The frontier C in Figure 2.1 shows the products being nonjointiy produced and there are 
no technological trade offs between Y^ and Y2 which are produced in fixed proportions. 
Input-output separability. 
Separability between inputs and multiple outputs impUes no specific interaction between 
any one output and any one input (Laitinen, 1980). Thus the margmal rates of 
transformation of aU output pairs are independent of factor intensities (Hall, 1973). If 
separable the technology can then be specified in terms of a single composite output as 
well as a single composite input. In Figure 2.2a the case of separability with additional 
input level is shown. Figure 2.2b shows the case where output is not separable with 
increasing input. Figure 2.2c illustrates the concept of homothetic output separabiUty. 
The Product Possibility Frontiers (PPFs) are parallel, but not equally spaced. 
Homotheticity means the marginal rates of transformation are the same on each PPF 
when a ray is drawn from the origin. In Figure 2.2d the concept of linearly 
homogeneous output separability is illustrated. PPFs are equally spaced and parallel. 
Separability between inputs and outputs UnpUes that biomass management, the 
management of "fish", rather than individual species is possible (Kirkley and Strand, 
1988). 
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0 
Y2 
Figure 2.1: Jointness in production where line (A is jointiy produced, (B) is jointiy 
produced with perfect substitution and (C) is nonjointiy produced. 
0 
Y2 
Figure 2.2 a: Product transformation frontiers with weak output separability. 
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0 
Y2 
Figure 2.2b: If production is not output separable product transformation frontiers cross 
with increasing input. 
Ray from Origin 
0 
Y2 
Figure 2.2 c: Homothetic output separability. All Product Production Frontiers (PPF's) 
are parallel but are not equally spaced. The Marginal Rate of Transformation (MRT) on 
all PPFs are equal thus homothetic. 
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Yi 
Ray from Origin 
MRT 
0 
Y2 
Figure 2.2 d: Linear homogeneous output separability. 
Frontiers are parallel and are equally spaced. 
AU Product Production 
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2.3.3 Selection of a model. 
The longline tuna fishery is multispecies with catches of Yellowfin, Albacore, Bigeye, 
and Billfishes, (Black, Blue and Striped Marlin and Swordfish). A model is to be 
selected that wUl be used to estimate multispecies production technology in the longline 
fishery. 
2.3.3.1 Alternatives 
From the review of available production functions a dual production function is an 
altemative to the direct fisheries production function. Dual functions are more desirable 
due to their less restrictive assumptions and potential for evaluating supply and demand 
relationships. The revenue function can be differentiated to obtain supply equations and 
simUarly a dual cost function, or profit function, can be differentiated to reveal demand 
functions (Chambers, 1988). A flexible functional form is more desirable, but often 
comes at the cost of having greater data requirements. These models often have more 
parameters and hence more observations are needed for estimation to obtain a desirable 
number of degrees of freedom (Dupont, 1988 ). 
Bjomdal (1985a) examined the possibiUty of using a normalized profit function (Lau, 
1978a) in the estimation of production in the North Sea Herring fishery. Eventtially a 
Cobb-Douglas function was used due to lack of available data. Dupont (1988) noted the 
data requirements of output supply and input demand behaviour are substantial. "AU 
unit prices of aU variable inputs and outputs, and their associated quantities must be 
available ... for enough micro units, so as to permit a sufficient number of degrees of 
freedom." (Dupont, 1988, p67). 
Where profit ftmctions have been used in fisheries, authors have had access to 
comprehensive cost data sets. Squires (1987c) had a considerable amount of confidential 
cost data from the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) weighout file and rettims 
from Federal income tax rettims. This enabled a profit function to be estimated. 
The data available to the present study are from a fisheries management database of 
catch and effort statistics. There are daUy observations of effort and catch, of all species 
of tuna and bUlfishes, for each vessel in the fishery. For the Japanese fleet in the AFZ 
this would enable a cross sectional analysis of production to be performed on the six 
years data (1984-1989), providing a total of approximately 12,700 daUy observations. 
Harvest and effort are well documented, but there are no observations on stock. This 
makes direct methods of estimation more difficult as stock is an essential input to die 
production process. 
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2.3.3.2 Stock. 
The traditional approaches to fishery economic modelling have included stock as an 
integral part of the production function. In the present study we do not have direct 
observations on stock size but may have several altematives. 
Many fisheries studies have used catch per unit effort as a proxy measure for stock. This 
is based on equation 2.2 where h/AE can be used as a proxy for stock. However, as 
pointed out earlier, when catch per unit effort is regressed against effort econometric 
problems are encountered (Uhler, 1979). According to Uhler, classical errors in variable 
problems result, with simultaneity bias and asymptotically biased error parameters. 
Indirect measures or proxies for stock size may be used (Bjomdal, 1991). In Bjomdal's 
study an index of upwelling was used as a proxy for stock with limited success. Another 
solution is to utilise the data in annual cross section, thus assuming the stock size is 
constant. A panel of data and the use of annual dummy variables would be equivalent to 
allowing for variation in stock size in each year of the data set. However, for both these 
methods the migratory nature of the species being considered may still cause problems as 
each boat is unUkely to be fishmg the same proportion of the stock. The treatment of 
stock, generally an unobserved variable, is a problem in most empuical fisheries 
production studies. 
2.3.3.3 Joint fisheries production. 
In the fisheries literature joint production is often referred to as targeting of species, with 
primal methods being used to relate catches to effort and technical production 
characteristics, such as size of gear or bait type. This technical evidence for targeting in 
tuna fisheries was reviewed in section 1.4.3. 
The economic approach to joint production views catch as being determined not only by 
the primal technology, but in response to output prices. Output prices are usually 
exogenous to the fish producer. Establishing jointness in production requires a dual 
approach to estimation and tests similar to those used in Kirkley (1986), Kirkley and 
Strand (1988), and Squires and Kirkley (1991). Should the fishery show output 
independence, with species being nonjointiy produced, then the production of each 
species can be estimated separately. If there is evidence of significant jointness in 
production then single species estimation wUl be inappropriate as the price of the joint 
species will be omitted from the analysis. 
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2.3.3.4 Deciding on the most appropriate model. 
In this study we wish to assess the basic production relationship in the fishery, the 
production of tuna from fishing effort. The literature on multispecies production 
problems has shown that a dual approach to estimation can incorporate important 
behavioural relationships such as cost minimisation, and revenue or profit maximisation. 
The absence of input prices precludes the estimation of a cost or profit function. The 
cost data on input prices for individual Australian vessels is limited to the cost survey in 
this smdy, which had only 21 respondents in the year surveyed. The cost data for 
Japanese vessels are averages for the fleet, rather than for individual vessels. Unlike the 
Squires (1987c) sttidy, there is no data base of factor input prices for the fishing activity 
on the Australian east coast. 
A revenue function was chosen for estimation since output, input and fish price data 
were available. The revenue function is applicable to fish producer behaviour as in the 
short-mn inputs are fixed and the individual producer will maximise profits by 
maxunising revenue. The revenue function approach can easily incorporate multiple 
species, and gives supply equations and yields own price, cross price, and product 
specific scale elasticities for each of the species (Kirkley, 1986). 
The price data available are monthly average price for each species at the port of Yaizu 
in Japan for the years 1984-1989. If used in an annual cross sectional analysis they 
would provide only twelve observations, which would not give enough degrees of 
freedom for estimation of a flexible functional form. The six years of input, output and 
price data available wiU be used as a longitudinal data set to estimate the revenue 
function for the 1984-89 period, incorporating annual differences in production due to 
changes in fish stocks and the environment by the use of shift parameters. 
The multispecies Japanese fishery is suited to estimation by a revenue function whereas 
the domestic fishery is almost a single species fishery concentrating on Yellowfin tuna. 
The domestic production wUl be estimated by both dual and primal methods, as the dual 
approach enables domestic and Japanese fishing production to be compared. The direct 
estimation of the domestic fishery wUl supplement the information from the dual analysis 
and uses the more comprehensive catch and effort data avaUable for the domestic fishery 
to give a detailed analysis of domestic YeUowfin tuna production. The direct estimation 
should confirm the results from the dual estimations and help to maximise the 
information obtained for management from the data available to the study. 
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The use of a revenue function requires a more detailed review of the requirements and 
conditions for the use of a revenue function. The requirements are identified and the 
regularity tests used to test the conditions are described in the next section. 
2.3.4 Requirements and conditions for use of a revenue function. 
In the single product competitive frnn, maximising revenue for a given output price 
amounts to maximising output. In the multiproduct firm there is a problem of choice due 
to the possibility of substitution among outputs. Hence, according to Laitinen (1980, 
p67), "revenue maximisation is intrinsically a multiproduct pioblem". 
In modelling the behaviour of the individual multiproduct firm revenue maximisation is 
Ukely to be the objective of the firm. Revenue maximisation is the equivalent of profit 
maximisation when using one fixed input or composite input (Diewert, 1974). The 
revenue function can yield output supply equations as fiinctions of the output prices and 
the fixed inputs and enables the characteristics of the technology to be determined 
(Kirkley, 1986). However certain properties are required. 
2.3.4.1 The requirements for use of a revenue function. 
This explanation of the requirements and conditions for use of a revenue function are 
taken from Chambers (1988) who defines the revenue function as: 
R(p,x) = max { py : y e Y(x),p>0} (2.Ic) 
where p is a m- dimensional vector of strictly positive output prices, x is the input vector, 
y the output vector and Y(x) the producible output set. The producible output set can 
be thought of as representing all output bundles that can be produced using a given input 
bundle. Properties of the revenue function are given by Chambers, (1988): 
If Y(x), the producible output set, satisfies properties al- a5 (below) then the revenue 
function, equation (2.1c) (above) satisfies the properties of P(p,x) bl-b6 (below). 
al Y(x) is non empty and closed; 
a2 if y G Y(x), yl < y, tiien yl e Y(x); if xl > x, then Y(xl) 2 Y(x); 
a3 Y(x) is convex; 
a4 Y(x) is bounded from above for finite x; and 
a5ify>0,y«? Y(0n);0inG Y(x). 
la the non emptiness property sUnply impUes it is always possible to produce any 
positive output. Closedness is assumed so as to preclude the possibiUty of "holes" at the 
boundary of Y(x) (Chambers, 1988). Should properties al-a5 be satisfied for the 
producible output set then the following properties will hold for the revenue function: 
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blR(p,x)>0; 
b2 if p > pi, then R(p,x) > R(pl,x); 
b3 R(tp,x) = tR(p,x), t >0; 
b4 R(p,x) is convex and continuous in p; and 
b5 if xl > X, then R(p x^) > R(p,x); 
b6 if R(p,x) is differentiable in p, a unique revenue maximising vector exists witii typical 
element: 
6R(p,x) 
yi(p,x)= ----— 
5pi 
Explanation of properties bl-b6. 
The property h i follows from a5 where 0^ is always producible and thus R(p,x) can not 
be less than zero. 
b2 is explained by considering yl to be the solution to the revenue function equation 
(2.1c) above, when pi prevails. When price rises from p to pi , Y(x) is not affected. 
Hence yl remains available and the worst that could be done is to produce at yl giving 
R(p,x) = pyl>plyl=R(pl ,x) . 
b3 states that constant retums to scale in the multioutput case impUes evenly spaced and 
parallel product transformation curves. This is illustrated in Figure 2.2 (d). 
b4 Convexity is proved in Chambers, (1988): 
let p2 = 0 pO+(l-0) pi and yi ( i = 0,1,2) denote the solution to equation (1) when 
p ^ i =0,1,2) prevails. By definition: 
R(p2,x) > p0y2, R(pl,x)>ply2 
But expansion reveals: 
R(p2,x) = p2y2 = [ e pO + (1-e ) plj y2 
= 0 p0y2 + (1-0) ply2 < 0 R(pO^x) + (1-0) R(pl,X) 
b5 foUows from a2 that for x < xl, Y(xl) 2 Y(x). This infers that the producible output 
set has not duninished in size and the worst one can do is to produce at the old output 
buncUe. 
b6 states that if R(p,x) is differentiable in p, a unique revenue maximising vector exists 
with typical element as shown in b6. This is the Samuelson-McFadden lemma 
(Chambers, 1988). 
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2.3.4.2 The Generalized Leontief (GL) revenue function and regularity conditions. 
Several forms of revenue functions have been proposed by Diewert (1974). This study 
follows Kirkley (1986), Kirkley and Strand (1988), and Squires and Kirkley (1992) in 
adopting the Generalized Leontief (GL) form. The advantages of this form over others 
are that other forms impose either constant retums to scale or separability between 
inputs and outputs and are not second order approximations to an arbitrary, positive 
linear homogeneous, twice differentiable function. 
The GL revenue fiinction is a second order approximation, imposes homogeneity in 
output prices and yields supply functions in terms of actual output levels (Kirkley, 1986). 
The GL form also accommodates various stmctural tests of the technology such as 
separability and nonjointness without cumbersome restrictions. Own-price and cross 
prices elasticities of supply, and elasticities of transformation can also be readily 
obtained. 
However in estimating the revenue function it is important to be aware of the regularity 
conditions in the use of the revenue function. The requirements for the use of a revenue 
function mean the empirical investigator should be aware of monotonicity, convexity in 
prices, concavity' in the fixed input, and symmetry. These are important conditions due 
to the need to validate the dual relationship between the factor requirement function and 
the revenue function under the revenue maximising assumption. 
In undertaking the tests the literature is divided on whether the tests should employ aU 
parameters or the statistically significant parameters only. Kirkley (1986) notes that the 
use of both significant and insignificant parameter estimates can lead to the rejection of 
the required conditions. Details of the specific tests for each of the regularity conditions 
is given in section 3.1.3.7 prior to the results of the regularity tests for aU models. 
Further theoretical examination of regularity conditions and additional tests can be seen 
in Lau (1978b). 
2.4 Conclusions. 
In this Chapter both general economic and fisheries economic production literature has 
been reviewed highUghting multiproduct and multispecies fishery production issues. The 
objective of the Chapter was to select the best model for estimating production in each 
of the fisheries in the study area. The data sets available have led to the conclusion that 
Japanese fishery should be modelled using a Generalized Leontief revenue function. The 
revenue function approach may not be suited to the domestic fishery which wUl be 
estimated by direct techniques. In both approaches to modeUing, dummy and proxy 
variables wUl be included to represent stock changes. The models are estimated in 
Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3: Modelling and Estimation. 
3.1 Introduction. 
This Chapter describes the econometric analysis of the available data on catch and effort 
of Japanese and Australian vessels engaged in longlining for tuna in the east Austtalian 
area. It includes a multispecies analysis of the Japanese catch retums using a revenue 
function approach; a two species comparison of the Japanese and Australian fisheries; 
and a single species analysis of the Australian fishery using a production function 
approach. The purpose of the multispecies analysis is to establish a detailed picttire of 
the technology of the fishery; the comparison between the Japanese and Australian 
fisheries is to determine the applicability of the Japanese results to Australian vessels; and 
the analysis of the Australian fishery is a detailed estimation of the production of 
Yellowfin tuna for comparison with the multispecies models of Japanese and Australian 
production. 
In the multispecies analysis "technology" refers to a combination of vessel and stock 
availabiUty characteristics which together with effort detemune catch. For any particular 
vessel the technology could differ by season, year, or location fished because of stock 
availabiUty and these differences are estimated as shifts of the revenue or production 
function. However it is assumed that some aspects of technology are common to aU 
vessels and these are reflected in the estimated coefficients on fishing effort. 
Choice of the range of technological variations to be considered is govemed partly by the 
objective of providing information which will be useful in managing the fishery and partly 
by the availabiUty of data. The approach to estimating Japanese fishing technology 
(section 3.1) is sequential; first, technology is estimated for the fishery as a whole; then 
the question of whether the fishery should be estimated separately for the northem and 
southem regions of the fishery is addressed; then the question of whether smaU boat 
technology differs from tiiat of large boats is considered; fmaUy the analysis estimates the 
technology for different vessel sizes in the northem and southem areas. 
In each of the above stages there is a substantial amount of econometric testing which 
could be performed: the estimated vessel technology can be tested for nonjointness, 
input-output separability, and the regularity conditions of monotonicity, convexity and 
symmetry; in addition, the significance of the dummy variables representing stock 
flucttiations can be tested. The fu-st section of this Chapter estimates the Japanese 
technology in the east coast fishery for the total east coast area and for the northem and 
southem management areas. 
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The second section of this Chapter estimates the relative availability of species with 
distance from the coast. The vessel technology tests described in section 3.1 are not 
repeated because the amount of data available declines as the sample is subdivided into 
twelve zones and the sub-samples are more suited to estimation of zonal differences in 
availability rather than tests for vessel technology. 
In section 3.3 the multispecies revenue function is used to compare AustraUan and 
Japanese technology in a smaU area adjacent to the Australian coast. The Japanese 
technology has already been established in section 3.1 and the Australian production is 
estimated in a single species framework in section 3.4. The revenue function approach in 
section 3.3 enables the Australian and Japanese technologies to be contrasted in an area 
where both nationalities were fishing together although facing different tuna prices. The 
Chapter ends with a detailed single species estimation of the production of Yellowfin 
tuna in the domestic fishery based on daUy observations of catches and a range of 
altemative variables such as water temperature, soaktime, moonphase, distance from the 
coast and the class of vessel used. These are the first estimations of production in the 
east coast tuna fishery. 
The following sections describe the analysis of the Japanese and AustraUan data and a 
discussion of its limitations; a description and discussion of the model which is used to 
represent the technology of the fishery; a description of the procedure which is followed 
for performing tests on the significance of the coefficients of individual variables or 
groups of variables; and the presentation and discussion of results. Because of the large 
number of test performed the results are presented in tabular form. The Tables generaUy 
report whether the indicated null hypothesis was rejected (Y) or could not be rejected 
(N) at a 5% significance level. Where tests are performed at other levels of significance 
the change is noted below the Table concemed. Each set of test results is identified by a 
Table number which indicates the location of the estimated equation; when an Appended 
Table is referred to its number wUl be prefixed by an "A" indicating that it is located in 
the Appendix following the body of the text and the references. 
3.1.1 Data in the Japanese fishery. 
In the Japanese fishery on the east Australian coast a logbook reporting system organised 
by the Australian authorities has been in existence since 1979. The data collected under 
this system have not previously been subjected to a detailed study of production. 
3.1.1.1 Description of the data. 
The study of Japanese production in the eastem Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) used 
data obtained from the TL04 logbook records and supplied by the AustraUan Fisheries 
Management Authority. The eastem AFZ is shown in Figure 1.2. 
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The data set included some observations from outside the AFZ which were removed. 
The southem extent of the study area was taken to be 34° South. Below 34° South 
management closures have kept the Japanese from fishing in the AFZ adjacent to 
southem New South Wales. Fishing activity further south towards 40°S was not 
included as this effort is directed towards the Southem Bluefin Tuna. 
Catch and effort data were available for the years 1984-1989 from the TL04 log book 
records. Prior to 1984 no fish weights were recorded in the TL02 log books tiiereby 
precluding the calculation of total revenue. The integrity of the 1984 and 1985 data was 
questioned as this was the first year on the new logbook system, during which 10% of 
vessels continued to fUl out the old TL02 records. Catches and effort were lower in 
1984 than in other years, as indicated in Table 1.4a, possibly reflecting poorer coverage 
of activity than in subsequent years. The catch and effort statistics were compiled and 
are reported in detaU for the fishery in Tables 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6. Tables 1.4a and b report 
the effort and catch in tonnes for the overall fishery and the northem and southem areas 
of the fishery. Table 1.4c presents the data reported in Table 1.4b for the northem and 
southem areas as a percentage of the total catch and effort in the overall fishery. 
The data set recorded effort in number of hooks set per day, which is a standard measure 
of fishing effort for biological studies of longlining. In an economic study, however, 
effort can be interpreted as an aggregate measure of inputs used in the production 
process in a fishery (Squires, 1987b). Using hooks as a measure of effort does not 
account for the varying capital input in the production process and hence the production 
advantages of having a larger vessel. Japanese fishing vessels ranged from 135 Gross 
Registered Tonnes (GRT) to 409 GRT (mean = 261 GRT, S.D. = 51 ). Larger vessels 
are able to operate m aU weathers and often have superior electronic equipment (Baron, 
1991). For the study of Japanese production the chosen measure of individual vessel 
effort was: 
number of hooks * GRT/100 
where GRT/100 represents a scaling factor for vessel tonnage. 
Monthly prices for the 1984-89 period were obtained for the port of Yaizu m Japan from 
the Austtalian Fisheries Management Authority. The average price data consisted of 72 
monthly observations for seven species over the six year period. 
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The data used in the estimations are a panel or longitudinal data set of monthly price, 
effort and catch observations per vessel in the 1984-1989 period. In production analysis 
observations on stock are desirable. There were no observations available as little is 
known of stock stmcture in the area (Caton and Hampton, 1985). Yearly and seasonal 
dummy variables were used to account for stock fluctuations or possible stock depletion 
through time. 
3.1.1.2 Selection of species. 
There are three commercially important tuna species and four commercially important 
biUfishes in the Japanese fishery. The catch of each species, effort and the gross revenue 
received for each year in the 1984-1989 period are reported in Table 1.1a. 
The most commercially important species are Yellowfin, Bigeye, Striped Marlin and 
Swordfish. The data were checked for missing observations and irregularities due to 
management exclusion of the Japanese fleet; for example, two months, April 1987 and 
November 1989 had no fishing activity. Examination of vessel daUy catch records for 
each species revealed a considerable number of zero catch observations for Black and 
Blue MarUn. Even when the data were aggregated to monthly catch per vessel there 
were stiU a considerable number of zero catch observations for these species as they are 
caught infrequently. Table 3.1 reports the percentage of zero observations for each 
species. 
Kirkley and Strand (1988) note that when aU vessels do not harvest all species there is a 
limited dependent variable problem which may lead to bias and non-normality in the 
residuals and thus incorrect acceptance or rejection of hypotheses (Madalla, 1984). The 
approach of Amemiya (1973) can be used to try to determine the problems that might 
result from the inclusion of zero valued observations. Kkkley and Strand (1988) 
concluded that there were no sign reversals or changes in the statistical significance of 
the parameters when the fitted values obtained from their sample, restricted to non-zero 
observations, were used to estimate supply fiinctions. They note that in their sample no 
one species had more than 11% of total observations as zero values. 
The present study had two species. Black and Blue Marlin which were not caught in 
approximately 65% and 40% of monthly boat observations. These large, predatory, 
highly migratory fish are not as numerous as the smaUer tuna species. It is unlikely a 
Black or Blue Marlin could be caught by each boat in the fleet in each month of the six 
year period. As highly migratory species they may not be in the study area for several 
months of the year thus explaining many of the zero catch observations. 
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Investigation of seasonal catches of Black and Blue Marlin species revealed that in the 
April to August period catches are much lower than the rest of the year with a 
considerable number of zero catch observations across the fleet. This contrasts with 
Striped Marlin which are caught all year around with only 4% of monthly boat 
observations being zero. 
The Marlin problem could have been resolved by dropping all zero observations, or 
removing months in which Marlin were not caught. The result would be bias across the 
data set as the April to August period, when many zero Marlin catches occur, is the start 
of the main fishing season for Yellowfin, Bigeye and Swordfish. Another altemative was 
to Umit the model to four species excluding Marlin. This was considered inappropriate 
as Marlin have been an important part of the fishery and often a contentious issue for 
management. 
After rejecting these altematives. Black, Blue and Striped Marlin were aggregated to 
form a new Marlin variable which reduced the number of zeros to less than the 4% figure 
for Striped Marlin. This was acceptable given the experience of Kirkley and Strand 
(1988). 
Aggregation of products within dual production functions requires some special 
consideration. Squires (1984) notes that insufficient attempts have been made in 
multispecies fisheries economic modelling to consider aggregation issues and the "proper 
usage of price and quantity indices for measurement are also neglected" (Squires, 1984, 
pi7). Traditional multispecies models have often aggregated species by weighted 
average methods (AgneUo and Anderson, 1981). 
In production sttidies, Diewert (1976, 1978, and 1980) noted that aggregation for 
estimation in dual profit, cost and revenue fiinctions may require the use of special 
indices so that the assumptions of the dual approach are not violated. Squires (1988) 
investigated the use of indexing in fisheries economics. Diewert (1978) proposed the use 
of the Divisia, Tomquist or Translog index, but Diewert (1976 and 1989) suggested that 
the Fisher Ideal price index satisfies the necessary tiieoretical assumptions, and is 
consistent with the full range of substitution possibilities in outputs. 
3.1.1.3 Construction of Marlin indices. 
The prices and weights of the three species of Marlins to be combined were used to 
constmct a Fisher Ideal price index for the 72 monthly time periods. The Fisher Ideal 
mdex incorporates Laspeyres and Paasche indices and takes the geomettic mean of the 
product of the two indices. That is: 
Laspeyres L* =(PfQt.j)/(Pj_j Q^^) 
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Paasche Pa^ = (PfQt)/(Pt-i Qt) 
Fisher Ideal F* =(LtPat)l/2 
where L is Laspeyre's index. Pa is Paasche's index, and F is the Fisher ideal price index. 
P and Q are price and quantity vectors, and t is the time periods over which the index is 
being constmcted, 72 months in this study. 
The price index constmcted used the first period as the base. An implicit quantity index 
for MarUn was formed for each vessel observation by dividing the total Marlin revenue 
by the price index in each monthly observation. The price index and implicit quantity 
index for Marlins could then be used along with the observations of price and quantity of 
the other species in estimation. To avoid dimensional problems in the estimated 
coefficients a correction factor was applied to the base of the index. This correction 
typically tumed a price index value of around 1 to approximately 800 Yen, which is 
similar in dimension to the prices of the other species. Sunilarly the implicit quantity 
index would be reduced by 800 in this example. 
In summary, the data used in the econometric modelling were monthly per vessel effort 
and multispecies catch for a six year period between 1984-1989. Potential statistical bias 
was reduced by the aggregation of the three less frequently caught Marlin species. 
3.1.2 The econometric model. 
3.1.2.1 The econometric model. 
The model to be used is a revenue function from which supply equations for each species 
can be estimated. On the demand side the model assumes that the individual vessel is a 
price taker on the Japanese tuna market. The individual producers in this multispecies 
fishery are assumed to make output decisions in accordance with maximising revenue 
(Carlson, 1973; Kirkley, 1986). 
The revenue function provides a duality based approach to examining the underlying 
short-mn production technology used when the fum is free to choose its revenue 
maximising output combination, with the input quasi-fixed. Revenue maximisation is the 
equivalent of profit maxinusation when input is quasi-fixed (Diewert, 1974). Most of the 
vessels in the fishery were built in 1982 and have an expected working life of twenty 
years over which period the tonnage and size of vessel is fixed. Inputs can also be 
considered to be fixed whilst the vessels are fishing on the grounds. In using the 
composite input (Z), the product of vessel tonnage and hooks set per day, it is assumed 
that all conditions for aggregation hold and the composite input is a function of aU inputs 
(Kirkley, 1986). Outputs are assumed to be given by the nominal catch records, all fish 
caught being sold in Japan. 
59 
hiitially the model for the entire east coast fishery data will be estimated. Following tiiis 
the sample will be split into northem and southem fisheries to test for differences in 
technology between these fisheries. 
3.1.2.2 The functional form. 
A revenue function is used to estimate the production technology in this multiproduct 
mna fishery. A non-homothetic Generalized Leontief revenue function was used by 
Kirkley (1986), and Kkkley and Strand (1988), in a study of multispecies production in 
the New England ttawl fishery. The Generalized Leontief is a second order 
approximation which imposes linear homogeneity in output prices and yields supply 
functions in terms of acmal output levels. It can also be used for stmctural technology 
tests such as separability and nonjointness witiiout cumbersome restrictions. 
The general form used by Kirkley (1986), and Kirkley and Strand (1988) is: 
R(Z,P)= I i I j 6ij (Pi Pj)l/2 Z + I i BiPi Z2 (3.1a) 
where R(Z,P) is a Revenue function, (Z) is the composite input, effort, and price is 
represented by (P), Pi being the price of the ith species. In the present study the revenue 
function is given by: 
R(Z,P) = l i l j By (Pi Pj)l/2 Z + I i fiiPi Z2 
+ l i l t ait DtPiZ + l i l m i^m QmPiZ (3.2) 
where Dt are dummy variables for years (1984 is the base year), and Qjj^  are quarteriy 
dummies for seasons (January to March is the base quarter). The dummy variables for 
year and seasons are included to capttire variable stock levels or changes in 
envkonmental parameters between years. It is not clear the extent to which the yearly 
dummies wUl be able to pick up long term stock flucttiations or the sustainabUity of the 
resource, which is considered in Chapter 5. The dummy variables for seasons reflect 
changes in the avaUabiUty of tuna between seasons due to the movement of the East 
Australia Current. The use of seasonal and annual dummy variables in the absence of an 
expUcit stock variable means the stocks are treated as technology shift parameters rather 
than factors of production. 
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The supply equations to be estimated are obtained from (3.2) by Hotelling's Lemma: 
JR(Z;P) 
= Yi(Z;P)= BiiZ + BiZ2 + I t ait ^ t Z + 1 ^ , ^i^, QjnZ+ 
dP[ 
+ IjBij(Pj/Pi)l/2z (3.3) 
The necessary symmetry conditions require 6ij=6ji, i ^ j . Zero homogeneity in prices 
follows from the Generalized Leontief form. 
3.1.2.3 Testing for nonjointness in production 
Nonjointness in inputs over aU outputs (species) means that the Generalized Leontief 
revenue function can be written as: 
R[P;Z] = I i Ri [P;Z] 
This impUes that the supply of each output (species) is perfectiy inelastic with respect to 
the price of the other species. Kkkley and Strand (1988) note the required econometric 
restrictions over all outputs (species) are : 
^ R 
— = 0, i.e. 6ii=0, i ^j, Vij. 
dPidPj 
Conditions for nonjointness in inputs for an individual output (species), Yj, are: 
B l j = 0 , V j , j ^ l . 
3.1.2.4 Testing for input-output separability. 
Separability between inputs and m multiple outputs impUes no specific interaction 
between any one output and any one input (Laitinen, 1980). The technology can then be 
specified as a single composite output as well as a single composite input. If technology 
is separable between output and the fixed input then according to Kkkley and Strand 
(1988) the Generalized Leontief revenue function with one input is separable in P and Z 
that is: 
R[P;Z] = R [P] Z 
The marginal rates of ttansformation of aU output pairs are independent of factor 
intensities (Hall, 1973). The appropriate econometric restriction is that: 
6i = 0, i= l,....m 
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Separability between inputs and outputs implies that biomass management, the 
management of "fish", rather than individual species is possible (Kirkley, 1986; Kirkley 
and Strand, 1988). 
3.1.3 Empirical results. 
3.1.3.1 Method of estimation. 
The supply equation (3.3) was estimated for each of the five species: 
Yk(Zk;P) = BiiZk + BiZk2 + I t ttit Dt Z^+ I ^ Wm Qm^k 
+IjBij(Pj/Pi)l/2Zk + 8k (3.3) 
where Ej^  is a random error term. Each equation has a random disturbance term to allow 
for error in the adjustment of the outputs to the revenue maximising level as a result of 
unexplained changes and other errors. The errors are assumed to satisfy the conditions 
of ordinary least squares estimation - normally distributed, with a mean of zero and 
constant variance. It is assumed that the random disturbances are correlated across 
equations, [E(eiej) = CTy], where Ci is the error term of the ith equation, and E is the 
expectations operator (Judge et al., 1982). The equations are linked only by a 
dismrbance term and are thus seemingly unrelated. It is also assumed that the 
covariances of the errors of any two equations corresponding to different fishing firms 
are identically zero (Kirkley, 1986). 
In the total fishery there were 1304 observations of monthly catch by individual vessels 
over the six year period and 72 observations of monthly price for each of the five 
species. 
Each supply equation was checked for heteroscedasticity. Squires and Kkkley (1991) 
noted heteroscedasticity of the form discussed by Parks (1971), such that the error 
variance is proportional to the squared input level (Z). The Breusch-Pagan (BP) test 
(Breusch and Pagan, 1979) was applied and the results are reported in Table 3.2a. 
The nuU hypothesis, HQ: heteroscedasticity is equal to zero was rejected at both 5% and 
1% levels of significance. To address this, each supply equation was divided through by 
the input Z to give an input scaled supply equation (Squires and Kkkley, 1991). Thus 
equation (3.3) became 
Yk(Zk;P) 
. . . . = 6jj + BjZj^  + ^^ otit Dt + I m Him Qm 
Zk 
-Hlj6ij(Pj/Pi)l/2 + e^ (3 4) 
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where 8^ is a random error term assumed to satisfy the required conditions of ordinary 
least squares estimation. 
Subsequent to this modification, the model was re-mn and lower chi squared statistics 
were obtained from the Breusch-Pagan test. However the null hypothesis was still 
rejected (See Table 3.2b). In the absence of the availabiUty of any additional correction 
for heteroscedasticity, and on the basis of improved results from the Breusch-Pagan test, 
it was decided to use the specification of equation (3.4) as the model. 
The input scaled product supply equations were estimated by Zellner's Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression Estimation (SURE), (Zellner, 1962) and iterated to convergence 
giving results to maximum likelihood using SHAZAM (1993). A convergence criteria of 
0.001 was used. 
The R2 of the system of equations was noted to be 0.9372 prior to correction for 
heteroscedasticity. This system R2 was given by the formula: 
R2=l-Det(E'E)/Det(y'y) 
where E'E is the cross product matrix of residuals and y'y is the cross product matrix of 
dependent variables. This statistic is frequentiy very high and should be interpreted with 
caution (Bemdt, 1991). Previous authors, Kkkley (1986), and Squires and Kkkley 
(1991), calculated a Generalized R2 for the system computed as: 
R2=l-exp[2(Lo-Li)/Nl, 
where LQ is the sample maximum of log-likelihood when aU slope coefficients equal 
zero, Lj is the maximum of the unconstrained log-likelihood, and N is the sample size. 
This is adapted from Baxter and Cragg, (1970) and is applied after the correction for 
heteroscedasticity. Under this test the Generalized R2 was 0.619 for the overall model 
(Table 3.9d). 
3.1.3.2 Hypothesis testing. 
The hypothesis testing method chosen was the LUcelihood Ratio ( 1(2 ) test. The 
LUcelihood Ratio test statistic is: -2 * (LR-LU) ~ X'^ 
where L R and Lu are the maximum log-lUcelihoods of the restricted and unrestricted 
versions of the model respectively. The test statistic has a Chi2 distribution with the 
degrees of freedom equivalent to the number of restrictions on the model being tested. 
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Two testing procedures were used in the subsequent analysis. The first tests, for model 
specification and technology, used M tests to test a specific null hypothesis, HQ: the 
coefficients on all dummy variables as a group are equal to zero. If the hypothesis was 
rejected then the result was recorded with Y (yes). Similarly in the case of tests for 
overall nonjointness the null hypothesis HQ: the coefficient on all Bij terms as a group are 
equal to zero (i.e. nonjointness) if rejected, was recorded as Y (yes); thus the species is 
produced jointiy. The second procedure used was to test for similarities in technology 
between vessels fishing the northem and southem regions, and tonnage groups within 
these regions. In this case the tests commenced with all parameters restricted to be equal 
north and south, (or tonnage groups to be equal), and the restrictions on the group of 
parameters to be tested were removed. This method was used to test the null hypothesis 
HQ: the coefficients on the dummy variables as a group are equal north and south (or 
between tonnage groups). If the hypothesis was rejected a new maintained hypothesis 
was established incorporating the previously tested variable in the unrestricted form. 
Should the hypothesis not be rejected, subsequent tests incorporate the variable in the 
restricted form. 
An example of each of the testing procedures is given below, fu-stly for specification of 
technology in the overall fishery and, secondly, tests for whether the fishery should be 
divided into northem and southem sections for management purposes. Subsequently the 
results will be presented in table form for discussion. 
3.1.3.3a Tests for the technology characteristics of the overall model. 
The model for the overall fishery was tested using the general-to-specific procedure, 
which involves sequential testing of hypotheses that the coefficients on each group of 
variables are equal to zero. The results were reported m Table 3.3a. Regularity 
conditions were tested and the results are reported later in the Chapter with the regional 
models in section 3.1.3.7. 
The nuU hypothesis HQ: the coefficients on aU dummy variables as a group are equal to 
zero was tested and rejected at both a 5% and 1% level of significance. Dummy 
variables as a group should be included in the model. The annual dummies were tested 
under the nuU hypothesis HQ: the coefficients on the annual dummies are equal to zero. 
The hypothesis was rejected at both levels of significance and annual dummies were 
included in the model to accommodate inter-annual variability which may be mdicative of 
stock changes. The quarterly seasonal dummies were also tested under the hypothesis 
HQ: the coefficients on seasonal dummies as a group are equal to zero. The test statistic 
for seasons was particularly high, being rejected at 1%. The fishery is noted to be 
distinctiy seasonal. These results reflect the seasonal and inter-annual variations of the 
East Australia Current on fish availability. 
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All technology variables, Bii, ^i ^^^ ^\j ^^''^ tested as a group by the null hypothesis, HQ: 
the coefficients on aU technology variables as a group are equal to zero. The hypothesis 
was rejected. 
The null hypothesis for input-output separability, HQ: the coefficients, Bi are equal to 
zero was rejected at a 1 % level of significance. The Bi terms are the coefficients on the 
effort squared term in the supply equations (3.3). These terms as a group are 
significantiy different from zero and indicate the absence of input-output separability. 
Input-output separability also indicates additive separability. 
OveraU nonjointness was tested by the null hypothesis HQ: the coefficients on the cross 
price terms, Bij, are equal to zero. This was rejected at 5% and 1% levels of significance. 
The production process in the fishery is joint which means that producers target species 
in response to relative fish prices. The constant terms, Bii ^^^^ ^^ ^^  tested by the null 
hypothesis HQ: the coefficients on Bii ^ ® equal to zero. The hypothesis was rejected. 
Each species was tested for individual nonjointness by the null hypothesis RQ: the 
coefficients on the B j^ terms are equal to zero. Nonjointness was rejected for each 
species at both the 1% and 5% levels of significance. 
The results of the above tests show that the preferred form of the model is given by 
equation 3.4. The coefficients from the overall model are reported in Table 3.3b. 
Since it is concluded in section 3.1.3.4 that the northem and southem fisheries have 
different technologies, the technology of the overall fishery wUl not be investigated in 
further detail at this stage. However there are some general issues which can be 
discussed on the basis of the overall model. 
3.1.3.3b Correlations in the explanatory variables. 
In the course of applying the model the possibiUty of correlation between the relative 
price variables and the yearly and seasonal dummy variables was noted. Serial 
correlation was not a problem in the model. The price data were plotted against tkne 
and can be inspected in Figure 3.1a and b. In the early nineteen eighties there was a 
collapse of the world tuna price across aU species with a limited recovery towards the 
end of the decade (Waugh, 1988). 
The relative price variables were checked for pairwise correlations with annual dummies. 
Table 3.4a records pairwise correlations, greater than 0.2, found between relative price 
variables and year and seasonal dummies. It was noted that the last of the year dummies, 
D5 was correlated with many of the relative price terms. The relative price variables 
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Figure 3.1a: Graph of the monthly prices of Albacore (Alb), Bigeye (Beye) and 
Yellowfin (Yfn) in the 1984-1989 period for the port of Yaizu, Japan. Data source-
AFMA. 
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(Pi/Pj) were regressed on the annual and seasonal dummy variables by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). Several of the regressions had high R2 values (Table 3.4 b). 
Further regressions of relative price terms on the seasonal dummies alone, which are not 
reported, revealed one R2 of 0.375. This was not typical of the rest of the relationships 
which had R2 values of less than 0.18. The year dummies explain a significant part of the 
difference in some of the relative price variables. 
The dummy variables were included to account for stock changes. Altemative measures 
of stock availabiUty such as Catch Per Unit Effort (CPUE), have been used in tuna 
fisheries as stock proxies (Schaefer, 1957; AUen and Punsley, 1984; Kirkley, 1986; 
Campbell and NichoU, 1994c). The catch per unit effort across the fleet in a given year 
may be indicative of the availabiUty of tuna to the individual vessels. The annual fleet 
CPUE was calculated and are reported in Table 3.5 and may be of assistance in 
interpreting coefficients of the annual dummy variables. In the present model the 
inclusion of the fleet wide CPUE as an additional variable was not pursued due to 
possible econometric problems, such as simultaneity bias (Uhler, 1979). Where CPUE 
was used by Kkkley, (1986) the observations were from independent research cmise 
surveys which are not available for this fishery. 
A possible solution to the problem of the year dummy relative price variable correlations 
was to transform the relative price variable to a non-linear log form to reduce 
correlations with year dummies. This would have made the model coefficients difficult 
to interpret and was not pursued. The possible bias introduced by annual dummy 
correlations with relative prices will be home in mind in the interpretation of the results. 
3.1.3.3c The interpretation of revenue function results. 
The coefficients from the estimated revenue function in the total fishery are reported in 
Table 3.3b. Some of the revenue function results can be predicted from theory. The 
coefficients Bii should be positive since a negative coefficient for a species would imply 
that a supply could be negative, although the effect of the Bi and dummy variable terms 
must also be considered. Kirkley (1986) gives the foUowing illustration which is adapted 
here to include the seasonal variable. "If the dummy variables for season and aimual 
avaUabiUty are greater than Bii ^ ^ ^^ ^ products of Bi Z2 and Bij(Pj/Pi)l/2 z yield a 
positive value, then the supply wiU also be positive for aU values of the composite input" 
(Kirkley, 1986, p 126). 
There are no a priori expectations about the signs of the coefficients on the seasonal 
duimnies. The signs of the coefficients on the annual dummies are determined in relation 
67 
to the abundance in the base year, 1984. The annual dummy variables may be of either 
sign and can be interpreted in conjunction with the fleet wide CPUE data (Table 3.5). 
The revenue function places no a priori restrictions on the sign of the effort squared 
term, Bi, in the supply function. The revenue function is only required to be concave or 
quasi-concave in the composite input, effort. This implies that Zi Bi Pi Z2 < 0. 
Constant retums to effort are implied if all Bi =0, whereas decreasing retums to effort 
would involve negative values of Bi. 
In bioeconomic studies of the fishery it is usual that fishery wide retums to effort in a 
fishery are declining (Gordon, 1954). This can be due to two factors: the diminishing 
marginal productivity of effort applied to a fixed stock; and the effect of effort in 
lowering the fish stock. In this study the observations of fishing effort are for individual 
vessels in a given month. It is lUcely that an individual vessel in a month may not 
experience the effect of stock depletion on retums to effort. Retums to effort for 
individual vessels in this case are expected to be constant or negative due to diminishing 
marginal productivity of effort applied to a fixed stock. 
The coefficients for the overall model are reported in Table 3.3b. The effort coefficients 
Bji are aU positive and significantiy different from zero at the 1% level of significance 
with the exception of that of Bigeye tuna. Retums to effort, Bi for individual species are 
diminishing and significant at the 5% level for Albacore, Swordfish and Marlin. 
Overall retums to effort from all species are dimirushing at the 5% level of significance. 
This is determined by the test of the null hypothesis HQ: the Average Retums to effort 
(ARe) less the Marginal Remms to effort (MRe) are equal to zero. For the overall 
model ARe-MRe was positive and the t ratio (2.07) significant at the 5% level. Thus the 
MRe is significantiy less than the ARe indicating diminishing retums to effort at the 
representative vessel level in the overall fishery. 
The Bjj terms show several significant cross price relationships. The signs of these 
coefficients indicate products are complements if positive and substitutes if negative. 
Since the next section suggests that the northem and southem fisheries have different 
technologies, the detailed nature of these relationships and of the annual and seasonal 
fluctuations wiU be considered separately for the two fisheries. 
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3.1.3.4 Tests for similarity between the northern and the southern fisheries. 
The data set was divided into northem and southern areas by the line of latitude 25° 
South and a range of tests was performed based on equation (3.4) to establish if the 
northem and southem fisheries were significantly different. The northern and southem 
fisheries were compared over all parameters and subsequently the annual, seasonal and 
technology characteristics were compared between the north and the south. The data 
observations now numbered 1611, as in each year some vessels had been in both the 
northem area and the southern area in the same month. Of the 1611 observations, 576 
were in the north and 1035 were in the south. The results of the tests are shown in Table 
3.6. 
Estimation of the northem and southem fisheries separately required an adjustment to 
the price indices for the aggregated Marlin term as the price index is a function of not 
just price, but quantity of the three Marlin species. The indices for Marlins were 
recalculated so as to reflect the quantities of Marlin harvested in the northem and 
southem fisheries. The data were rechecked for percentages of zero dependent variables 
and these are reported in Table 3.7. They were noticeably higher in the north than in the 
south, but were still acceptable. 
The nuU hypothesis HQ: the coefficients on aU parameters are equal in the north and the 
south was tested by the econometric restrictions: 
HQ: 6uN=fiUS' 15iN=fiiS' 6ijN=fiijS' DtN=DtS' QmN=QmS-
The pooled data for the overall fishery was the equivalent of restricting northem and 
southem parameters to be equal, whereas the unrestricted mn allowed aU northem and 
southem parameters to take up their respective values. The test statistic was given by: 
Likelihood Ratio (IS^ test statistic = - 2 * ( L O - ( L N + L S ) ) - %2 
where L Q is the loglikelihood overall, L^ is the loglikelihood in the north and Ls is the 
loglikelihood in the south, when not restricted to be equal. The hypothesis was rejected 
as the fisheries were found to differ significantly between the north and the south for aU 
variables as a group (Table 3.6). 
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Subsequent tests distinguished between aspects of the northem and southern fisheries. 
The annual variation between the fisheries was compared by testing the annual dummy 
variables. The null hypothesis HQ: the coefficients on annual dummies as a group in the 
north are equal to the coefficients on annual dummies in the south was tested by the 
econometric restriction, HQ: DtN = DtS- The null hypothesis was rejected as the annual 
dummies are significantly different between the north and the south. Similarly, seasonal 
variations were found to be significantiy different in the north and the south. 
Further tests examined the production technology in the two fisheries. The non-dummy 
variable terms of the model in equation (3.4) represent the species own price term (Bii), 
the production relationship with effort (Bi), and the cross price relationships with other 
species (Bij). The maintained hypothesis was that these coefficients on vessel technology 
variables as a group in the north are the same as the south. This was tested by the 
econometric restrictions: 
HQ: BiiN = BuS V i, BiN = Bis V i, and BijN = Bijs V i, j , i ^ t j . 
The maintained hypothesis was rejected as all the technology coefficients terms as a 
group were significantiy different between the north and the south. 
Each technology term was then tested individually. The maintained hypothesis that die 
coefficients of cross price terms in the north are equal to the coefficients on cross price 
terms in the south, was tested by the econometric restriction HQ: BijN = i^jS- The 
maintained hypothesis was rejected as jointness in production is different in the northem 
and southem fishery. Producer response to price changes in the north is different from 
the south. Similar tests for the maintained hypothesis that the Bi coefficients, HQ: BJN = 
Bis, found the maintained hypothesis could not be rejected at the 1% or 5% level of 
significance. Input-output separability is not significantly different m the north and the 
south. 
The own price term, the coefficient on effort in the supply equation, was tested by the 
econometric restriction &^ = Biig. This restriction was rejected at the 1% and 5% 
levels of significance, indicating that the coefficients on effort in the northem and 
southem fisheries are significantly different. The northem Bij coefficient values were 
higher than in the southem area. 
In conclusion, the north and south are significantly different fisheries m almost aU aspects 
considered and merit separate estimation by region. It was also hypothesised that the 
technology might be different for different sized vessels m both the northem and 
southem fisheries. The effect of vessel size is investigated in the next section. 
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3.1.3.5 Tests for the influence of vessel size in the northern and southern fisheries. 
The influence of tonnage was tested since smaller vessels may have a different 
production process from larger vessels in each fishery. The mean vessel tonnage in the 
entire fishery was 260 GRT, but 200 GRT was used to divide the data so as to follow the 
division of the available Japanese cost data (MAFF, 1989). 
In the northem fishery there were 474 monthly vessel observations greater than 200 
GRT and 98 observations less than 200 GRT. In the southem fishery there were 789 
monthly vessel observations greater than 200 G k l and 246 observations less than 200 
GRT. The test results are reported in Table 3.8 and the detailed econometric results are 
reported in Appendix Table 3.1.1a and b (ie Table A3.1.1a and b). 
There may be two senses in which different sized vessels have different technologies: 
they may be involved in different production processes as measured by the vessels 
technology terms (Bii, Bi, and Bij coefficients of equation 3.4), or they may have different 
exposure to the fish stocks as measured by the annual and quarterly dummy variables. 
The nuU hypotheses that the coefficients on all variables as a group are equal across the 
two tonnage classes, was tested and rejected at the 5% and 1% levels of significance in 
both the northem and southem fisheries. In each fishery the overall technology is 
significantly different between the two vessel classes and thus should be estimated 
separately. The test results reported in Table 3.8 show the annual and seasonal tuna 
availability is significantly different for the vessel classes in both fisheries. 
The vessel technology terms, were tested as a group and individuaUy in the northem and 
southem fisheries. In the southem fishery the technology terms as a group were not 
significantly different between vessel classes, but were significantiy different in the north. 
This means that in the northem fishery both the production technology and the annual 
and seasonal availabiUty of fish are different for smaU and large Japanese vessels, 
whereas in the south the main difference between vessel classes appears to be the 
availabiUty of fish. Of the individual technology terms only the Bjj terms were 
significantiy different between large and smaU vessels in the south whereas aU individual 
terms were significantly different at the 5% level in the north. 
The results suggest that the fmal estimations should be for separate tonnage classes in 
the northem and southem fisheries. 
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3.1.3.6 Technology tests in the northern and southern fisheries. 
From the previous tests it was concluded that the technology tests should be conducted 
separately for four subsets of the data: northem area - vessels below 200 GRT and 
vessels above 200 GRT; and southem area - vessels below 200 GRT and vessels above 
200 GRT. 
In the literature there are some slight variations in the order of sequential technology 
tests. The preferred order of Laitinen (1980) was regularity conditions, nonjointness, 
block independence and separability. However in Kirkley (1986) regularity conditions 
are followed by separability tests as the technology can be input-output separable and 
nonjoint. This approach is supported by Lau (1972 and 1978), Hall (1973), and Denny 
and Pinto (1978). Where dummy variables have been utilised the validity of their 
inclusion in the model has been tested after regularity conditions and prior to input-
output separability and nonjointness tests (Squires and Kirkley, 1991). This will be the 
approach adopted in this study. 
The regularity condition test results for monotonicity, convexity in prices, concavity in 
effort and symmetry wUl be presented prior to the dummy variable, input-output 
separability and nonjointness tests. 
3.1.3.7 Monotonicity, convexity, concavity, symmetry and goodness of fit. 
This section examines how the data perform in fulfUUng the theoretical requirements of a 
revenue function approach. The Generalized Leontief form leads to homogeneity in 
prices, an assumption which can be tested by investigating symmetry. Other conditions 
such as concavity in effort are required to satisfy the second order conditions for a 
maximum. 
Examination of the necessary conditions for revenue maximisation is required to establish 
the relationship between the factor requirements function and the revenue function. The 
literature is divided on whether this examination should employ all parameter estimates. 
Some authors use only the statistically significant parameters (Weaver, 1983). Kkkley 
(1986) notes that if aU parameters are used this may lead to the rejection of required 
conditions and cites the example of symmetry not holding if one of the products is 
produced by nonjoint technology, thus making the cross price terms equal to zero. 
In many empuical studies where dual functions are estimated not aU the conditions are 
always satisfied. Lopez (1984), in a study referred to by Chambers (1988), rejects 
symmetry at the 5% level of significance and convexity for 75% of the sample points. 
Shumway (1983) and Parks (1971) use a profit and cost function respectively and satisfy 
only monotonicity conditions. Kirkley (1986) notes that many studies do not inquke into 
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required conditions citing many examples (Kohli, 1978; Denny and Pinto, 1978; Caves et 
al. 1980; Weaver, 1983; and Chambers, 1982). 
Inherent in the testing of these conditions is that rejection of required conditions is really 
rejection of the underlying assumptions about production. However less stringent 
conditions may be examined to indicate the severity of the problem. An example of this 
is the case of convexity in prices. Hunt (1984) and Parks (1971) note problems with 
convexity in prices are not severe as long as the own price elasticities are not negative 
and statistically significant from zero (Kirkley, 1986). 
Monotonicity. 
Monotonicity requires that aU of the fitted production levels should be positive. This 
condition is satisfied for the overall model for Albacore, Bigeye, Yellowfin and Marlin. 
It was found that 2% of the predicted values for Swordfish were negative. The results of 
checking all predicted dependent variable values for the models are reported in Table 
3.9a. Monotonicity is seen to hold completely for 18 of the 25 results presented. The 
poorest individual results are for Swordfish, caught by larger vessels in the north. 
Monotonicity holds for only 92% of these predicted values in the worst case. The failure 
to satisfy monotonicity completely was acceptable given the limited number of negative 
predicted catches in the entire data set. 
Convexity in prices. 
Convexity in prices requires that the Hessian of the underlying factor requirements 
function must be positive definite. This can be examined by reviewmg the principle 
minors of the Hessian of the revenue function (Diewert, 1974; Parks, 1971). An 
elasticity of transformation matrix of AUen partial elasticities of transformation can also 
be used for determination of the appropriate sign of the Hessian. 
Elasticities of transformation can be calculated from the fuU or reduced form of the 
model (see section 3.1.3.10). When the reduced form is used there are zero values for 
species for which individual nonjointness could not be rejected by the L^ tests. When 
the AUen partial elasticity results are put in matrix form and the determinant of the 
principal minors evaluated for sign, the presence of columns or rows of zeros in the 
matrix leads to some of the signs of the principal minors being zero. In contrast using aU 
estimated coefficients gives a positive or negative sign for the principal minors. Both fiiU 
and reduced form estimates were calculated for all models. 
Convexity in prices could not be satisfied for the five models (Overall, north < 200 GRT, 
north > 200 GRT, south < 200 GRT, south > 200 GRT). The requirement of aU 
principal minors being positive definite was not met in the reduced form of the 
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estimations as zero observations in complete rows made the sign of the principal minor 
zero. Full estimates had mainly positive signs, with some negative determinants, though 
none were indicative of negative definiteness. 
In the overall model the own price supply elasticities for three of the five species are 
positive and significantiy different from zero (see section 3.1.3.11). In the four regional 
models four of six own price elasticities are positive and significant, one was not 
significantly different from zero, and the price elasticity for Bigeye in the larger vessels in 
the north is negative and significantiy different from zero. This latter result is possibly 
indicative of a problem, though the signs of all principal minors in the reduced form and 
the full form of the model suggest positive semidefiniteness. 
The rejection of convexity is not viewed as a problem and these results are comparable 
to the results of previously cited studies where convexity in prices was also rejected 
(Kirkley, 1986). 
Concavity in the fixed factor. 
Concavity in the fixed factor, effort, ensures that revenue is increasing at a decreasing 
rate for increasing levels of effort. This is consistent with the requirements for a well 
behaved revenue function. However quasi-concavity in the fixed factor is also a 
sufficient condition for a well behaved revenue function (Diewert, 1974). This allows 
constant retums to the fixed input without violating the required conditions. 
For the overall model the estimates of the Bi term as reported in Table 3.3b indicate that 
for all species concavity or quasi-concavity in the fixed input is satisfied. Further models 
presented for the northem and southem fishery satisfy this condition also (Table 3.9b), 
with the exception of increasing retums to effort for Bigeye produced by larger vessels in 
the southem area. 
Symmetry. 
Symmetry can be tested for by the econometric restriction: Bij=6ji, i t^ j . In this study 
L^ tests were used to compare the restricted case when symmetry was imposed with the 
unrestricted mn. Symmetry test results are reported in Table 3.9c. The hypothesis of 
symmetry was rejected for large vessels and could not be rejected for small vessels in 
both die north and south of the fishery. The failure to satisfy symmetry is not necessarily 
a rejection of revenue maximisation by fishing fums. Kkkley, (1986) notes that 
inadequate data, method of output aggregation and cross price coefficients reflecting 
area decisions in response to price changes, may lead to the rejection of symmetry. 
Despite the rejection of symmetry, it was imposed on the model to satisfy theoretical 
requkements. 
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Goodness of fit. 
Eariier in the study the System R2 was determined for the overall fishery model by two 
methods. The system R2, system Generalized R2, and individual equation ordinary R2 
results are reported in Table 3.9d. The system Generalized R2, after correction for 
heteroscedasticity, varied between 0.542 and 0.742, which indicates a moderate fit for 
the system. Ordinary R2 results were low for many of the individual species input 
compensated supply equations. 
3.1.3.8 Technology tests for dummy variables, input-output separabiUty and 
nonjointness. 
For each model the following hypotheses were tested by likelihood ratio tests. That the 
coefficients on: 
a) all dummy variables as a group are equal to zero Ho:Dt=0; Qni=0; 
b) annual dummy variables are equal to zero Ho:Dt=0; 
c) seasonal dummy variables are equal to zero Ho:Qni=0; 
Conditional upon these, the following technology hypotheses were tested. That the 
coefficients on: 
d) all technology variables as a group are equal to zero HQ:Bii=0, Bi=0, Bij=0; 
e) the Bi terms are equal to zero HQ:Bi=0; 
f) the Bij terms are equal to zero HQ:Bij=0; 
g) the Bij terms are equal to zero HQ:BIJ=0; 
Hypothesis (e) is the test for input-output separability, hypothesis (f) is the test for 
overall nonjointness, and hypothesis (g) is the test for individual nonjointness for each 
species. 
The results of each hypothesis for aU four models are shown individuaUy in Appendices 
(Table A3.1.2a,b,c and d). However for ease of interpretation the results, including the 
overall model, are presented in Tables 3.10a and b. 
Following the tests each model was estimated in the fuU and reduced or fmal form using 
only significant parameters determined by the L^ tests. The coefficients for each model 
are presented in Table 3.3b and Appendix Tables A3.1.3a,b,c,d. For ease of 
interpretation Table 3.11 compares the significant coefficients for the five models. 
75 
3.1.3.9 Technology test results. 
All the models reported in Table 3.10a have significant annual and seasonal dummy 
variables which are indicative of the inter-annual variation of stock availability and the 
inter-seasonal availability of fish. This may be due to stock movements or variation due 
to the movement of the East Australia Current. Significant variation in abundance is 
consistent with tuna species Uving on the edges of their global distribution limits (Cole, 
1980). 
The technology results for the diffprent fisheries are reported in Table 3.10b. In all 
fisheries there is a significant relationship between effort, as represented by the constant 
term (Bii) i" ^^^ ^ ^^^^ P^^ ""^^ ^ ^^^^ equation, and the catch of each species. 
Input-output separability, (Bi) was found for both sizes of vessel in the northern fishery 
and small vessels in the southem fishery. This means that the catch per unit effort does 
not vary with the level of effort at the vessel level and that the species mix of catch does 
not vary with the level of fishing effort, although it may vary with relative product prices. 
Large vessels operating in the south are not subject to input-output separability and 
experience decreasing catch per unit effort as the level of effort increases. 
The results for overall nonjointness, reported in Table 3.10b indicate that the production 
process in the southem fishery is joint, whereas the technology in the northem fishery is 
generally nonjoint. From the overview of coefficient results reported in Table 3.11, it 
can be seen that vessels operating in the northem region have little opportunity to 
influence species mix. The only significant joint production relationship in the north is 
substimtion by large vessels between Yellowfin and Swordfish and is orUy at the 5% 
level of significance. The production of large vessels in the north can be considered as 
nonjoint for management purposes, whereas the smaU vessel catch in the northem fishery 
is technically determined. These results suggest there is little scope for management to 
control harvests by output regulations on individual species in the northem fishery. 
Production in the southem region was found to be joint for both vessel classes with 
vessels having the opportunity to vary the species mix of the catch m a number of ways 
(Table 3.10b and 3.11). For both sizes of vessels Bigeye and YeUowfin were 
complements, Bigeye and Swordfish were substitutes, and for larger vessels Albacore 
and Bigeye were substitutes. These relationships indicate that a quota on Bigeye would 
reduce the production of Yellowfin and would lead to producers substituting to Albacore 
and Swordfish. 
The analysis of the data for the overall fishery indicated that Marlin and Yellowfin were 
complements and Marlm and Swordfish were substitutes. These results were not 
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confirmed in the separate analysis of the northern region or southern regions. However 
Marlin and Swordfish may be targeted by vessels moving between the two regions as 
Marlin are more abundant in the north and Swordfish in the south. These billfish species 
are also highly migratory. 
Table 3.11 also reports individual technology results for the different species. From 
examination of the Bii, coefficients the relationship between catch and effort in the 
production of Bigeye is not significantiy different from zero, whereas there is a positive 
relationship between the catch and effort for Yellowfin in all fisheries. It is probable that 
Bigeye catches are seasonal as reported in Table 3.12. 
The results for annual and seasonal dummy coefficients have been ranked for ease of 
interpretation and are reported in Table 3.12 (see Table A3.1.3. for coefficients). 
Likelihood ratio tests indicate that annual and seasonal availability pattems differ 
between the northem and southem regions, and between large and small vessels. The 
latter result is likely due to the different areas fished by large and small vessels. 
The years of the study 1984-1989 are designated years 0-5 and are listed in declining 
order of catch rates by species for the overall fishery (refer Table 3.12 top right hand 
side). If a fish stock was declining consistently over the period of the analysis, the years 
would be ranked in the order 0-5 with a perfect positive correlation between the rank 
and the year number. Albacore and Bigeye generally have positive correlations between 
the rank and the year number and the remaining species have negative correlations. 
However none of the correlations is significant enough to provide evidence of a change 
in stock availabiUty over the six years considered. A longer study period would be 
required to assess the sigruficance of any trends in catch rate. Sustainability is 
investigated in Chapter 5. 
The seasons are described by quarterly dummy variables with the base quarter (0) being 
defined as January-March. The quarters are listed in declining order of catch rates in 
Table 3.12 top left hand side. The results for each species for the overall fishery are 
reported and can be compared with the regional results for each vessel class. 
The seasonal variations in catch rates for all species were more pronounced in the 
southem fishery, which is south of the tropics, than in the north. Seasonal results appear 
more pronounced for large vessels in the southem region (Table 3.12 Ihs). Significant 
variations in the southem region from the seasonal pattem in the overall fishery include: 
the Swordfish fishery which peaks in Q3, (October to December); and the Yellowfin and 
Albacore fishery which peaks in Ql, (April to June) in the southem fishery adjacent to 
Lord Howe island. 
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The results presented are only part of the information available from the revenue 
function. Other information on production relationships can be derived by examining the 
elasticities calculated from estimated equations. The theory and method for calculation 
of different elasticities is presented in section 3.1.3.10 and elasticity results in section 
3.1.3.11 prior to the discussion of all results in section 3.1.4. 
3.1.3.10 Product supply, product specific scale elasticities and elasticities of 
transformation. 
Input compensated elasticities of supply and product specific scale elasticities enable the 
interactions between prices, effort and supplies of each species to be quantified for 
management purposes. The input compensated elasticities reported are calculated at the 
sample mean of the variables using the test command in SHAZAM. The test command 
stores the estimates and errors and can perform any linear transformation required. The 
errors from the test command estimates wUl be normally distributed if the coefficients 
estimated by the Generalized Leontief are normal. The computer uses a linear 
approximation to a non-linear fiinction, sometimes called the delta method, to establish 
asymptotic normal (t test) values used to assess statistical significance. 
AUen partial elasticities of transformation are also calculated primarily for validation of 
regularity conditions. 
Price elasticities of supply. 
The own and cross price input compensated price elasticities of supply are evaluated at 
sample means of prices and harvests. Own price elasticities are given by: 
8ii= dYi/dPi • PiA^ 
For the supply function (3.3): 
dYi Z 
. . . . = . 1/2 . . . . X Bij Pj'/2 
dPi Pi3/2 j=i 
Z 1 
p. . - y R.. p-Vi 
2Yi (Pif^ j=i 
Own price elasticities of supply show the percentage change m quantity supplied for a 
percentage change in price. Cross price elasticities are given by the following formula: 
8ij = dYi/dPj. PA^ 
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Elasticity for each of the supply equations with respect to Pj is: 
— = Bii ^/(Pi)''^' '/^  (Pj)'"'^ " 2 = '/^  "^ ii ^/(PiPj)''^' Z 
dPj 
so that £ij = V2 Bij l/(PiPj) /^2 Z • PAT. 
The supply elasticities indicate not only the possibility for technical and economic 
interactions, but also whether products are substitutes or complements. For substitute 
goods, dYi/dP2 < 0 and for complements dYi/dP2 > 0. 
Kirkley and Strand (1988) have noted possible problems with the price elastickies and 
recommend that they be interpreted with caution. They note that the level of 
aggregation of output may cause aggregation bias in the estimates with the result that 
negative and statistically insignificant own price elasticities are obtained (Gates, 1984). 
MulticolUnearity may also be a problem because of insufficient variability in output 
prices, the outcome being insignificant parameter estimates. This can be checked by 
assessing the coefficients of variation of right hand side variables in equation (3.1). The 
coefficients of variation in this study were between 0.15 and 0.339 (Table 3.13). These 
were much lower than coefficients obtained by Kirkley and Strand (1988) who found 
greater variation among species prices, with coefficients of variation between 0.60-0.82. 
This may reflect the aggregated nature of the Japanese price data set. 
The input compensated price elasticities were estimated from the reduced form of the 
model with the species that were nonjoint excluded. Where an individual species is 
nonjointiy produced there are no cross price interactions with other species and hence 
zero cross price elasticities. There is a zero own price elasticity for nonjointiy produced 
species. 
From Laitinen (1980) it is apparent that when a product is nonjoint-in-inputs, the supply 
fiinction will simply be the single output production function with no price effects. Since 
the firm's technology is captured irrespective of price, there are no own input 
compensated price elasticities. Another way of explaining the zero own price elasticities 
for nonjointiy produced products is that there is zero homogeneity in prices when using 
the Generalized Leontief form, thus: 
5 dlnYi dlnYi 5 dlnYi 
Y, = 0, = - X = 0 because 
j=l dlnPj dUiPi j=2 dlnPj 
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by nonjointness-in-inputs 
dlnY 
= 0, j = 2,...5. 
dlnPj 
The elasticities are calculated from the final model estimates reported in Table A3.1.3 
and are reported in Table 3.14a and b. 
Product specific scale elasticities. 
Input compensated product specific scale elasticities measure the percentage change in a 
specific output for a percentage change in input, given output prices. Willig (1979) and 
Panzar and WiUig (1977 and 1979) suggest that the product specific retums elasticity 
evaluated at the optimum output level is a measure of multiple output technology as it 
indicates the change between a specific output, and all inputs, given product prices. 
Kkkley (1986) refers to this as the partial equilibrium product specific scale elasticity. 
The input compensated product specific scale elasticity (Kirkley, 1986) is given by: 
£iz = Bii + 2 Bi Z + I j Bij(Pj/Pif^. Z/Yi 
The elasticity is calculated at sample means and shows for each species how a rise (or 
fall) in a vessel's effort will increase (or decrease) the catch of a given species. Input 
compensated product specific scale elasticity results for the northem and southem 
fisheries and their respective tonnage groups are reported in Tables 3.15. 
Allen partial elasticities of transformation. 
AUen partial elasticities of transformation indicate the degree of transformation between 
the outputs pairs in response to price changes. The elasticities measure the normalized 
change in supply due to a change in output price holding aU other prices and the 
composite input, effort, constant. They can be obtained by dividing the input 
compensated price elasticities of supply by the revenue share of each output (Hanoch, 
1978): 
£i| 
a i j= -•'-
J^ 
where Oij is the AUen partial elasticity of transformation, 8^ is the elasticity of supply, 
and Sj the revenue share of output for species j . The AUen partial elasticity is a one 
output, one price elasticity, and is also symmetric aij= Oji. The AUen partial elasticities 
are reported in Appendix Table A3.1.4 for each of the models and form the basis of tests 
for convexity in prices. Substitutability can be ascertained from the price elasticities of 
supply and only the major relationships for Allen partial elasticities will be discussed. 
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3.1.3.11 Elasticity results. 
Price elasticities of supply. 
Where production is joint in nature, as in the southem region, a change in relative species 
prices wiU result in a change in the species mix of the catch, with reductions in the 
catches of some species and increases in catches of others, for the same level of vessel 
effort. These changes in catches are described by input compensated price elasticities of 
supply which report the percentage change in the quantity of a species supplied in 
response to a 1% increase in the price of that species or another species. The supply 
response elasticities quantify the substitute/complement relationships already reported in 
section 3.1.3.9 Input compensated price elasticities of supply are reported in Table 
3.14a and b. 
Since smaller vessels in the northem region of the fishery were nonjoint in production, 
the supply of species for the smaller vessels in that region wUl depend on price indirectly 
through the effect of prices on the level of effort. Larger vessels in the northem region 
have joint production and the significant supply responses are as follows: 
Large Vessels (> 200 GRT) Table 3.14b 
A 1% rise in the price of Swordfish results in a 1.54% decline in the catch of Yellowfin; 
A 1% rise in the price of Yellowfin results in a 0.22% fall in the catch of Swordfish. 
There are also changes in the supply of Swordfish in response to changes in their own 
price in the northem fishery. The result for Swordfish is positive and indicates: 
A 1% rise in the price of Swordfish results in a 1.4% rise in the catch of Swordfish. 
In the southem region the species mix of the catch responds to changes in relative prices, 
with the level of vessel effort held constant. The sigruficant supply responses in the 
southem region are summarised as follows: 
Small Vessels (< 200 GRT) Table 3.14b. 
A 1% rise in the price of YeUowfin results in a 0.9% rise in the catch of Bigeye; 
A 1% rise in the price of Bigeye results in a 0.5% rise in the catch of YeUowfin; 
A 1% rise in the price of Bigeye results in a 0.06% decline in the catch of Swordfish; 
A 1% rise in the price of Swordfish results in a 0.38% decline in the catch of Bigeye; 
Large Vessels (> 200 GRT) Table 3.14b 
A 1% rise in the price of Bigeye results in a 0.4% decline in the catch of Albacore; 
A 1% rise in the price of Albacore results in a 0.3% decline in the catch of Bigeye; 
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A 1 % rise in the price of Bigeye results in a 0.6% rise in the catch of Yellowfin; 
A 1 % rise in the price of Yellowfin results in a 0.3% rise in the catch of Bigeye. 
A 1% rise in the price of Bigeye results in a 0.44% decline in the catch of Swordfish; 
A 1% rise in the price of Swordfish results in a 0.33% decline in the catch of Bigeye; 
There are also changes in the supply of some species in response to changes in their own 
price. The most significant result is for large vessels catching Albacore in the southem 
region: 
A 1% rise in the price of Albacore results in a 0.8% rise in the catch of Albacore. 
These elasticity estimates can be used by fishery managers to gauge the effect of species 
specific royalty or catch quota policies on the species mix of catch. Assuming that such 
policies could be enforced, the species mix of the catch could be influenced to some 
extent by the management authority. 
Product specific scale elasticities. 
The product specific scale elasticities are calculated from the full models with aU 
coefficients and a'-e reported in Tables 3.15. AU of the product specific scale elasticities 
for Albacore, Yellowfin and Marlin, and aU but one of the elasticities for Bigeye, are 
significantiy different from zero. Only one product specific scale elasticity for Swordfish 
is significant. 
In the overall fishery results Yellowfin has a product specific scale elasticity slightly over 
unity indicating that a 1 % rise in per vessel effort wUl lead to a 1.1% rise m the supply of 
Yellowfin, whereas Albacore has a more responsive elasticity of 1.6. The Marlin 
product scale elasticity coefficient is positive indicating that a 1 % rise in per vessel effort 
would increase Marlin supply by 1.1%. 
In the northem fishery the results for smaU vessels show the product specific scale 
elasticity for Albacore is particularly effort elastic, as a 1% rise in per vessel effort would 
produce a 3.2% rise in the per vessel supply of Albacore, whereas the response for large 
vessels is unity. Smularly the product specific scale elasticities for Yellowfin show smaU 
vessels have higher elasticities than larger vessels. Product specific scale elasticities for 
the larger vessels in the northem fishery are significant for aU species, whereas the results 
for smaU vessels in the north show no elasticities significantiy different from zero for 
Bigeye and Swordfish. 
In the southem fishery both vessel sizes have positive and significant product specific 
scale elasticities for Albacore, Bigeye, Yellowfin and Marlin. The product specific scale 
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elasticities for Albacore and Yellowfin are higher for small vessels than for large vessels. 
Larger vessels have a higher product specific scale elasticity for Marlin than the smaUer 
vessels in the south. The southem elasticity results are higher than those in the northem 
fishery. 
Allen partial elasticities of transformation. 
The estimated Allen partial elasticities of transformation are reported in Table A3.1.4 
and indicate the degree of transformation between the outputs pairs in response to price 
changes. These are a one output one price elasticity of transformation and it can be seen 
that for a given price elasticity of supply (£«), the higher the revenue share (Sj), the 
lower the Allen partial elasticity of transformation (ajj). For a given revenue share, £ij 
and (Jij will be directiy related. 
The transformation elasticities were significant for the large vessels in the southem 
fishery. A complimentary transformation exists between Yellowfin and Bigeye (1.99) and 
a substitute transformation exists between Swordfish and Bigeye (-1.9). Both Allen 
partial elasticities of transformation are price elastic indicating the responsiveness of 
these output pairs to relative price changes. 
3.1.4 Discussion. 
This section compares the production results for the different regions of the fishery and 
then discusses general modelling issues and concludes with discussion of the 
management implications of the revenue function production analysis results. 
3.1.4.1 Comparison of production between the north, south and the overall model. 
Likelihood ratio tests were used to compare the northem and the southem fisheries 
which were found to have significantly different production processes. SimUarly tests 
established that there were significant differences between smaller and larger vessels in 
each fishery. 
From the results in Table 3.10b and 3.11 smaller vessels in the northem fishery had 
nonjoint production, with evidence of individual jointness for Swordfish at the 5% level 
of significance only. This contrasts with the southem fishery where both vessel classes 
were found to be joint in production. Bigeye and Yellowfin were produced as 
complements and substitution relationships were found for Bigeye and Swordfish and 
Bigeye and Albacore (Table 3.11). 
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The overall model shows the substitution relationships between Albacore and Yellowfin 
and between Marlin and Swordfish, but these relationships were not confirmed in the 
separate regional analysis. Tables 1.4b and c show that catch rates of Albacore, 
Yellowfin and Marlin are higher in the northem region whereas catch rates of Bigeye and 
Swordfish are higher in the southem region. The overall model picks up these 
relationships for the wider region, whereas the separate regional analysis gives more 
specific relationships by area as intended. In the six years study period approximately 
307 vessels traversed between the north and the south, in a given month. This was 
approximately 30% of the fishing activity in the overall fishery. 
Table 1.4c reports that approximately 82% of the observed Swordfish catch from the 
total fishery is from the southem area where it is obtained by 63% of the effort in the 
total fishery. However Black and Blue Marlin are more abundant in the north where 81-
88% of the total catch for these species is obtained by 31% of the total effort in the 
fishery. The substitution relationships between Marlin and Swordfish and Yellowfin and 
Albacore in the overall model probably captures wider substitution relationships between 
the northem and southem fisheries occurring due to boat movements, stock movements 
and stock flucmations. Swordfish and all Marlin species in this region are considered to 
be highly migratory (Skillmann, 1989). This is an interesting resuU and suggests the 
modelling approach should cover as much of the area of distribution of a highly 
migratory species as possible. 
3.1.4.2 General modelling discussion points. 
The model yielded many results consistent witii anecdotal information about seasonal 
and regional feamres of the fishery. Eariier in the Chapter the correlation between 
annual dummy variables and relative price variables were noted and reported in Table 
3.4a. The correlation coefficients suggest that a significant proportion of the relative 
price variable may be correlated with the annual dummies which were included to 
capture annual variations in fish availability. The correlations are strongest in years 5 
and 6, and for the Swordfish-Yellowfin, Swordfish-Bigeye, and Swordfish-Albacore 
relative price variables. The correlations may understate the importance of these relative 
price relationships. 
Table 3.4b reports the results of a regression of the relative price term on the annual and 
seasonal dummies. Annual and seasonal factors explain between 25% and 87% of the 
variation in relative prices. The highest results are for the Swordfish relative price 
variables. The results confirm the direct correlation analysis. 
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One assumption of the analysis is that there was no development in the efficiency of the 
fishing gear used during the six years of the study period. Had there been rapid gear 
technology improvements these might have been detected as shift parameters or slope 
shifts in the modelling approach used. During preliminary modelling a series of technical 
shift and slope dummy variables were included to see if there had been technological 
improvement. The anecdotal evidence from observers was that there were no fishing 
gear improvements made during the period, but that improved satellite and temperature 
location electronic gear were introduced over the 1980's. However this trend was not 
consistent across every vessel in the fleet (Baron, pers. comm.). 
There was no evidence of a consistent increase in the coefficients of the technology 
dummy variables, in either intercept or slope form, as would be expected if technology 
was improving consistentiy. Further investigation noted that many of the vessels coming 
into the zone did not retum in the six year period. Thus it was not possible to detect 
improvements in technology. This is a common problem in the interpretation of catch 
and effort data in tuna fisheries modelling (Au, 1985). 
3.1.4.3 Management implications of the production relationships. 
Fisheries management attempts to control the fishing mortality of a fish stock by 
regulating the fishing industry using either input or output restrictions. Managers often 
assume that all vessels have similar technologies and operational strategies and wiU 
respond uniformly to regulation (Kirkley, 1986). When a regulation has a different 
impact on one section of the industry the manager will face complaints of inequity. In 
managing foreign fishing the manager wishes to understand the different responses of 
vessels to regulations as communication with fishers is usually poorer than with domestic 
fishers. In extreme cases misunderstanding the effects of regulation may result in 
inadequate restrictions on fishers and lead to overfishing of the fish stock. 
The Japanese longline fishery in the east Australian area has been under the management 
of the Australian govemment since 1979 when the AFZ was declared. Management of 
the foreign fishers has been by seasonal and zonal closures and by limitation of the 
number of foreign vessels fishing the zone, a gross control on effort. The uncertainty 
regarding stock stmcture, stock abundance and stock management objectives in the 
fishery has dominated past management. There has been no previous analysis of the 
stmcture of technology and the possible economic responses of fishers to regulations. 
This means that single species biological specifications of technology have been assumed 
for all of the fishery. Given the uncertainty regarding stock, the information on 
technology provided in this chapter will be an asset to any management plan. 
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The results indicate that the management of the fishery should consider the northern and 
southem areas separately rather than as one overall fishery. The vessels in the southem 
fishery were found to be joint in production, whereas in the northern fishery vessels were 
only individually joint for two species at the 5% level of significance and can be 
considered as being nonjoint for management purposes. This suggests that management 
of the northem area may be undertaken on a "biomass" or individual species basis 
(Kkkley, 1986). This means that managers should not use differential species quotas or 
royalties in the northem area, as the same result can be obtained from effort regulations 
at less administrative cost. 
Production decisions in the southem area have been proven to be related to output prices 
and fish availability. Management should consider that firms wUl respond to market 
prices and stock abundance in their production decisions, and monitoring of relative 
price relationships in the south would be recommended. The three relationships in the 
south, Bigeye and Yellowfin (as complements), Swordfish and Bigeye, and Albacore and 
Bigeye (as substitutes), suggest that a management imposed quota on Yellowfin or 
Bigeye would restrict the production of the other species. SimUarly quota restrictions on 
the harvest of Bigeye would increase production of Albacore as producers substitute 
between these two species. The strength of the relationship is given by the cross 
elasticity coefficient. 
The results suggest a separate management regime could be devised for the southern 
fishery. This may not be feasible as introducing output controls in the southem area 
would increase administrative costs and would work only if the policy could be enforced. 
The management of the east Australian area will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
The results in this study indicate that fishers do not have control over the MarUn 
component of their catch which is technically determined. Management has discouraged 
the targeting of Black and Blue Marlin in the east Australian region, seeking the 
cooperation of the Japanese govemment and fishing industry to take only Striped Marlin 
(Ward et al., 1991). The result should be interpreted with care as the aggregation of the 
three Marlin species into one Marlin variable may give misleading policy results if 
interpreted for an individual species. 
The overall model results point to the need to manage the highly migratory species 
Swordfish and Marlin over the area of the whole fishery rather than in northem and 
southem regions. The area model results suggest that only a reduction in the effort 
levels in the fishery would reduce the catch of Martin. However if the wider substihition 
relationships are valid there may be substitution to Swordfish. 
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The results for goodness of fit of the model suggest a good fit for the system of 
equations. However the robustness of the estimations may be questioned on the basis of 
individual ordinary R^ equation results, which explain only a fraction of the total 
variabUity in the catches for a species in the fishery. It is not clear as to the predictive 
capacity of the model in the face of a highly variable and uncertain fishery. This would 
be of concem for adoption of the joint modelling framework by management. 
3.1.5 Conclusions. 
In this section the Japanese technology of production in the overall fishery and the 
northem and southem areas has been estimated. The estimations concentrated on 
technology and on accounting for variation in production by size of vessel and area of 
operation. Significant differences were found between the northern and southem 
fisheries with implications for management policy. These will be discussed in Chapter 6, 
Policy. The results also indicate the need to take account of the movement of highly 
migratory species in setting policies. 
The results in this section have made no attempt to establish whether the amount of 
effort being applied to the fishery by the Japanese is optimal in terms of profitability and 
sustainability. This wUl be undertaken in Chapter 5. In the rest of this Chapter the 
spatial nature of production will be investigated further as the east-west dimension is 
added to see how distance from shore influences catches. This is an essential part of 
future policy making in the region, as previous management measures have used fifty 
mile distances from the coast to exclude Japanese fishing vessels. 
3.2. Zonal production. 
The fishery was divided into northem and southem regions using the 25° Une of latimde 
and tests concluded that production is significantly different in the two regions and 
between vessel size groups. More area specific estimations are required for sub-zones in 
the east-west direction as past management regulations have used distance from the 
coast to allocate zones for domestic and foreign access to the AFZ. In this section the 
modelling approach previously developed wUl be used to analyse production by sub-
zone. The technology of production has already been established and only the sub-zonal 
results will be described. 
3.2.1 Data. 
The same source data set was used as in the previous analysis but the data were summed 
on a sub-zonal basis. 
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3.2.1.1 Construction of the zones. 
Past management of both the domestic and foreign fisheries has used zonation based on 
distance from the Australian coast, usually 12 or 50 nautical miles. In analysis of future 
policy options segmentation of the AFZ by lines of 50 nautical miles width was deemed 
most appropriate. Constmction of the zones used geographical coordinates of the 
Australian coastiine and of the Australian Fishing Zone from the Data Animation in Real 
Time (DART) mapping software (BRR, 1990). 
Ten sub-zones 50 miles wide were constmcted with the maximum error being 3 miles in 
200 in places where the Australian coastline was irregularly indented and baseline 
coordinates, as opposed to coastiine coordinates, were not available. Calibration of the 
sub-zones was checked with the coordinates of the Australian Fishing Zone boundary 
from DART (BRR, 1990). The constmcted sub-zones are presented in Figure 3.2a. The 
individual data points in both the north and the south were sorted into their respective 
sub-zones and zonal dummy variables were constmcted for the production analysis. 
The northern fishery. 
The southem portion of the northem fishery, south of 21°S, was easily constmcted 
adding fifty nautical miles to the coastal baseline. The northem portion was more 
difficult to zone due to the baseline effectively being the edge of the Great Barrier Reef 
Marine Park, and 'Box 171', an area restricted to the handline tuna fishing method only. 
To overcome this a rhumb line was constmcted between 12°S 146.4°E and 2 r S 154°E 
(Figure 3.2a). Sub-zones north of 21°S were fifty nautical miles from this Une that 
approximates to the coastiine. Inside this Une was the irregularly shaped triangle 
bounded by 17°S 149°E, 18.5°S 149°E, and 21°S 153°E. This innermost sub-zone was 
the base zone for the zonal dummy variable. Ten fifty nautical mile sub-zones extended 
out to the edge of the AFZ. 
The southern fishery. 
In the southem fishery ten 50 nautical mile zones extend to the furthest part of the AFZ, 
east of Lord Howe island as shown in Figure 3.2a. Zone zero, (0-5C miles) was chosen 
as the base zone for dummy variables. However the Japanese were excluded from the 
first twelve nautical miles of zone one during the 1984-1989 study period. There also 
has been a seasonal closure in force for the period 31st December-31st March for the 
whole of zone zero south of 29° south for each year of the study. Thus in the fu-st 
quarter of the year it should be noted that the zone zero variable reflects Japanese fishing 
in the northem part of zone zero. 
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Figure 3.2a: The ten fifty mUe sub-zones in the northem and southem Japanese fisheries 
of the eastem Australian Fishing Zone. 
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Figure 3.2b: The six sub-zones in the northem and southem Japanese fisheries in the 
northem and southem Japanese fisheries of the eastem Australian Fishing Zone. Zones 
0-3 are 50 miles wide, and zones 4 and 5 are 150 miles wide. 
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3.2.2. The zonal model. 
The five species revenue function model (equation 3.2) was adjusted to include a 
multiplicative dummy variable term for each zone: 
R(Z,P) = l i l j Bij (Pi Pj)l/2 z + I i BiPi Z2 
+ l i l t "it DtPiZ + l i l m Mim QmPiZ + l i l l vii NiPiZ (3.5) 
where Nj is the dummy variable for zone where 1 represents the zone (0-50 n. miles from 
shore is the base zone). The supply equations thus become: 
dR(Z;P) 
= Yi(Z;P) = BiiZ + BiZ2 + I t ait Dt Z + 1 ^ liim Qm Z 
^ i 
IlViiNiZ + IjBij(Pj/Pi)l/2z (3.6) 
by Hotelling's Lemma. The presence of heteroscedasticity meant the estimated form of 
the supply function was: 
Yk(Zk;P) 
= 6ii + BiZk + I t ttit Dt + I m njjn Qm 
Zk 
+ I i vii Ni + I j Bij(Pj/Pi)l/2 + 8^ (3.7) 
where Ej^^ is an error term assumed to satisfy the OLS requirements being normally 
distributed with zero mean and constant variance. 
3.2.3 Estimation. 
3.2.3.1 Data and zones. 
The purpose of the zonal dummies is to establish how position relative to the coast wiU 
alter the availabiUty of fish. The fifty mile zonal widths were considered appropriate to 
address some of the future policy questions. 
With the disaggregation of observations by year, month, and boat, to a further level of 
year, month, boat and sub-zone, more zero dependent variables occurred as reported in 
Table 3.16. The disaggregation to zone increased the number and range of species that 
had levels of zero dependent variables above 10%. 
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In the northem fishery approximately 80% of the catch and effort of smaller vessels was 
in the inner 200 miles of the zone as reported in Table 1.6b. It was noted that the zero 
dependent variable problem in the north was greater in the outer area. This led to the six 
outermost zones being amalgamated into two zones of 150 miles each. Thus the first 
four zones from the coast were 50 miles wide and the last two zones were 150 miles 
wide making six zones in all (Figure 3.2b). This lessened the disaggregation in the data 
set and made the percentages of zero dependent variables more acceptable as reported in 
Table 3.16. The six zone model emphasised the 200 miles adjacent to the Australian 
coast and was suited to the policy issues to be addressed in this study. 
3.2.3.2 Tests for the technology characteristics of the zonal model. 
The zonal model was tested using general-to-specific technology tests and the results 
are reported in Table 3.17a. The null hypothesis HQ: the coefficients on all dummy 
variables as a group are equal to zero was strongly rejected and all dummy variables 
should be included in the model. Similar tests established that all zonal dummy variables 
as a group, and dummy variables for each of the six single sub-zones, should be included 
in the model. 
As previously indicated in the introduction to this Chapter the technology of the fishery 
has already been established in section 3.1 and the purpose of section 3.2 is to estimate 
relative availabiUty of species with distance from the coast. The use of dummy variables 
means that the estimated function shifts in response to changes in the relative availabUity 
of tuna in each sub-zone. The next part of this section briefly outiines the tests for 
divisions of the zonal model into separate fisheries and separate tonnage classes. 
Regularity conditions are briefly reported to support the zonal model's validity given the 
more disaggregated data set and the higher levels of zero dependent variables. 
The data were divided into northem and southem observations by the Une of latitude 
25°S, observations now numbering 3995, as in each year some vessels had been fishing 
in several sub-zones in the northem and the southem area ki the same month. Of the 
3995 observations, 1343 were from the north and 2652 were from the south. LUcelihood 
ratio tests established that the northem and southem fishery were significantly different 
across all parameters, and in zonal, annual, seasonal and technology parameters in 
particular. The results of the tests are reported in Table A3.2.1a. 
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In the northem and southem fisheries the influence of vessel tonnage on production was 
tested by a series of likelihood ratio tests where in the restricted case the coefficients on 
parameters were constrained to be equal for both tonnage classes under and over 200 
GRT. The results, reported in Table A3.2.1b and c, support the division of the northem 
and southem fisheries. The zonal model was mn for vessels above and below 200 GRT 
for the northem and southem areas. The estimated coefficients for the full model are 
reported in Appendix Tables A3.2.2abcd. 
The zonal model is an extension of the original model and it is expected that 
disaggregation of the data set may make regularity conditions more difficult to ftilfil. In 
the overall six zone model aU predicted dependent variable estimates were checked for 
monotonicity (Table A3.2.3a). For Albacore, Bigeye, and Marlin all predicted supplies 
were positive, whereas for Yellowfin and Swordfish only 98% of predicted supplies were 
positive. Given the number of observations, 3995 and the disaggregation of the model, 
this was an acceptable result. 
Convexity in prices was rejected across aU models as in the previous section 3.1.3.10. 
The signs of the own price elasticities were estimated and only one species, Bigeye, had 
a negative and significant elasticity. Although convexity in prices has been rejected there 
is unlikely to be serious problem (Hunt, 1984). 
The move to six zones led to constant retums to the fixed factor, effort, being found for 
most species as reported in Table A3.2.3b(i) and (ii). Several individual results, 
particularly for Bigeye and Yellowfin, indicated increasing retums to effort. The 
problem was more pronounced in the southem area and may be related to the area 
exclusions applied to Japanese producers inshore (Kirkley, 1986). In obtaining increasing 
retums to effort for one class of vessel, Kirkley (1986, p 141) suggests that these are due 
to "firms harvesting large quantities of cod in an area in which only limited fishing is 
possible because of bad weather or distance from shore" and concludes that it may not be 
possible to increase effort in these offshore areas. In the present context substantial 
catches can be taken in a given sub-zone, but it may not be practical to increase effort as 
the highly migratory fish stocks move from the area. The data set does not record the 
time spent searching for fish aggregations and this omission may also lead to apparently 
increasing retums to effort for some species. Theory requires concavity or quasi-
concavity in the fixed factor (Diewert, 1974). The results were accepted as satisfactory 
given the overall results, the experience of Kkkley (1986), and the level of 
disaggregation of the data in the zonal model. 
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Symmetry was rejected for all but one of the zonal models (Table A3.2.3c). This result 
may be due to the introduction of sub-zones as in the previous model symmetry could 
generally not be rejected. It also may support the assertion of Kirkley, (1986) that the 
symmetry condition is affected by the area decisions of producers and irregularities in the 
data. Symmetry was imposed on the model in keeping with theoretical requirements. 
The Generalized R^ values for the system and the individual equations are reported in 
Table A3.2.3d and show that the fit for the model is poorer than for the non-zonal less 
disaggregated model, especially for the smaller vessels in the northem fishery on which 
there are fewest observations. Given the disaggregation of the data the system 
Generalized R^ values are acceptable being between 0.58 and 0.66, though the smaller 
vessel results in the northem fishery, for which there are fewest observations, are lowest, 
at an R2 of 0.25. 
In conclusion the results of the six zone model are reasonable and the zonal model 
dummy variable results for the relative availability of species can be accepted. 
3.2.3.3 Results of the six zone models. 
The zonal model has been estimated for different vessel classes in the northem and 
southem fisheries. An example of the estimated coefficients can be seen in Table 3.17b. 
The estimated zonal coefficients have been ranked and are reported in Table 3.18. In 
comparing dummy variables for sub-zone it should be noted that all values are relative to 
the appropriate base zone. In the northem area the base zone is on the outer edge of the 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park as opposed to the southem area where the base zone is 
closer to the coast line (see Figure 3.2b). 
From Table 3.18 it can be seen that Albacore have greater availability in the outer area of 
the AFZ. In the northem fishery the zonal dummy coefficients from sub-zone 2-5 are 
significantly higher than the base zone, and are increasing with distance from shore. In 
the southem fishery the area from 200-350 miles from shore, adjacent to Lord Howe 
Island, has highest Albacore catch rates. 
In the northem fishery Bigeye availabiUty by sub-zone does not change significantly for 
smaU vessels with distance from shore. However larger vessels experience decreasing 
catch per unit of effort outside 150 miles from shore. In the southem fishery Bigeye 
catch rates are highest in the area 50-200 miles from shore. 
In both the northem and southem fisheries Yellowfin catch rates are greatest in the 
innermost 100 miles and diminish with distance from shore. In the northern fishery large 
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vessels have a statistically significant diminution in Yellowfin catch rate with distance 
from shore, whereas smaller vessels have a less significant result. 
Swordfish availabiUty is highly variable. In the northem fishery the catch rates are 
highest in the innermost 100 miles whilst in the south the outermost sub-zone had the 
greatest Swordfish catch rate being significantiy above the other Swordfish catch rates. 
The varied results reflect the highly migratory nature of this species (Skillman, 1989). 
Marlin availabiUty in the both fisheries is greatest in the area between 100 and 350 miles 
from shore though smaller vessels in the north show no significant difference in Marlin 
catch rate with sub-zone. 
3.2.3.4 Discussion and conclusions from the zonal results. 
The primary purpose of the zonal model was to establish variations in the production of 
species with distance from shore. The results as presented above indicate relative catch 
rates and should be interpreted in the light of total observed catches which show that in 
the north the area inside 200 miles from shore has approximately 80% of the northem 
catch (Table 1.6b). In the southem fishery the area outside 200 miles from shore has 
approximately 60-65% of the total southem catch and is relatively more important than 
in the north. 
The combination of the observed catch results and the model coefficients suggest that 
the inner zonal areas, particularly the area inside 150 miles from shore, are important for 
the two major sashkni tuna species, Bigeye and YeUowfin. Other tuna species, such as 
Albacore, are primarily offshore species having the greatest catch rates in the area of the 
AFZ outside 150 miles from shore. Marlins and Swordfish are highly migratory species 
and have highest catch rates in the outermost areas of the AFZ (Skillman, 1989). 
The move to the zonal model has given individual species information which is of use to 
management in determining the effect of area closures. From the zonal model it can be 
seen that the inner zones have significantly higher catch rates for the species most desired 
by the Japanese vessels, Bigeye and YeUowfin. This is also the area considered by 
domestic Australian fishers for future development of the inshore fishery. The study wUl 
now move to a more detailed comparison of technology for Japanese and Australian 
vessels in the inshore area. 
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3.3 A comparison of Japanese and Australian production. 
The purpose of this section is to compare the technologies of the Japanese and 
Australian tuna vessels operating in the eastem AFZ. The comparison is made difficult 
by several factors: firstly, the Australian fishery is an inshore fishery based on Yellowfin 
and is not really a multispecies fishery for many fishers; secondly, there are only a few 
areas in which the Japanese offshore and Australian inshore fisheries overlap and where 
it is possible to compare their operation based on the same stock availability conditions; 
and thirdly, even where the fisheries overlap there are various restrictions on access by 
the Japanese fleet. The twelve mile wide area adjacent to the coast is reserved for 
domestic vessels, and in the remainder of the two innermost fifty mile zones seasonal 
closures have been imposed on Japanese vessels, with no fishing in the December to 
March period for two of the years in the sample period, 1988 and 1989. 
3.3.1 Data. 
3.3.1.1 Catch and effort data. 
From catch and effort data for the Japanese and Australian fleets during the 1984-1989 
period an area of the fishery in which domestic vessels and Japanese vessels fished 
together was identified. Vessels of both nationalities are assumed to be fishing the same 
stock, but not necessarily the same proportion of the stock due to hydrographic features 
such as the continental shelf The biological literature is not clear on local stock 
stmcture. 
The domestic catch and effort data set was less comprehensive than the Japanese data set 
and covered the years 1987-1990. In this period there was only a relatively smaU area in 
which the Japanese and Australians were fishing together. This area is shown in Figure 
3.3 and will be used for modelling in this section of the study. 
The area selected was from 34°S to 25°S. The area below 34°S was not included as 
management closures have kept the Japanese from fishing in the AFZ adjacent to 
southem New South Wales. The study area was 100 miles wide and was split into two 
fifty mUe wide zones (Figure 3.3). Domestic vessels do not go far from shore due to 
thek limited size preferring the 50 mile wide strip adjacent to the coast reserved for 
Australian vessels (refer to Table 1.9 northem fishery). The comparison of Australian 
and Japanese production was confined to the area between 12 and 100 miles from shore 
where both Australian and Japanese vessels had access. 
3.3.1.2 Price data. 
Price data were available for the Japanese fleet for aU species in the area. The domestic 
fish price data came from two sources. Prices of Yellowfin and Bigeye exported to the 
Japanese fresh tuna market were provided by Daito-Fortuna Fishing Pty Ltd. for the 
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30" S 
Figure 3.3: The area where the Japanese and Australian domestic longliners have been 
fishing together in the 1988 and 1989 seasons. The study area is bounded by 25°S and 
34° S and extends one hundred miles from shore. 
97 
years 1988 and 1989. These were monthly average prices for Australian tuna in the 
Japanese fresh sashimi market. The second source was domestic market prices from the 
New South Wales Fish Marketing Authority (NSWFMA) at the Sydney fish market for 
the 1988-1989 period. The records available for 1988 and 1989 were weekly average 
prices for Albacore, Yellowfin, Bigeye, and Sashimi. The sashimi category was 
predominantly Yellowfin with a proportion of Bigeye. 
3.3.1.3 Construction of the domestic price variable. 
The model requires a price series for each of the species caught in the domestic fishery. 
A price variable was required to represent domestic and exported tuna prices for 
domestic fishers. 
The domestic Yellowfin catch can be sold in the Sydney fish market as Sashimi, 
Yellowfin gutted, Yellowfin gutted head on, and if poor quality, is sold for canning. An 
average price for longUned Yellowfin tuna in the Sydney fish market was constmcted 
using a Paasche index (Squires, 1988). The estimated proportions of each type of tuna 
are reported in Table 3.19a. It was not necessary to use a Fisher price index as the issue 
of substimtability in production between these categories of Yellowfin is not addressed 
in the smdy. The overall domestic price variable was sknUarly constmcted to 
incorporate the tuna from the Sydney market and the exported tunas. Table 3.19b 
reports the estimated ratios of exported and domestically marketed tuna which were 
obtained from confidential records held by the Australian Quarantine Inspection Service 
(AQIS). 
The prices of exported tuna were from the Japanese fresh tuna market and were 
observed prior to the deduction of transportation costs, such as air freight, packaging 
and administrative charges. For constmction of the average Yellowfin price the Japanese 
prices were adjusted to Sydney equivalent price by the deduction of an estimated 
transportation cost of 500 Yen per kilogram. This figure was obtained from discussions 
with fishermen who had regularly exported fish during the period. 
Other species did not pose as many problems as the more diversely marketed YeUowfin. 
Bigeye mna are sold in Sydney as sashimi and "Bigeye head on". The Bigeye tuna price 
variable was constmcted simUarly to the Yellowfin price variable (Table 3.19a). 
Albacore mna are not exported and are generally sold in Sydney. Billfish price data were 
available from Sydney and were used to value any Swordfish caught in the domestic 
fishery. 
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Revenue from tuna sold in Japan is initially received in Japanese Yen and exchanged to 
Australian doUars at appropriate rates (ABARE, 1991). The Yen was chosen as the 
common currency for comparison of the Japanese and Australian production process. 
3.3.1.4 A comparison of Japanese and Australian tuna prices. 
The Japanese vessels fishing in the eastem AFZ land their catch in the Japanese frozen 
sashimi market. Monthly average frozen tuna prices were obtained for the port of Yaizu 
in Japan. Domestic vessels send Yellowfin and Bigeye to the Japanese fresh sashimi 
market. Monthly average fresh tana prices were obtained for the years 1988 and 1989 
from Fortuna -Daito Pty Ltd. 
A two sample t test for independent means was used to test the hypothesis that the mean 
prices of Japanese and Australian tuna were the same, that is HQ: | I 1 = |J,2. The results 
are reported in Table 3.20. The test assumes that the variance of both samples is equal. 
Bartlett's homogeneity of variance test was performed to test the hypothesis that the 
variances of the two price samples are equal. The last column of Table 3.20 indicates if 
the hypothesis was rejected on the basis of the Chi2 statistic. 
3.3.1.5 Results of price comparisons. 
Table 3.20, reports the results of the price comparisons of the three markets relevant to 
the fishery; the Australian domestic market, the Japanese fresh market and the Japanese 
frozen market. The results show that for Yellowfin and Bigeye, Japanese fresh market 
prices are significantly greater than Japanese frozen market prices and Australian 
domestic sashimi market prices. Domestic Yellowfin prices are significantiy greater than 
the Japanese frozen market prices, but for Bigeye the Japanese frozen market price is 
significantly greater than the domestic Bigeye price. Price data available for other 
species were limited, but Albacore prices in the domestic market were significantly less 
than Japanese frozen market prices. Domestic Swordfish prices were significantiy higher 
than the Japanese frozen market Swordfish prices. 
In Table 3.20, under "other comparisons", are the results of comparing the net prices a 
fisherman may receive, after transport costs, for the Japanese fresh sashimi and 
AustraUan domestic sashkni markets. The Japanese fresh market prices, net of freight 
and packing of 500 Yen per kilogram, were significantly higher than Australian domestic 
prices for Yellowfin and Bigeye at the 1% level of significance. However, if freight costs 
are assumed to be 600 Yen per kilogram the Japanese and Australian Yellowfin prices 
are not significantiy different, though the Japanese fresh Bigeye prices were stiU 
significantiy greater than the domestic Bigeye prices. The results illustrate the risk faced 
by the domestic fisherman when considering export of Yellowfin tuna to Japan where the 
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prices obtained for an individual consignment may not necessarily be higher than the 
domestic Yellowfin sashimi market price (Williams, 1989). 
When modelling Japanese and Australian production the study uses the indexed price of 
fish for domestic vessels which reflects both the domestic market and the higher prices 
received in the Japanese fresh market. Prices received by the domestic Yellowfin and 
Bigeye fishers are approximately 40% higher than the prices received by Japanese fishers 
on the frozen market. 
3.3.1.6 Selection of species. 
The species composition of the catch of the two fleets is different as the Japanese 
produce seven species, whereas the domestic fishery is primarily based on Yellowfin tuna 
with the occasional catch of other tuna species. This has implications for the number of 
species considered in modelling. 
The data were checked for missing observations and for months in which catch by a 
vessel for a particular species was zero. The disaggregation of data to the relatively 
smaU area available for the comparison led to many zero catch observations as each 
observation is for effort per boat in a given month in a specific zone. Zero catch 
observations were most prevalent in the domestic fishery where the catch is almost 
exclusively Yellowfin, although Bigeye, Albacore and Swordfish are also caught. 
In the domestic fishery from 0-100 miles from shore catches of YeUowfin only were 
recorded for approximately 75% of monthly boat observations. All species other than 
YeUowfin were thus aggregated by means of a Fisher Ideal price index into the new 
variable called "other species". Yellowfin had 4-5% of zero observation values whereas 
the other new species variable had 45% of observations as zero dependent variables in 
the 12-100 mile study area. It was decided to estimate the model with and without zero 
observations and to compare results. However it should be recognised that the domestic 
fishery is based on Yellowfin tuna and jointness in production could only be an issue for 
25% of the observations in the 0-100 mile area. In the area 0-12 miles from shore almost 
all fishing activity is for Yellowfin only. 
An altemative to the two species aggregation was to aggregate aU species into one 
aggregated variable. This was rejected as there would be no cross price variables, the By 
term of equation (3.4), and so joint production technology could not be compared 
between vessel of the two nationalities. 
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The Japanese data did not have as many zero dependent variable observations as the 
Australian data, but for consistency with the domestic fleet data the Japanese data was 
aggregated to Yellowfin and "other species". Aggregation of the other species was 
achieved using a Fisher Ideal price index for the 24 monthly time periods. The indexed 
species were Marlins, Swordfish, Albacore and Bigeye which became the variable "other 
species". The price index and the revenue from sale of the other species were used to 
calculate an implicit quantity index for each vessel observation. The index was adjusted 
for dimensional problems in the coefficients, as explained in section 3.1.1.3. 
3.3.2 Econometric Model. 
The model assumes that price is exogenously determined and producers are price takers 
in thek respective markets. The Japanese supply approximately 6000-7000 tonnes of 
tuna and biUfish from the east Australian area to a market in Japan of 300,000-370,000 
tonnes of sashimi tuna (refer section 1.7.5). Thus Japanese fishermen are almost 
certainly price takers whereas the Australian domestic production constitutes over 50% 
of the Sydney tuna market and domestic price may not be independent of supply. There 
has been no empirical work on this question. However part of the domestic price 
variable is for exported tuna on the competitive Japanese fresh tuna market in which 
AustraUan fishermen are probably price takers due to their relatively insignificant 
contribution to this large market. 
3.3.3 Estimation. 
3.3.3.1 Data. 
Fish catch and effort data required for estimation were obtained from the domestic 
logbook records as supplied by the AustraUan Fisheries Management Authority. Effort 
was measured in hundreds of hooks set per day for the domestic vessels as no 
information was available on other boat characteristics, such as GRT, to enhance the 
measure of effort. The Japanese unit of effort was made consistent with the Australian 
unit of measurement which is in hundreds of hooks per day. 
The data were a panel or longitudinal data set of monthly vessel observations of catch 
and effort and relevant prices for the years 1988 and 1989. Zonal, seasonal and an 
annual dummy variable were used to account for changes in fish availability. 
3.3.3.2 Estimation and hypothesis testing. 
The area within 100 miles of shore was divided into two fifty mUe zones with the inner-
most 12 miles adjacent to the shore reserved for Australian fishermen only (Figure 3.3). 
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In the 88 mile wide study area there were 379 observations for Japanese vessels in the 
two year period. In the domestic fishery there were 409 observations in the two year 
period. Of these, 124 observations were for domestic vessels inside the innermost 12 
miles and of the remaining 285 observations, for the 12-100 mile area, there were 144 
observations that had zero catches of other species. This could lead to limited dependent 
variable bias in the analysis if zero catch observations are included. 
The supply equations previously used in section 3.2.2 were applicable to this model: 
Yi(Z;P) = BiiZ + 6iZ2 + I t ait ^ t Z + 1 ^ Mim Qm Z 
+ Iivii NiZ + I j Bij(Pj/Pi)l/2 z (3.6) 
where Dt is an annual dummy variable, Q^^ are seasonal dummy variables and Nj is a 
dummy variable for zone. 
Each supply equation was checked for heteroscedasticity and the Breusch-Pagan (BP) 
test for heteroscedasticity (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) was applied and the results 
reported in Table 3.21a and b. On the basis of these results, the hypothesis that there is 
no heteroscedasticity present in the data was rejected. To address this, each supply 
equation was divided through by input Z to give an input scaled supply equation (Squires 
and Kkkley, 1991). The estimated form of the supply function was: 
Yk(Zk;P) 
= Bii + f^ iZk + I t "k Dt + I m i^im Qm 
Zk 
+ I I Vii Ni + I j Bij(Pj/Pi)l/2 + 8k (3.7) 
where 8^ is an error term assumed to satisfy the OLS requirements being normaUy 
distributed with zero mean and constant variance. 
Subsequent to this modification, the model was re-mn and lower Chi squared statistics 
were obtained from most of the Breusch-Pagan tests. However the null hypothesis was 
still rejected ( Table 3.21c and d). On the basis of improved results from the Breusch-
Pagan test it was decided to use the specification of equation (3.7) as the model. 
The input scaled product supply equations were estimated by Zellner's Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression Estimator (SURE), (Zellner, 1962) and iterated to convergence 
giving results to maximum lUcelUiood using SHAZAM. 
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On estimation, the system Generalized R2, as defined in section 3.1.3.1, was noted to be 
0.35 indicating a poor fit for the system. This probably reflects the disaggregation of the 
data set and the limited area of the analysis which covers only part of each Japanese 
vessel's fishing activity. Regularity conditions were also pooriy fulfilled. Monotonicity 
held reasonably well with only 4% of predicted values being negative, however symmetry 
was rejected which may reflect irregularities in the data set (Kirkley, 1986). Convexity 
in prices was also rejected and concavity in effort was not met, being quasi-concave, in 
this limited analysis. The regularity results confirm that the limited area data set would 
not be suitable for an in-depth analysis of technology, such as that undertaken for aU 
Japanese vessels in the previous sections. The revenue function is used here for a 
comparative analysis, although the results should be treated with caution, given the poor 
fit of the system and possible irregularities in the behaviour of the function. 
3.3.3.3 Results. 
The first set of tests was performed on the data for both nationalities in the area 12-100 
miles from shore to establish if the Japanese and Australian fisheries were significantiy 
different from one another. The results are reported in Table 3.22a. Table 3.22b notes 
the results for the tests when zero observations for Australian vessels are excluded. 
The null hypothesis was HQ: the supply equation coefficients for the Japanese and the 
Australian fisheries are the same, tested by: 
HQ: Biij =BiiA, Bij = BiA, Bijj =BijA, Dtj = DtA, QmJ = QmA-
Pooling the data for the overall fishery was the equivalent of restricting Japanese and 
Australian production coefficients to be the same, whereas the unrestricted mn allowed 
Japanese and Australian coefficients to take different values from one another. The 
hypothesis that the Japanese and Australian fisheries have the same overall technology 
was rejected. 
The Japanese and Australian fisheries were tested for similar annual dummy variable 
coefficients, a measure of fish availability. The maintained hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the annual dummy are equal in the Japanese and Australian fisheries was 
rejected. There is a significant difference in the annual availabiUty of fish to the two 
fleets. The annual dummy was allowed to assume different values for Japanese and 
Australian vessels in subsequent tests. 
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In the test for seasonal similarity between the two fisheries the maintained hypothesis 
was that the coefficients on seasonal dummies as a group in the Japanese fishery are 
equal to the coefficients on seasonal dummies in the Australian fishery. This was tested 
by the econometric restriction: QmJ = QmA- The maintained hypothesis was rejected as 
seasonality differs significantiy between the Japanese and Australian vessels in the same 
area. This reflects the influence of the East Australian Current. 
Zonal dummies were tested by the maintained hypothesis HQ: the coefficients on the 
Australian and Japanese zonal dununies are equal. The hypothesis could not be rejected 
at a 5% level of significance for the model with zero catch observations included. When 
zero catch observations were excluded the maintained hypothesis was rejected at both a 
5% and 1% level. The result of this test is inconclusive, (see Table 3.22a and b). 
The maintained hypothesis that the coefficients on vessel technology variables as a group 
in the Japanese fishery equals the coefficients on technology as a group in the Australian 
fishery was rejected at both 5% and 1% levels of significance. The overall technology is 
significantiy different for Australian and Japanese vessels. 
The hypothesis that the cross price terms By are equal for vessels in the two fieets was 
tested and could not be rejected for either data set. Targeting behaviour with respect to 
price is not significantiy different for the Japanese and Australian vessels in the study 
area. Thus the Bij terms were restricted to equal each other in subsequent tests. 
The maintained hypothesis that the input-output separability coefficients, Bi are equal 
between Japanese and Australian vessels was tested and rejected for both data sets. The 
change in catch per unit effort with increased effort is significantly different between 
Japanese and Australian vessels in the same area. 
The final Japanese and Australian technology hypothesis was that the coefficient on the 
own price term Bii was equal for the Japanese and Australian vessels. The maintained 
hypothesis was rejected at the 1% and the 5% level of significance for the data set with 
zeros included. However when zeros were omitted the hypothesis was rejected at 5%, 
but could not be rejected at a 1% and the result is inconclusive. 
The coefficients from the estimations of Japanese and Austialian production are reported 
in Table 3.22c. The Table reports the final form of each of the models comparing 
Japanese and Australian vessels for the two data sets where zero observations are 
included, (left hand side) and excluded, (right hand side). 
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In theory the model which excludes zero observations provides unbiased results, but it 
has left out a considerable number of observations on Yellowfin fishing activity in 
rejecting the zero catch observations in the other species variable. However the loss in 
degrees of freedom caused by the omitted observations does not appear to have 
significantiy increased the standard errors of the estimated coefficients and the 
theoretically unbiased results from the model from which zero observations are excluded 
wiU be accepted. Both sets of coefficients will be reported in the Table of results, but 
only the results where zeros have been excluded will be discussed. 
The individual coefficients for Yellowfm production reported in Table 3.22c were 
compared by asymptotic t tests for each nationality and are reported in Table 3.22d. 
The Yellowfin Bii coefficient for the AustraUans is significantly higher than for the 
Japanese indicating a significant own price response. The size of the coefficients indicate 
that Australians have almost a three fold advantage in catching Yellowfin. On the basis 
of the results with zero observations this advantage could be as high as 8 times. The 
Yellowfin Bi term is positive and significant for the Australian vessels indicating 
increasing retums to effort for Yellowfin fishing. It is likely the increasing retums to 
effort are due to the absence of a measure of search time in the effort variable. 
The Japanese vessels show constant retums to effort in fishing for Yellowfin tuna. The 
Yellowfin cross price term Bjj is not significantly different between nationalities, the 
negative sign indicating substitution between Yellowfin and other species. The annual 
and seasonal dummies were included to pick up stock availabiUty and the relative 
availability of Yellowfin for the two nationalities. The YeUowfin year dummy is not 
significantiy different from zero for Australian and Japanese vessels and the year 
dummies are not significantiy different between the nationalities (Table 3.22d rhs). The 
Yellowfin seasonal dummies for the Japanese vessels do not show any signs of seasonal 
change, but Australian vessels have a positive and significant coefficient for the July to 
September period. This may be indicative of greater availabiUty of fish to the Australian 
vessels during this period. With the exception of this finding it would appear that there 
is no strong evidence that the nationalities experience sigruficantiy different pattems of 
inter-annual and inter-seasonal variation. 
Stock availabiUty may also vary with distance from shore and has been accounted for by 
the inclusion of a zonal dummy variable. The zonal dummy for Yellowfin is negative and 
significant for Australian vessels in the zone 50-100 miles from shore (Table 3.22c) 
indicating a lower catch rate in this area than in the 12-50 mUe area. Yellowfin catch 
rates are significantly less than for the Japanese in this area (Table 3.22d). 
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The results, when zero catch observations are included, suggest that vessels of neither 
nationality have significantiy different Yellowfin catch rates with distance from shore and 
that Australian vessels fishing Yellowfin have significantly different inter-annual 
availability. These results include the domestic vessels that fish for Yellowfin tuna only 
which wUl be the subject of further investigation in the domestic production analysis 
presented in section 3.4. 
The other species results are reported in Table 3.22c and show that the Australian and 
Japanese results are significantiy different only for the Bi and zonal dummy terms. The 
Bji terms are positive and significant for both nationalities, but are not significantly 
different. The Bi term for Australians fishing other species is negative and significant 
indicating diminishing retums to increasing vessel effort. The Australian estimate is 
significantiy less than the Japanese Bi coefficient, the Japanese having constant retums to 
effort for these other species. The Bij terms are indicative of joint production as both 
coefficients are significantiy different from zero and indicate substitution. The Japanese 
other species zonal dummy is negative indicating reduced availability of other species in 
the outer fifty mile zone. Australian vessels have significantiy higher availability of other 
species than Japanese vessels in the outer 50-100 mile region (Table 3.22d). 
Price elasticities of supply and product specific scale elasticities were calculated and are 
reported in Table 3.23a and b. For the Australian vessels it was found that a 1% rise in 
the price index of other species resulted in a 0.03% fall in the quantity of Yellowfm 
produced and a 1% rise in the price of Yellowfin resulted in a 0.4% fall in the quantity of 
other species. No significant cross species supply responses were detected for the 
Japanese vessels in the sample. The product specific scale elasticities suggest that for a 
1% rise in effort Australian vessels would experience a 0.89% increase in Yellowfin 
catch and a 1.2% increase in the catch of other species. The Japanese vessels 
experienced unitary remms to scale from both Yellowfin and other species. 
The jointness in the domestic fishery is limited to vessels that fish both Yellowfin and 
other species as explained in section 3.3.1.6. When these results are considered for 
management impUcations it should be recognised that because 75% of fishmg 
observations in the 0-100 mile area are Yellowfm only, management of the fishery should 
be nonjoint. The results above refer to the area 12-100 miles from shore in which half 
the observations include other species and appear to be joint. This result has 
implications for the development of the fishery. 
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3.3.3.4 Comparisons with smaller Japanese vessels. 
The analysis has compared the AustraUan vessels with all of the Japanese vessels in the 
study area. In developing future policy the production relationship between Australian 
vessels and the smaller vessels in the Japanese fleet may be of interest as the production 
analysis in section 3.1 found a significant difference between small and large Japanese 
vessels. 
The major difference exposed by the new tests are that the technologies are still 
significantly different overall and the own price Bii coefficients are not significantiy 
different between AustraUan and smaller Japanese vessels as reported from L^ tests in 
Tables 3.24a and b. The model coefficients are reported in Table 3.24c and d and can be 
compared with previous results in Tables 3.22a,b,c and d. 
The year dummy is no longer significantiy different between the vessels, indicating a 
similar Yellowfin availabiUty between years for Australian and smaller Japanese vessels. 
Yellowfin seasonal dummies show that smaller Japanese vessels have a significantiy 
lower Yellowfin catch rate in the second quarter of the year than the Australian vessels. 
The previous analysis showed that Australian and Japanese vessels have equal catch rates 
in this quarter. Seasonal availabiUty in other quarters is not significantiy different from 
the previous fleet wide model. 
The Yellowfin zonal dummy in the model with zero observations excluded suggests 
Australian Yellowfin catch rates are poorer than those for the smaller Japanese vessels in 
the 50-100 zone, though the model with zero observations included suggests there is no 
significant production difference between nationalities in the outer zone. This implies 
that the catch rates for Australian Yellowfin only vessels are not significantiy different 
from those for smaller Japanese vessels in the area 50-100 miles from shore. 
When fishing for other species the results of the production comparison of Australian 
and smaller Japanese vessels found no sigruficant difference between the Bii terms. 
However for the Bi terms the smaller Japanese vessels experienced constant retums to 
effort when fishing other species, whereas the Australian vessels experienced significant 
decreasing retums to effort. In the zone 50-100 mUes from shore Australian catch rates 
for other species were significantiy higher than the smaller Japanese vessels at the 5% 
level. This indicates that whilst some Australian vessels experience high catch rates of 
other species, increasing effort will lead to diminishing retums to effort. 
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3.3.4 Discussion. 
The comparisons of Australian vessels with all of the Japanese vessels and with the 
smaller Japanese vessels have indicated that technology is significantiy different between 
the nationalities. Further tests revealed the difference to be significant in both the 
availability of fish and in the vessel technologies used in the same area of ocean. 
Yellowfin production per unit of effort was found to be significantiy higher for the 
Australian vessels when compared to all the Japanese fleet, the advantage being between 
three and eightfold. However the comparison with smaller Japanese vessels indicates 
Australian vessels have no significant advantage in Yellowfin production. There is a 
seasonal advantage for Australian vessels fishing Yellowfin in the July to September 
period, but this diminishes with distance from shore. 
In the production of other species the Japanese appear to have a significant advantage 
over Australian vessels. This is between three and four fold in the model where all 
observations are included (Table 3.22c). However when Australian and small Japanese 
vessels are compared there is no significant advantage. 
The results for the vessels of both nationalities suggest a different approach to fish 
resources in the same area. The revenue function used an aggregated two species model, 
with Yellowfin and other species. Examination of the other species data prior to 
aggregation will help to explain the results of the revenue function model. 
The observed catches and effort for the Australian and Japanese vessels in the two zones 
of the study area for 1988 and 1989 are reported in Table 3.25a and b. These "raw" 
catch and effort data contain disaggregated information about catches of species other 
than Yellowfin which could not be expUcitiy examined in the production model where 
they were indexed as the other species variable. In both Tables it can be seen that the 
amount and distribution of effort being applied by the two nationalities is different, with 
the Japanese applying many more hooks in zone one and two than the Australian vessels. 
From the relative CPUE results reported in Tables 3.25c k can be seen that the 
Australian vessels have a greater Yellowfin catch rate than the Japanese vessels in zone 1 
and 2. The raw data supports the modelling results with a 2.8 to 8 fold Yellowfm 
advantage being apparent for Australian producers over all Japanese vessels. 
The relative CPUE comparisons reported in Table 3.25d point to substantial advantages 
for Japanese producers in the production of Swordfish, Marlin, Albacore and Bigeye in 
particular. The Japanese advantage in Bigeye production varies between 3 and 97 fold. 
SimUarly the Japanese have a distinct advantage in the production of Swordfish and 
Striped Marlin. 
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The concentration on different species confirms the revenue function results and explains 
why the initial overall technology tests indicated that the availability of the fish was 
significantly different between fleets in the same area. The domestic fishers pursue 
surface Yellowfin schools in small manoeuvrable vessels using light monofilament fishing 
gear, whereas the Japanese vessels target the deeper swimming species using their 
conventional oceanic deeper set Kuralon fishing gear. Contact with both industries 
confirm the results of the model, the Australian fishers indicating their dependence on 
local knowledge and searching procedures whereas the Japanese have confirmed this 
area is a significant Bigeye fishery (Mcllgorm, 1993). 
The Japanese vessels set approximately 3000 hooks in a 24 hour period as compared to 
the more manoeuvrable AustraUan vessels setting 200-400 hooks. The smaller 
Australian vessels are able to chase and locate surface Yellowfin tuna aggregations that 
at times are spotted visually, whereas the Japanese industrial fishery sets in a standard 
routine. Japanese vessels are known to be reluctant to set in water less than 100 metres 
deep, so hydrographic factors such as water depth and the position of the shelf break 
(approximately 25-28 miles in this area) may keep Japanese vessels away from the 
possibly more dense inshore Yellowfin aggregations. 
There is no evidence of significant difference in stock availabiUty to each fleet, but it is 
possible that as Yellowfin tuna move inshore onto the continental shelf they may occur in 
greater local densities than offshore. This may partially explain higher AustraUan retums 
to effort for YeUowfin. The other advantages held by Australian's in Yellowfin fishing 
are probably due to their more mobile domestic fishing vessels which use visual 
information and local knowledge to search for local tuna aggregations. This is different 
from their large industrial Japanese counterparts. 
3.3.5 Conclusions. 
The Japanese and Australian production processes in the inner two zones were compared 
by means of the estimated revenue function. It was found that the Australian fishery is 
mainly a surface fishery for Yellowfin tuna as compared with the deeper multispecies 
Japanese fishery. The technology between Australian and Japanese vessels was found to 
be significantly different across all parameters, showing both annual and seasonal 
differences and differences in vessel technology. 
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From the dual analysis it can be seen that the Australian fishery is primarily based on a 
single species, Yellowfin tuna. The revenue function was used to compare the Australian 
fishery, which has limited multispecies activity, with the Japanese fishery. In doing this 
indexing and aggregation of species other than Yellowfin was required and a limited 
dependent variable problem was created. Screening the data to remove zero catch 
observations eliminated 'YeUowfin only' vessels from the analysis. The technology of the 
remaining vessels fishing all species appeared to be joint in production, but as this 
constitutes less than half of the fishing observations in the study area (12-100 miles), and 
approximately 25% of fishing observations in the domestic fishery (0-100 miles), the 
fishery is assumed to be nonjoint for management purposes. 
To analyse the domestic fishing vessel technology a direct single species production 
model wUl be estimated to yield additional information on technology not available 
through the multispecies revenue function approach. This analysis of Yellowfin tuna 
production by the domestic vessels is undertaken in the next section and will investigate 
the production of Yellowfin tuna in the entire domestic fishery. 
3.4 Domestic production. 
In this section the production process of the domestic Australian vessels fishing inshore 
in the AFZ wUl be analysed using a direct or primal Cobb-Douglas fisheries production 
function. To date we have estimated the coefficient on effort in the Japanese fishery and 
have compared the multispecies production of Australian and Japanese vessels in a small 
area offshore. In this section we wish to examine the mainly single species domestic 
production process in greater detail. This should confirm previously estimated 
coefficients and give additional information for more specific management of the 
domestic fishery. 
As in the previous models there are no observations on stock, one of the arguments of 
the fisheries production function. The inclusion of various proxy variables for stock wUl 
be used to represent stock by modifying the coefficient on effort. Differences in 
production between seasons may reflect stock fluctuations or depletion through time. 
Sustainability is examined in Chapter 5. 
The area of the domestic fishery can be seen in Figure 4.1. In this study the domestic 
fishery wUl be divided into a southem and northem section around the 34° S Une of 
latimde adjacent to Sydney. 
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3.4.1 Data. 
The description of the data sets available to the study can be seen in section 1.3.3.1. In 
this section an overview and summary will be made of the data available for modelling 
production in the domestic fishery. Features that will influence production modelling 
wiU be examined. 
3.4.1.1 Observed variables. 
The catch of the domestic fishery was recorded as numbers of fish and total weight of 
fish caught per day. The following species were recorded: Yellowfin, Albacore, Bigeye 
and Southem Bluefin Tuna (SBT), Swordfish and Black, Blue and Striped Marlin. 
However Yellowfin tuna are the main species taken in the domestic fishery and will be 
the harvest variable in this single species production analysis. Effort was recorded as the 
number of hooks fished per day and no measures of vessel size, such as GRT, were 
available for the domestic vessels However each boat was characterised into one of four 
different classes: planing longliners, multi-purpose vessels, trawlers and purpose-built 
longliners. Soaktime is a measure of the hours fished, but since gear may be unretrieved 
due to bad weather this variable is not as reliable a measure of effort as the number of 
hooks set. 
The latitude and longitude of fishing locations for each daUy observation of catch and 
effort were available and from these it was possible to divide the fishing observations on 
the basis of sub-zones at different distances from the coast. Dummy variables were 
formed for the three zones: 12-50 miles, 50-100 miles and greater than 100 miles, with 
the 0-12 mUe zone acting as the default. The domestic fishery logbook data also 
included an observed temperature variable representing the temperature recorded by the 
fishermen just below the sea surface when the longline is being set. 
3.4.1.2 Other variables. 
DPIE (1990) notes the influence of moonphase on tuna catches and fishing effort for 
tuna. It is believed that moonlight makes the longUne gear more visible to tuna and 
reduces catchability. Moonphases and tidal pattems are also correlated and may 
influence fish avaUabUity. There are four phases of the moon occurring in a lunar month 
of 29.54 days: new moon, fu-st quarter, fuU moon and last quarter. The phases of the 
moon for each month from 1983-1991 were extracted from Reid's nautical aUnanac 
(Reids, 1984-1990). From this a series of moonphases was generated against a calendar 
date series by computer and crosschecked against the almanac for accuracy. The 
moonphase for each day was added to the fishing observations and moonphase dummy 
variables constmcted with the last quarter acting as the default. 
I l l 
The domestic data base also records whether the fisherman patrolled the line whilst it 
was fishing. Patrolling involves the fishermen moving along the set line and where a 
submerged float indicates the presence of a tuna. The fish is removed prior to the line 
being hauled and the hook rebaited and retumed to the water. Patrolling increases the 
catchability of the longline gear as more hooks will be available to catch fish than in the 
unpatroUed case. Patrolling will be represented by a dummy variable in the econometric 
model. 
There may also be a relationship between catch and the length of time the bait was in the 
water, the soak time. This variable was widely distributed. High values for soak time 
were recorded where bad weather delays gear retrieval for several days and this may 
introduce bias in the catch and soak time relationship. 
3.4.1.3 Proposed proxies for stock. 
It was decided that several approaches could be taken to deal with the absence of stock 
observations. They are based on the following assumptions: 
i) Assumption one: the availability of the stock to each vessel is the same over the period 
of the analysis, the traditional assumption of cross sectional analysis. 
This assumption is unrealistic because of movements of fish due to the influence of 
exogenous variables such as temperamre, seasons and other oceanographic and 
environmental conditions. Thus the stock would not be of uniform density and individual 
vessels would be fishing different proportions of the stock at any point in time and over 
time. 
U) Assumption two: the avaUabiUty of the fish stock to each vessel declines through the 
season. 
The fishery is known to be seasonal and under this approach an mdex of the rate of 
montiily decline of the stock would be estimated through the season. This would 
possibly show a faU in stock as fish are caught or move out of the fishery. This could be 
estimated by regression techniques using dummy variables for seasons. 
Ui) Assumption three: temperature is an indicator of local stock availability. 
Tunas are known to Uve in distinct ranges of water temperattire. Fishermen monitor sea 
surface and sub-surface water temperattires where possible, as an essential part of 
locatmg ttina. On the Austt-aUan east coast the movement of the Tasman front is known 
to influence ttina disttibution (Diplock and Watkins, 1988). 
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It is proposed that water temperature data may be used as a local index of stock 
availability. The empuical evidence for the temperature and density relationships was 
reviewed in section 1.5. The form the variable may take will be reviewed in section 
3.4.1.4. 
iv) Assumption four: moonphase may be indicator of availability. 
Moonphase may to influence the amount of Yellowfin tuna caught. Generally it is 
believed that in the darker time of the month, before the new moon, catch rates are 
higher than during the new moon (DPIE, 1990). In addition moonphase influences tidal 
movements which may affect migratory pattems of fish, thereby affecting catch rates. 
The effect of moonphase on catchability would alter the intercept term in the regression 
model. 
3.4.1.4 Formation of proxy variables. 
From the discussion of fish stock distribution, catches and temperature, it is proposed 
that an abundance proxy variable can be formed from observations of temperature. It is 
assumed that at the optimum sea surface temperature the fishermen will be fishing a 
greater proportion of the stock of fish than at a temperature away from the optimum. 
Thus it is hypothesised that the distribution of temperature can be used as a proxy for the 
local fish stock density. 
The form of the distribution of stock by temperature is not stated in the literature. 
However the literature notes upper and lower bounds for temperatures within which 
Yellowfin are known to occur (Cole, 1980). Despite mean and upper and lower bounds 
it is not clear the distribution of fish with temperature wUl be normally distributed. Fiuza 
(1991) notes that the temperature distribution for sardine stocks may be skewed. 
A proxy for fish stock was sought that would be a maximum at optimal temperature and 
decline towards the boundary temperatures. This led to the use of the following form for 
the production function: 
h = A E a e-«ITo-T*l 
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where h is harvest. A, a, and B are constants, e is the exponential operator, and E is 
effort. The proxy term for stock/fish abundance is determined by the difference between 
TQ, the observed temperature, and T* the optimal temperature as stated in the literature. 
Use of the reciprocal of the exponential of the absolute value of the difference between 
observed and mean temperature implies that as temperature diverges from the optimum, 
the proxy for abundance is decreasing exponentially. Thus at temperatures away from 
optimum the proportion of the fish stock available has exponentially decUned. The 
optimum temperature value for Yellowfin was assumed to be 21.5°C (Diplock and 
Watkins, 1988). 
A temperature distribution with a flatter functional form, described by a cubic function, 
was generated by AUen and Punsley, (1984) to simulate the cross sectional temperature 
profile of the eastem Pacific tuna purse seine fishery. The thermal stmcture in the east 
Australian area is on the continental shelf and not equivalent to an oceanic fishery 
(Punsley, pers comm.). The Allen and Punsley form was not appropriate to the present 
smdy. 
3.4.2 Econometric model, estimation and hypothesis testing. 
3.4.2.1 The econometric model. 
The econometric model proposed is the Cobb Douglas form of the fisheries production 
function. As was seen in Chapter 2 this has the form: 
h = A E " X6 
where h is harvest, A is a constant, E is effort, X is stock and a and B are the coefficients 
on the effort and stock terms respectively. 
hi the absence of observations on stock it is proposed to use a proxy for stock and 
compare the results obtained for the effort coefficient in eariier results. The following 
models were proposed earlier. 
i) Assume stock is constant 
The model becomes: h = A E^ 
ii) Assume stock effects are represented by seasonal dummy variables: 
h = AQiPlQ2p2Q3p3 £ « 
where Q^, are quarteriy seasonal dummies which act to modify the constant term. 
SimUarly if the data is estimated in a panel over several years the inclusion of year 
dummies can represent annual flucttiations in stock abundance. 
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iii) Assume a temperattire difference term reflects local abundance: 
h = A E a e-f^lTp-T*! 
where the term e" ^ 'TQ - T*l is the temperature proxy variable with e the exponential 
operator. 
iv) Assume moonphase will influence catchability 
h = A Mpi^l Mp2®2 Mp3«3 HOC 
where Mp are the phases of the moon. 
v) The soak time (St) can be included as a continuous variable and dummy variables for 
patroUing (Pt), vessel class (CI), zones (Z), years (D) and seasons (Q) can also be added. 
Catch may be influenced by these variables. 
Thus the following model can be specified: 
h =A Pt<t> Zi'Cl Z2'C2 Z3T3 ci^ei C1202 0363 Mpi«l Mp2®2 yip^m Q^pl Q2P2 Q^pS 
D1SID2S2D353 HOC e-6lTo-T*l s t9 
Specification tests wUl identify which variables should be included in the fmal model for 
estimation. The production function above is not linear in parameters and the estimated 
form will be log-linear. 
3.4.2.2a Estimation and hypothesis testing. 
For the domestic data set there were 4500 daUy observations of fishing activity by 
individual vessels in the years 1987-1990. The introduction of the vessel class variable 
reduced the observations to 3860 as the class of several vessels could not be established 
and they were omitted from the sample. Details of the vessel classes used in the 
domestic fishery are given in Chapter 4. Production is estimated in the total fishery and 
in the areas north and south of Sydney to see if separate analysis is required. 
3.4.2.2b Production in the total fishery. 
The following model was estimated using the panel of data: 
Inh^ = InA + (l)Pt-l- TIZ1+ X2Z2+ X3Z3+ eiQiH- 0202+ ©303+ C0lMpi+ C02Mp2+ C03Mp3 
+ plQi+ P2Q2+ p3Q3+ 5lDi+ 82D2+ 83D3+ a InEk + 6 l \ -T*' + 9 In St^ + £k (3-8) 
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where Pt is a dummy variable for patrolling (1 for patrolling, 0 when not), Z are dummy 
variables for zones (the base zone = 0-12 miles, Zi=12-50 miles, Z2=50-100 miles and 
Z3=100-150 miles), CI are vessel class dummies (the base case are planing longliners, Qj 
are multipurpose vessels, C\2 are trawlers and 0 3 are purpose built vessels), Mp are 
moonphase dummies (last quarter is the base case. New moon is Mpj, first quarter is 
Mp2 and ftiU moon MP3), Q are seasonal dummies (base case January-March, Q, April 
to June, Q2 July to September, and Q3^  October to December), D are the year dummies 
(base case 1987, Di is 1988, D2 is 1989, and D3 is 1990), E^ is effort, St^  is soaktime, 
and 'Tu -T*l is the absolute temperature difference term. E^ is an error term assumed to 
ftilfil the requirements of the OLS error term. The error term is assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean of zero and constant variance. The default value of all dummies 
indicates a planing longliner which does not patrol, and fishes in the area 0-12 miles from 
shore during the last phase of the moon, in the first quarter of 1987. 
It is worth mentioning that the issue of heteroscedasticity has been checked for in the 
model. Several procedures such as the B-P-G test (Breusch-Pagan 1979; Godfrey, 
1978), Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH; Engel, 1982), Harvey 
(1976), and Glejser (1969) were performed to detect the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
Unfortunately our tests did not allow us to accept the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity at the conventional level of significance. To overcome the 
heteroscedasticity problem we followed conventional practice and transformed the 
variables in several ways such as a log transformation and a transformations using the 
square root of effort. These procedures did not improve the heteroscedasticity result. 
The impUcations are that heteroscedasticity does not bias estimates, but leads to 
inefficiency. This may have implications for t tests and may lead to inappropriate 
rejection or acceptance of hypotheses. Given the variability in the level of effort between 
the northem and southem fisheries the sub-samples were also tested. Heteroscedasticity 
was still present and was not reduced with transformation. 
The groups of variables were tested for significance by means of likelihood ratio tests 
and the results are reported in Table 3.26a. The significance of individual coefficients 
was established by t ratio tests as reported in Table 3.26b. 
The groups of dummy variables for years, seasons, moonphases, vessels classes and 
zones were tested for statistical significance, the nuU hypothesis being that the 
coefficients on each group of dummy variables are equal to zero. The null hypotiiesis 
was rejected for each group of dummy variables though the null hypothesis for 
moonphase could only be rejected at the 5% level, aU other hypotheses being rejected at 
1%. The groups of dummy variables are included in the model. 
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For the individual variable results reported in Table 3.26b the null hypothesis, HQ: that 
the coefficient on the patrolling dummy variable is equal to zero was rejected at the 5% 
level of significance. Patrolling the longline makes a significant difference in catch rates 
as tuna are removed from the gear as soon as caught and the hook is rebaited and set. 
The effect of soak time was investigated by the null hypothesis, HQ: the coefficient on 
the soaktime variable is equal to zero. While this hypothesis was rejected at the 10% 
significance level only, die soaktime variable will be kept in the model. 
The coefficient on the absolute value of temperature difference was found to be 
significantiy different from zero at the 1% level of significance. The sign of the 
temperature difference term was negative, showing that as observed temperature 
diverges from the optimum temperature the catch rate declines. The effort and constant 
term, a modified form of the catchability coefficient, were also found to be significantiy 
different from zero and are important in the Yellowfin production process. 
3.4.2.2c Comparison of the northern and southern domestic Yellowfin fisheries. 
The domestic Yellowfin tuna fishery can be divided around 34°S into northem and 
southem fisheries. The differences in production between the two areas north and south 
of Sydney can be examined using equation 3.8. A likelihood ratio test was used to 
obtain a test statistic when the northem and southem regions' coefficients are allowed to 
differ from the pooled case, where they are restricted to be equal. The results of the 
tests are reported in Table 3.27. 
The null hypothesis, HQ: the coefficients on aU variables in the north are equal to the 
coefficients on aU variables in the south was rejected indicating that the fisheries are 
significantiy different over aU parameters. Subsequently annual and seasonal similarity 
hypotheses were rejected at both the 5% and 1% levels of significance. The significant 
inter-annual and inter-seasonal variation between the north and south may reflect the 
different availabiUty of Yellowfin tuna and the influence of the East Australia Current. 
Moonphase, patrolling, and zonal dummy variables, and the temperature difference and 
constant terms, were not found to be significantly different between the north and south. 
The northem and southem productivity of effort was examined by comparing the 
coefficients on the effort term and the hypothesis of equal productivity was rejected at 
both a 5% and a 1% level of significarice. The productivity of effort is significantly 
different between the northem and southem areas. 
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The estimated coefficients for the final northem and southem model are reported in 
Table 3.28a and tests between the individual coefficients are reported in Table 3.28b. In 
the summarised results reported in Table 3.28c, it can be seen that the coefficient on the 
soak time variable is significantiy higher in the north than in the south. Remms to effort 
are significantiy higher in the northem fishery than in the south. From the results for 
vessels class, trawlers have significantly higher catches in the north than the south at a 
1 % level of significance. Purpose-built vessels have higher catch rates in the north, but 
at a 10% level of significance only. 
Some annual differences in the catch rates between the north and south were detected. 
In 1989 and 1990 the underiying southem catch rates were higher than the north at the 
1 % level of significance. This may be due to the East Australia Current. The south had 
significantly higher Yellowfin catch rates in the April to June and October to December 
periods. However this modelUng showed that the north had no distinct seasonal 
advantage in the July to September period which is in contrast to the dual model in 
section 3.3. The availabiUty of YeUowfin tuna does not appear to be as seasonal as 
fishers believe and annual variations may determine the YeUowfin catch rates in the 
northem and southem areas. 
These tests have shown that the production processes in the north and south are 
significantiy different. Separate estimation wUl reveal the appropriate model 
specification and values of coefficients in each area. 
3.4.2.3 The north of the domestic fishery. 
The overall model, equation 3.8, was applied to the north of the domestic fishery and 
tested for specification. As previously indicated the nuU hypothesis of homoscedasticity 
was rejected and conventional transformations did not improve the result of tests for 
heteroscedasticity in either the northem or southem region. The results of the lUcelihood 
ratio tests for groups of dummy variables are reported in Table 3.29a and t ratio tests for 
individual variables are reported in Table 3.29b. 
The hypothesis tests revealed that annual and seasonal dummies are significantly different 
from zero and should be included in the model, whereas the zonal dummy variables as a 
group are not significantiy different from zero suggesting that distance from the shore 
does not affect the catch rate of Yellowfin. Moonphase was significant at the 5% level 
only. The dummy variables for vessel class were significantiy different from zero at die 
1 % level of significance and were included in the model. 
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Individual coefficient tests are reported in Table 3.29b. The hypothesis that patrolling has 
no effect on catch could not be rejected at eitiier a 5% or 1% level of significance and 
patrolling is not included in tiie northem fishery model. However the coefficient on tiie 
soak time, the temperature difference variable and the effort term, were significantiy 
different from zero at botii the 5% and 1% levels of significance and were included in tiie 
fmal model which was: 
Inhk = InA + e i a i + 0202+ ©303+ coiMp^ +C02Mp2 + 0)3Mp3 + plQi+ p2 Q2+ P3Q3 
+ 81D1+ 62D2+ 53D3+ a InEk + 6 \ \ -T*l + 9 In St^ + 8^ (3.9) 
where aU symbols are as in equation 3.8, and Ej^  is an error term assumed to satisfy tiie 
OLS error term requirements of normality, with mean of zero and constant variance. The 
final model coefficient estimates are reported in Table 3.31a (l.h.s.) for aU years and 
individual coefficients are tested for significance and reported in Table 3.31b. 
3.4.2.4 The south of the domestic fishery. 
Equation 3.8 was also applied to the south of the domestic fishery to test for model 
specification. The results of the likeUhood ratio and t ratio tests are reported in Table 
3.30a and b and show that the group dummies for years and seasons should be included 
in the model whereas the group dummy variables for zones, moonphase, and vessel class 
should not be included. Coefficients on the soaktime and the temperamre difference 
terms were significantiy different from zero in the southem fishery. The final form of 
southem model to be estimated was: 
Inhk = InA + (|)Pt+ plQi+ p2 Q2+ P3Q3+ 61D1+ 52D2+ 63D3 
+a InEk + 6 ' \ -T*l + 9 In Stk+ £k (3.10) 
where Ej^  is an error term fiilfUUng the assumptions of the OLS error term as previously 
described. The coefficient estimates for the southem model are reported in Table 3.31a 
(r.h.s.) and individual coefficients are tested for significance and reported in Table 3.31c. 
3.4.3 Results. 
Likelihood ratio tests, reported m Table 3.27, showed that the northem domestic fishery 
is significantiy different from the southem fishery and should be estimated separately. 
Table 3.28c presents a ranked overview of the results comparing the variables between 
the northern and the southem fisheries. Tables 3.29a and b and 3.30a and b report 
specification tests for the northem and southem fisheries and the fmal estimated 
coefficients are reported in Table 3.31a. Tests comparing the individual coefficients in 
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the north and soutii are reported in Table 3.31b and c and the ranked results are reported 
in Table 3.32 for discussion. Table 3.3Id reports how the estimated function shifts for 
each of the significant dummy variables estimated. The footnote on Table 3.3 Id explains 
the method used. 
3.4.4 Discussion. 
The results indicate that the domestic Yellowfin fisheries are significantiy different in the 
areas north and south of Sydney. This has implications for management of the domestic 
Yellowfin fishery. The annual and seasonal dummy variables were included in the 
models to account for variation in Yellowfin tuna stock, on which there were no direct 
observations. The northem fishery results in Table 3.32 had significantly higher annual 
catch rates in 1988 and 1990, than in 1987 and 1989. In the southem area catch rates 
were significantiy higher in 1989 and 1990, than in the years 1987 and 1988. The annual 
results confuTO the East Australia Current as a major determinant of tuna availability to 
the domestic fleet. The dummy variables for year reported in Table 3.3Id confirm that 
catch levels doubled in the south in 1989, relative to 1987 the base case, when other 
factors are held constant. Annual availabUity m the south is significantiy different 
between years. 
The seasonal dummy results reported in Table 3.32 show the Yellowfin catch to be 
highest in the south in the second and last quarters of the year. The seasonal dummy 
results confum anecdotal evidence that the first quarter of the year has low catches of 
Yellowfin, though catches in the south improve in April to June as the East Australian 
Current recedes northward. Southem fishers must decide if they should move north of 
Sydney where fishing is thought by fishers to be better m the July-September period. 
However the northem catch rates are not significantly higher than the southem area in 
the July to September quarter as noted in Table 3.32. The results in Table 3.3Id indicate 
that aU seasons in the south have significantly higher catches than the first quarter. The 
models indicate how difficult relocation decisions are for fishers as the seasonal 
differences in catch rate between the north and south are not as significant as fishers 
believe. The fisher must also be aware of the annual movement of the East Australian 
Current. 
Yellowfin catch rates also vary with vessel class as reported in Table 3.32. Purpose built 
longlmers and trawlers have significantly higher catch rates at the 5% level than other 
vessel classes in the north. Table 3.3Id indicates trawlers and purpose built vessels have 
a 33% and a 64% advantage in catch levels over planmg longliners, aU other factors held 
constant. The higher catches of trawlers in the north is possibly due to trawler owners 
waiting untU aggregations of ttina are observed and then fishing locally until the catch 
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rates decline. The few purpose built vessels in the northem fishery apparently enjoy the 
catching advantages of being designed for this type of tuna fishing. 
The effect of moonphase on Yellowfm catch rate was found to be of marginal 
significance in the northem fishery only. The results in Table 3.32 confirm that during 
the new moon Yellowfin catch rates are significantiy higher than the full moon and first 
quarter at the 5% level of significance. This confirms anecdotal information about the 
marginal influence of moonphase on catch rates (DPIE, 1990). The constant term, 
which is the log of the catchability coefficient from the fisheries production function was 
found to be significantiy different from zero in the both the north and south, but was not 
significantly different between the areas. 
The zonal dummies were excluded by likelihood ratio tests from both the northem and 
southem fisheries estimations. This result is in contrast to the earlier revenue function 
result in section 3.3, where it appeared that catch rates for Yellowfin tuna diminish with 
distance from shore. The apparent irrelevance of zone may indicate that localised 
availabiUty of fish to the vessel is the critical factor, rather than distance from shore per 
se. 
From tests it was estabUshed that patrolling had a significant influence on catch in the 
south of the fishery, but not in the north which may reflect the longer soaktimes used by 
the southem fishers. From estimates it was determined that in the south patrolling 
practices increase YeUowfin catch by 16.3%, when all other factors are held constant. 
Specification tests recommended that soak time should be included in the northem 
fishery and southem model, but the coefficient on the soaktime variable is significantly 
higher in the north at the 5% level (Table 3.29b, 3.30b). In both the north and south of 
the fishery it appears that YeUowfin catch rates increase as soak time increases. 
Communication with the fishers in the northem area suggests that strong currents 
prevent longer soak times as fishing gear tends to drift far from the port of operation. 
The temperature difference term was significant in both of the models of the northem 
and southem fishery, but was not significantly different between the areas. The 
coefficient on the temperature term was negative indicating that as fishers move away 
from the optimal temperature their catch reduces. From the estimated coefficients it is 
apparent that one degree more or less than the optimal temperature reduces catch by 
11% in the north and 7% in the south. This confirms the view that the local movements 
of tuna are related to temperature variations and that information on water temperature 
is of value to fishers in the conduct of the fishery. 
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The estimates of soaktime also revealed that a 1% rise in soaktime in the north and south 
leads to a 0.2% and 0.08% increase in catch respectively, all other factors held constant. 
Observed soaktimes in the northern fishery, reported in Table 1.8, were approximately 
half the value of soaktime in the southem area. Contact with fishers revealed that strong 
currents in the north limit the soaktime as the line drifts rapidly thereby increasing 
operating distance from port. 
The productivity of effort results show the northem coefficient to be significantiy higher 
than in the south. Both effort coefficients are less than unity showing diminishing rettims 
to effort which may be indicative of local stock depletion at the vessel level. The lower 
productivity of effort in the southem fishery may be associated with the movement of the 
East Australia Current. The estimations also show that if some of the effort presentiy 
applied to the south was applied to the northem area then production of Yellowfin ttma 
could be increased for the same level of effort. 
The constant term in the estimations represents the case when aU dummy variables are 
equal to zero. When interpreted at the mean level of effort, optimal temperature, and 
mean soaktime, 277 hooks in the north obtained 201 kilograms (kg) of Yellowfin, (0.7 
kg per hook in the mean soaktime), whereas in the south 345 hooks obtained 59 kg of 
Yellowfin, (0.17 kg per hook in the mean soaktime). This comparison may be 
misleading as the base case for vessels in the southem fishery is for the poorest year and 
quarter of the study period. Consideration of annual and seasonal dummies wUl augment 
catch significantly in the southem area whereas the northem fishery is less seasonal. 
The implications of these results for management are that any restrictions on effort will 
be resisted more by vessels in the northem fishery, where retums to effort are higher, 
than in the south. It would also be expected that effort regulations would be resisted by 
both the purpose built vessels and trawlers which have highest catch rates in the northem 
area. In response to regulations Umiting effort, vessels m the north would probably 
increase soaktime to increase catch, and vessels south of Sydney would increase both 
their soaktime and patrolling behaviour. 
3.4.5 Conclusions from the direct estimation of the domestic Yellowfm fishery. 
The direct estimation of Yellowfin tuna production in the domestic fishery revealed 
information not available in the revenue fiinction approach. YeUowfin tuna production 
was found to be significantiy different in the areas north and south of Sydney. The 
annual and seasonal variations in Yellowfin ttina catches and the influence of the East 
Austtalia Current are confirmed by the analysis, but the seasonal differences between the 
northem and southem fisheries are not as distinct as anecdotal information from fishers 
would suggest. 
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Rettims to effort for domestic YeUowfin vessels were higher north of Sydney than in the 
south and managers should be aware that effort limitations may be resisted more by the 
northem fishers. This result means that a reallocation of effort from the south to the 
north would lead to greater Yellowfin catches. 
The temperature term captured the availabiUty of Yellowfin to fishers at the vessel level, 
despite the complex current and water column stmcture in the east coast area. The 
analysis confirmed that Yellowfin catches in the area south of Sydney can be increased 
by patrolling, and suggested that increasing soaktime in both the north and south wUl 
increase catch. Such production behaviour is of interest to management as the potential 
effectiveness of regulations that limit the number of hooks set could be reduced should 
vessels increase patrolling and soaktimes. 
3.5 Discussion and conclusions from Chapter 3. 
3.5.1 Discussion of Chapter 3 results. 
In this Chapter the technology in the Japanese offshore and domestic fishery have been 
estimated. The modelling of the Japanese vessels suggested that the offshore fishery 
should be divided into northem and southem areas for management and that vessel size 
was also important. 
In the northem area of the offshore fishery the technology of the Japanese vessels is 
nonjoint, whereas in the southem area the Japanese vessels technology is joint. The 
southem fishery was also found to be more seasonal than the more tropical northem 
fishery. These findings wUl significantiy influence the management policies and 
instmments that wUl be adopted in the management of the fishery. Policy for the 
management of the fishery will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
The spatial aspects of technology were also investigated and the distance from shore is 
important in determining the availabiUty of each species to the Japanese vessels. In aU 
estimations there was significant annual and seasonal variation representing the 
availability of species and the influence of the East Australian Current. 
The domestic fishery was analysed using a direct single species model and a dual 
multispecies revenue function which allowed some comparison of the domestic and 
Japanese fishing vessel technology. The domestic fishery production was nonjoint and 
significantly different from the production of Japanese vessels in the inshore area. The 
Australian vessels concentrate on surface schools of Yellowfin tuna, in which they have a 
production advantage, whereas the Japanese vessels have a production advantage in 
producing the deeper swimming Bigeye tuna, and a range of other species. The seasonal 
availabiUty of species is highest for the Japanese vessels in the southem area offshore in 
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the March to September period. Similarly the availability of YeUowfm inshore in the 
northern area of the domestic fishery is highest in the July to September quarter. 
Modelling evidence on the inshore fishery was unable to find a significant difference in 
fish availabiUty for the Japanese and domestic vessels, suggesting both nationalities may 
be fishing the same stocks. 
The domestic fishery results for the revenue function model suggest that the July to 
September period has greatest availability of Yellowfin tuna in the northem NSW region. 
This result contrasts with the results of the direct single species Yellowfin model. 
However as the dual and primal models are at different levels of aggregation, the results 
are not directiy comparable. The revenue function considered prices, which was 
essential in the multispecies analysis, whereas the direct approach enabled a detailed 
analysis of Yellowfin tuna production to include features such as soaktime, patrolling and 
water temperamre. These variables were not available in the Japanese fishery data set. 
3.5.2 Conclusions from Chapter 3. 
In Chapter 3 it has been established that the vessel technologies in the domestic and 
Japanese fishery are significantiy different. Japanese vessel technology varies with area 
and vessel size. The joint technology of the Japanese vessels in the southem fishery 
offshore increases the policy options available for management. However the nonjoint 
behaviour in the north of the Japanese offshore fishery and in the domestic fishery need 
to be considered in any management regime. 
In the different approaches shift variables were used to account for changes in the 
unobserved variable, stock. Despite this limitation which is faced in most empirical 
estimations of fisheries production, the models gave comprehensive results reinforcing 
anecdotal observations. The shift variables indicated the significant variation in 
availabiUty of species with year, season and area and confirmed the influence of the East 
Australian Current as a major feature in both the Japanese and Australian fisheries. 
The information from these analyses wUl be used in the subsequent Chapters of the 
thesis. Chapter 4 surveys domestic fishers and examines recent survey literature to 
obtain the cost of effort for domestic and Japanese vessels. The cost of effort data are 
used in Chapter 5 with the revenue fiinction results from Chapter 3 to estimate the 
performance of aU vessels. The efficiency of allocation of vessel effort, long-mn 
viabiUty, rent and the sustainability of the fishery are examined. The results from 
Chapter 3 are also used to examine management and policy options for the fishery in the 
final Chapter of the thesis. 
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Chapter 4: Fishing Costs. 
This Chapter examines the costs of the Australian and Japanese longline tuna vessels 
operating in the eastem Australian Fishing Zone. The domestic fishery has not been 
surveyed before and the data obtained are used to estimate the cost of effort for domestic 
vessels and for modelling purposes later in the thesis. Recent information on the 
economic cost stmcture of the Japanese industry is used to calculate the cost of effort for 
Japanese vessels. The Chapter ends with a comparison of the costs of effort of the 
domestic and Japanese fleets in the east Australian area. 
4.1 The domestic east coast tuna fishery cost and income survey. 
4.1.1 Introduction. 
A cost survey was developed for the domestic tuna longline fishery to estimate capital 
and recurrent costs and income from tuna fishing. The survey in this study was the first 
cost and income survey of the east coast tuna fishery and was for the period 1989-1990. 
Previously Southem Bluefin Tuna industry cost surveys have been undertaken by the 
AustraUan Bureau for Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE, formerly the 
Bureau of Agriculmral Economics, BAE) (BAE, 1983, 1984 and 1986). Recent cost 
surveys of non-tuna Australian fisheries have been the Northem Prawn survey, the South 
East Trawl fishery, and the Southem Shark Fishery (Collins and Kloessing, 1988; Geen 
et al., 1989; Battaglene and Campbell, 1991; Battaglene and Pascoe, 1993). 
4.1.1.1 The domestic fishery. 
The domestic fishery extends from Cape York in Northem Australia to the Victoria and 
New South Wales state border in the south. The area of the fishery with the main ports 
is shown in Figure 4.1. Within the fishery four categories of vessels have been identified 
by physical and operational criteria (DPEE, 1990). The four categories are: planing 
longliners (PL), multi-purpose vessels (MP), trawlers (T), and purpose built 
longliners/dropliners (PB). 
4.1.2 The survey. 
4.1.2.1 Method. 
In an attempt to get the co-operation of the fishermen a personaUy distributed survey 
form was used rather than a posted form with no personal contact. Altemative methods 
of surveying by telephone were not deemed to be appropriate given the level of detail of 
accounting information required. 
The survey of the fishery was undertaken in three geographic areas as reported in Figure 
4.1. These were: the Northem Area/Queensland - Tweed Heads to Brisbane to 
Caims/Cape York; Northem NSW -Sydney to Tweed Heads; and Southem NSW - Eden 
to Sydney. 
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15°S 
Figure 4.1 : The area of the domestic tuna longUne fishery. Ports with three or more 
active mna vessels are shown. The three areas used in the domestic cost survey are 
shaded. (Eden to Sydney, Sydney to Tweed Heads and Tweed Heads to Cape York). 
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4.1.2.2 The survey form. 
The survey form was adapted from the ABARE cost survey of the South East trawl 
fishery (Geen et al., 1989) being modified for the inclusion of several longline specific 
cost categories, such as bait, not used in trawl fisheries. Income categories were also 
adjusted so as to separate tuna and non-tuna income and altemative boat income 
sources. The design of the survey form enabled cost and revenue data to be transferred 
from a fishing vessel's tax retum with minimum inconvenience for fisherman. This was 
intended to improve the response rate and the reliability of the data obtained. 
The definition of each cost and income category was included in the form so that the 
participant could sum costs into their appropriate categories. A copy of the survey is 
shown in Figure 4.2a and b. The domestic tuna longline fishery has a large variety of 
fishing vessels with different modes of operation. Licensing data from the Australian 
Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) provided insufficient information on vessel 
characteristics and a 'Fishing Record' form was developed to gain specific information on 
vessels and their operations as shown in Figure 4.3. 
4.1.2.3 The sampling strategy. 
Altemative sampling procedures for fishing income surveys were reviewed. Cluster 
analysis using vessel operational criteria can assist in identifying a representative sample 
of fishermen (Geen et al., 1989). However the lack of detailed vessel Ucensing 
information for all vessels in the fishery excluded this approach. The domestic logbook 
fishing activity confirmed the ports of operation as shown in Figure 4.1. Most of the 170 
endorsed vessels operate from ports south of Sydney with fewer fishermen in the area 
north of Tweed Heads where there was little fishing activity despite there being a 
significant number of endorsement holders. 
A postal survey was contemplated on a random sample of fishermen in each area. It was 
unlikely fishermen would co-operate with a postal survey and as the distribution of vessel 
classes was unknown a random survey of fishers may not necessarily have been a random 
sample of the different vessels operating in the fishery. 
It was concluded that as response rate would be the main constraint aU fishermen would 
be personally contacted to cooperate in the survey. The results which would include 
information on the type of vessel and fishing information would be assessed for bias 
when retumed. 
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SURVEY OF THE EAST C O A S T TUNA LONGLINE FISHERY 
Financial Year 1989-90 
Vessel name: 
Boat Receipts 
Income from tuna sales $•• 
Income from other fish sales $•• 
Other vesse l income $•• 
Total boat income $ -
Boat Expenses 
Administration $•• 
Boat repairs and maintenance $•• 
Gear replacements and repairs $•• 
Fuel, oil and Grease $•• 
Payments to crew (including skipper) $.. 
Insurance $•• 
Depreciation $•• 
Interest $• 
Licence fees, rates and taxes $. 
Bait $• 
Marketing expenses $. 
Other boat expenses $. 
Total boat expenses $_ 
Figure 4.2a: The survey instmment used in the east coast tuna longline fishery. 
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East Coast Tuna Longline Survey Definitions 
BOAT RECEIPTS 
Income from tuna sales 
The total returns from the sale of tuna caught during the financial year prior to 
the deduction of marketing charges. 
(TUNA includes Yellowfin, Bigeye, Albacore, Billfish and Skipjack.) 
Income from other fish sales 
The total return from the sale of "non-tuna" fish caught during the financial year 
prior to the deduction of marketing charges. 
Other vessel income 
Refers to all boat income not directly derived from the sale of fish. Such income 
may have been derived from charter fees, profits from sale of capital items 
connected with the business and rebates, refunds or discount relevant to the 
fishing activity - for example, payments by fishing co-operatives. 
BOAT EXPENSES 
Administration 
These costs comprise charges for: 
-accountancy 
-banking and legal 
-electricity 
-stationery 
-subscriptions 
-telephone 
-other 
Boat repairs and maintenance 
These costs include: 
-boat and equipment 
-slipping charges 
-other 
Gear replacements and repairs 
Fuel, oil and grease 
Figure 4.2b: The survey explanations used in the east coast tuna longline fishery. 
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Payments to crew (including skipper) 
Insurance These include charges for: 
-boat insurance 
-other capital items 
-workers compensation 
Depreciation 
Interest 
Licence fees, rates and taxes 
-boat - Commonwealth and State 
-wharfage 
-radio 
-management levies (membership to fisherman's association) 
Bait 
Marketing expenses 
-boxes and other packaging materials, packing costs 
-commissions, agents fees, export fees and selling costs/tariffs 
-freight. Air freight and cartage 
-cool storage 
-ice 
Other boat expenses. These costs include all those not stated elsewhere 
which are incurred in the operation of the business unit. 
-bad debts 
-rations 
-investment allowance 
-lease payments - onboard equipment 
-motor vehicle expenses 
-protective clothing 
-rent 
-travelling expenses 
-wages (excluding share payments) 
-loss on capital items sold 
-other 
MARKET VALUE OF BOAT 
Is the insured value of the boat including the hull, engine, radio, sonar etc. but 
excluding endorsements (or boat units if applicable). 
Figure 4.2b continued: The survey explanations used m the east coast tuna longUne 
fishery. 
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EAST COAST TUNA LONGLINE 
Fishing Record 
VESSEL 
VESSEL NAME OWNER'S NAME: _ 
LENGTH O.A.= AGE OF VESSEL: _ 
VESSEL TYPE: 
(a) Planing Longliner (c) Trawler 
(b) Multi purpose vessel (d) Deep sea purpose built longliner/dropliner 
What endorsements does the boat have? 
FISHING 
(i) If you fish in other fisheries, estimate your involvement in tuna fishing in days 
per year as accurately as possible for the July 1989/June 1990 period 
ie. - other fishing method: days - longlining for tuna: days 
(ii) What length is your normal tuna trip? 
(Iii) Estimate your cost of fuel/trip? 
(iv) BAIT Bait types used? 
Estimate your BAIT cost/trip? 
(v) What species do you most regularly target? (Rank in order 1 -6) 
Yellowfin Bigeye Albacore Billfish Bluefin Skipjack 
MARKETING 
(a) Where did you market most of your fish in the 1989/90 financial year 
(Estimate % by weight) 
DOMESTIC EXPORT 
Sydney Fish Market Last year to Japan 
Melbourne/Brisbane Last year to U.S. 
Cannery Last year to other destinations 
(b) Do you have detailed records of all your marketing? YES / NO 
Who is your normal Agent/exporter for the Japanese market? 
-Thankyou for your co-operation -
Figure 4.3: The Fishing Record form used in the survey. 
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4.1.2.4 Performing the survey. 
A list of endorsement holders was obtained from the tuna management section of the 
Australian Fisheries Management Authority. The domestic east coast tuna longline 
fishery had approximately 170 endorsed fishing vessels in the 1989-90 financial year 
which was selected for the survey. All fishermen who were known to be have fished in 
the 1989-90 year were identified from govemment catch and effort data base records. 
Each active fisherman was initially contacted by letter indicating that the Fishing Industry 
Research and Development Council (FIRDC) had funded project 90/89 into the 
economics of the future development of the fishery, a project supported by the East 
Coast Tuna Management Advisory Committee (ECTUNAMAC). It was indicated that 
the project officer would be attempting to contact all fishermen in order to obtain cost 
and income data and to listen to fishermen's opinions of economic issues in the future 
development of this fishery. The letter was followed up by a phone call prior to the date 
initially indicated, arranging times and places for meetings. 
Most fishermen were interested in the project, but could not guarantee an interview as 
fishermen must put to sea when the opportunity presents itself. The survey meetings 
were timed so as to be with the fishermen at low or marginal parts of the season rather 
than at periods of peak activity. 
On receiving the survey form many fishermen, or their wives as book-keepers, were 
reluctant to spend time in filUng out "yet another form". To counter this the project 
officer discussed the survey and Fishing Record and tried to partially or fully complete 
the survey during the interview. This minimised the remaining paperwork to be 
completed by the fisherman. FuU completion of the form at interview was often not 
possible as accounting source records were with the accountant having tax assessment 
prepared. 
A significant number of fishermen were not famUiar with accounting records and in the 
light of this it was concluded that the most accurate survey results could be obtained by 
the fishermen either getting their accountant to complete the form or by returning a copy 
of the vessel's Profit and Loss and Balance Sheet with the survey. 
Fishermen were reminded about the need to retum the survey form by telephone several 
weeks after being visited. Subsequently letters were written indicating a closing date for 
the survey. At the final deadline a significant number of fishermen were re-telephoned in 
an attempt to obtain survey retums. 
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The project was endorsed by AFMA and ECTUNAMAC and involved use of 
confidential catch and effort logbook records. The 1952 Commonwealth Fisheries Act, 
provisions for confidentiality, enabled the project officer to reassure fishermen that their 
vessel and business income data would not be shown in a way that enabled individual 
fishermen to be identified. 
4.1.2.5 Discussion of the survey response rate. 
Surveys were slow to be retumed primarily due to delays in getting records from 
accountants after year end tax calculations. Table 4.1 summarises the retums from the 
survey and Table 4.2 reports the results from the Fishing Record. 
In the fishery there were 68 endorsed vessels that did not fish in the 1989-90 tax year. 
Some of these vessels may be involved in other major fisheries, but many are not. 
Contact with inactive fishers suggested they were holding the tuna fishing endorsement 
as an investment in the hope of capital gain. Of the 102 active tuna fishing vessels, 29 
when initiaUy contacted were unable to supply data for the period. The reasons given 
were: inconsequential levels of fishing activity; vessels leaving the fishery; vessels 
entering the fishery; confidentiality; ill health; and major vessel breakdown. 
In aU 73 surveys were distributed, being given directiy to fishermen when an interview 
was possible. In the course of the six months after the survey 22 responses were 
collected or received. Of these, one was fUled out incorrectly and was unusable. The 
response rate can be estimated as approximately 20% of those actively fishing m the 
period as reported in Table 4.1. The gap of approximately 50 non-respondents could be 
attributed to several of the reasons previously stated above. However many fishermen 
were "too busy" and saw Uttle point in completing the form. Several responses were 
prompt, but many other responses only came after significant contact with the aU too 
busy fisher. 
4.1.2.6 The validity of the survey sample. 
In the tax year in question only 102 fishers took part in the fishery. The number of vessel 
trips in the tax year were calculated from the AFMA domestic logbook data. Figure 4.4 
is a plot of frequency, m number of vessels, versus the number of trips undertaken by 
vessels in the 1989-90 tax year. The non-tuna fishing days were estimated from the 
Fishing Record. 
The mean number of days fished by vessels in all fisheries in the 1989-90 tax year was 84 
days per vessel. Of this 57 days were spent on non-tiina fishmg activities and 27 tiina 
fishing. The ratio of vessel days tuna fishing to non-tima fishing can be seen in Figure 
4.4 where vessels 1-11 are planing longliners, 12-18 are multi-purpose vessels and 19-21 
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are trawlers. The non-tuna fishing activity is diverse and not necessarily recorded in log 
books, and is an estimate from the Fishing Record. 
For the tuna fishing activity that was recorded on the data base, Figure 4.5 reports a 
frequency plot of the number of vessels against the number of tuna trips undertaken by 
vessels in the 1989-90 tax year. This gives an indication of tuna fishing activity across 
the fleet. The respondents to the survey wUl be referred to as the "sampled" vessels and 
their activity is compared to that of all vessels in the fishery in Figure 4.5. 
In Figure 4.5 the distribution of total activity in the tuna fishery is skewed to the left. 
The mean tuna trips per vessel per year is 27 trips (S.D. 22) with approximately 64% of 
vessels fishing for tuna less than 20 days a year. This observation is reinforced by a 
median of 22 trips. The highest number of days tuna fishing by any vessel was 98. 
Fishing activity is highly variable with only 21.5% of fishermen fishing more than 30 days 
per year for tuna and only 10% fishing for tuna for over 40 days per year. 
The survey respondents' tuna fishing activity was compared to the tuna activity in the 
rest of the fleet. A visual comparison can be made from Figure 4.5 by comparing 
activity levels of the sampled and non-sampled vessels. It can be seen that the sample 
covered most levels of fishing activity in the fishery. The sample was further examined 
for the survey coverage of activity for the various classes of vessel as reported in Table 
4.3. 
The information from Table 4.3 shows that the sample covered 21% of vessels and 26% 
coverage of aU tuna fishing trips. This would indicate that, ceteris paribus, the sampled 
boats were more active tuna fishers than the non-sampled vessels. The sample coverage 
for effort and catch of 24% and 23% respectively, confirm the contribution made to the 
fishery by the surveyed vessels. In Table 4.3 the 'other vessels' were vessels unable to be 
identified for class type and several non-responding purpose-built longUner/dropliners. 
Although the unidentified vessels were 36% (37/102) of the vessel numbers, they 
accounted for less than 25% of the effort, trips and total catch. 
When sample coverage was investigated for each class of vessel, 30%-40% of each of 
the three classes were sampled. When trips and catch were used to assess the coverage 
of trawler activity, 61% of trips, 71% of effort and 67% total tuna catch were 
represented. 
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Examination of database catch and effort records for previous tax years confirmed that 
all of the vessels surveyed in the 1989-90 tax year were fishing in the 1988-89 tax year 
constituting approximately 20% of the active vessels and 28% of the tuna effort in that 
year. In the 1987-88 year the surveyed vessels still contributed 20 % of the declared 
tuna vessel activity. The activity of the sampled vessels in previous years suggests that 
the boats surveyed are not new entrants to the fishery or fishers of low activity. 
Interpreting income surveys of fishing activity is difficult due to possible inaccuracies. 
There is often inherent mistmst by fishermen of "the system" and the motives of 
management. In this survey the sample obtained from respondents' retums was thought 
to be reasonably representative of the fishing activity in the financial year surveyed. 
4.1.2.7 The Fishing Record. 
In order to gain more precise information on the vessels in the fishery the Fishing Record 
requested details of the vessel name, class, age and length as shown in Figure 4.3. Other 
details such as the cost of bait and fuel consumption per day were obtained as a check on 
stated fishing activity. Information about targeting on the various species in the fishery 
and bait type was also sought, and the record concluded by requesting details of the 
marketing of tuna from the fishery. The Fishing Record aimed at gaining as much 
additional information as possible, without overwhelming the fisherman with paperwork 
and thus lowering the survey's response rate. 
The Fishing Record responses were compiled for the retumed surveys and are shown in 
Table 4.2. Planing longline vessels were between 11 and 16.5 metres and are generally 
longer than multi-purpose vessels. Planing longliners were also the youngest vessel 
class, averaging 8 years, with some of the vessels just two years old. This contrasts with 
the older multi-purpose vessels, averaging 17 years, and trawlers which were the oldest 
vessels averaging over 23 years of age. 
Days spent tuna longlining were retrieved from logbook data and the Fishing Record. 
Planing longliners fished for tuna on more occasions than the other two vessel classes. 
Of the three vessel classes Planing Longliners were the most dependent on the tuna 
fishery, fishing an average of 31 days per year for tuna. Witiiin this group three vessels 
fished less than ten days per year and two vessels fished over 40 days per year. Multi-
purpose vessels and trawlers were less dependent on tuna than Planing Lxjngliners, 
fishing fewer days, 23 and 21 days per year respectively. As expected, the ratio of other 
fishing to tuna fishing days was higher for the trawlers and multi-purpose vessels. On 
average, trawlers and multi-purpose vessels fished more days per year than planing 
longliners. 
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Overall, planing longliners directed 42% of their fishing effort towards catching tuna. 
WhUe this was more than for the other classes, only one vessel directed all activity 
towards tuna in the period surveyed and several vessels fished more than 60% of their 
time for tuna. However for most fishers droplining, trapping, trawling and abalone 
diving were major fisheries with tuna fishing being regarded as the second fishery. This 
view is supported by the fact that reported days fishing other species exceeded the days 
spent fishing tuna for all vessel classes. 
The Fishing Record gave detailed data on the vessels in the fishery and the information 
proved essential in the interpretation of accounting data and in the assessment of 
economic performance. The Fishing Record was popular with fishermen, as they could 
fiU it in relatively easily and knew it was essential due to the complexity of this fishery. 
Any problems in the interpretation of the vessel class were resolved with the assistance 
of the New South Wales Fisheries research log book coordinator, who was familiar with 
the vessels. Similarly when there were discrepancies between the Fishing Record and the 
computerised log book records fishermen were contacted and the reasons clarified. 
Seasonality and down time due to poor weather and current conditions partially 
explained why days fished were low compared to a typical trawl fishery where 130-150 
fishing days per year is conunon. 
The Fishing Record could have been improved by the addition of a question on the 
crewing of the vessels. The crew numbers were requested from fishermen to assist in the 
calculation of the opportunity cost of labour, the respondents being contacted by 
telephone to provide information on part-time and full time crew numbers. 
4.1.2.8 Details of the survey form. 
The vessel cost and income survey form and the Fishing Record are presented in Figure 
4.2 and 4.3. With each cost category there is an explanation of compilation from source 
accounting records. 
Revenue is made up of three components: income from longline tiina activity; income 
from other fish sales; and income from other activities such as chartering. The relative 
proportions of each source of income depend on the type of vessel and the fishermen's 
commitment to different fisheries or activities other than tuna fishing. Income from fish 
sales for fishermen seUing to the local co-operative was received and recorded as net of 
marketing expenses. However some fishers recorded gross revenues and subtracted 
marketing expenses in the cost section. 
138 
The survey asked fishermen to state the following costs: Administration, Boat repairs 
and maintenance. Gear replacements and repairs, Fuel oil and grease, Payments to crew 
(including skipper). Insurance, Depreciation, Interest, Licence Fees, Rates and taxes, 
Bait, Marketing Expenses, Other boat expenses, Total boat expenses. Each cost was 
summed for the 1989-90 tax year from records and represent the total cost of operating 
the vessel in all fishing activities in that year. 
The following features of these costs should be noted: depreciation obtained from 
accounting data is depreciation for taxation purposes as opposed to economic 
depreciation; and interest rates were high in the survey period being between 18.75 and 
22.0% for personal loans (Anon., 1990). 
4.1.3. Results from the cost and income survey. 
The costs and retums of the accounting survey source data retumed by fishermen were 
entered on to a computer spreadsheet. Three classes of vessel were represented as no 
retums were received from the purpose built dropliners and longliners. The data were 
used to calculate accounting and economic profit. This required the survey data to be 
averaged across vessels. 
4.1.3.1 Weighting results to account for differing vessel activity. 
The individual results were to be calculated for different classes of vessel in the fleet. 
Due to the diversity in annual fishing activity, evident from Fishing Record and logbook 
data, a weighted average was used to reflect disparate levels of fishing activity. A simple 
average would be used where aU vessels have sunilar levels of operation, but would lead 
to less active boats being given over emphasis in the accounting averages and more 
active vessels being under represented. A weighted average was deemed essential given 
that some vessels surveyed fished as few as ten days per annum and some as many as 55 
days per annum. 
Weighting of the fishing activity could either be by effort, for example days fished, or 
could reflect the value of the catch for each vessel. The purpose of the survey in the 
thesis was to establish the cost of effort per day fished for the domestic vessels and 
weighting by days fished was most appropriate. The formula for weighting by fishing 
activity was: 
WAACFi = S Cij . — " 
j 
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where WAACF= Weighted Average Annual Cost of Fishing, i= the ith vessel class j= 
the jth vessel in the ith class, C = annual cost n= number of vessels and d= days fished. 
This weighted summation was based on the individual's days fished as a proportion of the 
total days fished in each vessel class of the fishery. Income was also apportioned by this 
method. 
4.1.3.2 Accounting profit results. 
Accounting profit was calculated for each vessel by subtracting operating costs, 
including interest and depreciation from income. Income, net of marketing costs was 
used, hence marketing costs were not included in expenses. Accounting retums to 
capital, a measure of accounting profitability, was also calculated by vessel class and are 
reported in Table 4.4. The results for the median vessel in each vessel class are reported 
for comparison due to small sizes of the samples. 
4.1.3.3 Discussion of the accounting profit results. 
Most income came from tuna fishing and other conunercial fishing activities with only a 
few vessels involved with short term chartering. Non-fishing income from chartering 
was low at less than 2% of income for planing longliners and multi-purpose vessels. 
Trawlers had just less than 5% of the total net receipts from chartering. The variation in 
the income between vessels of different class can be seen from the median vessels' 
results. 
Specific cost items, as a percentage of total cost, were calculated for each vessel class 
and are reported in Table 4.5. Repairs and maintenance as a proportion of total costs 
were greater for trawlers than for the other vessel classes. This reflects more slipping 
and maintenance due to older hull types. Fuel was noted to be a higher percentage of 
total costs for the planing longliners and trawlers, though in absolute terms the fuel costs 
for planing longliners were greater than those of the trawlers. Plarung vessels use large 
engines for the extensive travelling undertaken in the pursuit of tuna. 
Payments to crew as a proportion of total costs are highest for trawlers, but the wages 
for planmg longliners are higher in absolute terms (Table 4.4). Costs for crew wages, 
including the skipper, varied greatiy and may be underestimated given that aU vessels 
have a skipper with a least one reasonably competent deckhand and possibly a part-time 
deckhand, famUy member or youth assisting. The apparent low value for wages may be 
related to the poor catches in mna and non-tuna fishing with payment on a share ol 
receipts basis or may show a reluctance to state wage levels in the survey. 
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Depreciation is the largest cost in absolute terms and by percentage of total costs for 
planing longliners, the vessel class with lowest age. Interest payments also reflect the 
capital tied up in these newer planing longliners whereas trawlers have low interest 
repayments due to age of the vessels. Some of the newer multi-purpose vessels had debt 
levels as high as the planing longliners. Bait costs were lower for trawlers which can 
catch and retain bait for longlining. Other boat expenses were noticeably higher for the 
planing longliners and reflect the expenses incurred with travelling and working the boats 
from different ports along the coast. Overall planing longliners were noted to have 
highest total costs in absolute terms. The cost per day fished will be calculated later in 
this Chapter. 
The accounting profit results show that two of the three categories of vessel made an 
accounting loss in the 1989-90 tax year as reported in Table 4.4. Planing longliners had 
the severest losses, with an average of $23,077 per boat. Multi-purpose vessels and 
trawlers had losses of approximately $1054 and $748 respectively. Results from the 
median vessels were included to indicate the diversity in the small sample sizes. 
In all classes there were some vessels recording accounting profits and others with 
substantial losses. The numbers of accounting profits and losses in each class are shown 
in the last row of Table 4.4. Multi-purpose vessels had the highest proportion of 
profitable vessels in the fishery. Of the three trawlers, one vessel had severe losses which 
reduced the profitability results for this class. 
4.1.4 The economic profit. 
The accounting retums for the fishery are primarily of interest to fishermen, but are not 
suitable for assessment of resource allocation issues. The economic profit for vessels 
over all fishing activity are calculated below and the economic profit from tuna fishing 
are calculated in section 4.1.6. To determine the economic profit there are several 
changes that have to be made to costs. 
4.1.4.1 Economic costs. 
Economic costs vary from accounting costs as they consider the opportunity cost of 
capital and labour used in the fishing process. In calculating economic cost, interest was 
removed from accounting cost, and an opportunity cost of capital was included. The 
opportunity cost of capital was estimated to be 13.4 %, the long term (15 year) 
govemment bond rate for the period in question (ABARE, 1991). The rate was applied 
to the capital value of the vessel as stated in the survey and is essentially a riskless retum 
to capital and reflects a conservative view of opportunity cost. Economic depreciation, 
which is the other component of capital cost, is considered below. 
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The opportunity cost of labour was required to reflect opportunities for employment 
forgone in altemative industries. Crewing details were obtained by telephone survey 
requesting full time and part time crew members. The survey data for crew wages 
included the wages of the skipper, who often was the owner as well. As an owner / 
operator, wages should be included in the opportunity cost of labour at a retum similar 
to that paid to non-owner skippers in the fishery. 
The skiU level of the skipper was assessed to be similar to that of a qualified tradesman 
such as an electrician or plumber. Thus an independent measure of opportunity cost 
could be given by the minimum weekly wage for a qualified tradesman, such as an 
electrician, as stated in govemment pay award statistics (Anon., 1991a). In the 1989-90 
period this was $499.30 per week. The skiU level of a crewman was assessed as being 
equal to an unskilled labourer in the building trade. The 1989-90 minimum award wages 
levels were obtained at State level, as no Federal award for this classification exists 
(Anon, 1991b). Opportunity costs of labour for fuU time fishermen were imputed at an 
annual wage rate, whereas part time fishers were imputed on a per day fished basis. 
Several other adjustments were made in calculation of opportunity cost. Fees and 
licences can be interpreted as retums to the management of the fishery in the form of rent 
(Campbell and NichoU, 1991) and were not included as a cost. 
Economic depreciation is different from accounting depreciation, which is influenced by 
the tax system. The annual economic depreciation is the proportion of the capital value 
consumed in one year. The remaining lifespan, over which time the vessel would fiilly 
depreciate, was calculated for each vessel class from information available from the 
Fishing Record. The expected working lifespan was assumed to be 25 years for all 
vessel types. A straight -line depreciation formula was used to calculate the annual sum, 
at current prices, which would need to be invested to recoup the real current value of the 
vessel by the end of its life. A real rate of interest of 6% was assumed, being the 
difference between the long term govemment bond rate and the rate of inflation in the 
1989-90 period (ABARE, 1991). This assumes that the expected rate of inflation over 
the remaining Ufe of the asset wUl remain at 1989-90 levels, which in the light of 
subsequent changes may be high, but was the market expectation at the time of the 
survey. 
Over the remaming Ufe span of the asset the entire value of the asset in real terms wUl be 
consumed. The calculation of economic depreciation usually yields smaller depreciatior 
results than accounting methods and is given by the formulas below: 
S C = X 
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Where S= adjusting real interest factor 
X= annual economic depreciation 
C= value of the asset. 
given that: 
(l+r)[(l+r)n-l] 
S = 
r 
where r = the real rate of interest, n = remaining lifespan of the asset. 
Depreciation was calculated for each vessel and class and an adjustment was made to the 
depreciation recorded in the accounting survey when calculating economic cost. 
4.1.4.2 Economic profitability results. 
The economic profit and cost results of the survey are shown in Table 4.6. A percentage 
rate of economic profit was obtained by expressing economic profit as a percentage of 
the average capital employed in the fishery. The three vessel types showed a negative 
economic rate of retum to capital of -10% for planing longliners and trawlers and -13% 
for multi-purpose vessels. 
The economic profit were calculated on an aU equity basis, as if the vessel been fiiUy 
owned by the operator. This enabled vessels to be compared for economic performance 
across the fishery and with other surveys of other fisheries. The economic profit 
measures the capacity of the fishing vessel to meet aU costs, including depreciation and 
opportunity costs, in the long-mn. 
4.1.4.3 Discussion of the economic performance. 
For the period covered by the survey the vessels made an economic loss. The two 
methods of weighting fishing activity give different results, particularly in the case of the 
multi-purpose vessels. The level of economic loss is quite significant. Several questions 
arise: 
i) What is the short-mn viabUity of the vessels, given the low economic profit estimates? 
This wUl be addressed in section 4.1.4.4. 
ii) Are the retums indicative of the economic profit from tuna fishing or from other 
fishing activities? This wUl be addressed in section 4.1.5 when retums from both 
fisheries are calculated. 
iii) How do these vessels retums compare to those of other fisheries? 
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There have been no previous surveys of this fishery for comparison, but the results can 
be compared to the southem shark fishery survey of the 1988-89 financial year 
(Battaglene and Campbell, 1991). In the southem shark fishery the retums to full equity 
were from a high of 18% to a loss in one vessel class of -2.2% (Battaglene and 
Campbell, 1991). The presentation of the results of the current survey was amended to 
be comparable to those of Battaglene and Campbell, (1991) and are reported in Table 
4.7. The east coast tuna survey results were lower than those for the southern shark 
fishery in the same time period. In the year after the current survey the east coast tuna 
fishery was surveyed by Battaglene and Pascoe, (1993). The result of -9 % retum to full 
equity for all vessel classes in the financial year 1990-91 was a poorer result than in the 
current survey. 
4.1.4.4 Short-run viability of the fishery. 
In any industry, should there be economic losses occurring due to an individual 
producer's Total Costs exceeding Total Revenue, it is important to examine the 
relationship between Total Revenue (TR) and Total Variable Costs (TVC). When an 
individual firm's TR is less than TVC it is predicted that the firm will immediately shut 
down production (Tisdell, 1980; Baumol et al., 1990). In the case of the fishery this will 
lead to vessels being tied up in the hope of better times. It may also lead to long-mn 
exiting from the fishery. 
The variable costs were calculated for the vessels. Those costs most obviously related to 
fishing effort were added to variable costs (fuel, wages, bait). The overheads, 
administration, insurance, and depreciation were treated as fixed costs. Two cost 
categories were not clearly fixed or variable. The costs of gear repairs and maintenance 
can be considered both fixed and variable; discussion with fishermen revealed that 
greater fishing activity led to more repairs and maintenance though some repairs were 
independent of the level of use. This cost category was divided equally between fixed 
and variable costs. Discussion with fishers led to one third of other costs being assumed 
to be related to the level of fishery activity. The variable and fixed costs were calculated 
and are reported in Table 4.8. 
The total variable costs for the weighted mean vessel are lower than total revenue for all 
vessel classes under both methods and hence short-mn viabUity is not in question. In 
individual results, not reported due to confidentiality, three planing longliners, two multi-
purpose vessels and one trawler were facing shut down decisions. 
The next stage of the stiidy is to perform separate calculations for tuna fishing and non-
tuna fishing as the cost per day mna fishing is desu-ed for modelling later in the stiidy. 
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4.1.5. The economic profit from tuna and non-tuna fishing activity. 
The accounting and economic profit to vessels detailed previously reflect the retums 
from operating a vessel in several fisheries. The economic profit for each vessel class 
can be divided into retums from tuna fishing and retums from non-tuna fishing activities 
by apportioning according to the days fished in each fishery. 
4.1.5.1 The economic profit from tuna fishing. 
The ratio of days spent tuna fishing as opposed to other methods enabled the annual 
economic costs attributable to tuna fishing to be calculated : 
Annual economic profit dt 
attiibutable to tuna AEPT = EP-
fishing d 
where EP = the annual economic profit for each vessel, dt= days tuna fishing per annum 
and d = total days fishing in all fisheries per annum. Costs were apportioned on this 
basis, tuna revenues being available from the survey. 
AU boats have access to several fisheries in which the variable cost for operating may be 
different. Variable costs, apart from bait and fuel costs, for tuna fishing and for non-tuna 
fishing activities were calculated by apportioning overall variable costs by the ratio of 
days spent tuna fishing to total numbers of days fished. Using Fishing Record results for 
relative fuel and bait costs per day of tuna fishing, the ftiel cost per day for operating in 
tuna and non-tuna fisheries was obtained. The bait cost was regarded as being 80% 
attributable to longlining for tuna for multi-purpose and planing vessels, and 100% of 
bait costs for trawlers were attributed to longlining. 
The total variable costs for tuna fishing and non-tuna fishing are reported in Table 4.9 
where the fixed costs of tuna and non-tuna fishing have been apportioned by the ratio of 
days spent tuna fishing to other days. The sum of total variable costs and fixed costs for 
tuna fishing give the total economic cost of tuna fishing. 
The economic profits from tuna fishing and non-tuna fishing were given by subtracting 
total economic costs from total income for each category of operation. These are 
recorded in Table 4.10. The economic profit attributable to tuna fishing was calculated 
and also expressed as a rate of retum to the capital used in catching tuna. The 
percentage of capital attributable to tuna fishing was determined by the ratio of days 
spent tuna fishing to other fishing days. 
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4.1.5.2 Tuna and non-tuna fishing results. 
From Table 4.10 rows 3 and 4 it can be seen that planing longliners record annual 
economic losses of $8,806 from tuna fishing, a rate of retum of -11.3%. Trawlers 
retumed a loss of $2,847, a rate of retum for tuna fishing of -7.6%. However, muUi-
purpose vessels made a positive economic profit from tuna fishing of $7,553 and a high 
economic rate of return to capital invested of 35.7 %. 
The planing longliners received a poorer retum to capital from tuna fishing than other 
vessel groups, which is perhaps surprising as these vessels having been built specifically 
to fish mna. Daily costs and retums from tuna fishing are evaluated in section 4.1.5.5. 
The right hand side of Table 4.10 reports economic losses for all three vessel classes 
when not tuna fishing. Multi-purpose vessels show lowest economic rates of return, -
32.4% followed by trawlers, -10.8.% and planing longliners at -10.6%. Other fishing 
activities had poorer rates of retum than tuna fishing for all vessel classes. 
The economic rate of retum from tuna fishing is greater for aU classes than the rate of 
remm from non-tuna fishing. In the results above, planing longliners and trawlers earned 
negative rates of retum in both fisheries. 
Many of the planing longliners are newer, have been purpose built specifically for tuna 
fishing, but have high capital and operating costs. The rates of retum from non-tuna 
fishing activities by this class are approximately equal to tuna fishing. However, multi-
purpose vessels eam high positive rates of retum from tuna fishing and negative rates of 
retum from their other fishing activities though the average profit made tuna fishing 
($7,553) does not cover the average losses when not fishing tuna ($-22,163). 
4.1.5.3 Daily costs and returns in tuna and non-tuna fishing. 
The average number of days fished in tuna and non-tuna fisheries were obtained from 
data base and Fishing Record results and daUy income, economic cost, variable cost and 
fixed cost were calculated for both tuna and non-tiina fishing as reported in Table 4.10. 
The calculations should be treated with some caution as wiU be discussed in section 
4.1.6. 
Table 4.10 reports (rows 5-9) mcome per day of tuna fishing,of $1,592 for planing 
longliners and $1,455 for multi-purpose vessels. Trawlers had much lower daUy revenue 
from tuna fishing, $989 per day. The daUy income from tuna fishing exceeds estimates 
of the daUy income from other fishing activities for all vessels, and for multi-purpose 
vessels in particular where tuna income per day is 2.3 times the daUy income from non-
tuna fishing. Planing longliners and trawlers had higher non-tuna income than multi-
purpose vessels. 
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The economic cost, when allocated by days of operation, is highest for planing hull 
vessels at $l,871/day. This is much greater than the daily cost of multi-purpose vessels 
and trawlers, $l,125/day for both vessel types. The high economic cost for planing 
vessels is due to their high fixed cost component, $900/day which reflects the high 
opportunity cost of capital for these vessels. The low fixed costs per day for multi-
purpose vessels reflect the low capital value of these vessels. The variable costs for 
planing huU vessels are not insignificant, $971/day, compared to multi-purpose vessels, 
$599/day, or trawlers, $528/day. 
Economic costs for non-tuna fishing activities are lower than for tuna fishing, although 
planing longliners exhibit high fixed and variable costs relative to other vessels. Variable 
costs for multi-purpose vessels fishing tuna are $599 per day, but are lower when not 
tuna fishing, at $387 per day fished. This is probably due to higher fuel and bait 
consumption when tuna fishing. Trawlers have slightiy higher variable costs when they 
go tuna fishing the reason for which is not clear as fishers have suggested in personal 
contact that trawler fuel expenses are less when longlining for tuna. 
The days fished by each vessel class are reported in Table 4.2. The days per year fished 
by planing longliners (74) in aU fisheries were noticeably lower than other vessel classes 
(97 and 92) for multi-purpose and trawlers respectively. The high fixed costs per day for 
planing longliners could be reduced by vessels undertaking more activity. However this 
would only be rational if income for a additional day exceeded daUy variable cost and 
this depends on fish availability. 
Table 4.10 also shows the contribution margin from a day's fishing in the various 
fisheries. The daily contribution margin is the difference between daUy income and 
variable cost per day. The contribution margin is greatest for multi-purpose vessels 
fishing tuna and is lower when these vessels are fishing non-tuna species. The 
contribution margin for planing longliners is sunilar for both kinds of fishing whUe 
trawlers have a slightly higher margin when fishing for tuna. 
4.1.6 Discussion. 
The high daUy retums from tuna fishing for multi-purpose vessels may be related to the 
general reluctance on the part of multi-purpose vessels to switch to tuna longlining until 
aggregations of tuna are known to be in the area. Whilst the daUy margin would lead us 
to believe that more multi-purpose vessel effort should be directed towards tuna, many 
of these vessels do not consider tuna worth pursuing over large distances and are content 
to fish for a limited number of days when the tuna are known to be available. 
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Having substantial catch and hence income when tuna are available, gives a significant 
rate of retum from tuna fishing. It is not clear that spending more time tuna fishing 
would enhance the economic performance of the tiawlers and multi-purpose vessels. 
Interviews with many of these owners noted a reluctance to actively pursue tuna due to 
the additional travelling and social costs of moving port. 
At the time of the survey it was not possible to establish if the year surveyed had been a 
bad year for tuna. Many of the fishermen interviewed believed it was a poorer than an 
average year. Catches in the area north of Sydney were apparentiy down from previous 
periods. The dual production analysis for the area north of Sydney and the direct 
production analysis of Yellowfin tuna, reported in section 3.3 and 3.4 can assist in 
discussing these results. The survey results were for the financial year 1989-1990. The 
direct YeUowfin production results in Table 3.32 report 1989 to have significantly lower 
catch rates than 1990 in the area north of Sydney. The production results also suggest 
that the catch rates in the area south of Sydney were significantly higher in 1989 and 
1990 than in previous years. 
The daily results of this study should be interpreted with caution as the sample sizes 
obtained for each vessel class are low and the results showed marked differences 
between operators. This was especially true of the three trawlers surveyed where tiie 
results may be misleading due to the poor performance of one fisher. The daily figures 
depend on the integrity and accuracy of the log book records for the period and the 
estimation of involvement in other fisheries relative to tuna fishing by fishermen. Every 
attempt was made to establish if there was any difference between log books in the field 
and the data base records. 
DaUy costs also reflect the expenses from days when the vessel were transiting between 
ports, "chasing fish" without success and days lost due to vessel or gear breakdown. In 
aU these daUy figures it should be home in mind that the costs may be high due to 
assumptions used in the calculation of economic cost. The opportunity cost of labour 
assumes that the vessel skipper, who is often the owner, is employed fuU time with the 
boat. If part time labour outside these fishing activities is undertaken by the skipper, 
economic cost will be over estimated. 
The survey calculated income net of marketing expenses although the economic cost for 
modelUng purposes should include marketing costs. The marketing arrangements in tiie 
domestic fishery are complex and require knowledge of the industry marketing practices 
and the overall marketing costs as a percentage of economic cost are reported in Table 
4.11. For modelling the figure of 21.3% of econonuc cost was used to reflect industty 
wide commission transport and marketing costs (Campbell and Mcfigorm, 1992). 
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4.1.7 The economic cost of domestic fishing effort. 
The daily cost of tuna fishing for each class of domestic vessels has been calculated and 
dividing this cost by the mean number of hooks set by each vessel class reveals the cost 
of setting one hundred hooks as reported in Table 4.11. The economic cost of setting 
one hundred hooks was highest for the planing longliners, $684 per hundred hooks ('00 
hooks), multi-purpose vessels, $377 per '00 hooks, and trawlers, $ 403 per '00 hooks. 
There is a substantial difference in the cost of effort with vessel class due to the diversity 
in vessel tuna operations and fishing activity. A weighted average cost of domestic effort 
of $564 per hundred hooks is reported in Table 4.12. This has been calculated for 
comparison with the Japanese cost of effort in the area offshore and gives greater 
weighting to the planing longliners and multi-purpose vessels that fish offshore more 
than trawlers. 
4.1.8 Conclusions. 
The survey of the domestic activity was held to be representative of the fishing activity in 
the period. The results showed that all classes of vessels' economic profits were negative 
and hence the viability of some of the vessels in the fishery was investigated. Several 
vessels were found to be approaching a shut down decision. The results are typical of 
other economic costs surveys where capital appears to be earning less that its long-mn 
opportunity costs (Battaglene and Campbell, 1991). 
The results were investigated to see if the poor economic performance was related to 
tuna or non-tuna fishing activity. Of the three vessel classes multi-purpose vessels had 
much higher retums from tuna fishing than non-tuna activities while the retums for the 
other vessels from the two activities were similar. The poor economic performance of 
planing longliners fishing tuna is probably explained by the high fixed costs reflecting the 
capital cost incurred in owning this kind of vessel and the variable costs of chasing the aU 
too elusive tuna. WhUe income on a daUy basis is similar to other vessels, the 
concentration on tuna fishing, with the inevitable chasing and transiting between ports 
and areas, pushes up variable costs. High fixed and variable costs make this vessel class 
vulnerable to poor economic performance when income faUs due to poor catch rates. 
Multi-purpose vessels had good economic rates of retum from tuna fishing and poorest 
econonuc rates of retum from other fishing. The trawlers sampled had negative rates of 
retum from both fishing activities, though fishing tuna was marginally more profitable 
than trawling for other fish species. 
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The survey also enabled the activity levels to be measured and it was found that tuna 
longlining is only a secondary fishery for many of the vessels. Several planing longline 
vessels attempt to fish tuna all year round, but the survey has shown that tuna fishing is 
an attractive secondary fishery for multi-purpose vessels and some of the trawlers. 
The section concluded with the estimation of the cost of effort for the domestic fishery 
from the survey data and this estimate wUl be used in cost of effort comparisons in the 
section 4.3 and in the economic modelling in Chapter 5 of this study. 
4.2 The cost of Japanese longlining in the eastern Australian region. 
This section reports the economic cost stmcture of the Japanese longline industry and 
uses published data and database information available to this study to estimate a cost of 
effort for Japanese fishing vessels in the east Australian tuna longline fishery. 
4.2.1 Introduction. 
Japanese longliners vary in size depending on the fishery in which they participate. The 
inshore and near seas fleet consist of vessels that rarely exceed 100 Gross Registered 
Tonnes (GRT), whereas the ocean going vessels that pursue tuna in regions such as the 
Atlantic, Pacific and Southem Oceans are usually m excess of 200 tonnes and may be as 
large as 500 tonnes. Longline vessels in the Australian region are always in excess of 
150 tonnes, the tropical tuna longliners being between 200-300 GRT (Caton and Ward, 
1989). 
The database information for the eastem AustraUan region available to this study for tiie 
years 1984-1989 reveal the mean Japanese tuna longline vessel was 261 GRT witii a 
standard deviation of 51 GRT. In the total east Austialian area the vessels below 
200GRT delivered 23% of the effort in the study period. 
4.2.2 Sources of cost data. 
The primary source of data comes from the comprehensive statistics of the Japanese 
Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries MAFF (1979-89). This annual survey 
publishes details of the fishmg industry with considerable coverage given to the distant 
water tuna industry. These govemment statistics record distant water tuna fishing costs 
by different fishing methods such as purse seining, pole and lining and longlining. 
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Tuna longliners are divided into vessels below 100 GRT, 100-200 GRT and vessels over 
200 GRT. The MAFF data are mean results of an annual sample size of approximately 
thirty vessels m each class of vessel surveyed. The format of the Japanese survey data 
can be seen in MAFF (1987-89) which have recentiy been analysed by Campbell and 
NichoU (1991 and 1992a). 
Costs tend to be noted in Japanese fisheries economic literature only in the form of 
passing references. For example, Uyemae, (1975, p5) notes that "fuel and labour 
constitute 75% of operational costs". However most references to costs in Japanese 
tuna fishing literature are anecdotal and of little analytical value. 
The MAFF cost data do not indicate the region where distant water tuna vessels have 
been fishing. Taya, (1989) presents a pie diagram of the relative operating costs of a 
299-314 GRT longliner in three geographically different longline fisheries: the Bigeye 
and Yellowfin fishery in the Westem Pacific; the SBT fishery; and the Atlantic Yellowfin 
fishery. The data are reported in Table 4.13a. The Japanese class the east Australian 
fishery as part of the Pacific Bigeye and Yellowfin fishery. 
For each of the three fisheries the econonuc costs (total costs less depreciation and fees) 
were summed and the mean obtained. Adjustment factors to apply to the MAFF data for 
the eastem Australian area were calculated as reported in Table 4.13b. The results 
suggest an adjustment factor of 1 % on top of the MAFF cost for the east Australian 
fishery. Since Taya (1989) is the only reference on cost differences with area, the MAFF 
costs wUl not be adjusted, but the possibility of a 1% cost excess wUl be noted in the 
modelling results. 
Outside Japan the Fomm Fisheries Agency have used Japanese tuna vessel masters as 
financial and operational consultants for sashimi longliner ventures (Kida and Philipson, 
1988). WhUe details of Japanese operational and capital cost data have come from these 
individual studies, this information is obviously less comprehensive than the fleet wide 
MAFF statistics. 
4.2.3 The economic cost of tuna fishing. 
The economic cost of tuna fishing is required for modelling purposes later in the study. 
In a recent study of the costs and economic profitabiUty of the Japanese tuna industry, 
Campbell and NichoU, (1991 and 1992a) used the financial data from the MAFF statistics 
for the years 1979 to 1989 to calculate the economic costs and retums from Japanese 
longline tuna fishing. These years coincide with the catch and effort data available to the 
present study. 
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4.2.3.1 Method. 
In the profitability study the costs of fishing were divided into capital costs, operational 
costs and the costs of gaining access to EEZ's. The calculation of economic cost 
includes an opportunity cost for capital as a component of total cost. Depreciation must 
also be adjusted and Campbell and NichoU (1991 and 1992a) note their assumptions in 
the interpretation of the MAFF capital asset data for subsequent depreciation 
calculations. 
Campbell and NichoU (1991 and 1992a) use the two approaches of Ando and Auerbach 
(1990) to calculate retums to capital: in retum to capital 'A' it is assumed that debt-
equity ratios of a cross section of Japanese companies reflect the rate of retum required 
by firms and this will equal the rate required by the holders of the companies' securities; 
whereas in remm to capital 'B' it is noted that there is an adjustment needed to reflect the 
fact that remms from subsidiary holdings by a company are understated by Japanese 
accounting conventions and thus their capital costs will be underestimated. The current 
study will only report the retum to capital method 'A', a more conservative measure of 
opportunity costs than method 'B'. 
4.2.3.2 Economic profitability. 
The economic profit made by the average vessel in each vessel class in the Japanese 
distant water tuna fleet in the 1979-80 to 1988-89 period is reported m Table 4.14 and 
Figure 4.6. The results are for Japanese longliners over 100 GRT and represent the 
average vessel performance over the year in respect of all oceans. 
The results show that on average longliners in the 100-200 GRT 200-500 GRT classes 
were making an economic profit in the 1979-80 financial year, but by 1981, with rising 
fiiel prices and the world wide decline in tuna prices, the average vessel m both vessel 
classes was making a loss. Over the decade both vessels classes recovered profitabUity 
with the larger vessel remming an economic profit in the 1987-1989 period due to the 
recovery in the world tuna prices (Waugh, 1988). 
4.2.4 The economic cost of Japanese tuna fishing effort. 
Modelling work later in the study requires as an input the economic cost of effort for 
vessels in the east AustraUan region. The nominal annual econonuc costs for the two 
classes of longline vessel in this study are reported in Table 4.15a for financial and 
calendar years. 
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Figure 4.6: Graph of the levels of retum for the representative Japanese longline vessel 
in the 1979-80 to 1988-89 period (Adapted from Campbell and NichoU, 1991 and 
1992a). 
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Daily fishing costs were obtained by dividing the average total cost of operating the 
mean vessel for one year by the number of fishing days in that year (Campbell and 
NichoU, 1991) and are reported in Table 4.15a and b. Campbell and NichoU (1991) 
report that there was an increase in longliner costs per fishing day until 1985, after which 
time theie was a decline. The largest cost increase was in the 200-500 GRT vessels 
where there was a 58% rise between 1979 and 1986. Similarly the 100-200 GRT 
longline vessels faced a 50% rise over the same period. The cost increase in the early 
1980s was attributed mainly to rising fuel prices (Campbell and NichoU, 1991). 
The cost of effort was obtained by dividing the cost for a fishing day by the average 
effort on hooks set per day as reported in Table 1.3. The estimated cost of effort per 
thousand hooks is reported in Table 4.15b. The Japanese wholesale price index for the 
1984-1990 period was used to adjust nominal to real values (IMF, 1991). The base for 
the Japanese wholesale index was 100 in 1985 and the real cost of Japanese effort is 
reported in Table 4.15b. 
The variable economic cost of Japanese tuna fishing effort is also required for modelling 
purposes. The operational costs excluded depreciation, fees and licences and 
opportunity costs of capital (CampbeU and NichoU, 1991). The variable cost for a 
fishing day and for Japanese effort is reported in Table 4.16. 
4.2.5 Discussion. 
It is apparent from the results that larger Japanese vessels have a higher unit cost of 
effort than smaller vessels. However there may be revenue generating advantages from 
having larger vessel which offset the higher costs. 
It should also be noted that the 200-500 GRT class of vessels have a larger range of 
vessels sizes than the class below 200 GRT, where all vessels are greater than 150 GRT. 
In the mid 1980s the Japanese industry believed 299 GRT vessels to be the optimal size 
of tuna longliner, whereas previously 400 GRT was in favour (Dcematsu, 1984). 
Licensing data for the Japanese fleet in the east Australian area shows few of the large 
vessels were 400 GRT in the 1984-1989 period. 
4.2.6 Conclusions. 
The economic profitability of the global Japanese longline industry has been reviewed. 
The results confirm the impression gained from the literature review from Chapter 1 that 
after the poor profitability of the early 1980's, profitability improved by the end of the 
decade. 
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In this section the available Japanese cost data was combined with Japanese logbook 
data for the east Australian area and the economic cost of effort was determined for the 
Japanese longline vessels working off the eastem Australian seaboard. The variable cost 
of effort was also estimated and will be of use in modelling later in the study. The results 
show that the unit cost of effort for the larger Japanese vessels is higher than for the 
smaller Japanese vessels. Profitability in the global Japanese longlining industry is 
marginal and the profitability of the Japanese longline operations in the east Australian 
area will be investigated in Chapter 5. 
4.3. Comparison of the Japanese and Australian cost of effort. 
From the description of the Japanese and Australian fisheries in Chapter 1 it is apparent 
that the size of vessels used by the two nationalities is significantiy different. This 
Chapter will compare the cost of effort for the vessels of the two nationalities reported in 
the previous sections. 
The costs of effort for the two nationaUties are reported for comparison in Table 
4.17a,b,c,d. The larger Japanese vessels set up to 3000 hooks per day with effort being 
measured in thousands of hooks, whereas vessels in the domestic fishery measure effort 
in hundreds of hooks. In Table 4.17a the Australian results for each of the three vessels 
classes are presented in dollars and converted to Yen at the appropriate exchange rate 
for the 1989-90 period (ABARE, 1991). 
The Japanese results are given in Yen for both sizes of Japanese vessel in Table 4.17b. 
The relative cost of effort between the nationalities as a group is compared for one 
hundred hooks and is the ratio of the weighted average cost of Australian effort over the 
weighted average cost of Japanese effort and is reported in Table 4.17c. The weighted 
average uses the proportion of effort contributed by each class of vessels as a weighting 
factor. The results in Table 4.17c show that the Australian cost of effort on average is 
just over twice (2.05) the Japanese cost of effort. The ratio wUl be sensitive to exchange 
rates and to the fleet composition in a given area. 
Table 4.17d compares the extremes of the cost of effort values between vessel 
nationalities. The ratio of tiie Australian to Japanese cost of effort varies from 1.2, when 
the lowest cost class of Australian vessel is compared to the highest cost Japanese 
vessel, and 3.3 when the highest cost domestic vessel is compared to the lower cost 
smaller Japanese vessel. The weighted mean is believed to be a representative value for 
the costs of effort in each fleet and wUl be used in modelling. The difference in the 
relative cost of effort is not surprising given the economies of scale of the larger 
Japanese vessels. 
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4.4 Conclusions from the Chapter. 
In Chapter 4 the cost of tuna fishing in the domestic fishery was estimated by surveying 
domestic fishers. The accounting information from the survey was taken and adjusted to 
obtain the economic costs and profit from domestic tuna fishing. This enabled tiie 
economic cost of effort to be determined for comparison with the Japanese fishery. 
The published cost data available for the Japanese longline fleet were adjusted to 
economic cost by previous researchers (Campbell and NichoU, 1991 and 1992a). 
Integrating the economic cost data with the catch and effort database information 
enabled the cost of effort in the Japanese fishery to be established in the east Australian 
area. 
The comparison of the domestic and Japanese cost of effort showed that the domestic 
vessel cost of effort is 2.05 times the Japanese vessel cost of effort. The cost estimates 
wUl be used in addressing long-mn viability, profitability and sustainabUity issues in the 
next Chapter. The relative cost of effort wUl also be used in the economic comparisons 
of domestic and foreign fishing activity in Chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis. 
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Chapter 5: Economic Performance. 
5.1 Introduction 
This Chapter is concemed with several aspects of the performance of the fishery; first its 
economic performance in terms of efficiency of the pattem of allocation of fishing effort 
within AustraUa's EEZ is considered; second, the economic viability of the fishery 
measured by the adequacy of retums to producers is assessed; third, the annual value of 
the fishery rent generated by the fishery is estimated; and finaUy the sustainability of the 
fishery is considered. 
The analysis reported in Chapter 3 indicated that large and small Japanese vessels used 
different technologies. The large vessels over 200 GRT are designed for fishing the 
Southem Ocean fishery for Southem Bluefin Tuna whereas the small vessels under 200 
GRT usually fish more tropical species (Caton and Ward, 1989a). Caton and Ward 
suggest the fleets are loose associations of vessels from different regions of Japan. The 
different vessel sizes are recognised in Japanese statistical data (MAFF, 1989). Given 
the evidence from the present study and from other literature the different sized vessels 
will be treated as separate cases in the following discussion. 
The management regime of the east coast tuna longline fishery is best described as one of 
Umited entry. There are a fixed number of licensed Australian vessels, and a specified 
number of licensed Japanese vessels allowed to fish in the AFZ under an access 
agreement. With the exception of the prohibition on Japanese fishing within the 12 mUe 
limit and the small number of area closures described in Chapter 1, vessels are free to fish 
where they wish. Economic theory would predict that in the absence of management the 
fishery would generate less than the potential sustainable surplus (Gordon, 1954). The 
purpose of the present Chapter is to determine to what extent the performance of the 
vessels in the fishery exceeds that predicted for an unmanaged fishery. 
5.2 Efficiency of allocation of fishing effort. 
The vessels admitted under a limited entry regime behave in a similar maimer to vessels 
in a common property fishery. Gordon (1954) has suggested that vessels operating in a 
common property regime wUl distribute themselves m a fishery so as to equate the Value 
of the Average Product of effort (VAPe) in each ground to the oppormnity cost of 
effort. Equating the VAPe in all grounds does not satisfy the condition for a rent 
maximising allocation of effort which involves equating the value of the Marginal 
Product of effort (VMPe). These relationships wUl be evaluated for the east coast mna 
fishery in order to assess the efficiency of allocation of fishing effort between areas. 
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An important issue in fishery economics is that of the rent maximising level of effort 
exploiting the fishery. The analysis of the individual vessel behaviour does not directiy 
address this issue. However some indirect evidence can be obtained by considering the 
optimal allocation of individual vessel effort to the fishery. Further evidence relating to 
optimality is considered in the section 5.6, sustainability. 
5.2.1 The Average and Marginal Revenue of effort. 
The argument proposed by Gordon is illustrated in Figure 5.1a. This diagram describes 
an open access fishery in which entry to each fishing ground occurs to the point at which 
VAPe in each ground is equated with the opportunity cost of fishing effort. The result is 
that the total level of effort, EQ = EQI + EQJ, is in excess of the efficient level, and that the 
distribution of the total effort, EQ, between the grounds is inefficient in that the values of 
marginal product VMPei and VMPej are not equalised. A limited entry regime may 
succeed in reducing the level of total effort EQ, but it does not remove the incentive for 
vessels to locate so as to equalise VAPe between grounds. Under such a regime VAPe 
may exceed opportunity costs, indicating that rent is being generated, but VMPe wUl not 
be equalised between grounds. The limited amount of effort could be more effectively 
allocated, and generate more rent, if the value of the marginal product of effort in each 
ground was the same. In choosing where to fish, the vessels compare the VAPe between 
grounds i and j , but operating at these effort levels does not equate the VMPe between 
the fisheries. In this section Gordon's hypothesis is tested by comparing the VAPe 
between grounds for this multispecies fishery where there are significant spatial aspects 
resulting from the movement of the tuna stocks. Figure 5.1b illustrates the comparison 
of the VMPe between two fishing grounds, i and j . The profit or rent maximising 
allocation of effort, occurs where the VMPe in ground i, is equal to the VMPe in ground 
j , and where VMPe is equal to marginal opportunity cost. 
In a multispecies fishery the average and marginal retums to a unit of effort are based on 
catches of each of a range of species. The values of these catches can be calculated from 
the revenue function estimated in Chapter 3. The equivalent to the VAPe in a 
multispecies context will be termed the Average Revenue of effort (ARe), and tiie 
equivalent to the VMPe will be termed the Marginal Revenue of effort (MRe). 
The Average Revenue Effort (ARe) is given by dividing Total Revenue by the level of 
effort so that equation 3.2 becomes: 
R(Z,P) 
----- =ARe = ZiIj6ij(PiPj)l/2 + Si6iPiZ 
+ I i l t a i t DtPj -hIiXjn Mim QmPi (5.1) 
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i'igure 5.1a: Predicted distribution of Total Effort between two fishing grounds in an open 
ccess fishery as predicted by Gordon, (1954). Point C is the unit cost of effort. 
$ 
Effort in ground / 
> 
$ 
Effort in ground; 
< 
'igure 5.1b: The optimal distribution of a vessel's effort between two fishing grounds 
Gordon, 1954). 
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The Marginal Revenue effort (MRe) is the first derivative of the revenue function witii 
respect to effort: 
6TR 
MRe=—- that is: 
SZ 
^ . ^ ? ' ^^ = MRe = l i l j Bij (Pi Pj)^ ^2 + 2 Xi BiPi Z 
6Z 
+ I i l t ttit DtPi +^i^m Mim QmPi (5.2) 
Both the Marginal Revenue effort and Average Revenue effort estimates can be obtained 
using the Test command in SHAZAM (1993). The estimated coefficients from tiie 
model are inserted into the required linear transformations for ARe and MRe, and tiie 
test command calculates the resultant coefficient and variance by the delta method as 
previously discussed in section 3.1.3.10. 
In the above equations when the coefficient on the Bj coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero the ARe and MRe are equal to one another and constant with respect 
to the level of vessel effort. Tests of regularity conditions in Chapter 3 confirmed tiie 
existence of diminishing MRe for vessels in the overall fishery model only. The models 
for the vessels in the northem and southem areas were found to have constant retums to 
effort and thus ARe and MRe are equal. 
The revenue function was estimated on the assumption that while vessels were at sea all 
costs, including the cost of following the tuna stocks, were fixed. This impUes that tiie 
vessel's objective in this very short-mn period is revenue maxinusation. In this period tiie 
Japanese vessel needs to decide whether to fish in the AFZ. Since no vessel level data 
are available on the performance of the Japanese fleet in altemative zones, this issue is 
not pursued. However it can be noted that an analysis of this issue at an aggregate level 
was conducted by Brown and Dann (1991) who compared the value of the average 
product of effort in the eastem AFZ m 1989 and 1990 with altemative fisheries in tiie 
Westem Pacific. Since it can be assumed that fishing opportunities exist outside the AFZ 
it would be expected the ARe would be positive for vessels operating inside the zone, 
and, depending on the spatial allocation of effort, that MRe might also be positive. 
5.2.2 Test results. 
In order to test the hypothesis that the ARe and MRe of the representative vessel are 
zero, the ARe and MRe expressions given in equations (5.1) and (5.2) were evaluated at 
sample means for each of the four quarters in the overall Japanese offshore fishery. The 
test results are reported in Tables 5.1a and b and suggest that ARe and MRe are positive 
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in each quarter. Table 5.1c reports the results of a test of the hypothesis that the ARe 
and MRe of the representative vessel are equal in each quarter. This hypothesis is 
rejected and the test results suggest that ARe is significantiy higher that MRe as 
illustrated in Table 5.1a. 
According to Gordon's hypothesis the Japanese vessels fishing in the AFZ under a limited 
entry regime would distribute themselves so as to equate ARe across sub-zones of the 
fishery. However some authors have suggested that the Japanese vessels operate 
intemationaUy as a fleet and attempt to allocate themselves efficientiy (Comitini and 
Huang, 1971; Doulman, 1987). This implies that the vessels attempt to equate MRe in 
different areas of operation in a given period. Gordon's hypothesis can first be tested by 
comparing the ARe's at the same periods in time between the northem and southem 
areas of the fishery using a t test for sample means. This test requires large sample sizes 
with equal variance. 
Tables 5.2 a and b report the average and marginal revenue of representative vessel 
effort for each year and quarter in the overall fishery. Information on catches outside the 
AFZ area were not available to the smdy, though the results in 1989 can be compared 
with the Brown and Dann (1991) study. Brown and Dann confirm that the AFZ has 
higher fleet wide average revenue from effort than altemative fishing areas in the first 
and last quarters of the year, and that vessels are able to eam higher net benefits in 
altemative zones in the second quarter. The ARe results, reported in Table 5.2a are 
consistent with these observations, though Table 5.1a reports that the number of fishing 
observations is high m the AFZ m the second quarter, when according to Brown and 
Dann altemative fishing opportunities in Kiribati and Micronesia are apparently more 
beneficial. The MRe results by quarter and year reported in Table 5.2b appear to be 
consistent with the fact that ARe exceeds MRe although no formal analysis is conducted 
by year and quarter as this has already been examined. 
There are no MRe estimates outside the AFZ with which to compare the MRe results for 
the AFZ. The present study has revealed a significant difference between the northem 
and southem fisheries and considering this may assist in interpretation of the results. 
Table 5.3a reports the results of tests of the hypothesis that average revenue of effort is 
significantiy different from zero for smaU and large vessels in the northem and southem 
fisheries. The positive average revenues of effort in the two areas were compared by t 
test as reported in Table 5.3b. The average revenue of effort in the northem area is 
significantiy higher than the average revenue of effort in the southem area. This might 
suggest that the Doulman-Comitini and Huang hypothesis is favoured and that vessels 
are allocating their effort so as to equate MRe, but as no significant difference between 
the ARe and MRe at the representative vessel level can be detected, possibly because of 
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the smaller sample size of the north and south sub-samples, neither hypotiiesis can be 
supported. It was not possible to investigate the two hypothesis any further. However 
the consistentiy higher ARe, and by implication MRe, in the northem fishery suggests 
that the representative vessel following the tuna stocks allocate less than the optimal 
amount of fishing time to the northem section of the fishery. 
5.2.3 Discussion. 
This study has identified significant differences between the northem and southem 
fisheries. Table 5.3a reports the number of observations in each quarter of the six year 
study period and it is apparent that there are more large than small vessels, and that in 
the south quarters 2 and 3 have most fishing activity. In the north quarter 3 has the most 
fishing activity and quarter 2 has the least fishing activity of the four quarters considered. 
This low number of observations in quarter 2 in the north is consistent with vessels 
having higher average retums in the zones of Kiribati and Micronesia (Brown and Dann, 
op.cit.). However in the second quarter of the year in the southem area of the AFZ the 
vessel numbers are high despite receiving significantiy lower ARe than in the nortiiem 
area of the AFZ in that time period. The vessels in the south could apparently move to 
the north or to altemative Pacific fisheries in the second quarter of the year. This merits 
further investigation. 
The tests reported above are based on the implicit assumption that decisions are made 
under certainty with fiiU information. In the actual environment of a fishery based on 
stock movements which are not known with certainty it would not be surprising to find 
widespread variation of ARe under the Gordon hypothesis, or MRe under the Doulman-
Comitini and Huang hypotheses. However it would not be expected that lack of 
information would cause ARe and MRe to be consistentiy higher, as suggested in Table 
5.3a and b, in one of the two zones of the AFZ. A possible explanation for the results is 
that the species prices reported for the fishery understate the market value of fish 
captured in the colder waters of the southem zone relative to those caught in the north. 
Contact with the Japanese industry supports this view as they regard the northem fishery 
as marginal compared to the southem fishery (Mcllgorm, 1993). On average a rise in 
price of approximately 35-40% would be required to equate the average revenue of 
effort in the two areas. 
An altemative explanation is that the higher ARe in the north is determined by tiie 
productivity of altemative fishing grounds to the north of the AFZ. This has some 
support in the Brown and Dann stiidy, but there is insufficient data available to comment 
ftirther on regional allocation of vessels. However some degree of spatial or other 
separation of the northem and the southem fisheries would be required to support tiiis 
view. 
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Caton and Ward (1989a) note that the vessels in the north are smaller longliners fishing 
for tropical tuna species only, and the vessels in the southern area are larger Southem 
Bluefin Tuna (SBT) vessels. Brown and Dann confirm that regional data show that there 
are three distinct groups of Japanese tuna vessels in the whole AFZ: 20% of all vessels in 
the AFZ fish both tropical and sub-tropical areas and other EEZs in the South Pacific 
area; 45% of vessels, generally larger vessels, fish in the SBT fishery and the Australian 
east coast, but not elsewhere in the Pacific; and other Japanese vessels fish in Westem 
Australian waters alone. 
This suggests that the groups of vessels in the northem and southem fisheries have 
significantiy different targeting behaviour which is supported by the technology results in 
section 3.1. This may account for the southem vessels not taking advantage of the 
higher ARe in the north in the second quarter of the year. However this study noted 
eariier in Chapter 3 that in a given month approximately 30% of vessels in the east coast 
fishery traverse between the northem and southem areas. This degree of movement 
would be expected to contribute to an equalisation of retums between the two areas, and 
it lends support to the price data hypothesis. 
The allocation of effort within the northem and southem areas is now considered in 
order to test the hypothesis about the distribution of effort in terms of distance from 
shore. Table 5.4a and b report the results of the hypothesis that the ARe is equal to zero 
in each of the six zones considered. The hypothesis is rejected, as ARe is positive, with 
the exception of some zones which had no fishing activity in a given quarter. Table 5.4c 
and d reports the t test results of the hypothesis that the ARe's, and by implication the 
MRe's, do not vary with distance from the coast. 
The evidence for the significant variations of ARe with distance from shore in a given 
quarter is much weaker than that reported in the comparisons of the northem and 
southem fisheries. Witiiin the northem and southem region the reported species prices 
are likely to reflect prices across sub-zones, even if the absolute level of prices in the 
south is lower than market levels. This suggests that any observed variations in ARe 
within a region are not likely to be the result of inaccurate price data. 
Results in Table 5.4c and d suggest significant differences at the 5% level between tiie 
ARe's of the representative smaU vessel in adjacent sub-zones in 9 of 20 comparisons in 
the north, and 6 of 11 comparisons in the south. For the representative large vessel there 
are significant differences in 13 of 19 comparisons in the north and 14 of 20 comparisons 
in the south. While the comparisons do not take travel costs into account they suggest 
that ARe and hence MRe is not being equated across sub-zones by the representative 
vessel. 
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We now consider the allocation of effort to the fishery from the viewpoint of the 
representative profit maximising vessel. Optimality is detennined by equality of MRe 
and MCe, though the definition of MCe depends on the time frame considered. 
Since the question to be addressed is the optimal level of effort, the long-mn marginal 
cost is the appropriate measure. As the cost data available are limited, constant costs 
will be assumed so that LRAC = LRMC. To measure the cost of fishing effort in the 
zone some allocation of annual costs among fishing grounds must be made. In the 
current study the economic cost of annual operations was divided by the number of 
operating days per year, and the daUy cost of operating in the Australian zone was 
assumed to be the same as the average daily cost. Chapter 4 discussed the validity of 
these assumptions. The cost of effort was detemuned by dividing the average daily cost 
by the number of hooks set per day and multiplied by one thousand to obtain the average 
cost of setting one thousand hooks. 
The results of the MRe and MCe comparison are reported in Table 5.5a for the overall 
fishery. Where MRe > MCe, as in the years 1987 and 1988 with the exception of the 
second quarter, this suggests that the representative vessel could probably increase its 
effort in the AFZ. That it does not do so is lUcely due to profitable fishing opportunities 
outside the zone. The existence of these opportunities for vessels both inside and 
outside the AFZ suggests that the fishery as a whole could support additional vessels in 
these years. Whether this would be optimal depends upon the impact of additional 
vessels upon existing vessels through any gear, information, or stock extemalities. 
Section 5.6 of the study considers the sustainability of effort levels. 
Where MRe < MCe, which is the case in 1984, 1985, 1986 and 1989, the representative 
vessel appears to be contributing in excess of its profit maximising levels of effort. 
However this probably reflects the absence of altemative profitable grounds and tiie 
long-mn viability of these vessels may be in question. This issue is pursued further in tiie 
section on economic viability. 
5.2.4 Conclusions. 
This section has investigated the efficiency of the allocation of effort in the east 
AustraUan area. Comparisons of vessel performance inside and outside the zone were 
limited to comparisons with the aggregate results of Brown and Dann (1991). The 
assessment of the optimal allocation of effort by vessels witiiin the AFZ was not possible 
due to the ARe and MRe being not significantiy different at the vessel level. 
Tests of the Gordon, Doulman, Comitini and Huang hypotheses were inconclusive on 
whetiier vessels base the allocation of their effort between areas on ARe or MRe. Under 
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le Gordon hypothesis the northern and southern vessels did not appear to equate ARe 
s it was consistentiy higher in the northern fishery. This may have been due to the data 
et for the area understating the prices received for colder water tuna caught in the 
outhem region and the altemative opportunities available for vessels in the northem and 
outhem areas. The comparison with the results from Brown and Dann, examination of 
le fisheries literature, and evidence from this study led to the conclusion that the results 
re consistent with having three groups of vessels in the east Australian fishery: one 
;roup of tropical vessels appear to move between the northem area of the AFZ and 
ither Pacific tuna fisheries; the second group are larger vessels in the south of the fishery 
i^ hich also fish the Southem Ocean SBT fishery; and finaUy the present study has 
dentified that there are vessels which move between the northem and southem fisheries. 
'he hypothesis that the price data understate the price of fish in the south is supported 
ly differences m ARe with distance from shore being less significant than differences 
letween the northem and southem fisheries, and contact with the Japanese industry has 
ndicated the northem fishery is marginal compared to the southem area (Mcllgorm, 
993). 
'he comparisons of long-mn marginal revenue and long-mn marginal cost indicated that 
14 of the 6 years studied the representative vessel in the overall fishery was allocating 
nore than the profit maximising level of effort to the fishery. This suggests that effort 
hould be reduced at the vessel level to achieve profit maximisation, though the analysis 
vas not able to address the profit maxunismg level of effort in different areas and for 
lifferent vessel classes. 
.3 Economic viability. 
Tiis section examines the economic viabUity of the fishing operations in the east coast 
ma longline fishery. 
ti tiiis analysis we move from the very short-mn period, considered by the revenue 
iinction analysis in which all costs are fixed, to the short-mn in which some vessel costs, 
uch as costs of fuel, supplies, bait and crew bonus, can be avoided by not fishing, and to 
le long-mn which all costs including capital costs can be avoided. 
l^ability is ascertained by a comparison of price and average total cost (ATC) or average 
ariable cost (AVC) or by total revenue (TR) and total variable cost (TVC) or total cost 
rC). We consider the long-mn case first and examine the short-mn only m the case of 
essels which appear to be non-viable in the long-mn. We start by considering the 
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Japanese vessels, distinguishing between small and large vessels and operations in the 
northem and southem part of the eastem AFZ. 
Since we have no information about the operations of vessels outside the zone we 
consider the average daily revenue and daily cost of representative vessels operating in 
the AFZ. Cost data are obtained from the domestic tuna fishery cost and income survey 
and the review of the Japanese industry cost survey data in Chapter 4. Average revenue 
of effort estimates for the representative vessel in each class and sub-zone are available 
from the functions estimated in Chapter 3. 
5.3.1 Test results. 
Tests of long-mn performance reported in Table 5.5b compare the ARe and the ACe for 
the representative vessels in the overall fishery. In the overall fishery the only profitable 
time during the sample period for all classes of vessel is in all quarters of the years 1987 
and 1988, with the exception of the second quarter. Long-mn profitability is negative in 
other years. 
Specific ARe-ACe tests for the smaU and large vessels in the northem and southern 
region are reported in Table 5.6 a. For the representative smaU vessel in the north ARe 
was greater than ACe for aU but the last quarter of the year and are eaming economic 
profit. Large vessels in the north and smaU vessels in the south were found to be viable 
in the long-mn, but ACe exceeded ARe for large vessels in the south in all years. In this 
case, where the long-mn viabUity is m question, the issue arises of whether these vessels 
are covering short-mn variable cost as predicted by the theory of the firm? Further tests 
reported in Table 5.6b show all vessels with the exception of the large vessels in tiie 
southem fishery to be covering average variable cost of effort. 
5.3.2 Discussion. 
The results suggest that the smaU vessels in the north are eaming significant economic 
profit and are viable in the long-mn. The small vessels in the south and the large vessels 
in the north are eaming the required retum for long-mn viabUity, whereas the large 
vessels in the south are suffering economic losses. The economic losses are considerable 
and the vessels appear to fail the short-mn viabUity test criteria (ARe-AVCe), and are 
thus in a shut down position (TisdeU, 1980; Baumol et al., 1988). However the results 
refer only to the days the vessels are fishing in the AFZ and these large vessels are 
known to fish in the SBT fishery when not in the southem area of the east coast fishery 
(Caton and Ward, 1989a; Brown and Dann, 1991). Thus if annual fixed costs are 
covered in the SBT fishery these vessels can fish in the east coast region if tiiey can 
cover variable costs. The results of the short-mn viability test suggest the vessels are not 
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be viable in the short mn and should consider reallocating to a different fishery or stop 
fishing. 
Evidence of failure to achieve short-mn viability suggests that the under-reporting of 
price and catch data must be considered. In the previous section the price data for the 
southem area was considered to be too low. Similariy minor amounts of under-reporting 
of catch could also explain why vessels do not meet the short-mn viability criteria on the 
basis of the reported data and yet keep fishing. In the past there have been several cases 
in which Japanese vessels have been guilty of substantial under-reporting of catch 
(Rigney, 1990). This issue will be discussed further in the estimation of rent later in this 
Chapter. 
Now we tum to the viabUity of the representative domestic Australian vessel. Average 
revenue of effort estimates were obtained from the revenue function estimated in section 
3.3 where the Japanese and Australian vessel activity are compared in the inshore area. 
In Table 5.7a the ARe estimates for the representative domestic vessel are reported for 
data in which zero catch observations of other species are included or excluded. The 
case where zero observations are excluded has less potential bias due to a possible zero 
dependent variable problem, but the excluded observations are for vessels that may fish 
YeUowfin tuna only. The ARe estimates for the representative domestic vessel were 
positive when zero catch observations were included, but were only positive in the inner 
zone and in the third quarter in zone 1 when zero catch observations were excluded. 
The results for the representative Japanese vessels and the representative smaU Japanese 
vessel revealed ARe to be positive. For the representative vessels of both nationalities 
MRe was not sigruficantiy different from ARe and can be considered positive for the 
representative vessel with the exception of the outer zone in the domestic fishery. 
The ARe-ACe comparisons reported in Table 5.7b show that the representative domestic 
vessel is viable in the long-mn and a surplus of ARe over ACe is available in the third 
quarter of the year. This is due to the higher availabiUty of YeUowfin tuna in this quarter 
previously identified m section 3.3 and 3.4. The viability of different classes of vessel in 
tiie domestic fishery is estimated in section 5.5, domestic fishery rent. However it should 
be noted that the representative domestic vessel in zone 1, with zero catch observations 
excluded, is viable in 1988, but falls below long-mn viabUity in 3 of the 4 quarters of 
1989. 
The results for the representative Japanese vessel show the smaU vessels to be viable in 
both the inner and outer zones, whereas the representative vessel is not viable in either 
zone. 
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In comparing the ARe results for the representative Japanese and domestic vessels it is 
apparent that the representative domestic vessel has significantly higher ARe than the 
representative Japanese vessel, with the exception of the results for zone 1 when zeros 
are excluded. The ARe results for the representative domestic vessel indicate the 
positive contribution made to ARe by Yellowfin only vessels. This is again evident when 
the representative domestic vessel surplus, given by ARe-ACe, is found to be 
significantiy higher than for the representative Japanese vessel fishing the same area in 
the third quarter of the year. 
5.3.3 Conclusions. 
In the opening section of the Chapter it was noted that the tests of economic viability 
could be used to determine to what extent the performance of the vessels in the fishery 
exceeds that predicted for an unmanaged fishery. Economic theory would predict that in 
the absence of management the fishery would be unable to generate any sustainable 
surplus (Gordon, 1954). We have found that under the limited entry management regime 
the small vessels in the north can generate economic surplus, but small vessels in the 
south and large vessels in the north are not eaming above the long-mn level predicted in 
an unmanaged fishery. In the south the large vessels are eaming less than predicted in an 
open access fishery and their long-mn viability is questioned. However we have also 
raised doubts about the appropriate price data for these southem vessels and the possible 
under-reporting of catch, both of which would understate the econonuc performance of 
the southem vessels. 
In conclusion the long-mn viabUity of the Japanese fleet is sound, with the exception of 
large vessels in the southem fishery. The large vessels in the south fail to meet the short-
mn viabUity criteria and under-reporting of catch and price data are issues in the 
management of these vessels. The representative Australian vessel in the domestic 
fishery was found to be viable in the long-mn and was eaming a surplus in the July to 
September period. The analysis of fishery rent wUl be undertaken m section 5.5 which 
will address these issues further. 
5.4 A comparison of operations of Australian and Japanese vessels. 
One of the most important issues in the analysis of the operations of DWFNs (Distant 
Water Fishing Nations) is that of comparative advantage. The host nation can increase 
its economic welfare by allowing foreign vessels to exploit its fish stocks if these vessels 
have a comparative advantage over domestic vessels. In this context comparative 
advantage of vessels is determined by the level of catch, the price received for the catch, 
and the cost of fishing effort. Comparative advantage may differ from one fishery to 
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another, and within the same fishery, from one part of the zone to another. The 
literature on comparative advantage was reviewed in section 1.7. 
In section 3.3 the activities of Australian and Japanese boats operating in a section of the 
AFZ were analysed and compared. These results can be used to address the question of 
comparative advantage. A significant result was that the two fleets appeared to be 
targeting different species. The domestic vessels concentrated on Yellowfin tuna with 
less than half of the vessels catching species other than Yellowfin. The Japanese vessels 
concentrated on a range of deeper swimming species, particulariy Bigeye tuna, and had 
significantly different methods of operation. This suggests that the Australian vessels 
may have a comparative advantage in Yellowfin production in the inshore area, and 
Japanese vessels in deeper swimming species such as Bigeye. 
The comparative advantage between the vessels of the two nationalities can be 
compared. The revenue function accounts for technology differences and the different 
prices received by the two nationalities. Thus tests of average revenue of effort less the 
different average cost of effort for the two nationalities is a measure of comparative 
advantage. In this case the margmal and average revenue of effort are equal due to 
regularity test results for the comparative model. 
5.4.1 Test results. 
The average revenue of effort results were obtained for the vessels of the two 
nationaUties in the inshore area as reported in Table 5.7a. Table 5.7b reports the results 
of the tests of average revenue of effort less the average cost of effort for the vessels of 
the two nationalities. The results confirm that the representative Japanese vessel is not 
viable in the long-mn in the inshore area, though the representative smaller Japanese 
vessel is viable. Australian vessels are viable in the long-mn in all quarters, with the 
exception of vessels which fish more than Yellowfin tuna in zone 1 of 1989. 
The inclusion of the Australian Yellowfin only vessels leads to a significant advantage for 
the representative domestic vessel over that of the Japanese fleet in aU quarters. 
However when zero observations are excluded, and Australian vessels which catch more 
species than Yellowfin are compared to the Japanese vessels, the advantage is less 
distinct, particularly in zone 1 in 1989. Australian vessels have a less distinct advantage 
over the smaller Japanese vessels, except m the third quarter of the year when the 
Australian advantage is most evident. The advantage in the tiiird quarter is due to tiie 
abundance of Yellowfin tuna m the study area evident in estimations in section 3.3 and 
3.4. Comparative advantage between the two fleets wUl be discussed further in Chapter 
3. 
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5.5 Fishery rent. 
5.5.1 Fishery rent. 
The term rent is used to signify an economic surplus and can have several different 
sources. Rents can be permanent, due to innate or natural advantages, or may be 
temporary being able to be competed away by other economic agents. Fishery rent, 
sometimes referred to as resource rent, is the margin received by the individual producer 
over the cost of supply, being the difference between the landed value of the fish and the 
full economic costs of bringing the fish to port, net of any other kinds of rent (Campbell 
and NichoU, 1992a). Tme resource rents are a long-mn phenomenon as they are 
surpluses after all costs incurred in the production process, including opportunity costs, 
have been taken into account. Resource rent is not readily identifiable from the profit 
and loss accounts of firms as other forms of rent, or quasi-rent, may be reported rather 
than tme resource rent (Campbell and Haynes, 1990). In determining fishery rent the 
individual producer compares the Marginal Revenue and Marginal Cost from the last unit 
of effort applied to the fishery. 
Other components of economic surplus can be rent attributable to factor inputs and 
quasi-rents (Anderson, 1980). Rent generated by a factor of production in a fishery such 
as crew labour, is an example of a quasi-rent and is short-mn in nature (Anderson, 
1980). In many fisheries some fishers have greater catching abiUty than others. These 
"highliners" may have a permanent advantage due to better fish catching ability or tiiis 
may just be a temporary advantage due to information on fish locations (Campbell and 
NichoU, 1992b). 
In the open access fishery the absence of defined property rights leads to the complete 
dissipation of fishery rent (Gordon, 1954). Where the rents from the open access fisheiy 
have been competed away they can generaUy be regenerated only by management 
intervention. For tiiis reason fishery rent has also been described in the literatiire as 
"management rent", due to its regulatory origin (Anderson, 1980). 
5.5.2 Fishery rent studies and tuna fisheries. 
hi Australia, Geen (1990) and Brown and Dann (1991) estimated rent m tiina fisheries in 
the AFZ based on the assumption that the opportimity cost of fishmg effort is the value 
of the catch that vessels could harvest at a given time m altemative fishing locations. In 
the very short-mn, when aU inputs in the production of fishing effort can be considered 
as fixed, tius approach measures fishery rent. It has the advantage of not requiring cost 
information, and of recognising the importance of altemative fishing opportunities for 
tiiese transitory vessels, but can be misleading as to tme economic profitabUity m tiie 
long-mn. 
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In the Westem Pacific tuna fisheries Troedson and Waugh (1994) and Campbell and 
NichoU (1994 b) have estimated fishery rent. In Troedson and Waugh the sustainability 
of Skipjack tuna is incorporated in the rent estimations through the use of estimates of 
key population characteristics available in the fisheries biological literature for this 
species in Papua New Guinea. The Campbell and NichoU study does not address 
sustainability directiy and estimates rent from observed catch, price, and effort data, the 
approach used later in this section. 
5.5.3 Fishery rent estimation. 
Fishery rent is a marginal concept as it is derived from a comparison of the marginal 
revenue and the marginal cost of the last unit of effort applied to the fishery. Fleet wide 
rent could be calculated by taking the representative vessel marginal surplus, estimated 
from the revenue function, and multiplying by the number of vessels in the fishery. There 
were problems in this approach, as multiplying the marginal revenue of effort estimates 
for the representative vessels in a month by effort across the fleet, would explode any 
error and bias in the vessel estimate. The revenue function estimates were not 
appropriate for the fleet wide rent calculation, particularly in sub-areas, and sub-zones of 
the east Australian fishery where retums to effort were constant for vessel estimates. 
In this section observed fleet wide catch and effort data are used in conjunction with 
price and cost of effort data to calculate the annual fishery rent. The method used is 
given below: 
TRe-TCe = 7C (5.3) 
or P h - W Z = 7C (5.4) 
where TRe is the Total Revenue from effort, TCe is the Total Cost of effort, P is the 
price of fish, h is the harvest of fish, W is the services price of effort and Z is the 
aggregate input, effort. 
In any empuical estimation of fishery rent the difference between Total Revenue and 
Total Cost of effort may be an under or over-estimate of the tme fishery rent. The 
factors contributing to an under-estimate are the under-reporting of catches and the 
prices used, which are assumed to capture the value of the fish as determined by 
competitive markets. If fish are sold in uncompetitive markets the possibility of 
downstream rent exists due to transfer pricing between fishers and processors (Campbell, 
1989; CampbeU and NichoU, 1992). The analysis also assumes aU vessels have the same 
costs and factor inputs. Fishery rent may be over-estimated and may include other kinds 
of rents, such as the higher profits eamed by "highliners" (Anderson, 1980). Quasi-rents 
attributable to skUls and other advantage may also be included in the estimates of fishery 
rent. 
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The total approach to fishery rent calculation, as summarised by equations 5.3 and 5.4, 
will give a long mn estimate of fishery rent but does not account for the sustainability of 
catch levels which wUl be examined later in the Chapter. In the presentation of results 
the fishery rent can be expressed as a percentage of the Total Revenue. Access fees in 
the east Australian area were set at 6% of Total Revenue in the study period and thus a 
result in excess of 6% means rent in excess of the access fee level is being eamed. 
The cost of effort is required for the calculations and was estimated in Chapter 4 for the 
domestic and Japanese fishers. In obtaining the cost of effort all licence and access fees 
charges were removed as these are retums to management rather than the cost of factors 
of production (CampbeU and NichoU, 1991). The cost of effort was calculated for 
Japanese and domestic vessels and was reported in Table 4.17. 
5.5.4 Fishery rent results. 
This section reports the results of the direct long-mn rent estimates using equation 5.4 
on the observed data in the 1984-89 period. 
5.5.4.1 Fishery rent in the Japanese fishery. 
The rent eamed by all Japanese vessels in the whole east Australian area was estimated 
and is reported in Table 5.8a. The estimates for the overall fishery show a mean negative 
long-mn rent over the 1984-89 period of 380 miUion Yen per year. The rent in the total 
fishery was positive in only one of the six years, 1985 and the mean percentage of rent 
across the Japanese fleet in the east Australian area for the six year period 1984-1989 
was -14% of Total Revenue. In the northem fishery rent was positive as a percentage of 
TR for four of the six years, whereas the rent in the southem fishery was negative as a 
percentage of TR in all years. 
Table 5.8 b reports that the smaller Japanese vessels are more profitable than the larger 
vessels, and that profitability is higher in the northem area for both vessel sizes. In the 
soutii smaller vessels have positive rent for five of the six years of the study, whereas tiie 
larger vessels in the south have negative rents in all years averaging -34% of TR. 
Estimates of rent as a percentage of TR with season and sub-zone are reported in Table 
5.9 and Table 5.10 respectively. The quarterly results vary with vessel class. Rent as a 
percentage of TR is highest in the total and southem fishery m the last quarter of the 
year, hi the northem fishery smaU vessels have highest results in the second quarter 
whereas large vessels have highest resuUs in the last quarter. The sub-zonal results show 
that small vessels have higher rent as a percentage of TR in each zone than larger vessels, 
but that there are considerable differences in profitabiUty for smaU vessels between 
zones. Small vessels in the south have highest rent as a percentage of TR in tiie 
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innennost and outermost zones. In the north, the area 50-150 miles from shore has 
greatest profitability for both sizes of vessel, and the outer zone is particulariy profitable 
for small vessels. 
5.5.4.2 Fishery rent results in the domestic fishery. 
Rent is calculated for the domestic vessels in each season in the years 1988 and 1989 and 
is reported in Table 5.11. The third quarter of the year is most profitable in both 1988 
and 1989. The long-mn rent as a percentage of TR is reported for the areas north and 
south of Sydney in the domestic fishery in Table 5.12 and indicates very high positive 
retums in the third quarters of 1988 and 1989 in the northern domestic fishery. The 
percentage of effort applied in these quarters is also high. In the southern domestic 
fishery the results were poor for most quarters, with the second quarter of 1989 being 
most profitable. The results are consistent with the high catch rates identified in section 
3.4. 
Long-mn rent was also estimated for each of the domestic vessel classes and is reported 
in Table 5.13. The results illustrate the difference between rent eamed by different vessel 
classes in the domestic fishery. Planing longliners have poorer results than multi-purpose 
vessels and trawlers in both 1988 and 1989. In this analysis trawlers in the northem 
fishery appear to be highly profitable in their tuna fishing activity and outperform multi-
purpose vessels, whereas in the income survey results in Chapter 4, trawlers' reported 
retums from tuna fishing were less than those of multi-purpose vessels. The differences 
in economic performance between vessel classes means the introduction of domestic 
access fees would be resisted particularly strongly by the owners of the poorer 
performing vessel classes. 
5.5.5 Discussion of the performance analysis. 
The results in the Japanese offshore analysis show that the Average Revenue of effort is 
higher for the representative smaller Japanese vessel and for fishing activity in the 
northem area of the offshore fishery. The higher Average Revenue of effort is due to the 
higher catch rates in the northern area that were revealed in the estimations of 
production in Chapter 3. The results suggest that if vessels moved some of their effort 
from the south to the north, effort would be more efficiently allocated and more rent 
would be available from the same level of effort in the east Australian area. However the 
allocation of effort analysis has identified that the discrete operations of vessels in the 
southem and northem fleet mean this may only be an option for a minority of vessels that 
operate in both the northem and southem areas. 
The profitability results suggest that the larger Japanese vessels are less profitable than 
smaUer vessels in both the northem and southem fisheries and aU vessels are less 
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profitable when fishing in the south than in the north. The poor performance of large 
Japanese vessels in the south means that these large vessels should consider relocating to 
more profitable fishing areas if available and the analysis suggests that these vessels will 
relocate in the long-mn. The short-mn viability of the large vessels in the south was 
questioned as the Average Revenue effort (ARe) did not exceed the Average Variable 
Cost of effort (AVCe), and are in a shut down position (Tisdell, 1980; Baumol et al., 
1988) with regard to this portion of their annual fishing activities. 
In the Southem Bluefin Tuna fishery in 1990, the vessels Koyo Mam No.l and Shoun 
Mam No. 21 were apprehended and found to be under-reporting catch by approximately 
50% and 30% respectively (Rigney, 1990). In view of the possibility that catches are 
under-reported the long-mn rent estimates were recalculated for different rates of under-
reporting and the results are reported in Table 5.15. Increasing the value of the catch by 
30-40% is sufficient to restore the profitability of the larger Japanese vessels. Minor 
amounts of under-reporting would result in a finding of short-mn economic viability. 
The adjusted rent estimates in Table 5.15 could also be interpreted as reflecting tuna 
prices being under-reported by the Japanese to the Australian govemment. It is also 
possible that vertical integration by purchasing companies may make first sale prices 
artificially low and that downstream rents are being realised in Japan (Campbell, 1989). 
Fishery managers should re-appraise the sourcing and accuracy of price data as it has 
serious ramifications for profitability estimates in the fishery. 
The profitability results reported do not account for access fees, which were 6% of TR in 
the smdy period (Smith and Wilks, 1988). The rent results are expressed as a percentage 
of TRe and are reported in Tables 5.8, 5.9, 5.10. In Table 5.8 it is evident that the 
Japanese fleet achieved a rent equal to, or greater than, the 6% access fee charged in 
only one of the six years in the study period. In the northern fishery the smaU vessels all 
exceeded the 6% fee, though the larger vessel retiims exceeded 6% in only two of the six 
years considered. Managers may consider having a higher rate of access fee for tiie 
smaller Japanese vessels. 
In the southem fishery the large vessel results for the six year period aU fell below tiie 
6% level, averaging -34%. This is indicative of serious profitability problems. However 
smaller vessels in the south had retums exceeding 6% in three of the six years, and 
averaged a 7% retum over the period. There is apparentiy no scope for additional access 
fee royalties in tiie southem fishery under current management arrangements. 
It is not clear why large Japanese vessels fish in this area. The results compare the 
retums from effort with the cost of effort for the days the Japanese vessels operate in tiie 
study area. The profitability results for the east coast may be calculated in too narrow a 
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framework as many of the vessels in the east Australian area have been fishing Southern 
Bluefin Tuna (SBT) early in the year prior to entering the east coast fishery. Should the 
fixed costs of the vessels have been covered by SBT fishing activity, the east coast may 
be fished on a marginal basis where only short-mn viabUity is relevant. Short-mn 
viability is achievable given the possible under-reporting of catch and prices as previously 
discussed. However the results for large Japanese vessels in the present study are similar 
to those of CampbeU and NichoU, (1992b and 1994b) for the profitability of Japanese 
longliners in Papua New Guinea's Declared Fishing Zone. 
The Japanese industry have claimed that the profitability of distant water tuna fishing has 
been declining since the 1970s, and the industry has been the recipient of substantial 
refurbishment and industry adjustment subsidies to cope with stmctural change in the 
1980s (Neimeier and Walsh, 1988). Campbell and NichoU (1992a and b, 1994a and b) 
have calculated that the level of capital and operational subsidisation is more than 
adequate to cover industry losses. 
The comparison of the economic performance of the representative Australian and 
Japanese vessels inshore off the northem coast of New South Wales indicates that in 
similar areas the ARe of the representative Australian vessel is higher than that of the 
representative Japanese vessel in the 12-50 mUe area from shore. The domestic vessels 
were found to be most viable in the third quarter of the year in the northem New South 
Wales area. 
The production estimation m section 3.4 established that the domestic fishery is 
significantly different between the areas north and south of Sydney. Long-mn rent 
estimates in the northem and southem domestic fisheries are reported in Table 5.12 as a 
percentage of TRe and confirm the third quarter of the year as being most profitable in 
northem New South Wales. The rent results also show there are profitability problems 
in the domestic tuna fishery particularly m the first quarter of the year. In the southem 
area of the domestic fishery the second quarter can be profitable, but as was determined 
in the production analysis in section 3.4, catch rate varies between years. The long-mn 
rent results confirm the need for producers to have information on the seasonal factors 
affecting profitability, such as the East Australian Current, so as to move between the 
northem and southern fishery. The rent estimates vary with vessel class, with planing 
longliners eaming a low level of long-mn rent, although the performance of multi-
purpose vessels and trawlers is more favourable in the northem area. The results 
confirm the production analysis results of section 3.4 and 4.1 that profitability in the 
domestic fishery is marginal and varies with year, season, and vessel class. 
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In summary the analysis has shown that there is hmited amount of rent being earned by 
tuna vessels in the east Australian area under management arrangements in the study 
period. The sustainability of the current effort and catch levels will now be investigated 
to see if aggregate effort levels are higher than desirable. Conclusions about economic 
performance will be presented after the examination of sustainability. 
5.6 Sustainability. 
5.6.1 Sustainability and depletion. 
The maintenance of future catch rates and levels of fishery rent depends on the 
sustainability of the tuna stocks in the east Australian area. Policy makers lack 
comprehensive data on the stocks of tunas and marlins in this fishery, having access only 
to aggregated historical data. Management is complicated by the movement of these 
highly migratory species and the possible interaction with the adjoining Western Pacific 
tuna fisheries. Tagging studies have not proved migration between the Western Pacific 
and east coast fisheries (BRR, 1989). There are also doubts about the validity of the 
assumption that the tuna resources of the Western Pacific region represent a single stock 
(Caton and Hampton, 1985). 
This section investigates the sustainability of the tuna resources in the region by two 
approaches: the first approach estimates the change in catch rates in the fishery for the 
available data over the 1962-1989 period; the second approach uses the same data, 
augmented by average fish weight data, to estimate sustainability by production 
modelling (Schaefer, 1957). The analyses used are simple, due to the limited data 
available, and the results should be treated with caution because of the aggregated nature 
of the data and the assumptions underlying the approaches. The analysis will be 
undertaken with fuU knowledge of these limitations, as ignoring sustainability would be 
an oversight in determining future management and policy. Section 5.6.2 uses the catch 
rate approach, whereas section 5.6.3 uses production modelling. 
5.6.2 Modelling and estimation of stock depletion. 
5.6.2.1 Data. 
Catch and effort data were obtained for the wider area east of Australia as shown in 
Figure 1.1. The area was greater than the AFZ and the data were in 5 degree square 
aggregation from the Japanese Fisheries Agency (JFA) data set for the 1962-1980 
period. The data for the 1980-1989 period were obtained from the AFZIS and the SPC 
data systems for the study area and were summed to be compatible with the 5° 
aggregation. There were two changes in the data logbooks used during the 1962-1989 
period, the changes occurring in 1979 and 1983. The observations in the JFA data set, 
1962-1980 and AFZIS records 1979-1983, recorded tuna catch by numbers of fish, 
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whereas the post 1983 data recorded the weight and number of fish caught. This forced 
the time series analysis for the 1962-1989 period to use numbers of fish caught, rather 
than weights of fish. Using numbers of fish, in this analysis implicitiy assumes that the 
average weight of each species has been constant over the period. 
5.6.2.2. The stock depletion model. 
Assessment of sustainability requires examination of how the biomass of fish available in 
the fishery has changed through time. The data sets available are capable of supporting 
only an elementary analysis using catch and effort as stock proxies under restrictive 
assumptions. 
From the production relationships investigated eariier harvest can be expressed as: 
h = A E " xB (5.5) 
where h is harvest, E is effort, X is stock and A, a and B are constants. Re-arranging 
this equation above we can see that catch per unit effort (CPUE) may be expressed as: 
h 
. . . . = A E a - l x B (5.6) 
E 
ff it is assumed that a = 1 and 6 = 1 then the catch per unit effort is a proportion of the 
stock: 
h 
— = A X (5.7) 
E 
If the catchability coefficient, A is constant through time, changes in CPUE are 
proportional to changes in stock: The assumption that a = 1 in the harvest production 
relationship implies that CPUE does not vary with changes in the level of effort assuming 
a constant level of stock. This may not be the case for a fishery in which search 
behaviour is important (a > 1), or where there may be gear extemalities (a < 1). The 
assumption that 6 = 1 implies that catchability does not vary with stock size. However if 
the fish tend to school (6<1) the CPUE wUl not fall in proportion to the stock. The 
catchability coefficient denoted by the constant. A, may in fact increase over time as a 
result of technological change, as discussed in section 3.1.4.2, including improvements in 
fish location technology (Baron, 1991). For these reasons change in CPUE is a very 
imperfect index of changes in the level of fish stock and the results obtained from the 
analysis should be treated with caution. 
Effort is measured in hooks set per year and the catch is recorded in numbers of each fish 
species. Changes in CPUE over time can be analysed by means of the following model: 
h 
= a-H6iT-hl32Di + 63D2 + 64DF*T (5.8) 
E 
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where h is harvest, E is effort, T is time (1-28 years), Dj is a dummy variable to 
represent the change from JFA records to AFZIS records in 1979 (1962 to 1979=0, 
1979 to 1989=1), D2 is a dummy variable to represent the change from AFZIS TLOl 
records to TL04 records in 1984 (1962 to 1984=0, 1984 to 1989=1), and DF*T is a 
slope dummy variable for commencement of the domestic fishery in 1984 (1962 to 
1984=0, 1984 to 1989=1). 
5.6.2.3 Interaction 
The Australian domestic fishery conrbnenced in 1984 and expanded through the rest of 
the decade. To the north east of the study area the tuna fisheries in the Westem Pacific 
also expanded during the mid nineteen eighties. The available data will be tested to see 
whether in the post 1984 period Japanese longline vessel catch rates fell due to the 
development of the domestic or Westem Pacific fisheries. The effect of a gradual rise in 
exploitation in these other fisheries could have been to increase the rate of decline of 
CPUE over time in the East Australian area. This effect was tested for by the inclusion 
of a slope dummy variable to detect CPUE changes in the post 1984 period. Should the 
emerging Westem Pacific and Australian domestic fisheries have significantly depleted 
Japanese catch rates, the sign of the dummy variable would be negative. 
5.6.2.4 Estimation and hypothesis testing. 
The estimated form of the model became: 
hk/Ek = a -h 61 Tk -H 62D1 + 63 D2 + 64 DF* T^ + 8^ (5.9) 
where (h^/Ek) = CPUE is measured in number of fish per thousand hooks, T represents 
time, Dj and D2 represent the changes in reporting systems in 1979 and 1984, DF is the 
interaction dummy variable, and £ is an error term assumed to conform to the 
assumptions of the OLS error term which is normally distributed with a mean of zero and 
constant variance. 
The equation was estimated for all seven species in the fishery for the 1962 to 1989 
period. In aU species results the slope dummy variable term for interaction was not 
significantly different from zero and was dropped from the fmal model. The final 
estimated form became: 
hk/Ek= a + 6iTk + 62Di + B3D2+8k. (5.10) 
where all symbols are as in equation 5.9. 
5.6.2.5 Results. 
The results of the estimations are reported in Table 5.16. The null hypothesis for each of 
the seven species is HQ: the coefficient on the time variable is equal to zero, which 
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indicates there is no significant depletion in catch rate and presumably stock with time. 
The null hypothesis was rejected at the 5% level of significance for all species except 
Striped Marlin. 
Of the significant terms Albacore, Bigeye, Yellowfin and Blue Marlin had negative 
coefficients representing depletion at the 1% level of significance, and the coefficient for 
Black Marlin was negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating depletion of this 
species. Swordfish had a positive coefficient, which may be indicative of migration. AU 
constant terms were positive and significant at the 5% level. The values of these 
constants can be interpreted as the number of fish reported caught by a unit of effort, one 
thousand hooks, in the first time period of the sample. The results reported in Table 5.16 
suggest that Albacore, Bigeye, Yellowfin and Blue and Black Marlin stocks are being 
depleted. However there is no apparent depletion of Striped Marlin. 
The analysis wiU be extended to a production model to attempt to determine if the effort 
being applied to the species in the east Australian area is greater than the economic 
optimal level. 
5.6.3 The production model and sustainability. 
5.6.3.1 The model. 
The production modelling approach has been used in the economic analysis of tuna 
fisheries (Flagg, 1977), in multispecies tuna fisheries economic analysis (Conrad and 
Adu-Asamoah, 1986), and in the tuna fisheries biology literature (Schaefer, 1957; Pella 
andTomlinson, 1969; Sakagawa, 1979; SkiUmann, 1989; Suzuki, 1989). 
In the multispecies context it is standard to assume that the species may be ecologically 
and technologically independent (Hannesson, 1983b; Conrad and Adu-Asamoah, 1986; 
McUgorm, 1987). In this study that assumption has been challenged due to the evidence 
of joinhiess in production for some species m the south of the AFZ study area in the 
1984-1989 period. There are not sufficient data to incorporate the jointiiess findings for 
the entire 1962-1989 period, or to the wider area, and we assume that the species are 
non-jointly produced. 
In using the production modelUng approach there is no certainty that the unit stock 
assumption is ftilfiUed for each of the migratory species in the analysis (Caton and 
Hampton, 1985). The area of the analysis is also greater than the AFZ as shown in 
figure 1.1. In the previous section the depletion trend model was constrained to use 
lumbers of fish caught, as opposed to the weight of fish caught. Weights of harvest are 
equired in the production modelling approach and were obtained from the avaUable 
werage fish weight data for the 1984-1989 period. 
179 
Average fish weight data were available only for the 1984-1989 period and were 
examined for any evidence that the average weight of species is diminishing The 
monthly average weight of each species was regressed against time in months and the 
results, reported in Table 5.17a, indicate Albacore and Swordfish average weights to be 
reducing at the 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively. Further modelling result 
reported in Table 5.17b accounted for seasonal differences in fish weight by the use of 
seasonal dummy variables. The average weights of Albacore and Black Marlin were 
found to be declining at the 5% level, and Blue Marlin and Swordfish at the 1% level of 
significance. These trends will be borne in mind in the interpretation of the results 
However the analysis assumes a constant average weight of fish for the 1962-89 period 
using the mean weights of species available for the 1984-89 period. Output price, and 
cost of effort data are available for the year 1989. 
The model combines a biological and an economic production fiinction to give a 
relationship between harvest and fishing effort. Catch and effort data can be used to 
estimate the yield/effort relationship and when cost of effort and price data are available 
the maximum economic yield in the fishery can be determined (Campbell and HaU, 
1988). The biological production fiinction is as described by Pella and Tomlinson 
(1969). 
dX 
- - - - X = a X - b X m (5J1) 
where X represents stock and a, b and m are constants. In this case m=2 as it is assumed 
there is a symmetric relationship between the instantaneous growth of stock and the 
biomass, i.e. logistic growth: 
'^=^x(i ) 
K 
where r is the intrinsic growth rate and K is the environmental carrying capacity. The 
H L U T S ) '*'""" "'"'"""' ' ' " ' ^^ ' ' " ^ is r = a and K = r/b (Campbell and 
The economic production taction is given by equation 5.5. The values of a and B ate 
assutr^ d to be «,ual to unity implying that then= are no vessel externalities or stock 
^ r d ' h T H r " " " ' "''^- ™^ *^" ' ^ " ^ *^ - o - ™ ^ f-""-""" ft-nction adopted by Schaefer, (1967): 
h=AEX 
(5.13) 
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If the fishery is in biological equilibrium h= X. Using this relationship with (5.14) we 
have a relationship between the equilibrium levels of stock and effort: 
AE 
X = K ( 1 - - - ) (5.14) 
r 
Substituting this into (5.13) for X we have the yield/effort curve: 
AE 
h = A E K ( l ) (5.15) 
r 
When the fishery faces a perfectly elastic demand curve for its product the total revenue 
function is obtained by multiplying the yield / effort curve by the price of the harvest, p. 
CampbeU and Hall (1988) note that the economic model assumes the fishery is in long-
mn equilibrium and that all vessels are operating at the minimum of long-mn average 
cost of effort as expected in a competitive environment. The minimum long-mn cost of 
effort is c, and the total cost of effort is thus cE. The economic yield (Y) can thus be 
written as: 
AE 
Y = p A E K ( 1 ) - c E (5.16) 
5.6.3.2 Estimation. 
The usual method of estimating the bioeconomic model is to drop the assumption that 
the stock is in equilibrium so that the growth relation is replaced by: 
X 
X = r X ( l ) - h (5.17) 
K 
which is converted to the discrete form : 
Xt 
Xt+i-Xt = r X t ( l ) -ht . (5.18) 
K 
When the relation Xt = h^/AEt is substituted into (5.18) then: 
Ut+i-Ut r 
= r Ut - AEt (5.19) 
Ut AK 
where Uj = ht/Ej which is catch per unit effort. 
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Equation 5.19 can be converted to a stochastic relationship by the addition of a random 
ertor term and estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) using the time series of effort 
and catches over the 1962-1989 period. The econometric pitfalls in estimating this 
equation are noted by Uhler (1980), who recommends that the economic and biological 
production functions should be estimated separately, as in Henderson and Tugwell 
(1979) to recognise that they are distinct stochastic relationships. Uhler suggests that in 
estimating 5.19, the ertor tenn may violate the properties assumed in OLS estimation 
and suggests there is an ertor in variables problem and the potential for autocorrelation. 
The error in variables problem comes from using ht/AEt as a proxy for the unobserved 
variable, stock Xt The autocortelation problem comes from using ht/AEt in a discrete 
time model containing both Xt+i and Xt with the error terms in the estimating equation 
being autocorrelated. In this study the two production ftinctions cannot be estimated 
separately due to a lack of stock information and mis-specification and autocorrelation 
will be tested for and addressed if necessary. Monte Carlo techniques were used by 
Uhler (1980) to show that in OLS estimation of equation 5.19 the estimate of the true 
value of the rent maximising effort level is subject to less error than the estimates of 
stock and harvest. Since effort is often the most important management control variable, 
this is a significant finding. 
5.6.3.3 Results. 
The estimations of equation 5.19 are reported in Table 5.18a for each of the species. 
With the exception of the coefficient on effort in the Albacore equation, all coefficient 
estimates have the expected sign. In the estimations Bigeye, Swordfish, Black Marlin 
and Striped Marlin have positive constant terms (r) at the 5% level of significance. The 
coefficients on the Ut terms (i.e.-r/AK from equation 5.19) are negative and significantly 
different from zero at the 5% level of significance for all species except Black Marlin, 
Blue Marlin and Yellowfin. 
The coefficients on the Et term (-A) were negative and significant for Swordfish and 
Black Marlin, at the 5% level. The Durbin-Watson statistics indicated that first order 
autocorrelation or mis-specification was not a significant problem. The implication of 
the non-significant coefficients on the Et term is that the constant A is not significantly 
different from zero. Only Swordfish had statistically significant coefficients in all 
variables at the 5% level, though the Black Marlin results were significant at the 10% 
level. 
The results were used to calculate the levels of effort associated with Maximum 
Sustainable Yield (MSY) and Maximum Economic Yield (MEY) which are reported in 
Table 5.18b. 
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5.6.3.4 Discussion of the sustainability results. 
The results in Table 5.18a show that the model may not be appropriate for the 
assessment of sustainabUity due to some insignificant estimates of the coefficient values 
on the Et variable. This could be due to: the unit stock assumption being violated; data 
which may inadequately cover the spatial distribution of the stock; the migratory 
behaviour of the species in question; or violation of the assumption that a=B=l in the 
production relationship. Consequently the model will be applied to Swordfish and Black 
Marlin only. 
The results of the model in Table 5.18b report that for Swordfish the rent maximising 
level of effort, (MEY) in the fishery is 16.7 miUion hooks per annum and the MSY level 
of effort was 18.75 mUlion hooks. The results for Black Marlin showed the rent 
maximising level of effort to be 12.1 miUion hooks per annum and the MSY level of 
effort was 14.55 mUUon hooks per annum. The effort levels in the wider study area in 
the 1962-1989 period, reported in Table 5.19a and b, had a mean level of 14.9 milUon 
hooks per annum. In the 1984-1989 period effort levels had a mean value of 16.25 
million hooks per annum, with 1988 and 1989 having highest effort in excess of 20 
miUion hooks per annum. The effort levels in 1988 and 1989 were in excess of both the 
long-mn profit maximising level and the MSY effort level for both Swordfish and Black 
Marlin. 
Given that the effort in the eastem AFZ was approximately 60% of the total effort in the 
wider eastem Australian study area (see Table 5.19d), the MEY for the eastem AFZ can 
be estimated to be 9.85 and 7.14 miUion hooks for Swordfish and Black Marlin 
respectively. The 1988 and 1989 effort levels for Black Marlin and Swordfish were 
higher than desUable and this issue should be addressed by management. The modeUing 
suggests than to bring 1989 effort levels to MEY, effort would have to be reduced by 
28% and 41% for Swordfish and Black Marlin respectively. 
However management of a multispecies fishery often involves overfishing some species 
and underfishing others relative to the level that would be appropriate if the species 
could be fished individually. 
5.7 Discussion of results and conclusions from Chapter 5. 
5.7.1 Discussion of the economic performance and sustainability in the east 
Australian area. 
This Chapter has appraised the performance of the tuna vessels in the east Australian 
area. The allocation of effort by vessels was investigated and a limited comparison with 
the Brown and Dann (1991) study of altemative tuna fisheries outside the zone indicated 
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that vessels in the northern area of the eastern AFZ may move to other EEZs in th 
Pacific in quarters when the average revenue of effort is low in the AFZ. 
The average revenue of effort (ARe) of the representative vessel in the northern fishery is 
significantly higher than in the southem fishery. This is due to the higher species catch 
rates in the northern area identified in the estimations in Chapter 3. However theorv 
suggests that vessels would allocate their effort between areas so as to equalise thei 
average revenue of effort. This may not be happening for several reasons. First the 
price data used may not adequately reflect the prices received for the colder water tunas 
in the southem fishery. This implies that the observed differences in ARe are a statistical 
artefact caused by the use of aggregate price data which may not reflect the prices 
achieved by the tunas from the southem fishery. Alternatively, the higher ARe in the 
north may reflect the other fishing opportunities available to vessels outside the northern 
AFZ. In this case there should be a difference in fleet stmcture between the north and 
south. It is known that most of the northern vessels are tropical longliners, whereas the 
majority of the southem vessels are designed for the sub-tropical and mid latitude SET 
fishery (Caton and Ward 1989a, Brown and Dann, 1991). The high level of fishing 
activity in the southem area, tests of significantiy different catch rates and technology in 
Chapter 3, and evidence in the fisheries literature, suggests that the operation of the 
southem vessels are significantly different from the northem vessels. Only a minority of 
vessels in the fishery move between the south and the north in response to the 
differentials in ARe. 
The comparisons of long-mn marginal revenue of effort and the marginal cost of effort 
suggest that the representative vessel applies more than the profit maximising level of 
effort to the east Australian fishery in most years. This suggests that effort at the vessel 
level should be reduced if altemative fisheries are available. 
As was noted at the start of the Chapter the performance analysis is also a test of how 
eff^tive the current management regimes are in realising rent. The long-run 
perfomiance analysis indicated that small vessels in the north were most viable and that 
large vessels in the south had long-mn and short mn viability problems. 
llie results of the rent analysis show that the small Japanese vessels in the northem 
fishery eam rent, whereas large vessels in the northem fishery and small vessels in the 
^uth are not earning consistently greater retums than those in an open access fishery. 
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better long-mn economic perfomiance than the larger vessels in all areas. Small vessels 
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have the capacity to pay higher access fees than the larger vessels, particulariy in the 
northem area. 
Rent estimates were found to vary with vessel class and were distinctiy seasonal. For 
example there is rent generated in the domestic fishery in the innermost area north of 
Sydney in the July to September period only. An all year round domestic tuna longline 
industry in the inshore area would have viabUity problems, but the harvesting of tuna as 
an additional fishing activity for trawlers and multi-purpose vessels can give high 
seasonal retums when tuna are available. The only potential for increasing rent would be 
to encourage additional effort by domestic vessels in the most profitable quarter. 
However the sustainability of additional effort in the domestic fishery cannot readily be 
determined. 
The assessment of economic performance suggests the need for a greater understanding 
of the Japanese tuna industry operations, and for close monitoring of aU catch, effort and 
price data for accuracy. Subsidisation of tuna operations by the Japanese govemment 
lowers the average cost of effort to vessels, but at present the extent is unknown, though 
it is possibly offsetting poor operating profits (Campbell and NichoU, 1992a and b, 1994a 
and b). The subsidisation program may call the long-mn viabUity of the Japanese longUne 
tuna industry into question (Stokke, 1989). 
The revenue function analysis accounted only for seasonal and annual fluctuations in tuna 
stocks, and took no account of long-mn sustainability. The results of the depletion trend 
modelling indicated that the changes in reporting systems during the 1962-1989 period 
had significant effects on reported catch per unit effort (CPUE), but that the start of the 
Austialian fishery and the rise of effort m the Westem Pacific fisheries did not have a 
significant effect on the CPUE of the Japanese vessels m the eastem AFZ. The depletion 
model reported a significant downward trend in CPUE over time for aU species, except 
Striped Marlin and Swordfish, with Albacore and YeUowfin having the most significant 
declines in catch rate. However the results must be interpreted with caution due to the 
problems in achieving a consistent data series and the restrictive assumptions of the 
analysis. 
The production model approach proved to be appropriate only for Swordfish and Black 
Marlin. The Swordfish and Black Marlin results indicate that the effort applied was 
greater than the MEY level for these species m the east Australian area in 1988 and 
1989. The sustainability results need to be interpreted with caution due to the 
aggregated nature of the analysis and the breaks in the data set due to the changes in 
logbook systems. One weakness m the production analysis may have been the constant 
weight of fish assumption for the 1962-89 period. The analysis of average weight data 
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over [he 1984-89 period showed average weight of Albacore, Black and Blue Marlin and 
Swordfish to be diminishing over the 1984-89 period. Should tiiis be the case the results 
of the production modeUing analysis may assume more significance. The diminution in 
the average weight of Swordfish and Black Marlin is cause for management concem and 
may indicate the need for control of effort levels in the region. Further analysis of 
sustainability is beyond the resources and data available to this study, but is important for 
policy development and long-mn stock management of the east Australian resource. 
Any policy recommendations generated from the revenue function modelling must be 
sustainable in the long-mn. The analysis showed that Swordfish and Marlin species may 
be vulnerable to over-exploitation and the production model indicates that a reduction in 
effort would be required to maintain the sustainable harvesting of these species. 
However a reduction in effort, due to the Swordfish and Black Marlin estimates, may 
result in under-exploitation of the more prolific Yellowfin tuna stocks, for which the 
sustainability analysis presented here was unsuited. This is a common dilemma in 
multispecies fisheries management (Mcllgorm, 1987). 
The results suggest that the management regime in the 1984-1989 period did not result 
in the generation of substantial rent. Despite being a limited entry fishery the effort 
levels in the 1984-1989 period almost doubled, as reported in Table 1.4a. The southem 
fishery had the major share of the Japanese fishing activity and the large Japanese vessels 
had the poorest performance in this area. The sustainability analysis suggests that 
consideration should be given to reducing the effort levels in the east AustraUan area and 
this might lead to greater rent being generated in the fishery. The rent in the east 
AustraUan area could also be increased by a reallocation of Japanese vessel effort from 
the southem to the northem area where the average revenue of effort was significantly 
greater. However this Chapter has shown that this caUs for a greater understanding of 
the intemational operations of the Japanese tuna fleets and greater investigation of the 
reliability of both catch and price data supplied to management. 
5.7.2 Conclusions from Chapter 5. 
In this Chapter the rent and sustainability of the tuna resource in the east Australian 
fishery have been examined. The management regime in the east AustraUan area has 
lunited the access of both Japanese and domestic vessels, but has led to rent being 
generated only by the smaU Japanese vessels in the northem fishery which were eaming 
in excess of the remms expected under an open access regime. The large Japanese 
vessels in the north and small vessels in the south do not eam more than the open access 
scenario, and large vessels in the south have serious viabiUty problems. 
186 
The results indicate the limited entry regulations on Japanese vessel numbers were not 
specific enough in containing the rising effort that was a feature of the fishery in the 
1984-1989 period. The performance analysis recommends that rent could be increased 
by moving some of the Japanese vessels from the southern to the northem fishery. 
However this may not be easy due to the wider operational regimes of the different fleets 
of Japanese vessels. The Japanese vessel effort levels in the east Australian area should 
be reduced from 1989 levels to enhance profitability and sustainability. The poor 
profitability of larger vessels in the south may merit reduction in the effort of these 
vessels in particular. 
The results of the sustainability analysis were inconclusive for most species. In the first 
analysis there was no evidence of depletion of Japanese catch rates in the region due to 
the rise of the Westem Pacific tuna fisheries or the start of the Australian domestic 
fishery. The production analysis found effort levels for Swordfish and Black Marlin in 
1988 and 1989 were in excess of rent maxunising level. The effort level in 1989 was 
higher than the MSY level of effort for these two species and may indicate biological 
over-exploitation. Given the multispecies nature of the fishery and the nonjoint nature of 
production in the northem zone, management is severely constrained in its abiUty to 
address this problem. The production model did not give significant results for other 
species. 
The lack of conclusive sustainability results for all species shows that traditional "stock" 
approaches to modelling m this fishery can yield a limited amount of information for 
policy development and management, given the nature of the stocks and the quality of 
the data available. The use of a dual multiproduct production model to investigate policy 
options is an altemative approach. With only limited knowledge of the sustainability of 
the commercial species, caution should be a central feature of future poUcy and 
management for the fishery. Policy will be the subject of the final Chapter of the thesis. 
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Chapter 6.0: Policy Analysis. 
In fisheries management the exploitation of the fish stock is controlled by regulating the 
fishing industry in some way. Often the approach taken in multispecies fisheries 
management does not consider the technologies of producers and their potential 
response to regulations. The purpose of this Chapter is to consider policy and 
management of the fishery given the modelling results presented in the previous 
Chapters. The policy options must reconcile the foreign and domestic fishing activity in 
the east Australian area, take account of vessel technology, and consider the 
sustainability of the resources. 
The economics of foreign fishing literature was reviewed in Chapter 1. The revenue 
function approach used in the curtent study is different from the more traditional stock 
based approaches to foreign fishing analysis and can address many policy issues in this 
fishery. In section 6.1 the following management issues are identified: the vessel 
technology of each of the fleets and the impUcations for management; the sustainability 
of the tuna stocks in the fishery; and the domestic and foreign fishing balance in the 
fishery. The management implications of having different vessel technologies are 
discussed in section 6.2 as vessel technology constrains the choice of management 
regime in a multispecies fishery. In section 6.3 the vessel technology results in the 
Japanese offshore fishery are compared with the vessel technologies in the domestic 
fishery. The appropriateness of different management regulations to vessel technologies 
is reviewed and a common management approach is sought to management of the 
different fisheries. The results of the sustainability analysis are also considered for 
management of the different tuna and billfish stocks in the east Australian region. 
The poUcy conclusions from the modelling results are presented in section 6.4, where the 
most appropriate management regime for the fishery is considered and the future of 
Japanese vessel access to the east Australian area is discussed in the light of the 
modelUng results. The thesis concludes in section 6.5 with a summary of the study, and 
with comments on the use of the revenue function in fisheries economic modelling. 
From the review of foreign fishing literature in section 1.7 it is apparent that the Japanese 
foreign fishing activity in the eastem Australian area has to be reconciled with the 
domestic fishing activity. In the domestic fishery development literature it is usually 
assumed that the stock stmcture is known and can be measured as a variable, which is 
not the case in this study. In the literature, the fishery is usually single species and where 
multispecies, is nonjointly produced. It is often assumed that the foreign and domestic 
fishing fleet have homogenous vessel technologies though most foreign and domestic 
models recognise that the costs of production and output prices will probably differ 
between nationalities. 
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This study has shown that multispecies fishery production theory can be used to analyse 
complex joint production relationships involving different vessel groups, in the absence 
of explicit stock information. The modelling has implications for domestic fishery 
development and the management of the east Australian fishery. The policy and 
management issues identified from modelling are investigated in the next section. 
6.1 The policy issues in the east Australian area. 
The main policy issues in the east Australia area are: the vessel technology and its 
implications for management; the domestic and foreign fishing balance in the fishery; and 
the sustainable effort levels in the fishery. 
The revenue function modelling has estimated the technology of the Japanese vessels and 
domestic vessels and the supply of different species in the fishery. The vessel technology 
is important because it Umits the options for developing appropriate management 
regimes in a multispecies fishery (Kirkley, 1986). Past management has not considered 
the vessel technology and may be applying policies which make stock management 
objectives less effective. The technology analysis can also be used to address specific 
issues such as the effect of vessel technologies on individual species, such as Marlin, and 
the behavioural outcomes of introducing quota management. 
The Japanese have been fishing in the east Australian area under access agreements since 
1979 and apparentiy wish to have long term access to the area. The economics of 
domestic fishery development can be analysed by the revenue function approach. 
Comparative advantage can be estimated and the allocation of the resource between 
domestic and foreign fleets evaluated. 
FinaUy, the level of total effort that can be applied to the different fish stocks in the 
fishery, and the sustainability of the effort levels currentiy being applied by fishers, are 
also important for management. Sustainable harvesting is a policy objective of 
Australian fisheries management (DPIE, 1989). 
The next section wUl examine how vessel technology can influence stock management 
and why sustainabiUty is a key issue in fisheries management. 
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6.2 Vessel technology and sustainable management. 
In fisheries management regulations are usually used to achieve management objectives. 
However if the type of stock management adopted is not consistent with vessel 
technology, and management measures fail to take account of the inter-relationships 
between species, the regulations may not have their intended results (Kirkley, 1986). In 
multispecies fisheries management options are constiained by the form of vessel 
technology. 
The revenue function approach provides information about the options for stock 
management, such as whether it is possible to manage individual fish stocks 
independentiy of other species. The method also gives information about producer 
responses to output and input regulations. In interpreting the revenue function results it 
should be recognised that the approach is limited in that it permits the determination of 
ways the fish stock can be managed in the short to intermediate term, and evaluates 
conditional output responses by firms to regulations imposed at the stock level (Kirkley, 
1986). 
6.2.1 Vessel technology and stock management. 
6.2.1.1 Nonjointness and biomass management. 
In a multispecies fishery aspects of technology such as nonjointness and input-output 
separability are important in determining whether biomass management is appropriate. 
Input-output separability means that the marginal rate of transformation of output pairs 
does not vary with increases in the level of input. In multispecies production the relative 
mix of species would not alter with increasing effort at the vessel level. 
In stock management Kkkley (1986) notes that nonjointness means that individual stock 
or unit stock management is appropriate as decisions to harvest species are independent 
of other species, whereas jointness means that the management of individual stocks will 
be dependent on other stocks. Nonjointness and jointness are major management issues. 
Biomass management will only be appropriate where species are mdividuaUy nonjoint 
and input-output separable (Kirkley, 1986). 
If production is joint, and fish supply is related to the relative prices of species, it adds a 
layer of complexity for the fishery manager familiar with traditional stock management 
approaches only. In traditional multispecies fisheries management a manager often 
considers all species together as a single species, or as fish biomass. However should tiie 
technology be joint tiien this would be a mis-specification, as vessels wUl have the abUity 
to take tiie more valuable species in preference to the less valuable. 
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[gnoring joint relationships could mean that inappropriate policies based on nonjoint 
technology are applied, and that the opportunity to use royalties or quantitative 
restrictions in the joint fishery are foregone. Equally applying joint management policies 
to systems where technology is nonjoint may lead to the implementation of expensive 
output control regimes which may not be appropriate to the vessel technology. 
In multispecies fisheries management incidental harvest, or true by-catch, can also occur. 
If the incidental species is not part of the intended harvest and there is no supply 
response to price for the incidental species, it can appear to be nonjointiy produced 
(Kirkley, 1986). Effort and gear technology regulations can be used to address the 
composition of such technically determined catch. 
6.2.1.2 Regulations: royalties, quotas and effort limitations. 
Technology has a central role in determining the choices of management regulations. 
Management of fisheries is generally by input regulations, where effort is limited, or by 
output regulations, such as a per unit output royalty or output quota. In applying any of 
these instmments there wUl be an uneven response by different producers in the fishery. 
Kirkley (1986) refers to this as the cost of achieving uniform management, suggesting 
that where these costs are high to an industry sector, regulations will be resisted. 
From previous modelling in Chapter 3 it is apparent that fishing vessel responses to 
regulation wUl differ between years, seasons, and areas. Having accounted for variation 
by the use of shift parameters, the modelling capmres potential responses by producers in 
the form of elasticities, such as the product specific scale, own price and cross price 
elasticities, and elasticities of transformation. These measure the significance and the 
strength of the production relationships. 
To assist in interpreting the results Figure 6.1a illustrates joint production in a two 
species multispecies fishery. The output quantities qla and qlb of the two species are 
determined by the relative price ratio and joint Production PossibiUty Frontier (PPF) at 
equilibrium EQ. At this relative price ratio and level of fishing effort, the same quantities 
of catch could be taken by nonjoint technology as illustrated by a PPF given by qla, EQ, 
qlb. However if relative prices changed, the nonjoint technology would continue to 
produce qla and qlb for the given level of effort, whereas under the joint technology tiie 
proportion of the higher price species in the catch would increase. 
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Species A 
qii 
0 
PB/PA 
qlb Species B 
Figure 6.1a: Jointness ui production for a vessel in a two species multispecies fishery. 
The price ratio Une is given by: -price B/ price A ie. {-P^/PpJ. Nonjoint production is 
also shown and qla and qlb can be produced by either technology at the same level of 
effort. EQ is the equilibrium under the relative price ratio as shown. 
q2a 
Species A 
qla 
q3a 
0 
(PB-RB)/PA 
Eo 
PB/PA 
Species B 
Figure 6.1b: The effect of an output royalty or an output quota on species B when 
production is joint m a two species multispecies fishery. The price ratio Une under a 
royalty becomes: -price B- royalty on price B (Rb)/ price A ie ( - P B - R A / P A ) 
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Royalties. 
Royalties are a per unit output tax and have often been advocated as the policy 
instmment to address market failure and over-exploitation in fisheries (Cunningham et 
al., 1985). Nonjoint technology means that the input scaled supply of a species is 
perfectiy inelastic and thus restrictions on output prices wUl have no effect on the levels 
of supply of individual species, except indirectiy through their effect on fishing effort 
(Kirkley, 1986). Royalties will only reduce exploitation of taxed species where 
production is joint. In Figure 6.1b the price ratio now includes the royalty on species B 
and the output of species B decreases from qlb to q2b, as producers increase production 
of species A from qla to q2a. Under the royalty it should be noted that the new 
equUibrium EQ' is on the same PPF as Eg, but is on a lower gross iso-revenue line than 
the original equilibrium. Eg. 
Output quota. 
In fisheries management a quota is often used as a quantitative output regulation. The 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) is determined by management and quota systems take two 
forms: a global quota, as a quantitative Umit for fleet production; or an Individual Quota 
(IQ) which designates a specific quantity of catch to the individual fishing vessel. The 
global quota does not restrict individual vessel behaviour and leads to a race for the 
limited output, whereas the IQ restricts the output at the vessel level (Cunningham, 
1993). Where individual output quotas are transferable between vessels, they are 
referred to as Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs). 
When species are produced jointly they should be managed together so as to 
accommodate joint relationships. The introduction of a per vessel quota for a given 
species wUl lead to vessels catching substitute species, or having the output of a 
complementary species curtailed by the implementation of the quota. Figure 6.1b 
illustrates the outcome of imposing a quota of q2b, instead of a royalty, on jointiy 
produced species B. More of species A, q2a, wUl be produced after the introduction of 
the quota. The post quota equilibrium is EQ' which is at a lower level of effort than the 
original Eg. 
Under joint technology a quota on species B is results in more catch of species A. This 
may be a bad outcome if species A is overfished already, but can be good if species A is 
under fished. The argument in favour of quota regulation of species B, under joint 
technology, is that it is less costiy to producers, m terms of revenue forgone, as it allows 
for substitution. The estimation of the joint relationships enables managers to be aware 
of the good or bad effects of implementing species quotas. 
193 
Should a species be nonjointiy produced, a quota of q2b would limit the harvest of 
species A to a level such as q3a, as it is taken in fixed proportions to species B. This 
may be good or bad for species A, depending on whether it is overfished or not. The 
non-joint technology will lead to less vessel revenue under this quota scenario. 
One advantage of a quota over a royalty is that harvest is constrained to a given catch 
level, whereas with effort regulations substitution to non-taxed inputs may lead to 
greater than desirable harvests being taken. However under a royalty system revenue is 
raised for the taxing authority, whereas under a quota, the benefits stay with the fisher 
unless they are explicitly taxed or the original quotas are sold to the fishers. 
Effort restrictions. 
Effort restrictions are usually applied to fisheries to reduce fishing mortality and 
subsequently there should be an increase in the fish stock. The economic performance of 
input controls has been criticised as producers can switch to non-controlled inputs 
(Campbell, 1991). Input controls in tuna fisheries generally Umit the number of vessels 
adnutted to the fishery, the numbers of hooks set in a time period (an effort cap), or use 
closed seasons or areas to Umit effort. Specific limitations on longline fishing gear, such 
as a hook Umit per vessel, are less frequently advocated. Effort regulation in 
multispecies tuna fisheries has long been endorsed as the preferred method of regulation 
by the Japanese industry, rather than output quotas (Suda, 1972). 
Effort regulations can be illustrated in Figure 6.1b. In a nonjoint fishery, regulation of 
effort leads to fixed reductions in the output of the two species and is shown by the inner 
production possibility frontier where the catch is restricted to q3a and q2b. At this level 
of effort if production is joint, then the equUibrium Ej indicated in the diagram would be 
on a higher iso-revenue line than the intersect of q3a and q2b. The outcome is driven by 
the relative prices of the jointiy produced species which should be monitored by 
management. 
From the revenue fiinction, the product specific scale elasticities can assist in analysing 
changes in the supply of a species with effort limitations, and can predict how the effort 
limitations will impact on each class of vessel in the fishery (Kirkley, 1986). 
hi summary the revenue fiinction enables analysis of the vessel technology characteristics 
and can help to determine the most appropriate method of stock management. However 
the revenue fiinction has a limited capacity to assess the sustainability of the fish stock 
due to the relatively short time period used in the analysis. 
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6.2.2 Sustainability. 
Any policy adopted in a multispecies fishery should consider the sustainability of the 
resources. Sustainability is both an economic and ecological concept and is important in 
fisheries management. 
The sustainability of fisheries has been identified by the Commonwealth govemment as 
one of the three central objectives for managing fisheries in the 1990s (AFMA, 1989). 
The govemment has endorsed Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) as an 
objective in fisheries management (ESDC, 1992). The policies advocated from the 
revenue function approach have to be sustainable and must account for the uncertainties 
in the stock stmcture in the east Australian region (Caton and Hampton, 1985). 
6.3 Vessel technology and sustainability in the east Australian area. 
The results of the modelling of technology and sustainability will influence the 
management of the offshore and inshore fisheries. The modelling results for the Japanese 
and domestic fisheries are reviewed. 
6.3.1 Vessel technology in the east Australian area. 
6.3.1.1 The offshore Japanese fishery. 
Modelling in Chapter 3 showed that the Japanese offshore fishery should be divided into 
northem and southem fisheries and into large and small vessels for management 
purposes. The four subsets, vessels below and above 200 GRT in the northem and 
southem fisheries, will be examined and policy and management of the fishery wUl be 
discussed. Further tests showed that the northem and southem fisheries have 
significantly different annual and seasonal fish availability. In the southem area the East 
AustraUan Current makes fish availabiUty more seasonal than in the northem area, where 
tropical water temperatures change less with season. 
Japanese vessel technology was found to be significantly different between the northem 
and the southem fisheries. The underiying catch per unit effort was significantiy higher 
in the northem area and the joint technology of vessels was significantly different 
between the areas. 
In the northem fishery the technology of both sizes of vessel was nonjoint for 
management purposes, whereas production by small and large vessel in the southem area 
was joint, with species being targeted in response to price. Cross price relationships 
show that an output quota on Bigeye tuna caught in the southem area would reduce the 
Yellowfin catch and lead to substitution to Albacore and Swordfish. 
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Input-output separability did not differ significantly between the northem and southem 
fisheries. Only large vessels in the southem fishery were subject to input-output 
separability with increases in vessel effort leading, under constant relative prices, to a 
different species mix. 
Sub-zonal tests indicated significant differences in individual species availability with 
distance from shore. Bigeye and Yellowfin were found to be more readily available 
within 200 miles of shore, whereas Albacore and bUlfish species were generally available 
at greater distances from shore. 
6.3.1.2 The domestic fishery. 
The domestic fishery was compared with the inshore Japanese fishery in section 3.3, and 
in section 3.4 a direct production function was used to estimate domestic Yellowfin 
production. The domestic fishery is based on Yellowfin tuna with a limited catch of 
other species. The domestic technology can be considered as nonjoint for management 
purposes as only 25% of the total observations in the fishery have catches of species 
other than Yellowfin tuna. 
In both the direct and revenue function analysis the domestic vessels were found to 
experience significant annual and seasonal differences m Yellowfin catch reflecting the 
influence of the East Australian Current. 
In the direct analysis the retums to effort for vessels catching Yellowfin tuna differed 
between the areas north and south of Sydney, being sigruficantiy higher m the northem 
fishery (Table 3.28a and b). Domestic vessels experience greater localised Yellowfin 
stock depletion in the southem area, than m the area north of Sydney. The Yellowfin 
fishery varied significantiy between the areas north and south of Sydney. Patrolling, 
made a significant difference to vessel catch only in the southem fishery, whereas vessel 
class and moonphase made a significant difference to vessel catch in the north. 
Soaktime, water temperature, and effort were significant m both the northem and 
southem areas and were more important in determining YeUowfin catch than distance 
from the coast per se. The analysis also showed that Yellowfin harvest m the total 
fishery may be increased by re-allocating effort from the south to the area north of 
Sydney where retums to effort are significantly higher. 
6.3.1.3 The Japanese and the domestic fishery. 
The comparison of the production technology in section 3.3 showed that the domestic 
and Japanese vessels are significantiy different fisheries occupying the same area of 
ocean. The annual and seasonal dummy variables, and the vessel technology terms, 
indicate the availabiUty of fish to vessels, and the technologies of the vessels of the two 
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nationalities are significantiy different. The Japanese vessels concentrate on a wider 
range of species than the Australian vessels which tend to fish Yellowfin tuna only. The 
catch per unit effort comparisons confirmed the revenue function analysis that Australian 
vessels have at least a three fold advantage in Yellowfin catch rate. However the 
Japanese have distinct catch rate advantages in Albacore, Swordfish, Striped Marlin and 
in Bigeye capture in particular, as reported in Table 3.25d. 
The concentration on different species explains why the initial overall technology tests 
indicated that the availabiUty of the fish is significantly different between vessels in the 
same area. The domestic fishers pursue surface Yellowfin schools in smaU manoeuvrable 
vessels using light monofilament fishing gear with fish being associated with the presence 
of bird aggregations, or located through knowledge of local hydrographic features, such 
as the edge of the continental shelf or currents influenced by coastal topography. The 
Japanese vessels, on the other hand, target deeper swimming species using conventional 
oceanic longline Kuralon fishing gear. Contact with both industries confirm the results 
of the model, the Australian fishers indicating their dependence on local knowledge and 
searching procedures, whereas the Japanese have confirmed they regard the east 
Australian area as a significant Bigeye fishery (Mcllgorm, 1993). 
6.3.2 Implications for regulation and management. 
The results from the previous chapters can be interpreted to consider the appropriate 
stock management regime given the technology of the vessels. 
6.3.2.1 Nonjointness and biomass management. 
From estimations in Chapter 3 the Japanese vessels in the northem fishery were found to 
have nonjoint technology whereas the southem fishery had joint production of species. 
In the northem fishery the smaU Japanese vessels exhibit nonjointness and input-output 
separability m production. Taken together these conditions unply that the species 
composition of the catch is independent of species prices, or of the level of effort, and is 
suited to biomass management. These vessels account for only 5% of the effort, and 
between 2% and 9% of the catch from the eastem AFZ as reported in Table 6.1, which 
reports the percentage of the total catch of each species that is nonjointiy produced in the 
east Australian fishery. The insignificant level of smaU vessel effort m the northem 
fishery illustrates the need to evaluate the extent of nonjoint production for the catches 
of individual species in each sub-set of the fishery. 
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The large Japanese vessels in the north have significant nonjointness results. Table 6.1 
reports that 33% of Albacore catches and 17% of Bigeye catches in the entire east coast 
region are nonjointiy produced by large vessels in the north. As the joint production 
relationship between Swordfish and Yellowfin is significant at the 5% level only, the 
large vessels in the northem fishery should be managed nonjointiy. The northem fishery 
has nonjoint technology and is suited to biomass management or single species 
management regimes. Only the relative price relationship of Swordfish and Yellowfin 
would need to be monitored, as they may be exploited in preference to other species. 
In the southem fishery the joint production for both sizes of Japanese vessel gives 
management a greater range of regulatory instmments than in the northem fishery. 
Biomass or single species management is not appropriate in the southem fishery as it 
would not take account of the joint vessel technology. Only MarUn are individually 
nonjoint in the southem fishery and may be taken incidentally. 
The analysis of the Japanese production in this study has shown that biomass 
management of the entire east coast tuna fishery is not appropriate as the species 
composition of the catch is not independent of output prices or the input, effort in aU 
areas. In the southem area where the technology is joint, a biomass approach would lead 
to the depletion of the higher valued species. However the adoption of a joint 
management regime in the southem fishery, may not accommodate the Marlin species 
which may be taken incidentally. 
In the domestic fishery vessel technology can be considered as nonjoint for management 
purposes given the predominance of the Yellowfin catch. Single species or biomass 
management would be applicable. 
6.3.2.2 Regulations: royalties, quotas and effort limitations. 
The vessel technologies identified wUl affect the management measures that can be used 
in regulation of the fisheries. 
Royalties. 
Should a royalty or output tax per unit of catch be implemented in the eastem AFZ the 
Japanese vessels in the northem fishery would not change their supply of species, as 
production by these vessels is nonjoint. Any reduction in mortality required by 
management m the northem area should be addressed directiy by quantitative output 
controls or by regulating effort. 
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This is in contrast to the southern fishery where the joint production of Albacore, 
Bigeye, Yellowfin, and Swordfish species makes a royalty based regime potentially 
applicable. Management would have to decide on which species the royalty should apply 
to, and the level of the royalty. A species specific royalty with catch monitoring would 
be more costiy to administer and enforce than the current access fees charged for vessel 
entry. 
In applying the royalty, the individual nonjointness of Marlin for all vessels in the 
southem area, would mean Marlin capture would not be regulated under this instmment. 
Smularly the nonjoint producer behaviour in the domestic fishery would make a royalty 
system inapplicable for domestic vessels which catch more than one species. 
Output quota. 
Given the nonjoint vessel technology in the northem area, the best opportunity for 
management to introduce an output quota system is in the southem fishery where the 
production is joint. 
In the south the complementary relationship between Bigeye-Yellowfin, and the 
substitution relationships between Swordfish-Bigeye and Albacore-Bigeye mean that a 
quota on Bigeye tuna would restrict the production of Yellowfin, but would lead to a 
rise in the capture of Swordfish and Albacore. The cross price elasticities (Table 3.14b) 
confirm that the Yellowfin and Bigeye complementary relationship is most significant, 
with a 1% rise in the price of Yellowfin leading to a rise of 0.6% and 0.9% in the catch 
of Bigeye for smaU and large vessels respectively. Substitution to Albacore and 
Swordfish, which was found to be overexploited in the previous sustainabUity analysis, 
would be of concem to management. 
Before adopting an output control regime it should be recognised that setting of the 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC), and the individual vessel quota, would be difficult given 
the seasonal and annual variabUity for the 1984-89 period (see Table 3.12). The 
uncertainty of production of different species has been the major objection of the 
Japanese tuna longline fleet to regulation by output controls (Suda, 1972). An output 
quota system is suited to the southem fishery only, and would not cater for the 
nonjointness of important commercial species m the northem fishery nor the nonjoint 
domestic vessel production. 
In Figure 6.1b it was illustrated that where technology is nonjoint, output of different 
species could be addressed by effort restrictions. The administration and enforcement of 
an ITQ system for the southem area only may be difficult, costiy, and inappropriate 
considering the vessel technologies in the entire east Australian region. 
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Effort restrictions. 
Limited entry by vessel numbers has been used to regulate the access of Japanese vessels 
in the east Australian area, but there has been no specific total hook limit applied in the 
study period. 
In the northem fishery effort limitation on Japanese vessels could be used to achieve the 
same catch levels as quantitative restrictions, but perhaps at less cost of administration. 
Under nonjoint technology ITQs have no advantage over the more readily applied effort 
limitations. 
In the southem fishery effort regulations would not take advantage of the joint nature of 
the technology in management. Management would need to monitor the relative prices 
of jointiy produced species under effort restrictions so to avoid over-exploitation in 
response to relative price changes. The relationships to monitor are indicated by the 
cross-price elasticities of supply estimated in Chapter 3 for Albacore, Yellowfin, Bigeye 
and Swordfish. It is unlikely that an ITQ management regime is a cost effective option 
for the southem fishery alone. Effort limitation can be used to manage the northern, 
southem and domestic fisheries. 
From the revenue function, the product specific scale elasticities can assist in analysing 
changes in the supply of a species for each vessel class with individual vessel effort 
limitations (Kkkley, 1986). In the northem fishery effort limitations would reduce tiie 
Albacore supply, particularly for small vessels where the relationship is effort elastic, and 
a 1% reduction in effort could lead to up to a 3% reduction in Albacore catch. 
In the southem fishery smaU vessel product specific scale elasticities for Albacore, 
Yellowfin and Marlin are effort elastic and a reduction in vessel effort would see a 
greater than proportional reduction m the catch of these species. Larger vessel 
responses to effort reductions are relatively effort inelastic and hence less responsive. 
Managers should be aware that limitations in effort would not decrease the vessel supply 
of Swordfish which has insignificant product specific scale elasticities. This may lead to 
fiirther over-exploitation of Swordfish. A 1% reduction in effort would lead to a greater 
proportional reduction in Marlin catch in the south than in the northem fishery. 
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The domestic fishery product specific scale elasticities for the vessels which catch more 
than just YeUowfin tuna, reported in Table 3.2.4b, indicate that a 1% decrease (increase) 
in effort would cause a 0.89% decrease (increase) in the supply of Yellowfin and a 1.2% 
decrease (increase) in the supply of Other Species. Effort regulations would curtail 
Other Species supply more than the supply of Yellowfin. Should management wish to 
encourage fishers to diversify the range of species captured, vessel effort regulations in 
the domestic fishery would not promote this. 
Should effort regulations be introduced we can predict from the input-output separability 
results that for both sizes of Japanese vessel in the northem area and small vessels in the 
south, catch per unit effort (CPUE) at the vessel level would not decrease with limiting 
effort. The representative large vessel in the southem area experiences diminishing catch 
per unit effort at the vessel level and effort regulations may raise the CPUE for these 
vessels. 
The outcome of any effort regulation on vessels wiU be a fall in vessel revenue and hence 
access fee revenue for the coastal state. The Marginal Revenue of effort (MRe) is 
interpreted by Kirkley (1986) as the shadow price of effort, and is the amount of revenue 
fishing firms would have to receive to forgo laying another thousand hooks under a 
constant stock and output price assumption. From the estimates of MRe in Table 5.2b 
we can predict that a regulation reducing effort would lead to aU Japanese vessels in the 
overall fishery experiencing losses in Marginal Revenue. The Japanese would be 
expected to resist effort regulations. 
The results from Chapter 5 also predict that should effort regulations be introduced with 
no area restrictions, it is Ukely that vessels may move from the southem to the northem 
fishery, as vessels compare their average revenue of effort in deciding between fishmg 
grounds (Gordon, 1954). However the differing fleet stmctore in the east Australian 
area identified m Chapter 5 may inhibit this process. Management may consider using 
effort and area restrictions to reallocate Japanese effort from the southem fishery, where 
large Japanese vessels have poor economic performance, to the northem fishery where 
ARe, and by implication MRe, is significantly higher. 
The potential increase m stocks from effort restiictions are difficult to assess as dummy 
variables are used to accommodate stock and envkonmental changes. The analysis does 
not have information on the absolute changes in stock size. Where stock can be included 
as a factor of production m the revenue function analysis, an elasticity can be generated 
which can show how supplies may respond to increased investment in the stock (Kirkley, 
1986). 
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Considering the vessel technology in the domestic fishery, effort restrictions are the most 
appropriate regulation for management. The average revenue effort estimates, reported 
in Table 5.7a, are highest for the model which includes the Yellowfin only vessels. The 
domestic Yellowfin only vessels would be impacted more severely by effort regulations 
than vessels fishing both Yellowfin and other species. Should effort regulations be 
applied in the domestic fishery, the revenue implications of an increase in stock size in 
the domestic fishery are not clear, given the uncertainties in stock stmctiire in the region. 
The direct production modelling of the domestic fishery shows that should effort 
restrictions be introduced they would be resisted more by vessels in the area north of 
Sydney due to their higher retums to effort for Yellowfin tuna. Variations in catch witii 
years, seasons and types of vessel (Table 3.28c) indicate the difficulty management 
would have in applying effort restrictions, as the incidence of the policy would differ 
between areas and vessel classes in the fleet. Table 3.32 indicates that purpose built 
vessels and trawlers have catch advantages over other vessels, whereas in the area south 
of Sydney there is no significant different in catch with vessel class. 
Combining these results with the cost survey results in Chapter 4, means that planing 
longliners which have high costs and poorest catch levels would resist effort restrictions. 
The behavioural responses of domestic fishers to the effort regulations would also vary 
between the northem area, where the longline would be left in the water for greater soak 
times, and in the southem area, where patrolling the longline would increase Yellowfin 
tuna catch. 
6.3.2.3 Other management issues. 
The management of Marlin and other highly migratory species, such as Swordfish, pose a 
problem for management. Past management has tried to use specific bans on the capture 
of Black and Blue Marlin in the east coast area. Nonjoint production of Marlin in both 
the northem and southem areas, as reported in Table 6.1, reduces the options for 
management and suggests the only way of reducing their capture would be a reduction in 
vessel effort. The catch of Marlm is incidental, though this should be interpreted with 
care as the Marlin variable is an aggregate of three Marlin species. An effort reduction 
to reduce the catch of Marlin would mean that vessels would forego revenue. 
The overall fishery analysis suggested that Marlin are part of joint substihition 
relationships with Yellowfin and Swordfish within the east AustraUan area. These 
relationships were not confirmed in the regional analyses and Marlin species may need to 
be managed on a wider area basis due to their highly migratory characteristics. Given 
the possible over-exploitation of Black MarUn identified m Chapter 5, a precautionary 
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approach should be taken to the regulations introduced in the fishery. The sustainability 
of management options is considered below. 
6.3.3 SustainabiUty of the tuna stocks in the east Australian region. 
One of the most valid reasons for amending Japanese access would be if there was 
evidence that the Japanese fleet were overfishing the east Australian tuna and biUfish 
stocks. 
The production modelling achieved significant results only in the case of Swordfish and 
Black Marlin, which had effort levels substantially above MEY, requiring a 28% 
reduction on 1989 levels for Swordfish, and a 41% reduction in effort levels for Black 
Marlin to retum to the MEY effort levels. It is not possible to confirm that the catch 
rates of Albacore, Bigeye, Yellowfin and Blue and Striped Marlin are sustainable, 
although the model gives the impression they are. 
The Japanese effort levels in the eastem AFZ increased significantiy in the 1984 to 1989 
period as reported in Table 5.19c, from 6.4 million hooks per annum in 1984, to 12.8 
hooks per annum in 1989. The sustainability model found the regional MEY effort levels 
for Swordfish and Black Marlin were 16.7 and 12.1 miUion hooks respectively. This 
equates to MEY effort levels for the eastem AFZ of approximately 9.85 and 7.14 miUion 
hooks (from Table 5.19d). Actual 1989 effort levels were thus considerably above the 
MEY level for these two species in the eastem AFZ. 
In 1990 management reviewed the level of effort applied to the fishery in the previous 10 
years, and linuted effort to a maximum of 9 mUlion hooks per year. It can be seen from 
Table 5.19c that this was a significant reduction of effort. The effort m the Japanese 
fishery was thought to have risen above "acceptable levels" by the end of the 1984-89 
period (AFMA, pers. comm.). The effort Umit has subsequentiy been reduced to 7.5 
mUlion hooks per annum and a Umit of 2575 vessel days, of which 2100 are allowed 
between the 1st July and the 31st October, 1994 (AFMA, 1993b). The reduction in 
effort in the periods subsequent to the study is supported by the results of production 
models for Black Marlin and Swordfish. However, these effort levels may represent 
under-use of the more prolific tuna resources for which the modelling may not have been 
appUcable. Management should proceed with caution given the uncertainties m stock 
stmctiire and the objective of sustainable harvesting of all commercial species. 
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Whether the domestic fishery is sustainable is unknown. The short time series of data 
available is inadequate to determine if the inshore Yellowfin resource is depleted. 
Research has shown that some of the Yellowfin show seasonal movement along the New 
South Wales coastiine, but it is unlikely that this is a separate stock to the other 
Yellowfin in the east Australian region (Diplock and Watkins, 1988 and 1990). 
However the distribution of Japanese effort inshore may be a concem for management as 
in the area 12-100 miles from shore 3.1 miUion hooks were set by the Japanese in 1989 
(see Table 3.25a). This was roughly one quarter of the effort in the whole eastem AFZ 
in that year. It is not possible to tell if this effort level was sustainable, but the intensity 
of effort m the inshore fishery should be a concem for management, particularly if there 
is a resident fish stock in the eastem AFZ. More area specific effort regulations could 
address this problem. The absence of substantial stock information limits further 
assessment of sustainability, and management should proceed with caution given the 
uncertainties. 
6.3.4 Comparative advantage. 
Comparative advantage in domestic fishery development requires the comparison of 
technology, factor costs and output prices (Munro, 1985, 1989) between the domestic 
and Japanese vessels in the inshore fishery (Figure 3.4). The cost of effort for a Japanese 
vessels was found to be half the cost of the effort of the representative Australian vessel, 
as reported in Table 4.17. In Table 3.20 Australian vessels were found to have a 40% 
price advantage over the output prices of Japanese vessels. Both cost and price 
advantages are sensitive to exchange rate variations. The relative technology of tiie 
domestic and Japanese vessels was reviewed in section 6.4.1.3. 
In Chapter 5 the hypothesis tests for long-mn vessel surplus (ARe-ACe = 0) may be 
interpreted as a measure of comparative advantage between the vessels of the two 
nationalities in the inshore area. In the third quarter of the year Australian vessels have a 
comparative advantage over all sizes of Japanese vessel m the inshore area. The 
Australian advantage over the smaller Japanese vessels in the inshore area is less distinct. 
However the inshore vessel technology comparison also showed that the Australian 
vessels had an advantage in the production of YeUowfin tuna, whereas the Japanese 
vessels had an advantage in the production of Bigeye and other tunas. The model 
indicated both vessel nationaUties were fishing different species m the same area and 
could coexist should each nationality continue to fish in this manner. Lack of domestic 
vessels in the offshore fishery points to the Japanese vessels having a comparative 
advantage in the offshore fishery. 
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It has also been noted that the tiue comparative economic arguments for displacement 
may be clouded by the subsidisation policies of the Japanese govemment (Stokke, 1990; 
CampbeU and NichoU, 1991 and 1994). This would lead to a lowering of the costs of 
effort for Japanese vessels and illustrates the need for management to check the quality 
of all data supplied to the Australian govemment. 
6.3.5 Domestic fishery development. 
The desire of many domestic fishers is to remove the foreign fishers on the basis of their 
nationality and presence in the Australian Fishing Zone. Such action is contrary to the 
UNCLOS III article 62, 'surplus provision', given the inabUity of Australian vessels to 
take the Allowable Catch of tuna in this area. The question arises as to why Australia is 
importing the Japanese fishing vessels if their performance is apparentiy poorer than the 
domestic vessels ? 
The development of the domestic fishery to date has been with smaU inshore vessels not 
large enough to operate in the offshore area. Australia has been importing foreign 
capital, labour and technology to harvest the resource not harvested under existing 
AustraUan technology. The modelling in section 3.3 supports the admission of the 
Japanese to the offshore fishery, primarily due to Australia's lack of capacity to displace 
the Japanese at distances further than fifty miles from the coast. In the innermost 100 
miles there appears to be the possibUity of co-existence between the fleets, due to the 
significantly different targeting behaviour of the domestic and Japanese vessels. 
The presence of the Japanese vessels may inhibit the exploitation and development of the 
domestic fishery due to technical or stock interactions. Despite hooks being set at 
different depths, serious gear fouling incidents occurred between nationalities in the 1988 
and 1989 seasons. In 1990 Japanese vessels were excluded from the innermost fifty 
miles off northem NSW. Co-existence of Japanese and Australian vessels in the inshore 
area suggested by the model was not possible due to technical interaction and conflict 
between fishers. 
Removing the Japanese vessels zone by zone is not a costless policy as the Australian 
govemment will forgo access fees in not admitting the Japanese fleet. The annual cost of 
partial and total exclusion policies was estimated and is reported m Table 6.2. It was not 
possible to estimate the benefit from exclusion due to an absence of stock information. 
The cost results assume that in the negotiation process the foreign fisher recognises the 
loss of access and reduces the fees paid to the coastal state. The extent of any benefits 
accming to domestic fishers from exclusion of the Japanese vessels, or to the Australian 
community through changes m consumer surplus from the changes in policy, could not 
be predicted. 
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The annual cost of total exclusion of the Japanese vessels from the eastem AFZ is 
A$1.31 miUion (mA$) per annum (1985 = 100). The greatest exclusion losses are in the 
southem fishery (0.826 mA$ per annum), as compared to the northem fishery (0.48 mA$ 
per annum). Clearly the cost of exclusion of the Japanese fleet is substantial and their 
total exclusion is probably not economically rational given the differences in operations 
between the domestic and Japanese vessels. 
In the area adjacent to the coast the cost of excluding the Japanese vessels from the 12-
50 miles area in the southem fishery was $163,000 per annum, and $63,000 per annum in 
the northem area. More radical proposals involving the exclusion of Japanese vessels 
from intermediate distances from shore are considered in Table 6.2. The exclusion of 
larger Japanese vessels would reduce access fee revenue by a greater amount than 
policies that exclude the smaller Japanese vessels. 
The analysis is unable to account for the benefits to the domestic fleet from stock or 
catch rate interactions, the catch rates inshore potentially being influenced by the fishing 
effort of the Japanese fleet seaward of the domestic fleet. The assumption of an increase 
in the catch rates of the Australian fleet following some Japanese exclusion, presumes 
that both nationalities are fishing the same stocks and have the same technologies. The 
previous models have shown the significant difference in the technology of the fieets and 
illustrates that a Japanese vessel withdrawal may be of limited benefit to the majority of 
domestic fishers who catch Yellowfin tuna only. The potential interaction between 
offshore and inshore areas is probably most relevant to Yellowfin tuna, which is sought 
in quantity by both nationalities. 
In the fisheries literature catch rate and stock interactions in tuna fisheries have been 
reviewed by SPC (1988). Polacheck (1988), used analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests 
on 10° square catch and effort data to evaluate interactions between different tiina 
fishing methods m the Westem Pacific. In section 5.6.2 of this stiidy, 5° square catch 
and effort data were used to test for interaction between the domestic and foreign fishery 
by linear regression methods. It was found that the development of the domestic fishery 
had not significantiy reduced the Japanese catch rate for aU species considered. The 
aggregation of the data set may mask interaction, but absolute proof and quantification 
of catch rate interactions is a difficult area (Polacheck, 1988; SPC, 1988; Medley, 1992; 
Campbell, 1994). The present study concludes that there are no stock or catch 
interactions, foUowing the results from section 5.6.2, but this result should be treated 
with caution. 
The foreign fishing literature suggests the coastal state should consider keeping a long-
mn DWFN presence in their zone if there is a sustained economic benefit in doing so 
206 
(Munro, 1985). The costs of total Japanese exclusion policies, reported in Table 6.2, 
suggest that a long-mn Japanese presence in the east Australian area is lUcely to be 
beneficial to the host nation. 
6.4 PoUcy conclusions. 
The Japanese fleet have been fishing in the east Australian area since the 1950s and 
under access agreements since 1979. This study has shown that it is to Australia's 
economic benefit to keep the Japanese fleet in the offshore fishery as the current 
Australian fleet cannot replace these fishers. 
In managing the continuing Japanese presence in the eastem AFZ the study has found 
that the Japanese fishing effort should be reduced from the 1988 and 1989 effort levels. 
Adoption of an effort Umit of approximately 7.1 miUion hooks per annum would assure 
that the fishery is at the MEY effort level for Black Marlin. This would be a 
conservative exploitation policy given that the MEY effort level for Swordfish is in 
excess of this at 9.8 miUion hooks per annum. The sustainability analysis did not enable 
optimal effort levels to be recommended for other species, and the effort limits 
advocated here may constitute under-exploitation of the more prolific tuna species. 
The management of the Japanese fishery should recognise the significant differences in 
vessel technology and species availabiUty m the northem and southem areas, and 
consider managing each area as significantiy different fisheries. Although the availabUity 
of species varies significantiy with the distance from shore, it is not practical to manage 
by sub-area, within the northem and southem fisheries, due to the administrative costs, 
Umited enforcement resources, and the highly migratory nature of the species under 
management. 
The sigruficant nonjointness of important commercial species make the northem fishery 
less suited to management by ITQs or per unit catch royalties. Management can achieve 
the same objectives in the northem fishery, at less cost, by using area specific effort 
regulations. 
The southem fishery has significant joint production and could be managed by ITQs, 
rather than by royalties which may lead to the desired catch levels being exceeded. 
Under the quota scheme the model predicts that a quota Umit on Bigeye would reduce 
the catch of Yellowfin and lead to greater catches of Albacore and Swordfish. Marlin 
were nonjointiy produced m the southem fishery, may be incidental catch, and may not 
be regulated sufficientiy under ITQs. 
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Our sustainability analysis shows that Black Marlin and Swordfish may be over-
exploited. If management chose to put a quota on either of these species for 
conservation reasons the modelling of vessel technology would enable management to 
predict the response of producers. Under a Marlin quota the nonjoint technology would 
restrict vessels in taking other species, whereas a restriction on Swordfish wUl lead to 
substimtion to Bigeye tuna. 
An ITQ scheme in just the southem area for the Japanese vessels would be expensive 
due to the additional administrative and enforcement costs in regulating foreign vessels. 
Observer coverage of fishing activity would have to be increased from current levels and 
additional port inspections for vessels on arrival and departure from the AFZ would be 
required. An ITQ scheme for the entire east coast fishery would be based on a mis-
specification of the technology for both the Japanese vessels in the northem fishery and 
the vessels in the domestic fishery. The implementation of an ITQ regime for just the 
Japanese vessels in the south is not recommended as the benefits of exploiting the joint 
relationships in this area are unlikely to exceed the costs of implementation of ITQs. 
Effort limitations are recommended for the management of the entire east coast fishery 
as they suit the Japanese vessel technology in the northem fishery, the vessel technology 
in the domestic fishery, and are able to dkectiy Umit the effort applied in different areas 
of the fishery to maintain sustainability. Effort limitations can also reduce the incidental 
catch of Marlin which is technically determined in the Japanese fishery. However effort 
limitations do not recognise the joint production relationships m the southem fishery 
which have been identified in this study and can be monitored by management. 
Area specific effort limitations for Japanese vessels m the northem and southem areas 
could also be used by management to increase the rent available in both fisheries. In tiie 
southem area a reduction m the level of effort of large vessels may increase rent. The 
reallocation of effort from the south to the north may also increase the rent due to the 
higher average revenue of effort in the north. However these regulations may not be 
favoured by the Japanese vessels which have distinct operational pattems in the east 
Australian area as part of larger intemational campaigns. 
The management of the Japanese fishery since the end of the study period in 1989 has 
specified effort restrictions in terms of a Umit on the hooks set in the whole fishery. The 
current smdy suggests that more area specific effort limitations should be imposed on tiie 
Japanese fleet to improve the profitabiUty of the vessels in the southem and northem 
areas. 
208 
Management of the domestic fishery should promote vessels increasing effort in the 
northem NSW area between July and September, particulariy in the years when tuna are 
abundant. Similarly a reallocation of effort from the south to the north would increase 
Yellowfin catch. The direct production fisheries modelling showed the importance of 
patrolling, soaktime, and vessel proximity to the optimal water temperature and thus the 
value of information on the movement of the East Australian Current to producers. 
Should effort regulations be implemented in the domestic fishery the study has shown 
that resistance may be greatest from the fishers in the area north of Sydney where remms 
to effort are higher than in the south. Results suggest that high cost planing longliners, 
which have lowest catch in the area north of Sydney, would resist the introduction of 
effort limitations. 
Past management has allocated access by zones for the domestic and Japanese vessels at 
different distances from the coast. The smaller domestic vessels concentrate on surface 
schools of Yellowfin whereas the Japanese vessels concentrate on deeper swimming 
species in the inshore area. Modelling suggested that co-existence between the Japanese 
and domestic fleet in the inshore area was possible as they are significantiy different 
fisheries, but the Japanese vessels were excluded from the innermost 50 miles due to gear 
fouling with Australian vessels. Technical interaction may be a valid reason for 
displacement from the inshore area, but the evidence for dismissing the Japanese vessels 
on the basis of stock interaction or over-exploitation is not strong. The appraisal of the 
costs of further exclusion of the Japanese vessels suggests that further zonal exclusions 
of the Japanese vessels m the offshore fishery may be economically irrational, although 
the analysis was unable to incorporate the benefits of such policies to the domestic fleet. 
Interaction between the Westem Pacific fisheries, the development of the domestic 
fishery, and the eastem AFZ catch rate was not found to be significant. However, m the 
absence of better information, management should consider both scenarios of a resident 
local stock and the possibility of influxes of stocks from the Westem Pacific region. The 
uncertainty over stock stmcture would make the setting of optimal effort levels and total 
allowable catches a difficult problem. 
The modelUng does not give a fuU picture of the sustainability of aU the tuna resources 
and the levels of effort m the offshore fishery. It has also been noted that the tme 
comparative economic arguments for displacement may be clouded by the subsidisation 
policies of the Japanese govemment (Stokke, 1990; Campbell and NichoU, 1991 and 
1994). This illustrates the need for management to check the quality of aU data suppUed 
to the Australian govemment. 
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Under the information currently available, the Japanese presence should be maintained in 
the eastem Australian Fishing Zone. Management on a sustainable basis would most 
readily be achieved under more area specific effort limitations than are currently used. 
6.5 Summary and conclusions from the study. 
6.5.1 A review of the study. 
This has been the first analysis of the economics of the east coast tuna longline fishery 
incorporating the domestic and Japanese fishing activity. Chapter 1 described the east 
coast area and the catch and effort data available for the fishery. The management of tiie 
domestic and foreign fisheries was reviewed and the absence of stock information on tiie 
different tuna stocks was noted as a constraint in the potential modelling of the fishery. 
The Japanese tuna industry and tuna markets were examined as background to the east 
Australian fishery. From the review of stock information in the east Australian area it 
became apparent that the study would have to examine the fisheries economics literature 
for an approach to estimation suited to the data available for the fishery. 
In Chapter 2 the economic theory of fisheries production was reviewed and it was 
concluded that a dual revenue function approach was most suited to estimate tiie 
multiproduct technology in this fishery. This enabled supply equations to be detemuned 
for each species and the Generalised Leontief form meant specific aspects of technology 
such as input-output separability and nonjointness could be examined. 
Chapter 3 estimated production in the Japanese and domestic fisheries. The Japanese 
data available for the 1984-89 period were used to estimate the revenue function model. 
Likelihood ratio tests were used to compare production in the areas north and south of 
25°S which were found to be significantly different across aU parameters. Similar tests 
revealed that smaU and large Japanese vessels had significantiy different production 
technologies. The northem and southem fisheries were analysed separately and it was 
found that in the northem fishery the availability of fish was less seasonal than in tiie 
southem fishery and that the technology was nonjoint in the north and joint in the south. 
The revenue function model was used to estimate individual species supply equations for 
small and large Japanese vessels operating m various parts of the eastem AFZ. From the 
estimated supply equations it was evident that the values of own price coefficients, and 
hence CPUE in the northem fishery, was higher than in the southem fishery. The 
coefficients also enabled the joint relationships between species to be identified and tiie 
own price, cross price and transformation elasticities were evaluated. In the southern 
fishery YeUowfin and Bigeye are produced as complements and Bigeye has substitiition 
relationships witii Albacore and Swordfish. Product specific scale elasticities were also 
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evaluated from the estimated functions. Use of dummy variables enabled the annual and 
seasonal availabiUty of each species to be ranked. This confirmed the significant 
difference in the availabiUty of species to the Japanese vessels. Section 3.2 extended the 
analysis of section 3.1, to include sub-zones at distances from the coast. This modelling 
confirmed the previous results and indicated that the availability of species was also 
related to distance from the coast, with Yellowfin and Bigeye species having higher catch 
rates inshore, whereas billfish were more widely distributed offshore. The dummy 
variables representing catch rates in the six sub-zones were also ranked to indicate the 
relative availability of species with increasing distance from the coast. 
The prices received by domestic and Japanese fishers were also compared. It was found 
that the Australian fishers typically had a 40% price advantage over the Japanese vessels 
due to their abiUty to access the higher prices in the fresh sashimi market. However the 
price data available for frozen tuna may be understate the value of east Australian tuna 
from the southem fishery to the Japanese as discussed in Chapter 5. 
The revenue function approach was also used to compare the technologies of Japanese 
and domestic vessels in the inshore area. The production technologies were found to be 
significantiy different in both vessel technology and the availability of species. Further 
analysis confirmed that the difference was due to the smaU manoeuvrable Australian 
vessels concentrating on surface schools of Yellowfin, whereas the larger industrial 
Japanese vessels take a range of deeper tuna and bUlfish species. The coefficients of the 
models were compared and the Australian vessels were found to have significantiy 
greater YeUowfin catch rates than the Japanese vessels, whereas Japanese vessels had 
higher catch rates of other species. 
A direct production analysis of the domestic fishery was undertaken for Yellowfin tuna. 
The fisheries north and south of Sydney were found to be significantly different in aU 
aspects considered. The Yellowfin production north of Sydney showed higher retums to 
effort than m the southem area, but it was also noted that catches vary significantiy 
between years, seasons and areas. The results showed that proxinuty to the optimum 
water temperature and increased soaktimes would increase YeUowfin tuna catches in 
both the north and the south. In the northem fishery catches varied witii vessel class and 
in the southem area additional patrolling would increase catch. In the northem area 
purpose built vessels and trawlers had higher Yellowfin catches during their Umited 
fishing activity, than planmg longliners. The retums to effort results indicated that 
greater Yellowfin harvest could be obtained by reallocating effort from the south to the 
north where retums to effort are significantly higher. 
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Chapter 4 presented the results of a survey of the costs of operation in the domestic 
fishery from which the cost of tuna fishing effort was established. This required sourcing 
cost information by surveying fishermen and aligning the survey results with database 
catch and effort information for each vessel. The costs of effort for the three domestic 
vessel classes were calculated and presented at the end of Chapter 4 along with the 
Japanese cost of effort data. Japanese cost of effort results also combined existing 
survey data with database information from the east Australian area. It was determined 
that the Japanese vessels below 200GRT had a lower cost per unit of effort than tiie 
larger Japanese vessels. The typical domestic vessel effort was found to be 2.05 times 
the cost of the Japanese vessel effort. 
Chapter 5 examined the performance of the vessels in the east Australian area. The 
Average Revenue of effort and Marginal Revenue effort were found to be positive for 
the overall fishery. The investigations of efficiency of the allocation of effort were 
limited by the data available and the constant retums to effort for vessels in the 
disaggregated models. It was not possible to determine if vessels were allocating effort 
according to VAPe or VMPe. 
Comparisons with the results of Brown and Dann (1991) indicated that vessels in the 
northem AFZ allocate effort in relation to other fisheries in the Pacific. The analysis of 
allocation of effort in the eastem AFZ suggested that there are also a group of southem 
vessels that allocate effort to the SBT fishery, and a group of vessels that allocate their 
effort between the southem and northem area in the eastem AFZ. This operational 
segmentation in the Japanese fleet may inhibit movements between areas. 
The estimates of ARe were found to be higher in the northem fishery than the south, but 
showed less variation with distance from shore in both fisheries. The results suggest that 
the price for the species in the southem area may be under-reported. Modelling suggests 
that some of the Japanese vessels should move from the south to the north to exploit tiie 
higher average revenue of effort available m the northem area. However this may not be 
possible due to fleet operating pattems. 
The long-mn equilibrium effort tests confirmed that vessels were applying more than tiie 
profit maxunising level of effort in four of the six years examined. This may support 
reducing effort at the vessel level to achieve profit maximisation. Long-mn viabUity was 
estimated from the revenue function and cost data and suggested small Japanese vessel in 
the north were most viable and large vessels in the south had both short-mn and long-mn 
viability problems. 
2i: 
Rent in the Japanese and domestic fishery was calculated directly from catch, price, cost 
and effort data. The northern fishery had higher profitability than the southern area and 
small Japanese vessels had higher profitability than the larger vessels. The larger vessels 
in the southem fishery suffered significant economic losses. Investigation of the regional 
difference in the average revenue of effort and the profitability results suggested that the 
price data for species in the southem area were under-stated. Similarly under-reporting 
of catch may explain why large vessels in the south appear to have short-mn viability 
problems. In conclusion the current management regime was giving slightly more retum 
only for the small vessels in the north than would be expected under an open access 
regime in the long-mn. 
From the revenue function analysis comparing Japanese and domestic vessels in the 
inshore area it appears domestic vessels have a comparative advantage over Japanese 
vessels in the inshore area north of Sydney in the third quarter of the year. The domestic 
rent was also calculated from available catch, effort, price and cost data and the third 
quarter of the year in northem NSW was found to be the most profitable. Profitability 
estimates were also obtained for different vessel classes in the fishery. 
The depletion of the stocks m the east Australian fisheries was also appraised. In initial 
time series depletion analyses there was no evidence of depletion in the Japanese longline 
catch rates m the 1984-89 period when Westem Pacific and domestic fisheries were 
expanding. Further tests noted depletion in the catch per unit effort through time for 
Albacore, Yellowfin, and Blue Marlin species in the 1962-1989 period. 
Production modelUng results were obtained for Swordfish and Black MarUn. The effort 
levels applied to the fishery m 1989 were significantiy above MEY effort levels for both 
species and indicate a reduction of effort between 28% and 41% of 1989 effort levels is 
required to bring exploitation back to the MEY effort level for these species. The 
migration of species and the probable violation of the unit stock concept mean the results 
must be interpreted with caution. 
The final Chapter reviewed the results from the previous modelling and discussed their 
ramifications for management. The offshore Japanese fishery was divided into two 
distinct areas, north and south, as suggested by the revenue function estimations and 
subsequent tests. The northem fishery production was nonjoint and not suited to a per 
unit output royalty or a output quotas which have no advantages over regulation by 
effort limitations. In the southem fishery the significant jointness in production means 
that a per unit output royalty or ITQ would be a potential management regulation. 
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The domestic fishery activity was not suited to joint management techniques, due to 
many vessels catching only Yellowfin tuna. Effort regulations could be used as a 
measure to control exploitation in both the domestic and Japanese fisheries, and would 
be less costly to administer and enforce than implementing ITQs in the southem area 
only. However in the domestic fishery, effort limitations may not be appropriate as 
modeUing predicts that more domestic effort could profitably be used in the inshore 
fishery in the North of NSW in the July-September period. 
The comparisons of Japanese and domestic technology in the inshore area were 
investigated to find altematives for the future management of foreign fishing and 
domestic fishery development. The Japanese and domestic vessel technologies and fish 
availabiUty were significantiy different and the model indicated that the two fleets could 
co-exist in the inshore area. However, the Japanese vessels have been excluded from the 
innermost 50 miles since 1990 due to the technical interaction of fishing gear. The cost 
of this exclusion, and further exclusions of the Japanese fleet were appraised and found 
to be significant, although catch and stock interactions were not incorporated in the 
analysis due to a lack of information. A sustained Japanese presence in the AFZ is 
recommended due to the benefits from access fees and the lack of replacement capacity 
in the domestic fleet. 
The sustainability of the species in the east Australian area is difficult to assess given the 
lack of information on stock stmcture and sizes. This has ramifications for future 
management of the fishery as catch levels must be sustainable, and in allocating access to 
the resource, stock information is essential for evaluating long-mn outcomes (Munro, 
1985). Management regulation in the years subsequent to the study period has reduced 
effort to levels that are consistent with the model's prediction of sustainable exploitation 
of Swordfish and Black Marlin. The displacement of the Japanese vessels is an 
economically irrational proposal given the willingness of the Japanese fleet to pay fees, 
and tiie inability of the current domestic fleet to displace the foreign fishers. 
In conclusion the study has shown that the production of the east coast tima longline 
fishery can be analysed using a revenue function approach and has given management a 
comprehensive economic analysis of production m the fishery emphasising economic 
information not available under tiaditional stock oriented appraisals commonly used in 
fisheries analysis. This has been one of the main contributions of the thesis to existing 
knowledge. 
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6.5.2 A concluding evaluation of different fishery economic approaches used in the 
thesis. 
The diversity of this fishery led to several approaches being taken to modelling. The 
results have justified this approach as with each method there were distinct advantages, 
disadvantages and limits to the extent the techniques could be used. The different 
approaches gave more comprehensive solutions for management than the pursuit of any 
one technique up to, and possibly past, its extensive margin. The revenue function 
approach was the main technique used in the study and it is evaluated below. 
In the domestic fishery, which is primarily single species, a primal approach was used to 
estimate the domestic vessel production of Yellowfin tuna. This had the advantage of 
using daUy catch and effort observations which gave large sample sizes enabling a 
considerable number of dummy variables to be included. This gave an in depth analysis 
of the domestic production of Yellowfin enabling the effects of vessel type to be 
evaluated. However the primal function could not include the effect of price. In the 
comparisons of domestic and foreign production a reduced (two species) form of the 
revenue function was used. This examined relative vessel performance and helped to 
adjudicate on foreign and domestic fishing, but had the disadvantage of pushing the 
assumptions of the revenue function approach to their Umits in terms of regularity and 
other theoretical conditions. 
Sustainability could not be sufficiently investigated by the revenue function over the six 
year time period. A Gordon Schaefer model used a longer time series of catch and effort 
data to estimate possible trends in depletion and sustainability. This model has high 
expectations of the quality of available data in most fisheries over a 30 year period and 
also has restrictive theoretical production and discrete stock assumptions. The Gordon 
Schaefer model yielded some information on sustainabUity for two species, but did not 
give the information desired for some of the more commercially valuable species. As a 
consequence the sustainability of rent estimates calculated by a direct method were not 
clear. The direct method was preferred to the use of the revenue function for fleet wide 
rent estimations. The revenue function estimates were for the representative vessel and 
when multipUed to fleet wide estimates were found to be less useful than simpler direct 
rent estimation due to potential for explosion of error and bias in the estimates. 
The revenue function approach has been used to characterise the technology of 
production in the east Australian area. There are economic and fisheries limitations to 
tiie use of this technique. 
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The economic analysis assumes a short-mn comparative static approach to producer 
behaviour, with an instantaneous adjustment by producers to changes in output price and 
hence to a new equilibrium (Kirkley, 1986). The adjustment process may be slower than 
in theory due to different rates of dissemination of market information and operational 
considerations delaying the adjustments made by producers. Similarly, the behavioural 
objectives of producers may not be fully captured by the revenue maximising objective. 
Fishers may move areas for operational reasons, such as sheltering from bad weather, or 
fishing while in transit between known grounds. 
The revenue function approach is also restricted to explaining the deterministic 
behaviour of producers in the short-mn. If there is extreme uncertainty about prices and 
stock availabiUty over time, Kirkley (1986) suggests that the supply response may be 
stochastic or dynamic and require stochastic dynamic duality or a more comprehensive 
primal approach such as discussed by Epstein (1981), or Taylor (1984). 
The revenue fiinction can determine whether products are complements or substitutes in 
production, although the technique restricts the relationships to hold for the entire time 
of the analysis. These relationships may change between species with seasons and stock 
abundance. This suggests that more flexible models are needed to allow for variations in 
the sign and magnimde of coefficients with changes in stock and season (Kirkley, 1986). 
SimUarly these short-mn relationships may be altered m the long-mn, should one stock 
become abundant relative to the others, or be subjected to a single species fishery, or if a 
new species specific harvesting technology is developed. For example, should large 
influxes of YeUowfin tuna migrate from the Westem Pacific, the joint relationships 
involving Yellowfin tuna and other species evident here in the sample period, may be 
invalid in the long-mn. 
Several of the limitations in this modelling approach are common to empirical fisheries 
investigations. The catch and effort data are from declared logbook data, and output 
prices are assumed fiiUy to reflect the value of the east Australian catch. Prices may be 
erroneous tf the figures supplied by the Japanese govemment are market averages for 
more than tiiis fishery, or if the vertical integration of tuna marketing and fishing 
companies means the prices declared do not reflect the final prices of the different 
product forms. Product prices received for the east Australian tunas are worthy of 
further investigation by the Australian govemment. 
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The definition of effort, the aggregate input, is important in this technique. Log books 
record only the number of hooks set and it is assumed that the longline is immersed in 
the water for the same amount of time by all vessels, although the analysis was able to 
take account of soaktime used by the domestic fishers. In the study the traditional 
measure of effort in biological studies, hooks set per day, was modified by GRT to more 
fiiUy reflect the resources used by vessels in the first stage of the production process. 
The influence of technological change was also investigated, but it was not possible to 
detect if the installation of newer electronics across the fleet had increased fish 
catchability. The incorporation of vessel size in the effort variable may have captured 
part of this change, but future work could investigate the measurement and specification 
of effort and technical change in tuna longlining. 
Probably the most difficult part of the smdy, and potentially the most serious 
shortcoming, was the lack of data and information on tuna stocks, and hence the 
sustainabUity of the fishery. The revenue function accounted for variations in the stock 
and envkonmental fluctuations by using shift variables for years, seasons and areas. In 
not being able to incorporate stock levels as a factor of production, the approach may 
have under-estimated the influence of stock sizes on policy outcomes. 
The sustainabUity of the policies suggested by the revenue function approach were 
difficult to substantiate as conventional models were not applicable to the data available. 
This may reflect the highly migratory nature of the fish stocks in this fishery. It is 
unknown to what extent this transitory behaviour affects the revenue function analysis, 
but the use of shift variables for different areas attempted to cater for these movements. 
Should stock estimates be available in the future, a study comparing the appropriateness 
of shift variables as a proxy for stock, would be an interesting development. 
This study has also shown the importance of spatial assumptions in the analysis of vessel 
technology where many of the species are highly migratory. The iiutial results of the 
overall model would have led to the adoption of a joint management regime for the 
entire fishery. However likelihood ratio tests showed the northem and southem fisheries 
to be significantly different in aU parameters. Sigruficantiy different technologies were 
evident witii implications for the management regimes adopted. In applying the revenue 
function the area chosen for technology tests should be large enough to be considered 
for a separate management regime if necessary. Division into smaller areas is 
inappropriate. In a fishery where fish species are more static the differences seen in 
technology between the entire area and its sub-sets, may be less significant than m the 
highly migratory species case. 
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In conclusion, the study found that despite the tuna stocks in the east Australian region 
being under management for some time, traditional stock approaches to modelling have 
yielded very little information for managing this fluctuating and behaviourally diverse 
fishery. The contribution of this thesis has been to approach the multispecies fisheries 
management problem using the economics of production literature on multiproduct 
production. The study has demonstrated that the revenue function approach is more 
flexible than traditional fishery models and can estimate the technology of production in 
the fishery. Thus the supply of each species in response to output price can be identified, 
whereas traditional fishery models often ignore the prices of outputs and the behavioural 
response of fishers to price variations in the market place. The revenue function 
approach incorporates the economic behaviour of producers and yields rich economic 
information not found in traditional approaches (Kirkley, 1986). 
The study has also shown how several different modelling approaches can be utilised to 
address the management issues common in multispecies fisheries. The revenue function 
is a significant tool in empirical analysis, but it may be pmdent to use it in conjunction 
with other more conventional bio-economic techniques. In the future the availabiUty of 
better quality stock information should lead to the revenue function becoming a more 
useful tool in estimation of empirical multispecies fishery problems. This study has 
illustrated how the revenue function approach may assist in determining the appropriate 
management policy in the diverse and fluctiiating east Australian tuna longline fishery. 
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Table 1 la: The gross value of Japanese catches by species for the east coast tuna 
longhne fishery (1984-1989) where total revenue is in millions of Yen (M.Yen) and in 
trillions of Australian dollars (MA$). 
The Total Fishery 
Total Revenue 
Year Effort Alb Beye Yfn Swf Bm Blu Stm M.Yen MA$ 
1984 6 4 364 274 423 344 73 42 271 1792 8.9 
985 7 5 483 455 1286 521 43 56 326 3171 19.1 
986 60 302 336 421 401 10 26 165 1661 13.8 
987 7 2 277 257 846 535 62 48 182 2207 22.3 
988 126 505 445 1456 695 106 94 190 3491 34.3 
1989 12.8 609 628 1431 418 42 77 468 3672 33.6 
Mean 8.7 424 399 977 486 56 57 267 2666 22.0 
The Northem Fishery 
Year Effort Alb Beye Yfn Swf Bm Blu Stm M.Yen MA$ 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
2,5 
2.5 
1.0 
1.9 
4.5 
4.7 
148 
149 
65 
77 
253 
294 
71 
94 
18 
42 
93 
177 
214 
663 
110 
446 
868 
719 
106 
97 
35 
77 
75 
104 
71 
39 
7 
58 
97 
35 
31 
45 
19 
41 
87 
63 
113 
123 
29 
51 
62 
157 
754 
1209 
283 
792 
1535 
1548 
3.7 
7.3 
2.3 
8.0 
15.1 
14.2 
Mean 2.8 164 82 503 82 51 48 89 1020 8.4 
The Southem Fishery 
Year Effort Alb Beye Yfn Swf Bm Blu Stm M.Yen MA$ 
1984 4.0 216 203 209 238 3 11 157 1038 5.1 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
5.1 
5.1 
5.3 
8.1 
8.1 
334 
237 
201 
252 
315 
361 
318 
215 
352 
451 
624 
311 
400 
587 
712 
425 
366 
459 
620 
314 
4 
3 
3 
9 
7 
11 
7 
6 
7 
14 
203 
136 
132 
129 
311 
1962 
1378 
1415 
1956 
2124 
11.8 
11.4 
14.3 
19.2 
19.4 
Mean 5.9 259 317 474 404 5 9 178 1645 13.5 
Key: Alb- Albacore, Beye-Bigeye, Yfn-Yellowfin, Swf-Swordfish, Bm-Black MarUn, 
Blu-Blue Marlin, Stm-Striped Marlin and Mar-Marlin as a group. 
Compiled from the Australian Fishing Zone Information System (AFZIS) logbook 
data. (Exchange rates from ABARE, 1991). The fishery is divided into northem and 
southem regions around 25°. 
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Table 1.1b: The percentage of total value by species for the northern and southem 
region of the Japanese fishery, (from Table 1.1a) 
North 
Year Effort Alb Beye Yfn Swf Bm Blu Stm TR 
1984 38 41 26 51 31 97 73 42 42 
1985 32 31 21 52 19 90 81 38 38 
1986 16 22 5 26 9 69 72 17 17 
1987 26 28 16 53 14 95 86 28 36 
1988 36 50 21 60 11 92 93 32 44 
1989 36 48 28 50 25 83 82 34 42 
Mean 32 39 21 52 17 91 84 33 38 
South 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Mean 
62 
68 
84 
74 
64 
64 
68 
59 
69 
78 
72 
50 
52 
61 
74 
79 
95 
84 
79 
72 
79 
49 
48 
74 
47 
40 
50 
48 
69 
81 
91 
86 
89 
75 
83 
3 
10 
31 
5 
8 
17 
9 
27 
19 
28 
14 
7 
18 
16 
58 
62 
83 
72 
68 
66 
67 
58 
62 
83 
64 
56 
58 
62 
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Table 1 2a- A comparison of the variables recorded on the four logbook types that 
have been used to monitor foreign fishing in the eastem Australian Fishing Zone. 
Variable 
CALL SIGN 
NATIONALITY 
VESSEL SIZE CLASS 
LATITUDE 
LONGITUDE 
FAJ* 
y 
y 
y 
5°SQ. 
5°SQ. 
DATE 10 DAYS 
TIME start of operation 
EFFORT 
FISHING METHOD 
TOTAL CATCH NO. 
TOTAL CATCH WT 
ALBACORE BY NO. 
ALBACORE BY WT. 
BIGEYE BY NO. 
BIGEYE BY WT. 
YELLOWFIN BY NO. 
YELLOWFIN BY WT. 
SBT BY NO. 
SBT BY WT. 
BLUE MAR.BY NO. 
BLUE MAR. BY WT. 
BLACK MAR. BY NO. 
BLACK MAR. BY WT. 
STRIPED MAR. BY NO. 
STRIPED MAR. BY WT. 
SWORDHSH BY NO. 
SWORDFISH BY WT. 
SAILHSH BY NO. 
SAILFISH BY WT. 
SHARKS BY NO. 
SHARKS BY WT. 
-
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
Log book types 
TLOl 
y 
y 
5°SQ. 
5°SQ. 
DAILY 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
TL02 
y 
y 
y 
y 
DAILY 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
TL04 
y 
y 
y 
y 
DAILY 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
V indicates - Yes, the variable is present. Blank spaces refer to variables not recorded. 
V FAJ is the Fisheries Agency of Japan). 
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Table 1.2b: The variables on the AL02 domestic logbooks as released in domestic 
and South Pacific Commission (SPC) formats. 
Variable 
CALL SIGN 
NATIONALITY 
LATITUDE 
LONGITUDE 
DATE 
TIME start of operation 
EFFORT 
FISHING METHOD 
SURFACE TEMPERATURE 
BOTTOM DEPTH 
CURRENT DIRECTION 
HOOKS PER FLOAT 
DEPTH DEEPEST HOOK 
SOAK TIME 
LINE PATROLLED 
BAIT CODES 
BAIT TYPE 
PORT CODE 
TOTAL CATCH NO. 
TOTAL CATCH WT 
ALBACORE BY NO. 
ALBACORE BY WT. 
BIGEYE BY NO. 
BIGEYE BY WT. 
YELLOWFIN BY NO. 
YELLOWFIN BY WT. 
SBT BY NO. 
SBT BY WT. 
BLUE MARLIN BY NO. 
BLUE MARLIN BY WT. 
BLACK MARLIN BY NO. 
BLACK MARLIN BY WT. 
STRIPED MARLIN BY NO. 
STRIPED MARLIN BY WT. 
SWORDFISH BY NO. 
SWORDFISH BY WT. 
SAILFISH BY NO. 
SAILFISH BY WT. 
SHARKS BY NO. 
SHARKS BY WT. 
Logbook formats 
DOMESTIC 
FORMAT 
y 
y 
y 
y 
DAILY 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
SPC 
FORMAT 
y 
y 
y 
y 
DAILY 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y indicates - Yes, the variable is present. Blank spaces refer to variables not recorded. 
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Table 1 3* The average effort per day, in hooks, and numbers of Japanese vessels 
the east coast fishery in each of the years 1984-1989. m 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Obs. 
n 
1803 
1813 
1763 
1839 
2784 
2703 
Total 
obs. 12,705 
Tonnage 
(GRT) 
100-200 
200-500 
100-200 
200-500 
100-200 
200-500 
100-200 
200-500 
100-200 
200-500 
100-200 
200-500 
Mean 
Effort/day 
2534.7 
2738.7 
2728.5 
2832.8 
2813.2 
2851.8 
2843.0 
2887.3 
2788.2 
2889.4 
2908.9 
2952.8 
St.Dev. 
288.4 
180.2 
231.8 
129.7 
82.3 
126.4 
55.3 
140.3 
162.8 
165.8 
144.1 
165.7 
No. of vessels 
5 
42 
7 
42 
7 
35 
10 
38 
20 
67 
19 
78 
Obs.= Number of daily observations on catch and effort for both vessels sizes in the 
the study area of the AFZ only. Compiled from AFZIS logbook data. 
Table 1.4a: The total Japanese catch in tonnes for each species and for all species for 
the overall fishery in the 1984-89 period. Effort is in millions of hooks. 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Effort 
6.43 
7.54 
6.02 
7.15 
12.57 
12.77 
Alb 
920 
1182 
880 
1001 
1743 
1716 
Beye 
336 
516 
513 
391 
591 
689 
Yfn 
788 
1731 
958 
1931 
3339 
2497 
Swf 
453 
548 
520 
619 
877 
601 
Bm 
165 
87 
22 
167 
195 
83 
Blu 
96 
125 
58 
145 
398 
301 
Stm 
289 
313 
216 
216 
343 
465 
Mar 
550 
525 
296 
528 
936 
849 
Total 
Weight 
3047 
4501 
3167 
4472 
7486 
6352 
Compiled from AFZIS logbook data. 
Table 1.4b(i): The total Japanese catch in tonnes for the northem fishery. Effort is in 
millions of hooks. 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Effort 
2.45 
2.45 
0.96 
1.86 
4.51 
4.65 
Alb 
373 
365 
190 
277 
874 
829 
Beye 
87 
106 
28 
64 
123 
194 
Yfn 
399 
892 
251 
1019 
1992 
1254 
Swf 
139 
101 
45 
89 
95 
149 
Bm 
159 
78 
16 
158 
179 
69 
Blu 
70 
101 
42 
126 
369 
248 
Stm 
121 
118 
38 
60 
111 
156 
I Mar Total 
350 
297 
95 
344 
659 
473 
weigM 
1349 
1761 
609 
1793 
3743 
2899 
238 
Table 1.4b (ii): The total Japanese catch in tonnes for the southern fishery. Effort is 
in millions of hooks. 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Effort 
3.98 
5.09 
5.06 
5.29 
8.07 
8.11 
Alb 
546 
817 
690 
724 
869 
887 
Beye Yfn 
249 390 
410 839 
486 707 
327 913 
468 1347 
495 1243 
Swf 
314 
446 
475 
530 
782 
452 
Bm 
6 
9 
7 
9 
16 
14 
Blu 
26 
24 
16 
20 
29 
53 
Stn-
168 
195 
178 
156 
232 
309 
I Mar Total 
Weight 
200 1698 
228 2740 
201 2559 
184 2678 
277 3743 
376 3453 
Table 1.4c: The total Japanese catch and effort for the northem and southem fishery 
expressed as a percentage of the total catch and effort in the overall fishery in the 
1984-1989 period. 
Effort Alb Beye Yfn Swf Bm Blu Stm Mar Total Weight 
North 31 
South 69 
37 
63 
20 
80 
48 
52 
18 
82 
88 
12 
81 
19 
32 
68 
57 
43 
42 
58 
Table 1.5a: The total mean catch in tonnes for Japanese vessels greater and less than 
200 GRT in the total, northem and southem fisheries over the 1984-1989 period. 
Effort is in thousands of hooks. Compiled from AFZIS logbook data. 
Total fishery 
<200GRT 
> 200GRT 
North 
<200GRT 
> 200GRT 
South 
< 200GRT 
> 200GRT 
Effort 
1967 
6731 
408 
2376 
1559 
4355 
Alb 
273 
957 
79 
400 
194 
557 
Beye 
118 
386 
14 
86 
104 
300 
Yfn 
330 
1521 
129 
817 
201 
704 
Swf 
168 
434 
14 
89 
154 
345 
Bm 
24 
95 
22 
87 
2 
8 
Blu 
23 
161 
17 
139 
6 
22 
Stm 
64 
242 
13 
88 
51 
154 
Mar 
HI 
498 
52 
314 
59 
184 
Table 1.5b: The total catch and effort for Japanese vessels smaller and greater than 
200 GRT in the total, northem and southem fisheries expressed as a percentage of the 
total catch and effort in the northem fishery or southem fisheries. (From Table 1.5a). 
Total 
< 200GRT 
> 200GRT 
North 
< 200GRT 
> 200GRT 
South 
< 200GRT 
> 200GRT 
Effort 
23 
77 
12 
88 
25 
75 
Alb 
22 
78 
15 
85 
25 
75 
Beye 
23 
77 
11 
89 
25 
75 
Yfn 
18 
82 
12 
88 
20 
80 
Swf 
28 
72 
13 
87 
29 
71 
Bm 
20 
80 
16 
84 
14 
86 
Blu 
12 
88 
8 
92 
21 
79 
Stm 
21 
79 
11 
89 
25 
75 
Mar 
18 
82 
11 
89 
24 
76 
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Table 1 6a • The total mean catch in tonnes for Japanese vessels greater and less than 
9m GRT inthe inner 200mile area and area outside 200 miles from shore in the 
northem and southem fisheries over the 1984-1989 period. Effort is in thousands of 
hooks 
North Effort 
<200grt inner 330 
>200grt inner 1901 
<200grt outer 78 
>200grt outer 475 
South 
<200grt inner 571 
>200grt inner 1873 
<200grt outer 988 
>200grt outer 2483 
Alb 
53 
275 
26 
125 
51 
181 
143 
377 
Beye 
12 
72 
2 
14 
40 
146 
64 
154 
Yfn 
108 
697 
22 
120 
94 
369 
107 
335 
Swf 
13 
72 
1 
17 
51 
133 
103 
213 
Bm 
21 
82 
1 
5 
1 
5 
1 
3 
Blu 
12 
114 
5 
26 
2 
14 
4 
8 
Stm 
10 
61 
2 
27 
14 
49 
38 
105 
Mar 
43 
256 
9 
58 
17 
68 
42 
117 
Compiled from AFZIS logbook data. 
Table 1.6b:The total catch and effort for all Japanese vessels in the inner 200mile 
area and area outside 200 miles in the northem and southem fisheries expressed as a 
percentage of the total catch and effort in the northem fishery or southem fisheries. 
North 
North inner 
outer 
South inner 
outer 
Effort 
80 
20 
41 
59 
Alb 
68 
32 
31 
69 
Beye 
84 
16 
46 
54 
Yfn 
85 
15 
51 
49 
Swf 
82 
18 
37 
63 
Bm 
94 
6 
60 
40 
Blu 
80 
20 
58 
42 
Stm 
71 
29 
30 
70 
Mar 
82 
18 
35 
65 
Table 1.6c: The total catch and effort for Japanese vessels smaller and greater than 
2(X) GRT in the inner 200mile area and area outside 200 miles in the northem and 
southem fisheries expressed as a percentage of the total catch and effort in the 
northem fishery or southem fisheries. 
North Effort 
<200 grt inner 
>2(X) grt inner 
<200grt outer 
>200 grt outer 
South 
<200grt inner 
>200 grt inner 
<200grt outer 
>200 grt outer 
12 
68 
3 
17 
10 
32 
17 
42 
Alb 
11 
57 
5 
26 
7 
24 
19 
50 
Beye 
12 
72 
2 
14 
10 
36 
16 
38 
Yfn 
11 
74 
2 
13 
10 
41 
12 
37 
Swf 
12 
70 
1 
17 
10 
27 
21 
43 
Bm 
19 
75 
1 
5 
8 
52 
8 
33 
Blu 
7 
73 
4 
16 
9 
49 
13 
29 
Stm 
10 
60 
2 
27 
7 
24 
18 
51 
Mar 
12 
70 
2 
16 
7 
28 
17 
48 
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Table 1.7a: The total catch and effort in the domestic fishery for the three main 
species, Albacore, Bigeye. and Yellowfin. Effort is in thousand hooks. Catch in 
tonnes. 
Total Fishery 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990* 
Obs. 
21 
852 
893 
1756 
975 
Effort 
8.3 
278.1 
288.1 
536.4 
326.8 
Albacore Bigeye 
0.1 
20.2 
19.3 
54.3 
21.5 
0.6 
11.6 
8.2 
7.6 
5.3 
Yellowfin 
2.7 
205.2 
233.7 
446.9 
309.1 
* 1990 data had some logbook retums outstanding. Compiled from AFZIS logbook 
data. 
Table 1.7b: The total catch and effort in the northem and southem domestic fishery 
for the three main species, Albacore, Bigeye and Yellowfin. Effort is in thousand 
hooks. Catch in tonnes. 
Northem Fishery 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Obs. 
1 
449 
258 
531 
331 
Southem Fishery 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Obs. 
20 
403 
635 
1225 
644 
Effort 
0.8 
139.6 
67.6 
134.0 
98.1 
Effort 
7.5 
138.5 
220.5 
402.4 
228.7 
Albacore 
0.0 
7.9 
5.1 
3.2 
4.9 
Albacore 
0.1 
12.3 
14.2 
51.1 
16.7 
Bigeye 
0.0 
1.0 
0.2 
0.2 
0.9 
Bigeye 
0.6 
10.6 
8.0 
7.4 
4.4 
Yellowfin 
0.1 
158.2 
139.7 
148.9 
166.7 
Yellowfin 
2.6 
47.0 
94.1 
298.0 
142.4 
n.b. catches in 1986,87,88 are low due to incomplete logbook coverage 
(Anon., 1990). 
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Table 1.7c: The northern and southern catch and effort in the domestic fishery 
expressed as a percentage of total catch and effort in each year. (From Table 1.6 
a&b) 
Northem Fishery 
Year 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Mean 
Southem Fishery 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Mean 
Obs. 
5 
53 
29 
30 
34 
36 
95 
47 
71 
70 
66 
63 
Effort 
10 
50 
23 
25 
30 
32 
90 
50 
77 
75 
70 
68 
Albacore 
0 
39 
26 
6 
23 
23 
100 
61 
74 
94 
77 
76 
Bigeye 
0 
9 
2 
3 
17 
8 
100 
91 
98 
97 
83 
92 
Yellowfin 
4 
77 
60 
33 
54 
56 
96 
23 
40 
67 
46 
44 
Table 1.8: Descriptive statistics of the variables in the domestic data for the years 
1986-1990 for the total, northem and southem fishery. The mean values are for 
individual daily fishing observations. 
Total fishery 
Obs. 
Soaktime(hrs) 
Alb (Kg) 
Beye (Kg) 
Yfn (Kg) 
Temperamre (°C) 
Effort (Hooks) 
4500 
North 
Soaktime(hrs) 
Alb (Kg) 
Beye (Kg) 
Yfn (Kg) 
Temperature (°C) 
Effort (hooks) 
Obs. 
1570 
South 
Soaktime(hrs) 
Alb (Kg) 
Beye (Kg) 
Yfn (Kg) 
Temperature (°C) 
Effort (hooks) 
Obs. 
2930 
Mean s.d. 
9.05 
25.65 
7.39 
266.19 
20.56 
319.84 
Mean 
5.89 
13.41 
1.46 
390.80 
21.29 
280.30 
Mean 
10.75 
32.20 
10.56 
199.41 
20.17 
341.03 
10.7 
71.5 
39.0 
353.1 
1.8 
147.7 
s.d. 
5.5 
44.9 
12.0 
468.7 
1.8 
135.9 
s.d. 
12.3 
81.5 
47.2 
247.0 
1.6 
149.4 
s.d = Standard deviation. Compiled from AFZIS logbook data. 
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Table 1.9: The mean domestic catch of Yellowfin and mean effort in each zone of the 
domestic fishery for the years 1987-1989. The catch or effort as a percentage of the 
total catch or effort is shown in the right hand side columns. The mean values for the 
northem and southem fishery are also shown. Compiled from AFZIS logbook data 
Total Fishery 
Zone 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
North 
Zone 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
South 
Zone 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Effort 
72944 
183513 
28058 
3059 
857 
Effort 
18183 
79558 
9272 
610 
200 
Effort 
58398 
119867 
23483 
3265 
1185 
Yfn 
57210 
160779 
19296 
2391 
467 
Yfn 
27781 
110006 
11502 
1152 
95 
Yfn 
34985 
72775 
9743 
1652 
654 
%ofT.E. 
25 
64 
10 
1 
0 
%ofT.E. 
17 
74 
9 
1 
0 
%ofT.E. 
28 
58 
11 
2 
1 
%ofTCYfn 
24 
67 
8 
1 
0 
%ofTCYfn 
18 
73 
8 
1 
0 
%ofTCYfn 
29 
61 
8 
1 
1 
where T.E. is total effort and TCyfj^ is the total catch of Yellowfin. Zone 0 = 0-12 
miles, zone 1 =12-50 miles, zone 2 =50-100 miles, zone 3 =100-150 miles and zone 4 
=150-2(X) miles, n.b. The results are means for the area specified. 
Table 1.10: Biological parameter estimates for tuna species in the east Australian 
region (After Caton and Hampton, 1985). 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Natural 
Mortality 
(y-1) 
-
0.36 
0.8 
(0.3-1.2) 
K 
(y-1) 
0.14-0.43 
0.38-0.41 
0.33-0.46 
Loc 
(cni) 
105-145 
187-215 
190-195 
K is a von Bertalanffy growth coefficient. Loc is the asymptotic length of the species. 
Data in parenthesis are a range of estimates. 
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Table 3 1* The percentage of zero catch observations by species for each Japanese 
vessel in a month over the 1984-1989 period for the total fishery. 
Species 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Black Marlin 
Blue Marlin 
Striped Marlin 
Aggregated Marlin 
Percentage zeros 
1 
3 
4 
0 
6 
65 
40 
8 
4 
Table 3.2a: Results of preliminary 
(Breusch-Pagan test). 
Dependent 
Variable 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfm 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Chi 
squares 
144.26 
79.42 
234.09 
97.44 
346.49 
(n=1611) 
tests for heteroscedasticity in the supply equations. 
Degrees 
of freedom 
14 
14 
14 
14 
14 
Reject 
Yor : 
1% 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
5% 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
*Marlin are aggregated Striped, Black and Blue Marlin. 
Table 3.2b: Results of tests for heteroscedasticity in the input scaled supply equation 
The supply equation was divided through by input (see equation 3.4). (Breusch-
Pagan test). 
Dependent Chi Degrees Reject 
Variable squares of freedom Y o r N 
(%2) 1% 5% 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marhn 
75.91 
27.98 
44.63 
53.68 
133.4 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
*Marlin are aggregated Striped, Black and Blue Marlin. 
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Table 3.3a: Tests of the stmcture of production technology for Japanese vessels in 
the overall east coast tuna longline fishery (Total Fishery). 
Test Log No. of Chi Reject 
likeh- independent squares Y or N ? 
hood restrictions (5^ 2) ^^ ^ ^ ^ 
Unrestricted -31655.9 
All dummy 
variables -32209.1 
Annual dummy 
variables -31776.1 
Quarterly 
dummy 
variables -32067.7 
All technology 
dummy 
variables -31966.8 
Input-Output 
Separability -31663.9 
Overall 
Nonjointness -31690.3 
Bii -31724.7 
Nonjointness for: 
Albacore -31664.5 
Bigeye -31665.2 
Yellowfin -31672.7 
Swordfish -31670.3 
Marlin* -31668.2 
40 
25 
15 
20 
5 
10 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
240.4 
823.6 
621.8 
16.0 
1106.4 Y 
68.8 
137.6 
17.2 
18.6 
33.6 
28.8 
24.6 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Note: Likelihood ratio tests with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
independent restrictions. *Marlin are aggregated Striped, Black and Blue Marlin. 
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Table 3.4a: Pairwise correlations between relative price variables and dummy 
variables for year and season. Only correlations greater than 0.2 are shown. 
Variable 
Prices Dl D2 D3 D4 D5 Ql Q2 Q3 
PI 0.257-0.272 -0.422 -0.225 0.224 
P2 -0.283 -0.257 0.220 -0.274 0.302 
P3-0.209-0.301 -0.329 -0.336 0.644 
P4 0.366 -0.723 
P5 -0.507 -0.431 
Relative prices 
P2/P1 -0.352 
P3/P1 -0.380 
P4/P1 
P5/P1 
P3/P2 
P4/P2 0.333 
P5/P2 
P4/P3 0.217 
P5/P3 
P5/P4 
-0.212 
0.284 0.582 
0.306 0.387 
0.324 0.487 
0.200 0.238 
0.227 
0.292 
-0.272 
-0.480 
-0.492 
-0.264 
-0.680 
-0.364 
0.525 
0.650 
-0.653 
0.372 
0.492 
-0.507 
0.309 
-0.793 
-0.634 
•0.202 
-0.240 
-0.304 
0.314 
0.297 
0.220 
-0.201 
-0.219 
Where D1-D5 are the dummy variables for years 1985-1989 (where 1984 is the base 
year), Q1-Q3 are the dummy variables for seasons (where January-March is the base 
period and April to June, July to September and October to December are Ql, Q2and 
Q3 respectively). Plto P5 are species prices where Pl= Albacore, P2=Bigeye, P3 = 
Yellowfin, P4 = Swordfish, P5 = Marlin. 
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Table 3 4b- Results of regressions of the relative price variable and annual and 
seasonal'dummy variables. The coefficient values with t ratios are shown. 
Relative Dummy 
Price Variables 
Variable Years Seasons 
R2 Const. Dl D2 D3 D4 D5 Ql Q2 Q3 
P21 0 545 3 01*-0 52* -0.11**0.072 0.309^0.144-1.09^ -1.08^ -0.47=^  
t (64.0) (-i 1.3) (-2.26) (1.59) (7.67) (3.62) (-26.4) (-27.9) (-9.57) 
^^^ 0 675 2 05* -0.55* -0.42* -0.35* -0.4* 0.178* -0.27* -0.15* -0.12* 
t (92.0) (-26.4) (-18.5) (-16.4) (-21.2) (9.44) (-14.2) (-8.62) (-5.12) 
0 729 2 64* -0.13* 0.4* 0.729*-0.01 -0.62* -0.31*-0.27*-0.33* 
(89.9) (-4.66) (13.5) (25.9) (-0.25) (-24.8) (-12.1)(-11.1) (-10.6) 
p41 
t 
^^^ 0413 2 32* -0.48* -0.15* -0.12" -0.71" O.lT -0.36"^  -O.IT 0.1' 
t (50.4) (-11.9) (-3.28) (-2.83) (-18.2) (3.04) (8.82) (-2.8) (2.07) 
^^^ 0 569 0.705*-0.05*-0.14*-0.16* -0.26*0.11* 0.196*0.25* 0.05* 
t (43.1) (-3.37) (-8.65) (-10.4) (-19.2) (7.75) (13.67) (18.75) (3.2) 
p42 
0.711 0.88* 0.31* 0.305* 0.352*-0.13* -0.3* 0.35*0.31* 0.01 
t (42.3) (15.72) (14.08) (17.6) (-7.53) (-16.9) (19.24) (18.38) (0.48) 
0.598 0.84* 0.024 -0.04** -0.1*-0.43* 0.041** 0.19* 0.28* 0.217* 
t (42.68) (1.29) (-2.01) (-5.39) (-25.9) (2.49) (11.27) (17.74) (6.13) 
p43 
0.875 1.26* 0.44* 0.623* 0.759* 0.324*-0.44* 0.101* 0.032*-0.07* 
t (70.4) (26.33) (33.58) (44.37) (21.14) (-28.7) (6.5) (2.21) (-3.87) 
p53 
0.2511.187*0.105*0.17* 0.16* -0.21*-0.09*-0.04 0.028 0.115 
t (40.97) (3.86) (5.67) (5.8) (-8.56) (-3.59) (-1.51) (1.19) (3.79) 
0.647 1.05* 0.246*0.331* 0.47* 0.64* -0.3*0.179* 0.029-0.12* 
p45 
t (35.2) (8.73) (10.67) (16.44) (24.98) (-11.7) (6.85) (1.2) (-3.93) 
" Significant at the 1% level,'''' Significant at the 5% level 
Pl= Alb, P2= Beye, P3=Yfn, P4=Swf, P5=Marlin. P21= price of Bigeye/price of 
Albacore. 
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Table 3.5: The Japanese fleet wide catch per unit effort (CPUE) data (tonnes per 
thousand hooks) for the total fishery. Effort is in thousands of hooks. 
Year Effort CPUEs 
Albacore Bigeye Yellowfin Swordfish Marlin 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
6,431 0.143 
7,544 0.156 
6,022 0.146 
7,151 0.140 
12,574 0.138 
12,766 0.134 
0.052 
0.068 
0.082 
0.054 
0.047 
0.053 
0.122 
0.229 
0.159 
0.270 
0.265 
0.195 
0.070 
0.072 
0.086 
0.086 
0.069 
0.047 
0.085 
0.069 
0.049 
0.073 
0.074 
0.066 
Table 3.6: Statistical test results for the overall structure of the Japanese fishery 
(North versus South). 
Test Like- No. of Chi Reject 
variable lihood independent squares Y or N? 
restrictions Cx}) 1% 5% 
Restricted 
model 
Fisheries 
equal 
N&S 
All dummy 
variables 
equal N & S 
-39488.3 
-39246.0 
-39301.9 
Annual dummy 
variables 
equal 
N&S 
Seasons 
equal 
N&S 
-39323.5 
-39301.9 
Technology tests: 
Beta terms 
equal N & S 
as a group 
'^ ijN='3ijS 
6jN=6jS 
i^iN=fiiiS 
-39249.9 
-39260.2 
-39255.6 
-39249.9 
60 
40 
25 
15 
20 
10 
5 
5 
484.6 
372.8 
329.6 
43.2 
104.0 
83.4 
9.2 
20.6 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
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Table 3.7: The percentage of zero observations of catch by species for each 
Japanese vessel in each month in the 1984-1989 period for northem and southem 
fisheries. 
Species 
Percentage zeros 
North South 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Black Marlin 
Blue Marlin 
Striped Marlin 
Aggregated Marlin 
3 
7 
0 
18 
45 
21 
20 
6 
2 
1 
0 
2 
70 
70 
4 
3 
Observations n= 576 1034 
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Table 3.8: Statistical tests for tonnage differences in the northem and southem 
Japanese fisheries. Vessels below and above 200 GRT are compared. Detailed 
results for each set of test can be seen in Tables A3.1.1 a&b 
Test 
variables 
Fully 
Restricted 
model 
Fisheries 
equal 
<200 & >200 
All dummy 
variables 
equal 
<200 & >200 
Annual 
variables 
equal 
<200 & >200 
Seasons 
equal 
<200 & >200 
Technology tests: 
Beta terms 
equal 
<200 & >200 
as a group 
'^ ijN= i^jS 
'^ iN='^ iS 
i^iN='^ iiS 
North 
1% 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
5% 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
South 
1% 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
"r 
N 
N 
5% 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
N 
N 
. : i _ J n^A XT rv^oonc tVi<» 
Y - indicates the nypotnesis mat me vaiiduics m^ ^ ^u^. „^., . ^ j ^ — --
hypothesis could not be rejected at either the 1% or the 5% level of significance. 
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Table 3.9a: Non-parametric examination of Monotonicity. 
M^dd N^ofObs. Albacore BTgeye Yellowfin Swordfish Marlin 
Overall 1304 100 100 100 98 100 
North 
<200 GRT 
>200 GRT 
South 
<200 GRT 
>200 GRT 
98 
478 
243 
792 
98 
100 
100 
100 
97 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
99 
100 
94 
92 
98.5 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
(This Table shows the percentage of observations for which montonicity is satisfied 
for the predicted values of each species in each of the models estimated in the 
Japanese fishery). 
Table 3.9b: Non-parametric examination of Concavity in effort as seen in the retums 
to effort for the Japanese fishery models. 
Model Retums to No.of Species that are: 
Effort Diminishing Constant Increasing 
Overall model 
North < 200 GRT 
North >200 GRT 
South <200 GRT 
South >200 GRT 
Dim** 
Const. 
Const. 
Const. 
Const. 
, * * 
* significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level. 
Table 3.9c: The results of likelihood ratio tests for Symmetry in the Japanese fishery 
models. 
Model 
Overall model 
North < 200 GRT 
North >200 GRT 
South <200 GRT 
South >200 GRT 
Restricted 
Log 
Likelihood 
-31616.5 
-2552.89 
-11292.5 
-5853.48 
-18605.1 
Un-restricted 
Log 
Likelihood 
-31655.9 
-2557.07 
-11317.6 
-5863.50 
-18651.5 
Test 
Statistic 
78.8 
8.36 
50.2 
20.04 
92.8 
Reject? 
5% 1% 
Y Y 
N N 
Y Y 
Y N 
Y Y 
Test statistic is y} with 10 degrees of freedom due to independent restrictions. 
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Table 3.9ci: Goodness of fit results for the system and estimated input compensated 
supply equations. 
System System** Ordinary R2 
R2 Gen. R2 Alb Beye Yfin Swf Mariin 
Overall 
model 0.937 0.619 0.072 0.307 0.245 0.161 0.195 
North 
< 200 GRT 0.997 0.740 0.350 0.257 0.162 0.155 0.269 
North 
> 200 GRT 0.961 0.542 0.063 0.077 0.243 0.204 0.149 
South 
< 200 GRT 0.972 0.729 0.181 0.304 0.388 0.218 0.146 
South 
> 200 GRT 0.949 0.631 0.197 0.269 0.200 0.094 0.148 
See Bemdt (1991) ** Generalised R2 (After Baxter and Cragg, 1970). 
Table 3.10a: Results for group tests of dummy variables for the overall fishery and 
for vessels smaller and larger than 200 GRT in the northem and southem Japanese 
fisheries. Detailed test results are reported in Appendix 3.1.2. 
Overall fishery 
North < 200 GRT 
North > 200 GRT 
South < 200 GRT 
South >200 GRT 
All Dummies 
(Ho:Dk=0;Qi=0) 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
Annual, 
(Ho:Dk=0) 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
Seasonal 
(HoiQpO) 
N (Table 3.3a) 
N (Table A3.1.2a) 
N (Table A3.1.2b) 
N (Table A3.1.2c) 
N (Table A3.1.2d) 
N means the econometric restriction is not equal to zero, the hypothesis is rejected. 
Relationships are at the 5% significance level. 
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Table 3.10b: Results for group tests of technology variables for the overall fishery 
and for vessels smaller and larger than 200 GRT in the northem and southem 
Japanese fisheries. Detailed test results are reported in Appendix 3.1.2. 
Input output Constant, Nonjointness 
separability term overall 
(61= 0 V i) (6ii=0 Vi) (6ij=0 V i9.!:j) 
Overall fishery N N N (Table 3.3a) 
North < 200 GRT Y N Y (Table A3.1.2a) 
North > 200 GRT Y N N (Table A3.1.2b) 
South < 200 GRT Y N N (Table A3.1.2c) 
South >200 GRT N N N (Table A3.1.2d) 
N means the econometric restriction is not equal to zero, the hypothesis that the 
coefficient is equal to zero is rejected. All relationships are at the 5% significance 
level. 
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Table 3.11: An overview of the significant technology coefficients for Bji, Bj and Bjj 
terms for individual species for the input compensated supply equations. Results are 
for the overall model, and Japanese vessels below and above 200 GRT in the northem 
and southem fisheries. 
• • 
Overall 
Fishery 
(Table 
3.3b) 
North 
< 200 GRT 
(Table 
A3.1.3aii) 
North 
> 200 GRT 
(Table 
A3.1.3bii) 
South 
< 200 GRT 
(Table 
A3.1.3cii) 
South 
> 200 GRT 
(Table 
A3.1.3d) 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfm 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfm 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfm 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Bii 
-1-
0 
-1-
-1-
-1-
+ 
0 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
0 
+ 
** 
-1-+ 
Individual 
nonjointness Joint 
Bi 1 
. 
0 
0 
iF'f' 
n/s 
n/s 
n/s 
n/s 
n/s 
n/s 
n/s 
n/s 
n/s 
n/s 
n/s 
n/s 
n/s 
n/s 
n/s 
0 
0 
0 
0 
** 
(Blj=0 V 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
j ^ * * 
N* 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
Y 
j) relationships 
(AY)S 
(BY)C(BS)S 
(YA)S(YB)C(YM)C 
(SB)S(SM)S 
(MY)C(MS)S 
n/s 
n/s 
n/s 
n/s 
n/s 
(YS)S 
(SY)S 
(BY)C(BS)S 
(YB)'^  
(SB)S 
(AB)S 
(BA)S(BY)C(BS)S 
(YB)C 
(SB)S 
All coefficients are reported at the 1% level of significance, unless ^hown at 5% ^ 
n/s indicates the reporting of the statistic is not sigmficant due to previous tests 
rtte h J ^ J h S s (lable 3.10b), The Y reported foj/^-^.^^^f^^^^^^^ 
indicates Yes Bii=0 In reporting jointly produced species which have cross pnce 
; S S i p s \hi^superscripF( )C fnkates ^ positive c-ffia^^^^^^ 
relationship between the two products (i.e. Bij>0) The superscnpt ( ) represents 
negative coefficient and a substitution relationsTiip (i.e.l3ij<Uj. 
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Table 3.12: The ranked results of the coefficients for seasonal and annual dummies 
for the overall model and the Japanese vessels below and above 200 GRT in the 
northem and southern fisheries. Seasonal dummies are: 0=base period, Januarv-
March, l=April to June, 2=July to September and 3=October to December' For vear 
dummies the base year, 0=1984, 1=1985, 2=1986, 3=1987, 4=1988 and 5=1989 
Highest coefficients are to the left. 
Seasonal dummies Annual dummies 
Overall 
Fishery 
(Table 
3.3b) 
North 
< 200 GRT 
(Table 
A3.1.3aii) 
North 
> 200 GRT 
(Table 
A3.1.3bii) 
South 
< 200 GRT 
(Table 
A3.1.3cii) 
South 
> 200 GRT 
(Table 
A3.1.3d) 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
0 ,1*,2**,3. 
1*,2*,0,3 
0*,3,2*,1 
1**,2*,3*,0 
3*,0*,2*,1 
1,0*,2,3. 
1,2*,0,3 
0,2,1,3 
2,3,1,0 
3,0,2,1 
0,2,1,3. 
1*,0,3,2 
0,1,3,2 
2*,3,0,1 
3*,2,0,1 
1,0,2,3. 
1,3,0,2 
0,2*,3,1 
3**,1*,2,0 
0,3,2,1 
1*,2*,0,3 
1*,0,2*,3 
2*,3,0*,1 
3,1,2*,0 
3*,0,2*,1 
0,3,5,2,1,4 
2*,1,3**,4,0*,5 
3,4,1,2,5*,0 
5,4,0,1,2,3 
3,4,2,1,0,5 
0**,1,2,4,5,3 
4,5,1,3,0,2 
3,4,1,2,0,5 
3,0,1,5,2,4 
3,2,5,4,0,1 
2,4,3,1,5,0 
3,4,1,5,0,2 
3*,4,1,2,5,0 
0,5,1,3,2,4 
3,0,2,4,5,1 
0,5,3,1,2,4 
2,1*,3,4,0*,5 
5,4,1,3,0,2 
4,3,1,2,0,5 
1,5,0,2,3,4 
3,2,0,4,1,5 
2**,1,3**,4,0*,5 
4,3,5,1,2,0 
1,2,4,0,3,5 
2,0,3,5,1,4 
sS^^'FfS^^^^^ "T"^^ V^^ nght at the 1% level of 
different from ze o he bas^^er OH r r ^ ' ^^^^g^ighted, in bold, it is significantly 
level of signific^S. ^ ^ ''PP^'^^ ^^  *^ "^^t lowest number at a 5% 
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Table 3.13: Coefficients of variation for monthly aggregated price data for the Yaizu 
fish market, Japan: 1984-1989. 
Species 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Black Marlin 
Blue Marlin 
Striped Marlin 
Coefficient of variation '^  
0.152 
0.264 
0.258 
0.154 
0.339 
0.237 
0.306 
n.b. The coefficient of variation = standard error/ mean. 
Table 3.14a: Input compensated own price and cross price elasticities for the overall 
Japanese fishery model. 
Overall 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Mariin 
Albacore 
0.865* 
(3.86) 
-0.164 
(-1.29) 
-0.193** 
(-2.43) 
-0.137 
(-0.70) 
-0.087 
(-0.78) 
Bigeye 
-0.142 
(-1.29) 
-0.051 
(-0.40) 
0.217* 
(4.32) 
-0.261** 
(-2.16) 
-0.068 
(-0.83) 
Yellowfin 
-0.485** 
(-2.43) 
0.630* 
(4.32) 
0.005 
(0.39) 
-0.317 
(-1.26) 
0.2971** 
(2.01) 
Swordfish 
-0.155 
(-0.70) 
-0.339** 
(-2.16) 
-0.142 
(1.26) 
1.185* 
(3.69) 
-0.555* 
(-3.78) 
Marlin 
-0.083 
(-0.78) 
-0.074 
(-0.84) 
0.112** 
(2.01) 
-0.469* 
(-3.78) 
0.413* 
(3.68) 
Note: * Statistically significant at 1%, ** Statistically significant at 5%. Elasticities 
are calculated at sample mean. Asymtotic t ratios in parenthesis. For a species on 
the left hand side of the table e.g. Albacore, the first elasticity in row one is the own 
price elasticity of Albacore. The second is the cross elasticity with Bigeye, where the 
coefficient represents the percentage change in the supply of Bigeye for a one percent 
change in the price of Albacore. 
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Table 3.14b: Input compensated own price and cross price elasticities in the northem 
and southem Japanese fisheries. 
North 
<200 GRT 
>200GRT 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
South 
< 200GRT . 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
> 200GRT. 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
Not applicable 
-0.244 
(-0.50) 
-0.307 
(-1.62) 
-0.202 
(-0.10) 
0.818* 
(3.29) 
-0.349* 
(-2.95) 
0.425 
(0.042) 
-0.367 
(-1.89) 
0.017 
(0.14) 
Bigeye Yellowfin Swordfish 
; - nonjoint production at the 5% level. 
0.381 
(-1.51) 
-0.322 
(-1.62) 
-0.013 
(-0.05) 
0.531* 
(3.26) 
-0.382** 
(-2.00) 
0.180 
(0.87) 
-0.379* 
(-2.95) 
0.166 
(1.29) 
0.327* 
(3.68) 
-0.334** 
(-2.28) 
0.075 
(0.59) 
-1.54** 
(-2.47) 
-0.341 
(-1.01) 
0.857* 
(3.26) 
-0.857** 
(-2.13) 
0.599 
(1.45) 
-0.268 
(-1.37) 
0.088 
(0.42) 
0.625* 
(3.68) 
-0.453** 
(-1.97) 
0.120 
(0.40) 
-0.016 
(-0.08) 
-0.126 
(-0.50) 
0.397 
(1.51) 
-0.226** 
(-2.47) 
1.40** 
(2.01) 
-0.402 
(-1.24) 
-0.064** 
(-2.00) 
0.645 
(1.45) 
-0.527 
(-1.89) 
-0.442** 
(-2.28) 
0.083 
(0.40) 
0.582 
(1.53) 
-0.254 
(-1.07) 
Marlin 
-0.402 
(-1.24) 
0.127 
(0.87) 
-0.117 
(-1.37) 
0.014 
(0.14) 
0.056 
(0.59) 
-0.006 
(-0.08) 
-0.142 
(-1.07) 
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Note: * Statistically significant at 1%, Statistically significant at 5% Elasticities 
are calculated at sample mean. Asymtotic t ratios in parenthesis. The elasticities are 
estimated from the final model form. If the species is nonjoint there are no cross price 
or own price elasticities. For a species on the left hand side of the table e.g. Albacore 
the first elasticity in row one is the own price elasticity for Albacore. The second is 
the cross elasticity with Bigeye, where the coefficient represents the percentage 
change in the supply of Bigeye for a one percentage change in the price of Albacore. 
Table 3.15: Input compensated product specific scale elasticities for the Japanese 
fisheries. 
Overall 
Fishery 
North 
< 200 GRT 
North 
> 200 GRT 
South 
< 200 GRT 
South 
> 200 GRT 
Albacore 
1.62* 
(14.19) 
3.236* 
(8.06) 
1.071* 
(7.29) 
1.469* 
(4.10) 
0.557* 
(4.16) 
Bigeye 
0.47* 
(5.41) 
0.400 
(0.85) 
0.953* 
(5.34) 
0.728* 
(2.63) 
0.776* 
(6.60) 
Yellowfin 
1.14* 
(12.62) 
1.191* 
(4.11) 
0.777* 
(8.50) 
1.315* 
(3.72) 
0.524* 
(3.44) 
Swordfish 
0.16 
(1.17) 
0.301 
(0.48) 
0.852* 
(3.04) 
-0.102 
(-0.25) 
0.339 
(1.75) 
Marlin 
1.11* 
(10.74) 
0.549** 
(2.21) 
0.944* 
(7.79) 
1.303* 
(2.75) 
1.545* 
(8.45) 
* * Note:: Statistically significant at 1%' Statistically significant at 5%. Elasticities 
calculated at sample mean. Asymtotic t ratios in parenthesis. 
Table 3.16: The percentage of zero catch observations by vessels in each zone of the 
northem and southern Japanese fisheries. Observations are at the vessel level, 
monthly for the 1984-1989 period. The left hand side is for the six zone model and 
the right is the ten zone model. 
Species 
Percentage zeros 
Six zone model Ten zone model 
North South North South 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
5 
13 
1 
18 
5 
3 
5 
1 
6 
15 
16 
20 
S 
20 
7 
3 
8 
1 
8 
19 
Observations n= 1343 2652 1465 3304 
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Table 3.17a: Statistical test results for structure of technology tests in the six zone 
model of the Japanese fishery. 
Test 
Unrestricted 
All dummy 
Variables 
Zonal dummy 
variables 
Annual dummy 
variables 
Quarteriy dummy 
variables 
Zones < 200 
miles 
Zones > 200 
miles 
Zone 5 
Zone 4 
Zone 3 
Zone 2 
Zone 1 
Input-Output 
Separability 
Overall 
Nonjointness 
Log 
like-
hood 
-99981.1 
-101495 
-101520 
-100238 
-100687 
-100188 
-100398 
-100246 
-100231 
-100172 
-100077 
-100003 
-100008 
-100040 
No. of Chi 
independent squares 
restrictions (X^) 
Reject 
YorN? 
1% 5% 
65 
25 
25 
15 
10 
15 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
10 
3027.8 
3077.8 
564.0 
898.0 
413.8 
833.8 
529.8 
499.8 
381.8 
191.8 
45.8 
53.8 
137.0 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Note: Likelihood ratio tests with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
independent restrictions. 
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Table 3.18: The ranked results of the coefficients for zonal dummies in the overall 
model and the vessels below and above 200 GRT in the northem and southem 
Japanese fisheries. The base zone dummy is 0=0-50 miles, 1=50-100 miles 2-inn 
150 miles, 3=150-200 miles, 4=200-350 miles and 5=350-500 miles. The hWhest 
value is on the left of the column. 
Zones 
Overall 
Fishery 
(Table 
3.17b) 
North 
< 200 GRT 
(Table 
A3.2.2a) 
North 
> 200 GRT 
(Table 
A3.2.2b) 
South 
< 200 GRT 
(Table 
A3.2.2C) 
South 
> 200 GRT 
(Table 
A3.2.2d) 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfm 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
4*,3,5,2*,1,0 
0,1*,2, 3**,2,4,5 
0,1*,2,3**,4*,5 
5*,2,3,4,1,0 
4**,3*,5,2,0,1 
5,4,3,2*,1,0 
0,1,2,3,4,5 
1*,2,3,4,0,5 
1,2,0,4,3,5 
3,2,4,0,1,5 
5,4*,3*,2*,1,0 
1,0,2**,3,4,5 
0,1**,2,3,4,5 
2,1,4,3,0,5 
4,3,0,2,1,5 
4*,5,3,2,1,0 
0,1,2,3,4,5, 
0,1,2,3,4*,5 
5*,2,3,1,4,0 
3,4*,5,2,1,0 
4*,3,5,2*,1,0 
0,1,3,2**,4,5 
0,1*,4,2,3,5 
5*,2,3**,4,1,0 
4*,3,5,2**,1,0 
""^ 
s ign1ScM^*fST4) ' "^^^^^^ ^^^ "ght at a 1% level of 
different frorn zero the base^one I "^^^ !f '^ ^g'l.^ ghted, in bold, it is significantly 
level of signified. ' "" ^PP^'^'^ ^° ^^^ "^^t lowest number at a 5% 
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Table 3.19a: Assumed proportions of each species exported or retained on the 
domestic market used in calculating the tuna price index. 
Species 
Yellowfin 
Bigeye 
Albacore 
Billfish 
Sashimi 
Yfn, gutted 
Yfn, head on 
Yfn, canning 
Sashimi 
Bigeye head on 
Albacore 
Billfish 
0.5 
0.1 
0.025 
0.025 
0.65'' 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
1.0 
1.0 
''Source: AQIS and NSWFMA estimates 
Table 3.19b : Assumed proportions of total catch for each species used to calculate 
the average NSWFMA Sydney market tuna price index. 
Species 
Yellowfin 
Proportion Exported 
Proportion sold domestically 
Bigeye 
Proportion Exported 
Proportion sold domestically 
Exchange rate 1988 
1989 
0.35 
0.65' 
0.40 
0.60 
101.83 
109.41 
* * 
* * 
*Source: AQIS and NSWFMA estimates **Source : ABARE, 1991. 
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Table 3 20' The results of t-test comparisons of market prices for Japanese and 
Australian iuna markets for the years 1988 and 1989. 
Null 
Hypothesis 
Market comparisons 
Ho:JFY=FY 
Ho:JFE=FE 
Ho:JFY=DS 
Ho:JFE=DE 
HQ: D S = F Y 
HQ: D E = F E 
Other Species 
HQ: D A = F A 
HQ: D B = F B 
Other comparisons 
Ho:JFY5oo=DS 
Ho:JFY600=DS 
Ho:JFE5oo=DE 
Ho:JFE60o=DE 
HQ: P Y = F Y 
HQ: P E = F E 
Mean 
Ml 
1497.5 
2822.1 
1497.5 
2822.1 
845.5 
733.4 
222.8 
833.9 
997.5 
897.5 
2322.1 
2222.1 
824.6 
1119.8 
Mean 
M2 
573.3 
863.2 
845.5 
733.4 
573.3 
863.2 
316.8 
666.6 
845.5 
845.5 
733.4 
677.4 
573.3 
863.2 
ttest 
stafistic 
13.61* 
6.75* 
7.07* 
7.28* 
3.74* 
-2.43** 
-6.41* 
2.53** 
1.64 
0.56 
5.67* 
5.18* 
5.55* 
2.13** 
HQ: 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Bart. 
\i2 H.o.V. 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
N 
Y 
N 
Y 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
*Significant at the 1% level, significant at the 5% level**. 
KEY 
Bart.H.o. V.= Bartletts Homogeneity of Variance test. JFY= Japanese Fresh market 
price for Yellowfin. JFE= Japanese Fresh market price for Bigeye. FY= Japanese 
Frozen market price for Yellowfin. FE= Japanese Frozen market price for Bigeye. 
FB= Japanese Frozen market price for Broadbill Swordfish. DS= Domestic market 
price of sashimi Yellowfin. DE= Domestic market price of Bigeye. DA= Domestic 
market price of Albacore. DB= Domestic market price of Broadbill Swordfish. 
PY= Weighted Average price of Yellowfin for domestic producers. PE= Weighted 
Average price of Bigeye for domestic producers. Subscripts JFY500 and JFY60O are 
Japanese fresh market prices for Yellowfin net of 500 and 600 yen per kilo freight. 
264 
Table 3.21a: Results of preliminary tests for heteroscedasticity in the sunnlv 
equations for the Japanese Australian catch effort data (with zero catch observation, 
included). (Breusch-Pagan test). civduons 
Dependent Chi Degrees Reject 
Variable squares of freedom YorN 
(X )^ 1% 5% '0 
Yellowfin 26.63 5 Y Y 
Other Species 135.78 5 Y Y 
Table 3.21b: Results of preliminary tests for heteroscedasticity in the supply 
equations for the Japanese Australian catch effort data (zero catch observations 
excluded). (Breusch-Pagan test). 
Dependent Chi Degrees Reject 
Variable squares. of freedom YorN 
r2 (X )^ 1% 5% '0 
Yellowfin 15.01 5 N Y 
Other Species 98.19 5 Y Y 
Table 3.21c: Results of tests for heteroscedasticity in the input scaled supply 
equation for the Japanese Austrahan catch effort data. The supply equation was 
divided through by input (see equation 3.4, zero catch observations included). 
(Breusch-Pagan test) 
Dependent Chi Degrees Reject 
Variable squares of freedom Y or N 
(%2) 1% 5% 
Yellowfin 48.18 4 Y Y 
Other Species 1.38 4 N N 
Table 3.21d: Results of tests for heteroscedasticity in the input scaled supply 
equation for the Japanese Australian catch effort data. The supply equation was 
divided through by input (see equation 3.4, zero catch observations excluded) 
(Breusch-Pagan test). 
Dependent Chi Degrees Reject 
Variable squares of freedom YorN 
(;^ 2) 1% 5% 
Yellowfin 24.6 4 Y Y 
Other Species 2.09 4 N N 
'o 
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Table 3 22a- Statistical tests comparing the Japanese and Australian fishery in the 
inshore study area. Domestic data includes zero catch observations. 
jZ^[ Log" No.of Ciii Reject 
Like- independent squares YorN? 
lihood restrictions (X )^ 1% 5% 
FuUy 
Restricted 
model 
Fisheries 
equal 
J & A 
All dummies 
as a group 
-6163.14 
-6010.71 16 
-6041.90 10 
Annual dummy 
variables 
equal 
J & A 
Seasons 
equal 
J & A 
Zones 
equal 
J & A 
-6129.65 
-6043.96 
-6041.90 
Technology tests: 
Beta terms 
equal J & A 
as a group 
BiJ=BiA 
BijJ=6ijA 
BiiJ=6iiA 
-6015.42 
-6027.55 
-6027.09 
-6015.42 
304.86 Y Y 
242.48 Y Y 
237.88 
171.38 
4.12 N N 
6 
2 
2 
2 
52.96 
28.70 
0.92 
23.34 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
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Table 3.22b: Statistical tests comparing the Japanese and Australian fishery in the 
inshore study area. Domestic data excludes zero catch observations. 
Test 
FuUy 
Restricted 
model 
Fisheries 
equal 
J&A 
AU dummies 
as a group 
Log 
Like-
lihood 
-4597.75 
-4477.32 
-4494.49 
Annual dummy 
variables 
equal 
J&A -4549.29 
Seasons 
equal 
J&A 
Zones 
equal 
J&A 
-4508.45 
-4494.49 
Technology tests: 
Beta terms 
equal J & A 
as a group 
BiJ=6iA 
'^ ijJ=BijA 
BiiJ=BiiA 
-4477.34 
-4480.81 
-4480.52 
-4477.34 
No.of 
independent 
restrictions 
16 
10 
2 
6 
2 
6 
2 
2 
1 
Chi 
squares 
i7?) 
240.86 
206.52 
143.94 
81.68 
27.92 
34.30 
28.36 
0.58 
6.36 
Reject 
YorN? 
1% 5% 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
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T,hi. 1 22c- The coefficients of the Australian and Japanese model with zero 
Ibse-^tons induded and excluded, (t ratios tn parenthesis) 
Coefficient 
Yellowfin 
Bii 
Bi 
Bij 
Years 
Ql 
Q2 
Q3 
Zone 
Other Species 
Bii 
Bi 
Bij 
Years 
Ql 
Q2 
Q3 
Zone 
Zeros included 
Austialia Japan 
69.53* 
(5.61) 
2.67* 
(5.03) 
6.57* 
(8.41) 
-30.70* 
(-4.23) 
-13.75 
(-0.99) 
33.13* 
(2.74) 
-8.22 
(-0.63) 
2.61 
(0.53) 
4.79** 
(2.07) 
-0.24** 
(-2.4) 
6.57* 
(8.41) 
-0.32 
(-0.24) 
-1.95 
(-0.76) 
-0.37 
(-0.16) 
-0.93) 
(-0.38) 
-0.62 
(-0.68) 
8.55 
(0.70) 
0.01 
(0.41) 
6.57* 
(8.41) 
-1.48 
(-0.24) 
-4.54 
(-0.36) 
3.48 
(0.29) 
-3.53 
(-0.16) 
2.61 
(0.53) 
16.64* 
(7.07) 
0.01 
(1.60) 
6.57* 
(8.41) 
-1.08 
(-0.96) 
0.62 
(0.26) 
-0.25 
(-0.11) 
4.00 
(0.98) 
-0.62 
(-0.68) 
Zeros excluded 
Australia Japan 
62.84* 
(4.86) 
1.57* 
(3.37) 
-7.65* 
(-3.98) 
-1.06 
(-0.16) 
8.28 
(0.55) 
33.08* 
(2.61) 
0.21* 
(0.01) 
-33.02* 
(-4.61) 
32.55* 
(6.74) 
-0.56* 
(-3.75) 
-7.65* 
(-3.98) 
-1.46 
(0.68) 
-4.35 
(-0.91) 
-2.12 
(0.52) 
-3.18 
(-0.73) 
3.99 
(1.75) 
23.55* 
(2.96) 
0.013 
(0.75) 
-7.65* 
(-3.98) 
-4.39 
(-1.23) 
-3.33 
(-0.43) 
3.31 
(0.45) 
-1.88 
(-0.14) 
3.10 
(0.82) 
31.34* 
(10.37) 
0.006 
(1.00) 
-7.65* 
(-3.98) 
2.15 
(1.59) 
-0.96 
(-0.39) 
-0.39 
(-0.17) 
2.57 
(0.59) 
-2.39** 
(-1.97) 
significant at the 1% level significant at the 5% level 
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Table 3.22d: Results of tests of hypotheses that individual coefficients are equal for 
the Australian and Japanese coefficients (tested by the econometric restriction the 
Australian individual coefficient minus the Japanese individual coefficient=0). A 
ositive coefficient indicates the Australian coefficient is higher than the Japanese and 
vice versa. 
With zeros Without zeros 
Yellowfm 
6iiA-BiiJ=0 
6iA-6iJ=0 
Year dummies 
A-J=0 
Q1A-Q1J=0 
Q2A-Q2J=0 
Q3A-Q3J=0 
Zones 
A-J=0 
Other Species 
BiiA-6iiJ=0 
6iA-6iJ=0 
Year dummies 
A-J=0 
Q1A-Q1J=0 
Q2A-Q2J=0 
Q3A-Q3J=0 
Zones 
A-J=0 
60.98* 
(3.56) 
2.66* 
(5.00) 
-29.22* 
(-3.11) 
-9.21* 
(-3.11) 
29.68 
(1.75) 
-4.68 
(-0.18) 
-36.12* 
(-4.45) 
-11.84* 
(-3.68) 
-0.25** 
(-2.49) 
0.76 
(0.43) 
-2.57 
(-0.74) 
-0.13 
(-0.04) 
-4.93 
(-1.04) 
39.28* 
(2.63) 
1.56* 
(3.35) 
3.53 
(0.46) 
11.61 
(0.68) 
29.76** 
(2.03) 
2.10 
(0.11) 
1.21 
(0.25) 
-0.56* 
(-3.78) 
-3.57 
(-1.44) 
-3.39 
(-0.63) 
-2.13 
(-0.45) 
-5.75 
(-0.93) 
6.39** 
(2.46) 
significant at the 1% level ** significant at the 5% level 
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Table 3.23a: Input compensated own price and cross price elasticities in the 
Australian domestic and Japanese fishery between 12-100 miles from shore. 
Yellowfin Other species 
Australians 
Yellowfin 0.029* -0.029* 
(3.13) (-3.13) 
Other -0.409* 0.409* 
Species (-3.13) (3.13) 
Japanese 
no applicable terms as Bij coefficients are 
not significantly different from zero. 
Note: * Statistically significant at 1%, Statistically significant at 5%. Elasticities 
calculated at sample mean. Asymtotic t ratios in parenthesis. The elasticities are 
estimated from the final model form. If the species is nonjoint there are no cross price 
cr own price elasticities. For a species on the left hand side of the table e.g 
Yellowfin, the first elasticity in row one is the own price elasticity for Yellowfin. The 
second is the cross elasticity with other species, where the coefficient represents the 
percentage change in the supply of Yellowfin for a percentage change in the price of 
other species. 
Table 3.23b: Input compensated product specific scale elasticities (Domestic and 
Japanese fishery comparison). 
Australians 
Japanese 
Yellowfin 
0.892* 
(3.19) 
1.049* 
(6.71) 
Other species 
1.192* 
(2.61) 
1.027* 
(9.76) 
Note: * Statistically significant at 1%» ** Statistically significant at 5%. Elasticities 
calculated at sample mean. Asymtotic t ratios in parenthesis. 
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Table 3.24a: Statistical tests comparing the technology of Japanese vessels below 
200 GRT and Australian fishing vessels. Domestic data includes zero catch 
observations. 
Test 
FuUy 
Restricted 
model 
Fisheries 
equal 
J&A 
All dummies 
as a group 
Log 
Like-
lihood 
-3529.89 
-3471.46 
-3483.79 
Annual dummy 
variables 
equal 
J&A 
Seasons 
equal 
J&A 
Zones 
equal 
J&A 
Technology t 
Beta terms 
equal J & A 
as a group 
Bj=6iA 
'^ ijJ=6ijA 
6iiJ=BiiA 
-3517.71 
-3487.12 
-3483.79 
:ests: 
-3471.46 
-3474.17 
-3472.10 
-3471.95 
No. of 
independent 
restrictions 
16 
10 
2 
6 
2 
6 
2 
2 
2 
Chi 
squares 
(X') 
116.94 
92.10 
24.36 
61.18 
6.66 
24.60 
19.24 
4.34 
4.24 
Reject 
YorN? 
1% 5% 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
N Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
N N 
N N 
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Table 3.24b: Statistical tests comparing the technology of Japanese vessels below 
200 GRT and Australian fishing vessels. Domestic data excludes zero catch 
observations. 
Tgst Log No. of Chi Reject 
Like- independent squares YorN? 
lihood restrictions C/}) 1% 5% 
FuUy 
Restricted 
model 
Fisheries 
equal 
J & A 
AU dummies 
as a group 
-2114.33 
-2072.13 
-2080.85 
Annual dummy 
variables 
equal 
J & A 
Seasons 
equal 
J & A 
Zones 
equal 
J & A 
-2102.04 
-2092.13 
-2085.20 
Technology tests: 
Beta terms 
equal J & A 
as a group 
Bij=BiA 
'^ ijJ=15ijA 
l^ iiJ=l^ uA 
-2072.13 
-2075.31 
-2073.34 
-2074.60 
16 
10 
2 
6 
2 
6 
2 
2 
2 
'0 
84.40 Y Y 
66.96 Y Y 
14.58 Y Y 
19.82 Y Y 
13.86 Y Y 
26.14 Y Y 
19.78 Y Y 
3.94 N N 
1.42 N N 
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Table 3.24c: The coefficients of the technology model comparing Australian and 
smaller Japanese vessels (<200GRT) with zero catch observations included and 
excluded, (t ratios in parenthesis). 
Zeros included Zeros excluded 
Coefficient Australia Japan Australia Japan 
Yellowfin 
Bii 
Bi 
Bij 
66.61* 66.61* 56.02* 56.02* 
(4.14) (4.14) (3.19) (3.19) 
2.68* 0.007 1.60** 0.004 
(3.82) (0.02) (2.37) (0.10) 
7.07 7.07 -6.19* -6.19* 
(0.73) (0.73) (-3.07) (-3.07) 
Years -29.88* -5.47 0.21 -8.98 
(-3.14) (-0.33) (0.02) (-0.79) 
01 -11.46* -57.09** 12.70 -32.19 
(-6.34) (-2.12) (0.60) (-1.43) 
02 53.42** -52.03** 37.52* -27.69 
(2.45) (-2.07) (2.61) (-1.29) 
03 -5.81 -58.7 5.07 -32.33 
(-0.34) (-0.98) (0.27) (-0.76) 
Zone 1.88 1.23 -33.78* 2.26 
(0.17) (0.07) (-3.15) (0.21) 
Other Species ^^ . ^ ^^^ 
Bii 4.80** 16.64* 39.65* 31.65* 
(2.28) (7.07) (6.78) (6.78) 
6i -0.23** 0.01 -0.56* 0.004 
(-2.49) (1.60) (-3.77) (0.44) 
Bij 7.07* 7.07* -6.19* -6.19* 
(9.70) (9.70) (-3.06) (-3.06) 
Years -0.42 0.74 -1.70 4.45 
(-0.34) (0.34) (-0.81) (1.76) 
01 -2.73 12.94* -5.36 -1.94 
(-1.17) (3.67) (-1.16) (-0.39) 
Q2 -1.61 11.50* -3.23 -2^61 
(-0.78) (3.50) (-0.83) (-0.55) 
Q3 -1.97 19.56** -4.35 2.68 
(-0.89) (2.52) (-1.04) (0.28) 
Zone 2.67 -3.46 3.98 -2.92 
(1.86) (-1.65) (1.76) (-1.64) 
significant at the 1 % level significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 3.24d: Results of tests of hypotheses that individual coefficients are equal for 
the Australian and smaller Japanese vessels (<200GRT) coefficients (tested by the 
econometric restriction the Australian individual coefficient minus the Japanese 
individual coefficient =0). A positive coefficient indicates the Australian coefficient is 
higher than the Japanese and vice versa. 
Yellowfin 
BiiA-BiiJ=0 
6iA-6iJ=0 
Year dummies 
A-J=0 
Q1A-Q1J=0 
Q2A-Q2J=0 
Q3A-Q3J=0 
Zones 
A-J=0 
Other Species 
6iiA-6iiJ=0 
6iA-6iJ=0 
Year dummies 
A-J=0 
Q1A-Q1J=0 
Q2A-Q2J=0 
Q3A-Q3J=0 
Zones 
A-J=0 
With zeros 
2.67* 
(3.80) 
-24.41 
(-1.28) 
45.63 
(1.75) 
87.45* 
(3.84) 
52.91 
(0.90) 
0.66 
(0.03) 
-0.24* 
(-2.57) 
-1.16 
(-0.47) 
-15.67* 
(-4.61) 
-13.11 
(-4.42) 
-21.53* 
(-2.81) 
6.13** 
(2.43) 
Without zeros 
1.59** 
(2.36) 
9.19 
(0.62) 
44.90** 
(2.05) 
65.21* 
(3.59) 
37.41 
(0.91) 
-35.05** 
(-2.33) 
-0.56* 
(-3.80) 
-6.15 
(-1.88) 
-3.41 
(-0.69) 
-0.63 
(-0.15) 
-7.03 
(-0.77) 
7 9 j** 
(2.41) 
significant at the 1% level significant at the 5% level 
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Table 3.25a: Observed effort and total catches in the three zones adjacent to the 
Australian coast for Australian and Japanese vessels in the years 1988 and 1989 
Effort is in hooks and weights of fish catch are in kilograms for each species 
37545 4122 
64006 2345 
Australians 
Year Zone Effort Walb Weye Wyfn Wswf Wbm Wbl 
169 44437 547 0 0 
449 86209 422 0 0 
14350 495 251 24555 348 0 0 
47436 1474 401 37207 635 0 120 
142743 4688 191 131050 953 0 61 
25030 1476 361 12995 350 0 0 
1988 0 
1 
2 
1989 0 
1 
2 
Wstm 
448 
657 
120 
602 
992 
360 
Japanese 
Year Zone Effort Walb Weye Wyfn Wswf Wbm Wbl Wstm 
1988 1 702010 40724 75332 116238 39669 2461 2328 13942 
2 971633 54052 54185 235035 51999 2866 7571 24294 
1989 1 1488703 100863 143763 227132 89262 4398 16236 32909 
2 1611294 160564 95338 299704 87678 4285 13736 44308 
Zone 0 is 0-12 miles from baseline, zone 1 is 12-50 miles and zone 2 is 50-100 miles. 
Key: Walb is weight of Albacore, and Weye -Bigeye, Wyfn- Yellowfin, Wswf-
Swordfish, Wbm- Black Marlin, Wblm-Blue Marlin, Wstm-Striped Marlin. 
Table 3.25b: The Catch Per Unit Effort(CPUE) for each of the species in each zone 
for Australian and Japanese vessels in the study area in the 1988 and 1989 period. 
(CPUE: Kg per hook or tonnes per thousand hooks). 
Australians 
Year Zone Effort 
1988 0 
1 
2 
1989 0 
1 
2 
Japanese 
37545 
64006 
14350 
47436 
142743 
25030 
Year Zone Effort 
1988 1 
2 
1989 1 
2 
702010 
971633 
1488703 
1611294 
Alb 
0.110 
0.037 
0.034 
0.031 
0.033 
0.059 
Alb 
0.058 
0.056 
0.068 
0.100 
Beye 
0.005 
0.007 
0.017 
0.008 
0.001 
0.014 
Beye 
0.107 
0.056 
0.097 
0.059 
CPUE 
Yfn 
1.184 
1.347 
1.711 
0.784 
0.918 
0.519 
CPUE 
Yfn 
0.166 
0.242 
0.153 
0.186 
Swf 
0.015 
0.007 
0.024 
0.013 
0.007 
0.014 
Swf 
0.057 
0.054 
0.060 
0.054 
Bm 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
Bm 
0.004 
0.003 
0.003 
0.003 
BI 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.003 
0.000 
0.000 
BI 
0.003 
0.008 
0.011 
0.009 
Stm 
0.012 
0.010 
0.008 
0.013 
0.007 
0.014 
Stm 
0.020 
0.025 
0.022 
0.027 
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Table 3.25c: Relative catch per unit effort between Australian and Japanese vessels. 
The ratio is CpucA/Cpuej : if the ratio is equal to one, the cpues are equal; if greater 
than one, the Australian value is higher; and if less than one, the Japanese Cpue is 
higher. 
Year Zone Alb Beye Yfn Swf Bm BI Stm 
1988 1 0.6 0.1 8.1 0.1 - - 0.5 
2 0.6 0.3 7.1 0.5 - - 0.3 
1989 1 0.5 0.0 6.0 0.1 - - 0.3 
2 0.6 0.2 2.8 0.3 - - 0.5 
Table 3.25d: Relative catch per unit effort between Japanese and Australian vessels. 
The ratio is Cpuej/Cpue^: if the ratio is equal to one, the cpues are equal; if greater 
than one the Japanese value is higher; and if less than one, the Australian Cpue is 
higher. 
Bm BI Stin 
2.0 
3.1 
3.1 
1.9 
Year Zone 
1988 1 
2 
1989 1 
2 
Alb 
1.6 
1.6 
2.1 
1.7 
Beye 
15.3 
3.3 
97.0 
4.2 
Yfn 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.4 
Swf 
8.1 
2.3 
8.6 
3.9 
Table 3.26a: Results of hypotheses in the overall domestic fishery on groups of 
dummy variables. (Likelihood ratio test). 
Test 
FuUy 
unrestricted 
model 
Years 
Seasons 
Zone 
Class 
Moonphase 
Log 
Like-
lihood 
-5547.94 
-5578.59 
-5712.03 
-5555.00 
-5569.11 
-5552.88 
No.of 
independent 
restrictions 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Chi 
squares 
31.65 
328.18 
14.12 
42.34 
9.88 
Reject 
YorN? 
1% 5% 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
N Y 
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Table 3.26b: Results of individual coefficient t test hypotheses in the overall 
domestic fishery. 
Variable 
CONSTANT 
PT 
MPl 
MP2 
MP3 
Cll 
C12 
C13 
Zl 
Z2 
Z3 
Ql Q2 
Q3 
Dl 
D2 
D3 
LNST 
LNE 
ABTD 
Coefficient 
1.310* 
0.086** 
0.122* 
-0.003 
0.061 
0.048 
0.274* 
0.394* 
0.054 
-0.185* 
0.005 
0.385* 
0.933* 
0.471* 
0.146* 
0.351* 
0.322* 
0.048*** 
0.502* 
-0.124* 
Standard 
error 
0.23 
0.03 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.04 
0.09 
0.04 
0.07 
0.16 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
0.02 
0.04 
0.01 
t ratio 
5.51 
2.30 
2.66 
-0.08 
1.32 
1.08 
5.55 
3.98 
1.39 
-2.62 
0.37 
7.40 
17.44 
8.24 
2.60 
7.01 
5.88 
1.93 
12.2 
-8.85 
LNST= log of soaktime, LNE= log effort and ABTD is the Absolute Temperature 
Difference term, t significant at 1% level t= 2.57. t significant at 5% level t= 
1.96, *** t significant at 10% level t= 1.64. R2 = 0.169, n = 3860 
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Table 3.27: Tests of hypotheses comparing the northem and southem areas of the 
domestic fishery (Likelihood ratio tests). 
Test Log 
Like-
lihood 
FuUy 
restricted 
Total Fishery 
Years 
Seasons 
Moon Phase 
Vessel 
Classes 
Zones 
Patrolling 
Soaktime 
Temperature 
Difference 
Effort 
Constant 
-5547.94 
-5362.51 
-5456.54 
-5405.58 
-5403.57 
-5392.88 
-5389.92 
-5391.87 
-5377.42 
-5377.28 
-5362.99 
-5362.51 
No. of Chi 
independent squares 
restrictions (X )^ 
Reject 
YorN? 
1% 5% 
19 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
370.86 
182.80 
101.92 
4.02 
21.38 
5.92 
2.01 
31.00 
0.28 
28.86 
0.96 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
N 
278 
Table 3.28a: Coefficients estimates in the comparison of the northem and southem 
domestic fishery after LR tests reported in Table 3.27. 
Variable Coefficient Standard t ratio 
error 
CONSTANT 
PT 
Zl 
Z2 
Z3 
Clls 
CIIN 
C12s 
C12N 
C13s 
C13N 
MPl 
MP2 
MP3 
Dls 
D2s 
D3s 
DIN 
D2N 
D3N 
Qls 
Q2s 
Q3S 
QIN 
Q2N 
Q3N 
LNEs 
LNEN 
ABTD 
LNSTs 
LNSTN 
0.728* 
0.087** 
0.005 
-0.153** 
0.026 
-0.008 
0.129 
-0.047 
0.301* 
0.203 
0.578* 
0.111** 
0.010 
0.044 
0.287* 
0.768* 
0.485* 
0.446* 
-0.827 
0.231* 
0.416* 
0.416* 
0.374* 
-0.124 
0.320** 
-0.190 
0.539* 
0.722* 
-0.085* 
0.094* 
0.203* 
0.242 
0.036 
0.038 
0.068 
0.155 
0.050 
0.083 
0.075 
0.062 
0.106 
0.200 
0.044 
0.044 
0.044 
0.071 
0.064 
0.071 
0.086 
0.705 
0.786 
0.052 
0.074 
0.064 
0.158 
0.144 
0.153 
0.042 
0.046 
0.014 
0.028 
0.046 
3.00 
2.38 
0.14 
-2.23 
0.16 
-0.17 
1.55 
-0.62 
4.80 
1.91 
2.88 
2.54 
0.23 
0.99 
4.05 
11.93 
6.78 
5.16 
-1.17 
2.94 
7.86 
5.57 
5.84 
-0.78 
2.21 
-1.24 
12.57 
15.60 
-5.80 
3.28 
4.35 
LNST= log of soaktime, LNE= log effort and ABTD is the Absolute Temperature 
Difference term. Northem coefficients have the subscript N and souther coefficients 
the subscript § 
* t significant at 1 % level t= 2.57 R^ = 0.245 n=3860 
** t significant at 5% level t= 1.96 
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Table 3.28b: Results of tests of hypotheses on individual variables in the northem 
and southem*domestic fishery comparisons (Table 3.28a). 
Test 
LnSts-LnStN=0 
LnEs-LnE^ = 0 
Clis-CliN=0 
Cl2S-Cl2N=0 
Cl3S-Cl3N=0 
Qis-QiN=o 
Q2S-Q2N =0 
Q3S-Q3N =0 
DlS-DlN =0 
D2S-D2N =0 
D3S-D3N =0 
Coefficient 1 
-0.108** ( 
-0.183* ( 
-0.138 ( 
-0.348* ( 
-0.375*** ( 
0.540* ( 
0.096 ( 
0.565* ( 
-0.158 ( 
0.851* ( 
0.254** ( 
I ratio 
:-1.98) 
;-5.36) 
;-1.42) 
;-3.55) 
;-1.67) 
; 3.22) 
: 0.57) 
:3.35) 
-1.43) 
:9.11) 
: 2.39) 
* t significant at the 1% level, at 5%, and at 10%. 
Table 3.28c: The ranking of the individual coefficients for variables between the 
northem and southem domestic fisheries. The left hand coefficient is highest and 
asterisked if significant. (Source: Tables 3.28 a and b) 
Constant 
Patrolling 
Soak time 
Zones 
Vessel Class 
Multi Purpose 
Trawlers 
Purpose Built 
Moonphase 
n.s.d. 
n.s.d. 
N**>S 
n.s.d. 
N > S 
N * > S 
N >S 
n.s.d. 
Years 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Seasons 
Apr.-June 
July-Sept. 
Oct.-Dec. 
Effort 
Temperature 
term 
N > S 
S*>N 
S**>N 
S*>N 
N > S 
S*>N 
N * > S 
n.s.d. 
n.s.d.= not significantiy different (from LR tests). * t significant at the 1% level-
at 5%, and * at 10%. 
* * 
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Table 3.29a: Results of hypotheses for groups of dummy variables in the northem 
domestic fishery (Likelihood ratio tests). 
Test 
FuUy 
unrestricted 
model 
All dummies 
Years 
Seasons 
Zones 
Moon Phase 
Vessel 
Class 
Log 
Like-
lihood 
-2018.26 
-2097.66 
-2041.80 
-2051.62 
-2019.85 
-2023.86 
-2030.42 
No.of 
independent 
restrictions 
15 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
Chi 
squares 
158.80 
47.08 
66.72 
3.18 
8.02 
21.14 
Reject 
YorN? 
1% 5% 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
N N 
N Y 
Y Y 
Table 3.29b: Results of t tests on individual variables in the northem domestic 
fishery after LR tests for groups of variables. 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t ratio 
CONSTANT 
PT 
MPl 
MP2 
MP3 
Cll 
C12 
C13 
Ql 
Q2 
Q3 
Dl 
D2 
D3 
LNST 
LNE 
ABTD 
0.964 
-0.042 
0.107 
-0.102 
-0.048 
0.067 
0.282* 
0.480** 
-0.140 
0.284 
-0.238 
0.468* 
-0.026 
0.273* 
0.202* 
0.711* 
-0.106* 
0.41 
0.06 
0.07 
0.07 
0.07 
0.08 
0.06 
0.21 
0.17 
0.16 
0.17 
0.09 
0.07 
0.08 
0.04 
0.06 
0.02 
2.36 
-0.63 
1.41 
-1.34 
-0.63 
0.76 
4.23 
2.27 
-0.78 
1.71 
-1.37 
5.07 
-0.34 
3.25 
4.15 
10.92 
-4.37 
^t significant at 1% level t= 2.57 
t significant at 5% level t= 1.96 
R2 = 0.267 n=1412 
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Table 3 30a: Results of hypotheses in the southem area of the domestic fishery of 
tests on groups of dummy variables. (Likelihood ratio test results). 
Test Log 
Like-
lihood 
No. of Chi 
independent squares 
restrictions (X^) 
Reject 
YorN? 
1% 5% 
FuUy 
unrestricted 
model 
All dummies 
Years 
Seasons 
Zones 
Moon Phase 
Class 
-3331.51 
-3464.67 
-3416.52 
-3362.62 
-3343.21 
-3336.99 
-3339.36 
15 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
266.32 
170.00 
62.22 
5.4 
5.86 
4.74 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
Table 3.30b: Results of t tests in the southem area of the domestic fishery for 
individual variables. 
Variable Coefficient Standard t ratio 
error 
CONSTAT 
PT 
Ql 
Q2 
Q3 
Dl 
D2 
D3 
LNST 
LNE 
ABTD 
^T 0.756 
0.150* 
0.407* 
0.382* 
0.365* 
0.285* 
0.766* 
0.488* 
0.080* 
0.535* 
-0.068* 
0.29 
0.04 
0.05 
0.07 
0.06 
0.06 
0.06 
0.06 
0.02 
0.05 
0.01 
2.57 
3.50 
7.82 
5.17 
5.80 
4.15 
12.22 
7.06 
2.88 
10.59 
-3.65 
* * 
t significant at 1 % level t= 2.57 R2 = 0.138 n = 2448 
t significant at 5% level t= 1.96 
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Table 3.31a: Estimated coefficients of the models for the northem and southem 
areas of the domestic fishery for the period 1987-1990. (t ratios in parenthesis). 
Variable North South 
Constant 
(LnA) 
Patrol 
Mpi,New 
Mp2, First 
Mp3, FuU 
Ql,Multi 
Purpose 
02, Trawlers 
03, Purpose 
BuiU 
Season 1 
Season 2 
Season 3 
Year 1,1988 
Year 2, 1989 
Year 3, 1990 
LnSt 
Ln Effort 
ABTD 
0.874** 
(2.28) 
n/a 
0.107 
(1.42) 
-0.104 
(-1.36) 
-0.047 
(-0.62) 
0.077 
(0.89) 
0.285* 
(4.28) 
0.498** 
(2.37) 
-0.141 
(-0.79) 
0.285*** 
(1.74) 
-0.235 
(-1.36) 
0.464* 
(5.04) 
-0.036 
(-0.47) 
0.263* 
(3.19) 
0.201* 
(4.12) 
0.724* 
(11.65) 
-0.106* 
(-4.39) 
0.756* 
(2.57) 
0.151* 
(3.50) 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
0.407* 
(7.83) 
0.382* 
(5.17) 
0.365* 
(5.80) 
0.285* 
(4.16) 
0.766* 
(12.22) 
0.488* 
(7.06) 
0.08* 
(2.88) 
0.535* 
(10.59) 
-0.068* 
(-3.65) 
^ t significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, *** aUhe 10% level 
R2N = 0.267, nN=1412, R2S = 0.138 ns=2448. 
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Table 3.31b: Results of t tests of individual coefficients in the northem domestic 
fishery. 
Xest Coefficient t ratio 
ai-ci2=o 
Cl2-Cl3=0 
ai-ci3=o 
Mpi-Mp2=0 
Mpi-Mp3=0 
Mp2-Mp3=0 
Qi-Q2=0 
Q1-Q3 =0 
Q2-Q3 =0 
Di-D2=0 
D1-D3 =0 
D2-D3 =0 
-0.208** 
-0.212 
-0.421*** 
0.211* 
0.154** 
-0.056 
-0.426* 
-0.094 
0.52* 
0.449* 
0.201** 
-0.299* 
(-2.18) 
(-1.00) 
(-1.89) 
(2.71) 
( 1.96) 
(-0.70) 
(-4.49) 
(0.87) 
(7.44) 
(5.96) 
(2.18) 
(-4.13) 
t significant at 1% level t= 2.57, t significant at 5% level t= 1.96, 
t significant at 10% level t= 1.64 
Table 3.31c: Results of t tests for individual coefficients in the southem domestic 
fishery. 
Test 
Q1-Q2 =0 
Q1-Q3 =0 
Q2-Q3 =0 
D1-D2 =0 
D1-D3 =0 
D2-D3 =0 
Coefficient 
0.025 
0.042 
0.017 
-0.481* 
-0.203* 
0.278* 
t ratio 
(0.396) 
(0.787) 
(0.240) 
(-9.42) 
(-3.51) 
(5.45) 
* J significant at 1% level t= 2.57 (2 tailed) 
t significant at 5% level t= 1.96 
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Table 3.31d: The percentage shift in the estimated domestic Yellowfin tuna 
production function for significant dummy variables relative to the base case, ceteris 
paribus, in the northem and southem fishery estimations of Table 3.31a. 
Dummy variable 
Patrolling 
Trawlers 
Purpose Built 
vessels 
Season 1 
Season 2 
Season 3 
Yearl 
Year 2 
Year3 
North 
-
33.0 % 
64.5 % 
-
-
-
59.0 % 
-
30.0 % 
South 
16.3 % 
-
-
50.0 % 
46.5 % 
44.0% 
33.0 % 
115.1 % 
62.9 % 
n.b.: As In h = InA -i- 4>Pt ( Pt is the Patrolling dummy), then e^ nh = g (In^ + <t>Pt), and 
h = A e't'Pt. Thus the % shift of the function, relative to the base case when the 
dummy variable is zero, is (Ae'1'Pt-A)/A * 100 = (e<t'Pt-l) * 100. 
Table 3.32: The ranked dummy variable results for northem and southem domestic 
fishery estimations. Results are ranked with highest value to the left. 
Years 
North 1988*, 1990*, 1987,1989 (Table3.31a,b) 
South 1989*, 1990*,1988*, 1987 (Table 3.31 a,c) 
Seasons 
North 2*,1,3,0, (Table 3.31 a,b) 
South 1,3,2,0 (Table3.31a,c) 
Vessel 
Class North PB,TR**,MP,PL (Table3.31a,b) 
Moonphase 
North New,Last,Full,First (Table 3.31 a,b) 
note: (New**> Full, New >First) 
South No moonphase variables in final model form 
If in bold font, the value is significantiy different from zero at the 5% level of 
significance. The asterisk means the value is greater than the next value to the right at 
1%, *5%, or *** 10% levels of significance. 
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Table 4.1: The retums of the surveys distributed to the domestic east coast tuna 
longhne fishers. 
Number of endorsed 
Vessels 
Number of active 
vessels in 1989/1990 
tax year 
Fishermen contacted 
Surveys sent 
Surveys retumed 
North/ 
Queensland 
42 
5 
5 
4 
0 
Northern 
NSW 
34 
33 
33 
22 
9 
Southem 
NSW 
89 
64 
64 
47 
13 
Total 
170 
102 
102 
73 
22 
Table 4.2: The numbers, characteristics and activity of domestic vessels samnled (source: the survey's Fishing Record). ^ 
Vessel Type 
Number of 
Vessels 
Length 
Vessel Age 
(Years) 
Days 
longlining 
Days other 
Total days 
fished 
Ratio of tuna to 
non-tuna fishing days 
Planing Multi- Trawlers 
longliners(PL) Purpose(MP) (T) 
11 
13.8 
8.5 
31.6 
42.5 
74.1 
1.3 
7 
11.5 
17.3 
22.9 
74.1 
96.9 
3.1 
3 
15.9 
23.7 
21 
71 
92 
3.3 
It was not possible to establish to which group the unidentified vessels belonged. 
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Table 4.3: The survey coverage of different vessel classes in the domestic fisherv 
Source: Derived from the domestic logbook database, Australian Fisheri^ 
Management Authority. iMicnes 
YEAR Planing 
1989-90 Longliners 
Sample by vessel numbers 
No of Vessels 
No. Surveyed 
% Coverage of class** 
Coverage as % of total 
Sample by trips 
Trips per vessel 
Surveyed trips 
% Coverage of class** 
Coverage as % of total 
Sample by effort in '00 hooks 
Vessels '00 hooks 
Surveyed '00 hooks 
% Coverage of class** 
Coverage as % of total 
(PL) 
35 
11 
31 
11 
1026 
320 
31 
17 
3288 
936 
28 
16 
Sample by Total Catch (tonnes) 
Weight,all species 
Surveyed all species 
% Coverage of class** 
Coverage as % of total 
261 
71 
27 
15 
Multi Trawlers 
Purpose 
(MP) 
17 
7 
41 
7 
247 
101 
41 
5 
647 
285 
44 
5 
50 
24 
48 
5 
(T) 
8 
3 
38 
3 
104 
63 
61 
3 
234 
166 
71 
3 
21 
14 
67 
3 
Others 
37 
0 
0 
0 
417 
0 
0 
0 
1208 
0 
0 
0 
110 
0 
0 
Totals 
102 
21 
21 
1893 
484 
26 
5801 
1387 
24 
464 
109 
0 
23 
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Table 4.4: Accounting profit results for the domestic vessels in the Australian east 
coast tuna longline fishery survey for the 1989-90 tax year. The results are displayed 
in three vessel categories and are weighted means. Median values are also shown for 
comparison. 
Vessel Type 
Number of vessels n= 
RECEIPTS 
Income from tuna 
Income other fish 
Fish revenue 
Fish rev. net of marketing exp 
Other vessel income 
Total receipts 
Total net receipts ($) 
% Income from Tuna 
Net income from tuna 
BOAT EXPENSES ($) 
Administration 
Repairs and Maintenance 
Gear replacement and repair 
Fuel,oil and grease 
Payment to crew (inc skipper) 
Insurance 
Depreciation (dep.) 
Interest (int.) 
Licence fees,rates and taxes 
Bait 
Marketing expenses * 
Other boat expenses 
Annual cost (cash-i-int-i-dep)($) 
Accounting Profit (loss) ($) 
Capital value of boat ($) 
Mean vessels 
PL 
11 
54709 
63476 
118184 
110955 
898 
119082 
111852 
45 
50281 
3657 
11017 
6996 
14520 
36364 
3871 
20166 
11950 
5170 
5501 
15716 
1 134929 
-23077 
183636 
Accounting retum to Capital(%) -12.6 
Interest as a % of Annual cost 8.9 
Vessels in -i-ve a/c profit 2/11 
MP 
7 
41894 
53667 
95562 
77925 
818 
T 
3 
25445 
73501 
98946 
80641 
4588 
96380 103534 
78724 
42 
33267 
2118 
5080 
7216 
6958 
26449 
2429 
8685 
7542 
4065 
3379 
5857 
79778 
-1054 
89633 
-1.2 
9.5 
4/7 
85229 
24 
20768 
4208 
11641 
4539 
11571 
30175 
2195 
10321 
2143 
4439 
1836 
2911 
85978 
-748 
163333 
-0.5 
2 5 
1/3 
Median vessels 
PL 
41583 
106025 
147608 
147608 
0 
147608 
147608 
28 
41583 
3441 
393 
8688 
34918 
51413 
8042 
20000 
17337 
4068 
1500 
30728 
180528 
-32920 
250000 
-11.0 
MP 
12687 
16000 
28687 
28687 
0 
28687 
28687 
44 
12687 
0 
1500 
5018 
3800 
11500 
0 
0 
0 
3000 
300 
0 
0 
25118 
3569-
80000 
4.5 
T 
5516 
48420 
53936 
43156 
0 
53936 
43156 
10 
4414 
1665 
3902 
4118 
7237 
29564 
0 
2008 
0 
3803 
895 
10780 
510 
53702 
10546 
90000 
-11.7 
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Table 4.5: A vertical size statement displaying costs as a percentage of total 
accounting cost. Total cost is net of marketing expenses. 
BOAT EXPENSES 
Administration 
Repairs and Maintenance 
Gear replacement and repair 
Fuel,oil and grease 
Payment to crew (inc skipper) 
Insurance 
Depreciation 
Interest 
Licence fees, rates and taxes 
Bait 
Marketing expenses * 
Other boat expenses 
Annual cost (cash-i-int-i- dep.) 
PL 
2.7 
8.2 
5.2 
10.8 
27.0 
2.9 
14.9 
8.9 
3.8 
4.1 
0.0 
11.6 
MP T 
2.7 4.9 
6.4 13.5 
9.0 5.3 
8.7 13.5 
33.2 35.1 
3.0 2.6 
10.9 12.0 
9.5 2.5 
5.1 5.2 
4.2 2.1 
0.0 0.0 
7.3 3.4 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 4.6: The economic costs and profit for each of the three vessel classes and their 
respective medians. 
Vessel Type 
Economic Profit 
Total net receipts 
Mean vessels 
PL MP 
Median vessels 
PL MP 
111852 78724 85229 147608 28687 43156 
Annual cost less int.&fees 120479 69736 81335 36310 25118 53702 
0pp. Cost: Capital & labour 25488 26235 25136 54470 23620 12536 
Adjusted depreciation -14121 -3572 -5338 -2301 2052 300 
Total Economic Cost 131846 93334 101694 88479 50790 66538 
Economic Profit -19994 -14610 -16465 -55075 -22103 -23382 
Economic Rate of Retum % -10.8 -16.3 -10.1 -22.0 -27.6 -26.0 
Capital value of boat 183636 89633 163333 250000 80000 90000 
Table 4.7: The economic rates of retum for the east coast tuna longhne fishery when 
compiled on an all equity basis (Battagelene and Campbell, 1992). 
Vessel Type Planing Multi 
Longliner Purpose 
Trawlers 
Retum to full 
equity ($) 
Retum to full 
equity* as % 
1808.94 -5098.63 
-5.7 
3919.54 
2.4 
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Table 4.8: The economic variable and fixed costs for each vessel for all fishing 
activities. 
Variable cost of fishing 
Total Revenue net 
Weighted Means 
PL MP T 
111852 78724 85229 
Variable Costs 
Gear replacement and repair 
Fuel,oil and grease 
Payment to crew (inc skipper) 
Bait 
Other boat expenses 
Total Variable Costs (TVC) 
TVC as % of Total Costs 
Total Fixed Costs (TEC) 
TEC as % of Total Costs 
3498 
14520 
36364 
5501 
5238 
65122 
49 
66724 
51 
3608 
6958 
26449 
3379 
1952 
42346 
45 
50988 
55 
2269 
11571 
30175 
1836 
970 
46822 
46 
54873 
54 
Table 4.9: The variable and fixed costs for tuna and non-tuna fishing. 
Variable costs 
Gear replacement and repair 
Fuel,oil and grease 
Payment to crew (inc skipper) 
Bait 
Other boat expenses 
Total Variable Costs 
Total Fixed costs 
Total Economic cost 
TUNA FISHING 
PL MP T 
1491 851 518 
7031 3440 1626 
15497 6237 6888 
4401 2703 1836 
2232 460 221 
30652 13691 11089 
28435 12023 12526 
59087 25714 23615 
NON -TUNA FISHING 
PL MP T 
2007 2757 1751 
7489 3518 9945 
20867 20213 23287 
1100 676 0 
3006 1492 749 
34470 28656 35733 
38289 38965 42347 
72759 67620 78079 
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Table 4.10: The economic cost, variable cost and income per day tuna and non-tuna 
fishing for domestic vessels in the east coast tuna fishery. 
ANNUAL RESULTS 
Income ($) 
Economic cost ($) 
Economic profit ($) 
Ec. rate of retum(%) 
DAILY RESULTS ($) 
Tuna income /day 
Economic cost/day 
Variable cost/day 
Fixed cost /day 
Margin per day 
FISHING DAYS 
Days fished 
Total days for class 
Days fished as % of 
Total days 
Capital attributable to 
fishing method ($) 
TUNA FISHING 
PL 
50281 
59087 
-8806 
-11.3 
1592 
1871 
971 
900 
622 
32 
74 
43 
78258 
MP 
33267 
25714 
7553 
35.7 
1455 
1125 
599 
526 
856 
23 
97 
24 
21136 
T 
20768 
23615 
-2847 
-7.6 
989 
1125 
528 
597 
461 
21 
92 
23 
37284 
NON TUNA FISHING 
PL 
61571 
72759 
-11188 
-10.6 
1448 
1711 
811 
900 
637 
43 
74 
57 
105378 
MP 
45457 
67620 
-22163 • 
-32.4 
614 
913 
387 
526 
227 
74 
97 
76 
68497 
T 
64462 
78079 
-13618 
-10.8 
908 
1100 
503 
597 
405 
71 
92 
77 
126049 
Table 4.11: The estimated average price of tuna for each vessel class. The ratio of 
domestic to export sales and the approximate marketing costs as a percentage of 
economic costs are also shown. 
Vessel Type Planing Multi Trawlers 
Longliner Purpose 
Ratio of tuna sales 
domestic:Export 
Vessels sampled 
Marketing costs 
as % of economic cost 
76:24 
5/11 
13.3 
70:30 
6/7 
21.3 
90:10 
3/3 
16.1 
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Table 4.12: The economic cost of effort for domestic vessels in the east coast tuna 
fishery in the 1988-89 financial year. 
Vessel Type Planing Multi Trawlers 
Longliner Purpose 
Economic Cost per 
Effort in hooks 
Average number of 
hooks per day 
Economic cost 
day A$ 1871.39 
9425.6 
273.5 
1124.99 
6814.0 
298.5 
1124.52 
5550.0 
278.6 
per hundred hooks A$ 684.3 376.9 403.6 
Weighted average cost/ '00 hooks A$ 564.0 
Table 4.13a: The relative costs for three classes of Japanese tuna vessels in the 299-
314 GRT size range working in intemational tuna fisheries: (a) Bigeye and Yellowfin 
fishery [Eastem Australia / Pacific], (b) the SBT fishery [S.Australia /N.Zealand 
/S.Africa], (c) Atiantic fishery. Source: Taya,(1989). 
Cost (a) (b) (c) 
204 147 
121 153 
307 295 
69 41 
45 40 
42 65 
96 84 
32 30 
68 71 
38 36 
Fuel 
Others 
Crew wage 
Others 
Repair 
Others 
Depreciation 
Fees 
Interest 
payments 
General 
management 
217 
99 
304 
75 
48 
30 
96 
29 
62 
40 
Total costs 1000 1022 960 
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Table 4.13b: Calculation of Adjustment Factors from Table 4.13a.(above). The 
adjustment factor is the total cost less depreciation, fees and interest as a proportion 
of mean of the three different vessels. Source of data Taya, (1989). 
Total costs 
Less depreciation, 
Fees and Interest 
Mean= 
Adjustment Factor 
Tropical 
Bigeye and 
Yellowfin 
1000 
813 
1.0095 
S.B.T 
1022 
826 
1.0257 
Atlantic 
fishery 
962 
777 
0.9648 
805.3 
Table 4.14 : A summary of the Economic Profit (Loss) for average Japanese longline 
mna fishing vessel for the financial years 1979-80 to 1988-89. The Retum to Capital 
is by method (A) (Campbell and NichoU, 1991). 
Financial years 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 1983-84 
GRT 
100-200 2,371 (34,190) (53,338) (40,889) (38,925) 
200-500 20,513 (33,307) (52,729) (33,948) (32,027) 
Financial years 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 
GRT 
100-200 (36,921) (-302) (7,516) (316) (18,735) 
200-500 (11,973) (-369) 1,895 7,011 13,329 
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Table 4.15a : Total Costs per year for the average Japanese longline vessel over the 
period 1984-1989. Retums to Capital (A) are used for both classes of vessels 100-
200 GRT and 200-500 GRT (After Campbell and NichoU, 1991). 
84/85 85/86 
932 722 
1312 1036 
(Yen '000) 
84/85 85/86 
932 722 
1312 1036 
86/87 
624 
1109 
86/87 
684 
1109 
87/88 
633 
997 
87/88 
670 
997 
88/89 
557 
1017 
88/89 
654 
1017 
Total economic 
cost for a financial year (Yen '000) 
financial year 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 
(GRT) 100-200 252,806 340,058 263,446 227,847 231,067 203,406 
(GRT) 200-500 418,845 478,896 378,291 404,837 363,811 371,263 
Total economic cost per day of owning operating 
average vessel: (Yen '000) 
financial year 83/84 
(GRT) 100-200 693 
(GRT) 200-500 1148 
Total economic cost per fishing day 
financial year 83/84 
(GRT) 100-200 698 
(GRT) 200-500 1148 
Total economic cost for a fishing day (Yen '000) 
Calendar year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
(GRT) 100-200 815 827 703 677 662 654 
(GRT) 200-500 1230 1174 1073 1053 1007 1017 
Table 4.15b: The cost of a fishing day and the cost of fishing effort (nominal and 
real) for the east Australian tuna longline fishery. 
Total economic cost for a fishing day 
Calendar year 1984 1985 
(GRT) 100-200 815 827 
(GRT) 200-500 1230 1174 
Average no. of hooks /day 
(GRT) 100-200 2535 2729 
(GRT) 200-500 2739 2833 
(Yen '000) 
1986 
703 
1073 
2813 
2852 
1987 
677 
1053 
2843 
2887 
1988 
662 
1007 
2788 
2889 
1989 
654 
1017 
2909 
2953 
Nominal Cost of Effort 
per '000 hooks 
(GRT) 100-200 
(GRT) 200-500 
Real Cost of Effort 
per '000 hooks 
(GRT) 100-200 
(GRT) 200-500 
* Note: Calendar year 
321 
449 
318 
445 
Japanese Wholesale Price Index (WPI) 
303 
414 
303 
414 
1984 
1.01 
(Yen '000) 
250 238 
376 365 
(Yen '000) 
275 272 
414 417 
1985 1986 1987 
1 0.909 0.875 
237 
348 
274 
402 
1988 
0.866 
225 
344 
253 
388 
1989 
0.888 
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Table 4.16 : The Total Variable Costs per annum and the Variable Cost of fishing 
effort for the 1984-1990 period (nominal and real) in the east Australian tuna longline 
fishery. 
Nominal 
TVC per annum 
financial year 
(GRT) 100-200 
(GRT) 200-500 
TVC per fishing day 
financial year 
(GRT) 100-200 
(Yen '000) 
83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 87/88 88/89 
239,642 289,682 253,283 199,408 202,776 174,786 
329,376 404,133 429,902 364,353 362,396 320,095 
(Yen '000) 
83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87 
657 794 694 599 
902 1107 1178 998 
87/88 88/89 
588 562 
993 877 
TVC per fishing day 
Calendar year 
(GRT) 100-200 
Average no. of hooks /day 
(GRT) 100-200 
(GRT) 200-500 
(Yen '000) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 
725 744 646 593 
1143 1088 996 935 
2535 2729 2813 2843 
2739 2833 2852 2887 
1988 1989 
575 562 
890 902 
2788 2909 
2889 2953 
TVC of Effort (nominal) 
(GRT) 100-200 286 
(GRT) 200-500 417 
(Yen '000) per '000 hooks 
273 230 209 206 193 
384 349 324 308 306 
TVC of Effort (real) 
(GRT) 100-200 
(GRT) 200-500 
(Yen '000) per '000 hooks 
283 273 253 238 238 218 
413 384 384 370 356 344 
Table 4.17a: The economic cost of effort for the different classes of domestic vessels 
in the year 1988-89. 
Australian Vessels Planing Multi- Trawler Weighted 
Longhner Purpose Average 
Economic cost /'OO hooks 
In Australian Dollars 684 
In Japanese Yen 74,864 
376 
41,231 
403 
44,162 
563 
61,704 
Exchange rate:- Exchange Rate 109.4 Y = 1 A$ (ABARE, 1991). 
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Table 4.17b: The economic cost of effort for Japanese vessels in the year 1988-89. 
Japanese Vessels 100-200 GRT 200-500 GRT Weighted 
Average 
Economic cost /'OOO hooks 
In Japanese Yen 224,800 344,500 301,554 
Economic cost /'OO hooks 
In Japanese Yen 22,480 34,450 30,155 
Table 4.17c: The relative economic cost of effort for domestic and Japanese vessels 
in the year 1988-89 for AustraUan and Japanese vessels as a group. Effort is in 
hundred hooks. (W.A.C. is the weighted average cost of effort). 
Cost in Yen Cost Ratio 
W. A.C.of Effort - Australian 61,704 2.05 
W.A.C.ofEffort- Japanese 30,155 1.00 
Exchange rate:- Exchange Rate 109.4 Y = 1 A$ (ABARE, 1991). 
Table 4.17d: A comparison of the relative economic cost of effort for classes of 
domestic vessel relative to the costs of smaller Japanese vessels in the year 1988-89. 
Economic cost /'OO hooks 
Australian Vessels Planing Multi- Trawler Weighted 
Longliner Purpose Average 
In Japanese Yen 74,864 41,231 44,162 61,704 
Cost of small Japanese vessels effort 22,480 Yen per '00 hooks. 
Relative cost ratio* 
for each class 3.3 1.83 1.96 2.75 
*defined as cost of effort of Australian vessels/ cost of effort of Japanese vessel. 
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Table 5.1a: The results of the hypothesis Average Revenue effort equals zero 
(ARe=0), for the representative Japanese vessel in the overall fishery in the 1984-
1989 period. Estimates are in thousand Yen per thousand hooks. 
Season Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
coef. 
t 
n 
352.13* 
(34.58) 
157 
292.37* 
(43.72) 
366 
317.32* 
(62.63) 
6i2 
338.00* 
(32.51) 
149 
t ratios in parenthesis significant at the 1% level, n = number of observations. 
Table 5.1b: The results of the hypothesis Marginal Revenue effort equals zero 
(MRe=0), for the representative Japanese vessel in the overall fishery in the 1984-
1989 period. Estimates are in thousand Yen per thousand hooks. 
Season Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
coef. 
t 
n 
341.73* 
(30.74) 
757 
281.97* 
(30.43) 
366 
306.92* 
(41.69) 
632 
327.31* 
(27.31) 
149 
t ratios in parenthesis significant at the 1% level, n = number of observations. 
Table 5.1c: The results of the t tests for the hypothesis Average Revenue effort less 
Marginal Revenue effort equals zero (ARe-MRe=0), for the representative Japanese 
vessel in the overall fishery in the 1984-1989 period. Estimates are in thousand Yen 
per thousand hooks. 
Season Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
3.45 3.49 10.47 3.41 
t-test critical values are 2.57 at the 1% level of significance and 1.96 at the 5% level 
of significance. 
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Table 5.2a: The results of the hypothesis Average Revenue effort equals zero 
(ARe=0), for the representative Japanese vessel in the overall fishery. Estimates are 
in thousand Yen per thousand hooks. 
Season Ql Q2 Q3 Q 4 
Year 
1984 311.32* 253.36* 277.78" 299.64^ 
t (23.07) (23.54) (29.03) (23.95) 
1985 371.89* 313.94* 338.35* 360.22* 
t (28.63) (29.41) (35.01) (27.75) 
1986 362.74* 304.78* 329.20* 351.07* 
t (25.12) (25.89) (29.27) (23.78) 
1987 395.96* 317.55* 341.96* 363.83* 
t (29.22) (31.30) (36.41) (29.27) 
1988 375.50* 317.55* 341.96* 363.83* 
t (33.64) (35.22) (42.61) (30.15) 
1989 313.67* 255.72* 280.13* 302.00* 
t (27.22) (28.50) (35.65) (24.80) 
t ratios in parenthesis significant at the 1% level. 
Table 5.2b: The results of the hypothesis Marginal Revenue effort equals zero 
(MRe=0), for the representative Japanese vessel in the overall fishery. Estimates are 
in thousand Yen per thousand hooks. 
Season 
Year 
1984 
t 
1985 
t 
1986 
t 
1987 
t 
1988 
t 
1989 
t 
Ql 
299.95* 
(20.79) 
360.53* 
(26.34) 
351.31* 
(23.66) 
384.59* 
(26.96) 
361.14* 
(30.35) 
302.31* 
(24.67) 
Q2 
242.00* 
(19.04) 
302.57* 
(24.51) 
293.42* 
(22.47) 
326.64* 
(26.12) 
306.18* 
(27.89) 
244.35* 
(22.46) 
Q3 
266.42* 
(23.19) 
326.99* 
(29.85) 
317.84* 
(26.27) 
351.05* 
(31.16) 
330.60* 
(34.54) 
268.77* 
(28.71) 
Q4 
288.28* 
(20.61) 
348.85* 
(24.64) 
339.70* 
(21.76) 
372.92* 
(26.01) 
352.47* 
(26.41) 
290.63* 
(21.69) 
t ratios in parenthesis significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5.3a: The resuUs of the hypothesis Average Revenue effort equals zero 
(ARe=0), for the representative 100-200 and 200-500 GRT Japanese vessels in the 
northem and southem fishery. Estimates are in thousand Yen per thousand hooks. 
Season 
North 
smaU 
coef. 
t 
n 
large 
coef. 
t 
n 
South 
small 
coef. 
t 
n 
large 
coef. 
t 
n 
Ql 
396.63* 
(10.89) 
27 
398.78* 
(29.09) 
722 
271.99* 
(8.17) 
5 
216.59* 
(14.72) 
49 
Q2 
387.63* 
(6.13) 
7 
327.34* 
(8.58) 
75 
265.6* 
(35.96) 
97 
271.63* 
(42.56) 
259 
Q3 
375.32* 
(15.34) 
48 
360.59* 
(36.58) 
257 
269.1* 
(42.49) 
135 
299.78* 
(61.10) 
441 
Q4 
307.09* 
(8.33) 
22 
387.29* 
(27.61) 
770 
258.88* 
(7.04) 
4 
278.23* 
(17.56) 
43 
t ratios in parenthesis * significant at the 1% level, n = number of observations. 
Table 5.3b: The results of the t tests of the hypothesis Average Revenue effort in the 
north equals the Average Revenue of effort in the south (ARe^- AReg =0 ), for the 
representative 100-200 and 200-500 GRT Japanese vessels in the northem and 
southem fishery. Estimates are in thousand Yen per thousand hooks. 
Season Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
smaU 
t 6.97 18.41 46.47 2.41 
large 
t 76.93 19.68 106.77 41.67 
t-test critical values are 2.57 at the 1% level of significance and 1.96 at the 5% level 
of significance. 
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Table 5.4a: The results of the hypothesis Average Revenue effort equals zero 
(ARe=0), for the representative 100-200 and 200-500 GRT Japanese vessels in the 
northem fishery. Estimates are in thousand Yen per thousand hooks. 
Quarter ZO 
North small vessels 
QO 
Ql 
Q2 
Q3 
North 
QO 
Ql 
Q2 
Q3 
all 
t 
all 
t 
all 
t 
all 
t 
320.88 
(7.89) 
329.07* 
(5.45) 
287.44* 
(7.82) 
291.42* 
(7.83) 
large vessels 
all 
t 
all 
t 
all 
t 
all 
t 
386.29* 
(22.91) 
384.24* 
(11.57) 
366.06* 
(23.04) 1 
399.15* 
(24.61) 
Zl Z2 
* 378.14* 404.01 
(11.23) (12.61) 
'' 386.33* 412.2* 
(6.29) (6.94) 
344.7* 370.57* 
(10.7) (13.07) 
348.68* 374.55* 
(10.41) (11.69) 
373.04* 369.87* 
(27.90) (28.85) 
370.99* 367.83* 
(11.21) (11.22) 
352.81* 349.64* 
(27.67) (28.99) 
385.91* 382.74* 
(27.47) (28.12) 
Z3 Z4 
* 392.00* 400.52' 
(12.20) (11.19) 
400.19* 408.71* 
(6.60) (6.85) 
358.56* 367.08* 
(12.77) (10.96) 
365.54* 371.06* 
(10.89) (9.72) 
364.1* 369.44* 
(27.03) (25.32) 
362.05* 367.39* 
(11.13) (11.04) 
343.87* 349.21* 
(27.82) (28.05) 
376.97* 382.3* 
(26.16) (24.65) 
Z5 
' 294.47* 
(3.53) 
302.66* 
(3.30) 
261.03* 
(3.19) 
265.01* 
(3.17) 
262.83* 
(5.29) 
0 
0 
242.61* 
(4.89) 
275.7* 
(5.46) 
t ratios in parenthesis * significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5.4b: The results of the hypothesis Average Revenue effort equals zero 
(ARe=0), for the representative 100-200 and 200-500 GRT Japanese vessels in the 
southem fishery. Estimates are in thousand Yen per thousand hooks. 
Quarter 
South 
QO 
Ql 
Q2 
Q3 
South 
QO 
Ql 
Q2 
Q3 
ZO 
small vessels 
all 
t 
all 
t 
all 
t 
all 
t 
0 
0 
238.84* 
(19.06) 
251.06* 
(21.19) 
0 
0 
large vessels 
all 
t 
all 
t 
all 
t 
all 
t 
213.59* 
(16.12) 
259.46* 
(33.83) 
292.76* 
(39.03) 
282.76* 
(19.16) 
Zl 
245.05* 
(6.74) 
229.86* 
(20.80) 
242.09* 
(25.27) 
244.1* 
(8.72) 
211.49* 
(16.68) 
211.49* 
(28.77) 
290.67* 
(45.14) 
280.66* 
(20.28) 
Z2 
257.68* 
(7.08) 
242.49* 
(20.99) 
254.72* 
(27.51) 
257.04* 
(9.16) 
189.11* 
(14.69) 
189.11* 
(22.62) 
268.3* 
(38.94) 
258.28* 
(18.39) 
Z3 
257.59* 
(7.10) 
242.4* 
(23.22) 
254.63* 
(28.29) 
256.95* 
(9.27) 
201.48* 
(15.50) 
201.48* 
(26.03) 
280.66* 
(43.45) 
270.65* 
(19.30) 
Z4 
255.31* 
(7.23) 
240.13* 
(28.42) 
252.35* 
(31.43) 
254.67* 
(9.17) 
200.57* 
(16.25) 
200.57* 
(31.69) 
279.76* 
(50.87) 
269.75* 
(19.97) 
Z5 
0 
0 
282.92* 
(25.31) 
295.14* 
(24.03) 
297.46* 
(10.09) 
220.7* 
(14.83) 
220.7* 
(23.23) 
299.89* 
(30.54) 
289.87* 
(18.42) 
t ratios in parenthesis significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5 4c- The results of the t tests of the hypothesis Average Revenue effort in 
each zone is equal to the the Average Revenue in the adjacent zone (ARezQ- ARe^j 
=0 ) for the representative 100-200 and 200-500 GRT Japanese vessels in the 
northem fishery. Estimates are in thousand Yen per thousand hooks. 
Quarter ZO-Zl Z1-Z2 Z2-Z3 Z3-Z4 Z4-Z5 
North small 
QO t -2.85 -2.05 1.01 -0.64 2.84 
Ql t -0.82 -0.36 0.17 -0.12 1.54 
Q2 t -4.15 -2.56 1.49 -0.87 3.65 
Q3 t -4.21 -2.09 0.67 -0.30 2.57 
Large 
QO t 4.38 1.58 2.79 -2.09 11.67 
Ql t 0.65 0.14 0.32 -0.27 na 
Q2 t 5.41 1.80 3.50 -3.31 16.31 
Q3 t 8.40 2.60 4.69 -3.81 19.09 
t-test critical values are 2.57 at the 1% level of significance and 1.96 at the 5% level 
of significance, na means not applicable due to a zero observation or low numbers of 
observations in the t test. 
Table 5.4d: The results of t tests of the hypothesis Average Revenue effort in each 
zone is equal to the the Average Revenue in the adjacent zone (ARe^O" ARezi =0) 
for the representative 100-200 and 200-500 GRT Japanese vessels in the southem 
fishery. Estimates are in thousand Yen per thousand hooks. 
ZO-Zl Z1-Z2 Z2-Z3 Z3-Z4 Z4-Z5 
South small vessels 
QO t 
Ql t 
Q2 t 
Q3 t 
Large 
QO t 
na 
2.72 
3.00 
na 
0.48 
na 
-3.32 
-5.59 
na 
5.87 
na 
0.03 
0.06 
na 
-2.82 
0.06 
1.21 
1.78 
na 
0.22 
na 
-25.11 
-20.19 
na 
-2.62 
Ql t 47.94 15.74 -7.90 0.98 -20.99 
Q2 t 2.79 35.14 -19.94 1.78 -22.46 
Q3 t 0.20 4.95 -2.60 0.20 -2.91 
t-test critical values are 2.57 at the 1% level of significance and 1.96 at the 5% level 
of significance, na means not applicable due to a zero observation or low numbers of 
observations in the t test. 
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Table 5.5a: The results of the hypothesis Marginal Revenue effort less the Marginal 
Cost of effort equals zero (MRe-MCe=0), for the representative Japanese vessel in 
the overall fishery. Estimates are in thousand Yen per thousand hooks. 
Year 
1984 
t 
1985 
t 
1986 
t 
1987 
t 
1988 
t 
1989 
t 
Ql 
-135.45* 
(-23.07) 
-38.07* 
(-28.63) 
-3.89* 
(-25.12) 
46.29* 
(29.22) 
38.14* 
(33.64) 
-18.79* 
(-27.22) 
Q2 
-193.4* 
(-23.54) 
-96.03* 
(-29.41) 
-61.78* 
(-25.89) 
-11.66* 
(-31.30) 
-16.82* 
(-35.22) 
-76.75* 
(-28.50) 
Q3 
-168.98* 
(-29.03) 
-71.61* 
(-35.01) 
-37.36* 
(-29.27) 
12.75* 
(36.41) 
7.60* 
(42.61) 
-52.33* 
(-35.65) 
Q4 
-147.12* 
(-23.95) 
-49.75* 
(-27.75) 
-15.5* 
(-23.78) 
34.62* 
(29.27) 
29.47* 
(30.15) 
-30.47* 
(-24.80) 
4-
t ratios in parenthesis significant at the 1% level. 
Table 5.5b: The results of the hypothesis Average Revenue effort less the Average 
Cost of effort equals zero (ARe-ACe=0), for the representative Japanese vessel in the 
overall fishery. Estimates are in thousand Yen per thousand hooks. 
Year Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
1984 
t 
1985 
t 
1986 
t 
1987 
t 
1988 
t 
1989 
t 
-124.08* 
(-23.07) 
-26.71* 
(-28.63) 
7.54* 
(25.12) 
57.66* 
(29.22) 
52.50* 
(33.64) 
-7.43* 
(-27.22) 
-182.04* 
(-23.54) 
-84.66* 
(-29.41) 
-50.42* 
(-25.89) 
-20.75* 
(-31.30) 
-5.45* 
(-35.22) 
-65.38* 
(-28.50) 
-157.62* 
(-29.03) 
-60.25* 
(-35.01) 
-26.00* 
(-29.27) 
3.66* 
(36.41) 
18.96* 
(42.61) 
-40.97* 
(-35.65) 
-135.76* 
(-23.95) 
-38.38* 
(-27.75) 
-4.13* 
(-23.78) 
25.53* 
(29.27) 
40.83* 
(30.15) 
-19.10* 
(-24.80) 
t ratios in parenthesis significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 5 6a- The results of the hypothesis Average Revenue effort less the Average 
Cost of effort equals zero (ARe-ACe=0), for the representative 100-200 and 200-500 
GRT Japanese vessels in the northem and southem fishery. Estimates are in thousand 
Yen per thousand hooks. 
Season Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
North 
coef 134.18* 125.18* 112.87* 44.64 
t • (3.27) (3.05) (2.75) (1.09) 
large 
coef 15.88 -55.56 -22.31 4.39 
t (0.39) (-1.35) (-0.54) (0.11) 
South small 
coef. 9.54 3.15 6.65 -3.57 
t (0.29) (0.43) (1.05) (-0.10) 
coef. -166.31* -111.27* -83.12* -104.67* 
t (-11.30) (-17.4) (-16.94) (-6.61) 
t ratios in parenthesis significant at the 1 % level. 
Table 5.6b: The results of the hypothesis Average Revenue effort less the Average 
Variable Cost of effort equals zero (ARe-AVCe=0), for the representative 100-200 
and 200-500 GRT Japanese vessels in the northem and southem fishery. Estimates 
are in thousand Yen per thousand hooks. 
Season Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
North 
smaU 
coef. 
t 
large 
coef. 
t 
South 
smaU 
coef. 
t 
large 
all 
t 
177.13* 
(4.86) 
63.78* 
(4.65) 
52.49* 
(1.58) 
-118.41' 
(-8.05) 
168.13* 
(2.66) 
-7.66 
(-0.20) 
46.1* 
(6.24) 
• -63.37* 
(-9.93) 
155.82* 
(6.37) 
25.59* 
(2.60) 
49.6* 
(7.83) 
-35.22* 
(-7.18) 
87.59** 
(2.38) 
52.29* 
(3.73) 
39.38* 
(1.07) 
-56.77* 
(-3.58) 
t ratios in parenthesis significant at the 1% level. * significant at die 5% level. 
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Table 5.7a: The results of the hypothesis that the Average Revenue effort equals zero 
(ARe=0) for the representative Japanese vessel, the representative Japanese vessel 
below 200 GRT, and for the representative Australian domestic vessel. Figures are in 
Yen per hundred hooks. 
Japanese Japanese Australians Australians 
All Vessels <200GRT with zeros without zeros 
Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 0 Zone 1 
1988 
Quarter 
0 24640* 25205* 24037* 24288* 76235* 69809* 55367** 16026 
(13.14) (14.01) (3.11) (3.21) (5.07) (4.26) (2.45) (0.6) 
1 22071* 22637* 24044* 24294* 68761* 62335* 65500* 26159 
(21.63) (21.25) (11.77) (12.20) (5.95) (4.22) (3.79) (1.18) 
2 26576* 27142* 26006* 26257*113800*107370* 109350* 70014* 
(26.36) (32.16) (14.15) (17.58) (13.66) (9.28) (8.9) (4.19) 
S 24958* 25524* 26050* 26301* 67669* 61243* 67794* 28453 
(8.06) (8.64) (4.43) (4.69) (7.52) (4.82) (5.27) (1.64) 
1989 
Quarter 
0 23143* 23709* 21195* 21446* 55692* 49266* 48499** 9158 
(12.21) (12.97) (2.70) (2.78) (4.98) (3.25) (2.34) (0.36) 
1 20574* 21140* 21202* 21453* 48218* 41792* 58632* 19292 
(20.42) (19.83) (11.10) (10.85) (5.13) (3.05) (4.16) (0.97) 
2 25079* 25645* 23165* 23415* 93254* 86828* 102490* 63146* 
(27.47) (34.36) (15.18) (18.20) (14.4) (7.87) (11.66) (4.34) 
3 23462* 24027* 23208* 23459* 47126* 40700* 60926* 21585 
(7.81) (8.39) (4.15) (4.40) (5.55) (3.14) (4.63) (1.22) 
significant at the 1% level, significant at the 5% level, t ratios are in parenthesis. 
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Table 5.7b: The results of the hypothesis that the Average Revenue effort less 
Average Cost of effort equals zero (ARe-ACe=0) for the representative Japanese 
vessel, Japanese vessels below 200 GRT and Australian domestic vessels. Figures are 
in Yen per hundred hooks. 
Japanese Japanese 
All Vessels <200GRT 
Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 0 Zone 1 
Australians Australians 
with zeros without zeros 
Zone 0 Zone 1 Zone 0 Zone 1 
1988 
Quarter 
0 -5489* -4924* 297 548 
(-2.93) (-2.74) (0.07) (0.07) 
14535 8109 -6333 -45674 
(0.97) (0.49) (-0.28) (-1.71) 
1 -8058 -7492 304 554 
(-7.90) (-7.03) (0.15) (0.28) 
2 -3553* -2987* 2266 2517 
(-3.52) (-3.54) (1.23) (1.68) 
3 -5171 -4605 2310 2561 
(-1.67) (-1.56) (0.39) (0.46) 
1989 
Quarter 
0 -6986* -6420* -1284 -1034 
7061 635 3800 -35541 
(0.61) (0.04) (0.22) (-1.60) 
52100*45670* 47650* 8314 
(6.25) (3.95) (3.88) (0.50) 
5969 -457 6094 -33247 
(0.66) (-0.04) (0.47) (-1.92) 
-6008 -12434 -13201 -52542 * * 
(-3.69) (-3.51) (-0.16) (-0.13) (-0.54) (-0.82) (-0.64) (-2.07) 
-9555 -8989 
(-9.48) (-8.43) 
-5050* -4484* 
(-5.53) (-6.01) 
-6667** -6102** 
(-2.22) (-2.13) 
-1278 -1027 
(-0.67) (-0.52) 
684 935 
(0.45) (0.73) 
728 979 
(1.30) (0.18) 
-13482 -19908 -3068 -42408** 
(-1.43) (-1.45) (-0.22) (-2.13) 
31554* 25128**40790* 1446 
(4.87) (2.28) (4.64) (0.10) 
-14574 -21000 -774 -40115** 
(-1.72) (-1.62) (-0.06) (-2.27) 
significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, t ratios are in parenthesis. 
306 
Table 5.8a: Long-mn rent in the northem, southem and total fisheries over the 1984-
1989 period. Effort is in thousands of hooks, TRe, and Rent is in million Yen. 
Year 
Total fishery 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Effort TRe TCe Rent 
6363 1771 2740 -969 
7544 3171 2985 185 
6022 1661 2117 -456 
7151 2207 2373 -165 
12458 3459 3955 -495 
12654 3607 3989 -382 
Rent 
%of 
TRe 
-55 
6 
-27 
-7 
-14 
-11 
Mean 8699 2664 3094 -380 -14 
Vll North 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Mean 
All South 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
2451 
2450 
962 
1864 
4435 
4543 
2784 
3911 
5094 
5060 
5287 
8024 
754 
1209 
283 
792 
1509 
1483 
1018 
1017 
1962 
1378 
1415 
1950 
1079 -325 
998 210 
357 -74 
647 146 
1439 71 
1463 21 
1017 8 
1661 -644 
1987 -25 
1760 -382 
1726-311 
2516 -566 
-43 
17 
-26 
18 
5 
1 
1 
-63 
-1 
-28 
-22 
-29 
1989 8112 2124 2526 -402 -19 
Mean 5915 1645 2077 -388 -24 
Table 5.8b: Long-mn rent as a percentage of Total Revenue for both small and large 
vessel classes in the northem and southem fisheries 1984-1989. 
Year Total Fishery Northem fishery Southem fishery 
All Small Large All Small Large 
1984 -55 
1985 6 
1986 -27 
1987 -7 
1988 -14 
1989 -11 
Average -14 
-43 
17 
-26 
18 
5 
1 
1 
34 
45 
25 
28 
27 
24 
28 
-53 
15 
-29 
17 
-1 
-3 
-4 
-63 
-1 
-28 
-22 
-29 
-24 
-24 
-28 
20 
4 
8 
6 
12 
7 
-71 
-7 
-36 
-34 
-46 
-30 
-34 
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Table 5.9: Long-mn rent as a percentage of Total Revenue by Season for both small 
and large Japanese vessel classes in the northem and southem fisheries 1984-1989. 
Quarter 
Total Fishery Northem fishery Southem fishery 
All Small Large All Small Large 
1 - 3 4 35 -1 -49 6 -60 
2 - 3 2 11 46 -29 -34 0 -48 
3 -17 -6 28 -12 -21 6 -29 
4 6 8 26 4 -8 21 -21 
Quarter 1 = January to March, Q2= April to June, Q3 = July to September and Q4 
October to December. 
Table 5.10: Rent as a percentage of Total Revenue by sub-zone for both small and 
large Japanese vessel classes in the northem and southem fisheries 1984-1989. 
Sub-Zone Northem fishery Southem fishery 
All Small Large All Small Large 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
-7 8 
8 34 
4 37 
-7 28 
-3 28 
16 39 
-10 
4 
-1 
-12 
-7 
-66 
-26 
-23 
-30 
-26 
-26 
-11 
11 
1 
6 
5 
3 
23 
-40 
-29 
-42 
-37 
-37 
-32 
Sub-zone 1 = 0-50 miles, zone2 = 50-100 miles, zone 3 =100-150 miles, zone 4= 
150-200, miles, zone 5 =200-350 miles and zone 6 =350-500 miles. 
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Table 5.11: Effort, Total Revenue, Total Cost effort, and Rent by quarters for the 
domestic fishing activity in the years 1988 and 1989. 
Year Qtr Trips Effort TRall TCe Rent Rent as Effort as 
% TRe % TE 
1988 1 178 52660 185 282 -97 -52 18 
1988 2 216 71392 232 382 -151 -65 25 
1988 3 279 96560 1014 517 497 49 34 
1988 4 220 67526 304 362 -58 -19 23 
Totals 893 288138 1735 1544 191 11 100 
1989 
1989 
1989 
1989 
269 
591 
488 
408 
74164 
186900 
146697 
128653 
261 418 
1028 1054 
831 827 
531 725 
-158 
-26 
4 
-194 
-60 
-3 
0 
-37 
14 
35 
27 
24 
Totals 1756 536414 2651 3025 -374 14 100 
Note: Trips are daily, Effort is in hooks per day, TRe, TCe and Rent are in thousands of dollars. 
TRall represents the Total Revenue for Albacore, Bigeye and Yellowfin tunas. The cost survey data 
were from the financial year 1989-90, but were used to obtain estimates of rent in 1988. Personal 
communication with fishers and price indices for the period led to 5% being deducted from the 1989 
cost estimates at account for inflation in the price of factor inputs during the 1988-89 period 
(ABARE, 1991). The absolute value of rent may be under-reported as the domestic logbook 
coverage of catch and effort statistics was less complete in 1988 than in 1989 (Anon., 1990). When 
rent is expressed as a percentage of TCe and TRe such data problems are less relevant. 
Table 5.12: Rent as a percentage of Total Revenue by season in the northem and 
southem domestic fisheries for the years 1988-1989. Figures in parenthesis are effort 
in a given quarter as a percentage of the total effort for the year. 
Year Qtr 
1988 1 
1988 2 
1988 3 
1988 4 
1989 1 
1989 2 
1989 3 
1989 4 
Overall fishery 
Rent 
as% 
ofTR 
-52 
-65 
49 
-19 
-60 
-3 
0 
-37 
Effort 
as% 
ofTE 
(18) 
(25) 
(34) 
(23) 
(14) 
(35) 
(27) 
(24) 
North 
Rent 
as% 
ofTR 
n/a 
-57 
73 
14 
-27 
-3 
16 
-27 
Effort 
as% 
ofTE 
(0) 
(4) 
(65) 
(31) 
(5) 
(9) 
(67) 
(18) 
South 
Rent 
as% 
ofTR 
-52 
-66 
-75 
-45 
-65 
-2 
-41 
-39 
Effort 
as% 
ofTE 
(24) 
(31) 
(24) 
(21) 
(17) 
(43) 
(14) 
(26) 
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Table 5.13: Rent as a percentage of Total Effort by vessel class in the northem and 
southem domestic fisheries for the years 1988-1989. 
Overall North South 
fishery 
1988 
Planing Longliners -61 28 -115 
Multi-Purpose 10 55 5 
Trawlers 67 81 -107 
1989 
Planing Longliners -35 -18 -42 
Multi-Purpose 24 28 23 
Trawlers 33 49 1 
Table 5.14: Operating profit as a percentage of Total Revenue for both small and 
large vessel classes in the northem and southem fisheries 1988-1989. 
Year Total Fishery Northem fishery Southem fishery 
All Small Large All Small Large 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Average 
-39 
13 
-18 
5 
-1 
2 
-3 
-31 
24 
-17 
28 
16 
13 
58 
51 
31 
36 
36 
35 
-42 
21 
-19 
26 
11 
8 
-45 
7 
-18 
-8 
-14 
-5 
18 
28 
12 
19 
18 
25 
-59 
1 
-27 
-19 
-29 
-16 
11 38 6 -11 20 -22 
Table 5.15: Rent as a percentage of adjusted Total Revenue for both smaU and large 
Japanese vessel classes in the northem and southem fisheries 1988-1989. 
Adjustment 
Total 
+ 0% -14 
-1-10% -4 
+20% 5 
-1-30% 12 
-140% 18 
Fishery Northem fishery 
All Small Large 
1 28 -4 
10 34 6 
17 39 13 
23 43 20 
29 47 26 
Southem fishery 
All Small Large 
-24 7 -34 
-12 16 -22 
-3 22 -12 
5 28 -3 
12 33 4 
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Table 5.16: Coefficient estimates for the the sustainability model for Japanese catch 
and effort in the east Australian region (1962-1989). 
CPUE Constant T D, Do R2 
Species 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Black Marlin 
Blue Marlin 
Striped 
Marlin 
18.77* 
(13.01) 
1.98* 
(10.58) 
11.05* 
(8.87) 
0.43* 
(2.39) 
0.59* 
(7.62) 
0.41* 
(8.48) 
0.93* 
(6.33) 
-0.86* 
(-6.14) 
-0.05* 
(-2.87) 
-0.53* 
(-4.47) 
0.06* 
(3.70) 
-0.01** 
(-1.96) 
-0.02* 
(-4.22) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
5.81* 
(2.72) 
0.52 
(1.88) 
7.61* 
(4.14) 
-0.83* 
(-3.10) 
-0.1 
(-0.91) 
0.21* 
(2.89) 
-0.26 
(-1.21) 
7.4* 
(3.84) 
0.55** 
(2.21) 
3.67** 
(2.21) 
-0.19* 
(-3.10) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.14** 
(2.11) 
-0.23 
(-1.17) 
0.65 
0.29 
0.51 
0.37 
0.55 
0.43 
0.33 
Significant at the 1% level, significant at the 5% level, t ratios are in parenthesis. 
Degrees of freedom=24. 
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Table 5.17a: Coefficient estimates for the average weight versus time (in months) 
model caught by the Japanese in the east AustraUan region (1984-1989). 
Average 
Weight Constant T R^ 
Species 
Albacore 14.88* -0.045** 0.056 
(16.22) (-2.07) 
Bigeye 37.71* -0.054 0.013 
(16.32) (-0.97) 
Yellowfin 34.76* -0.072 0.031 
(17.41) (-1.51) 
Swordfish 73.73* -0.214* 0.098 
(22.62) (-2.76) 
Black Marlin 84.87* 0.578 0.015 
(9.76) (0.27) 
Blue Marlin 115.77* -0.498 0.057 
(9.67) (0.27) 
Striped 46.68 -0.069 0.017 
Marlin (17.93) (-1.12) 
Significant at the 1% level, significant at the 5% level, t ratios are in parenthesis. 
Degrees of freedom =70. 
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Table 5.17b: Coefficient estimates for the monthly average weight of Japanese 
catches versus time model for the east coast region (1984-1989). 
Average 
Weight Constant T Ql Q2 Q3 R2. 
Species 
Albacore 17.57* -0.043**-5.18* -5.10* -0.75 
(19.24) (-2.43) (-5.0) (-5.1) (-0.73) 0.43 
Bigeye 43.35* -0.026 -6.48**-10.96* -9.17* 
(16.21) (-0.50) (-2.17) (-3.65) (-3.03) 0.20 
Yellowfin 32.97* -0.069 4.37* 2.69 -0.20 
(16.21) (-1.45) (1.57) (0.96) (-0.07) 0.08 
Swordfish 69.49* -0.23* 4.57 9.11** 6.22 
(17.13) (3.01) (1.01) (2.00) (1.36) 0.15 
Black Marlin 62.09* -0.016 26.22** 57.75* 17.99 
(6.73) (-1.96) (2.55) (5.58) (1.73) 0.33 
BlueMarlin 86.70* -0.458* 48.95* 61.83* 11.51 
(11.57) (-3.18) (5.85) (7.36) (1.36) 0.55 
Striped 49.16* -0.038 -1.96 -0.10 -12.31* 
Marlin (16.66) (-0.68) (-0.59) (-0.03) (-3.69) 0.23 
*Significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, t ratios are in parenthesis. 
n=70 Degrees of freedom=65. 
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Table 5 18a- Coefficient estimates for the production model (equation 5.19) for 
Japanese vessels in the east Australian area over the 1962-1989 period. 
Species 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Black Marlin 
Blue Marlin 
Constant 
0.156 
(1.13) 
0.821* 
(3.35) 
0.576*** 
(1.85) 
1.35* 
(3.28) 
1.31* 
(3.06) 
0.45 
(1.53) 
Striped Marlin 0.72** 
(2.47) 
Ut 
-0.0017** 
(-2.07) 
-0.0010* 
(-3.17) 
-0.0017 
(-1.65) 
-0.0103** 
(-2.07) 
-0.0128*** 
(-1.89) 
-0.0013*** 
(-1.73) 
-0.0011** 
(-2.38) 
Et 
0.000045 
(0.55) 
-0.000012 
(-1.16) 
-0.U00006 
(-0.32) 
-0.000036** 
(-2.12) 
-0.000045** 
(-2.17) 
-0.004 
(-0.22) 
-0.000019 
(-1.46) 
R2 
0.22 
0.33 
0.157 
0.33 
0.27 
0.13 
0.22 
D.W. statistic 
2.48 
2.54 
2.28 
2.40 
2.43 
2.07 
2.23 
* * * * Significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, '^ '"^ significant at the 10% 
level, t ratios are in parenthesis. 24 df. 
Table 5.18b: The MSY and MEY effort levels for the production modelling result in 
Table 5.18a. Effort is in millions of hooks. The data are from the wider east 
Australian region which is greater than the AFZ. 
Species MSY effort MEY effort K(tonnes) 
Swordfish 
Black Marlin 
18.75 
14.55 
16.7 
12.1 
3640 
2274 
Note: MSY effort = r/2A, and MEY effort = (r/2A) (1-c/p AK) from equation 5.17. 
Pswf = 685 Yen per kilo, Pbm= 440.8 Yen per kilo. Cost of effort (c) = 248,000 Yen 
per thousand hooks. 
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Table 5.19a: Catch and effort data for the Eastem Australian Region for the years 
1962-1989. Effort is in miUions of hooks and catch is in numbers of fish. 
Year 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Effort 
24.35 
21.03 
17.36 
19.54 
28.13 
15.93 
13.30 
10.91 
11.91 
17.24 
13.18 
15.72 
18.42 
7.64 
8.02 
3.72 
9.75 
11.54 
7.46 
24.37 
19.34 
16.15 
13.64 
15.12 
15.20 
10.50 
22.18 
20.89 
1.12 
Nalb Neye 
642718 49878 
315407 
267403 
39543 
22562 
266284 35098 
427767 
250094 
173643 
91591 
130046 
148214 
94548 
129656 
96471 
51572 
59466 
24179 
40897 
63892 
38427 
164785 
150479 
191593 
128747 
145475 
148404 
124280 
192187 
38098 
23545 
24497 
23812 
22047 
23121 
18706 
31601 
21517 
6591 
13793 
2398 
8324 
16331 
15933 
28294 
21401 
24388 
18755 
30847 
34460 
16094 
9418 
235112 29444 
8653 1695 
Nyfn 
358090 
220739 
179018 
198295 
211977 
88216 
55749 
72267 
74512 
108867 
36727 
60719 
66069 
24674 
21092 
10865 
36359 
40928 
76234 
232440 
112356 
165994 
64890 
190544 
116506 
92761 
258714 
126525 
21238 
Nstm 
9016 
8183 
5341 
14280 
14397 
9504 
18664 
11867 
13161 
19816 
19400 
18672 
23808 
10697 
19654 
3247 
8472 
11175 
7081 
14785 
22930 
12304 
13226 
18108 
14199 
15059 
20984 
18133 
152 
Nbm 
11252 
10693 
9009 
14899 
12022 
6515 
5592 
9481 
9138 
5747 
3098 
4267 
4522 
3964 
1456 
2297 
2551 
2875 
1351 
2880 
4633 
2773 
2312 
1715 
995 
2175 
2500 
1134 
108 
Nbl 
12504 
Nstm 
35365 
10504 20348 
9369 
4428 
7357 
2851 
2235 
1848 
4215 
3811 
1795 
13548 
14566 
17257 
7462 
7525 
7978 
19231 
17201 
17274 
1732 20976 
2207 
1343 
1158 
476 
643 
981 
1875 
5144 
6877 
3648 
2867 
2959 
3823 
2239 
7673 
6378 
1507 
14841 
8980 
7563 
3273 
6912 
11781 
3908 
12870 
19383 
6668 
8251 
7906 
5205 
5027 
7100 
12089 
184 
Effort is in hooks. Species are in numbers caught eg Nalb= number of Albacore. 
Mean effort level 1962-1989 = 16.25 million hooks; Mean effort level 1984-1989 = 
14.95 million hooks. 
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Table 5.19b: Catch and effort data for the Eastem Australian Region for the years 
1962-1989. Effort is in millions of hooks and catch is in Tonnes (t) offish. 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990* 
Effort i 
Effort Walb 
24.35 8741 
21.03 4290 
17.36 3637 
19.54 3621 
28.13 5818 
15.93 3401 
13.30 2362 
10.91 1246 
11.91 1769 
17.25 2016 
13.18 1286 
15.72 1763 
18.42 1312 
7.64 701 
8.02 809 
3.72 329 
9.76 556 
11.54 869 
7.46 523 
24.37 2241 
19.34 2047 
16.15 2606 
13.64 1751 
15.12 1978 
15.20 2018 
10.50 1690 
22.18 2614 
20.89 3198 
1.12 118 
S in millmnc nf 
Weye 
1835 
1454 
830 
1291 
1401 
866 
901 
876 
811 
850 
688 
1162 
791 
242 
507 
88 
306 
601 
586 
1041 
787 
897 
690 
1135 
1267 
592 
1450 
1083 
62 
Wyfti Wswf 
11838 611 
7298 555 
5918 362 
6556 968 
7008 976 
2916 644 
1843 1265 
2389 804 
2463 892 
3599 1343 
1214 1315 
2007 1266 
2184 1614 
816 725 
697 1332 
359 220 
1202 574 
1353 757 
2520 480 
7684 1002 
3714 1554 
5488 834 
2145 896 
6299 1227 
3852 962 
3067 1021 
8553 1422 
4183 1229 
702 10 
Wbm 
1015 
964 
812 
1344 
1084 
588 
504 
855 
824 
518 
279 
385 
408 
357 
131 
207 
230 
259 
122 
260 
418 
250 
208 
155 
90 
196 
225 
102 
10 
Wbl 
1293 
1086 
969 
458 
761 
295 
231 
191 
436 
394 
186 
179 
228 
139 
120 
49 
66 
101 
194 
532 
711 
377 
296 
306 
395 
232 
793 
659 
156 
Wstm 
1630 
938 
625 
671 
796 
344 
347 
368 
887 
793 
796 
967 
684 
414 
349 
151 
319 
543 
180 
593 
894 
307 
380 
364 
240 
232 
327 
557 
8 
Mean effort levH QRd TQRQ' M O< M l ^^^'^^^^ = ^^-^^ million hooks; 
Mean ettort level 1984-1989 = 14.95 miUion hooks. Average weights of soecies in 
Kilograms 1984-89): Albacore =13.6, Bigeye = 36 78 YeUnvj^n-\%n^^'^Ar u 
Year Effort Walb Weye Wyfti Wswf Wbm Wbl Wstm 
]?E ^^ 920 336 788 453 165 96 9 8 ^ 
1985 7.54 1182 516 1731 548 87 12S ??? 
1986 6.02 880 513 958 520 22 58 oil 
1987 7.15 1001 391 1931 619 167 14? 9 ^ 
1988 12.57 1743 591 3339 877 95 Itl ?]? 
1989 12.77 1716 689 2497 6m ^83 0 HI 83 301 465 
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Table 5.19d: Catch and effort data for the eastem AFZ as a percentage of the catch 
and effort data in the Eastem Australian Region for the years 1984-1989. (Table 
5.19c as a percentage of Table 5.19b). 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Effort 
47 
50 
40 
68 
57 
61 
Walb 
53 
60 
44 
59 
67 
54 
Weye 
49 
45 
40 
66 
41 
64 
Wyfti 
37 
27 
25 
63 
39 
60 
Wswf 
51 
45 
54 
61 
62 
49 
Wbm 
79 
56 
25 
85 
86 
81 
Wbl 
32 
41 
15 
63 
50 
46 
Wstm 
76 
86 
90 
93 
105 
83 
Table 6.1: The percentage of the total catch of Japanese vessels produced nonjointiy 
by small and large Japanese vessels greater than 200 GRT in the northem and 
southem fisheries. 
North 
< 200GRT 
> 200GRT 
South 
< 200GRT 
> 200GRT 
Total 
Effort 
5 
27 
18 
50 
100 
Alb 
6 
33 
16 
55 
Beye 
3 
17 
20 
Yfn 
7 
7 
Swf 
2 
2 
Mar 
9 
52 
10 
30 
100 
Bm 
18 
73 
2 
7 
100 
Blu 
9 
76 
3 
12 
100 
Stm 
4 
29 
17 
50 
100 
Table 6.2: The aimual cumulative cost of exclusion of the Japanese fleet from the 
following areas of the eastem Australian fishery. The costs represent access fees 
(assumed to be 6% of Total Revenue effort in the 1984-1989 period) foregone. 
Values are in thousands of Australian dollars (1985 = 100). 
50 miles 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 350 miles Total 
All Vessels 
<200 GRT 
>200 GRT 
South 
All Vessels 
<200 GRT 
>200 GRT 
63 
10 
53 
162 
45 
117 
175 
25 
150 
286 
70 
216 
308 
41 
266 
364 
90 
274 
391 
53 
338 
459 
114 
345 
480 
65 
415 
749 
193 
556 
488 
71 
416 
826 
222 
603 
Exchange rate 115 Yen to 1 A$ mean exchange rate over the 1984-89 period (ABARE,1991). 
Access fees are assumed to be 6% of the Total Revenue. 
317 
Appendix Tables. 
Table A3.1.1a: Statistical tests for tonnage differences in the northem fishery. Tests 
compare Japanese vessels below and above 200 GRT. 
j^l Uke^ No.of Chi Reject 
variable lihood independent squares ^J^^^l^ 
restrictions (%^ ) 1% 5% 
FuUy 
Restricted 
model 
Fisheries 
equal 
<200 & >200 
All dunruny 
variables 
equal 
<200 & >200 
Annual 
variables 
equal 
<200 & >200 
Seasons 
equal 
<200 & >200 
-14196.0 
-14027.5 
-14095.4 
-14124.0 
-14095.4 
Technology tests: 
Beta terms 
equal 
<200 & >200 
as a group 
i^jN=fiijS 
'5iN='^ iS 
'^ iiN='^ iiS 
-14027.5 
-14047.0 
-14041.1 
-14027.5 
60 
40 
25 
15 
20 
10 
5 
5 
337.0 
144.0 
144.0 
57.2 
135.8 
96.8 
11.8 
46.0 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
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Table A3.1.1b: Statistical tests for tonnage differences in the southem fishery. Test 
compare Japanese vessels below and above 200 GRT. 
Test Log Like-
variable lihood 
FuUy 
Restricted 
model -24741.8 
Fisheries 
equal 
<200&>200 -24561.4 
All dummy 
variables 
equal 
<200&>200 -24580.6 
Annual dummy 
variables 
equal 
<200&>200 -24609.8 
Seasons 
equal 
<200&>200 -24580.6 
Technology tests: 
Beta terms 
equal 
<200 & >200 
as a group -24565.5 
6ijN=6ijs -24568.0 
6iN=6is -24564.2 
6iiN=6jis -24565.5 
No.of 
independent 
restrictions 
60 
40 
25 
15 
20 
10 
5 
5 
Chi 
squares 
(%2) 
360.8 
322.4 
264.0 
58.4 
30.2 
25.2 
7.6 
5.0 
Reject 
YorN? 
1% 5% 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
N N 
Y Y 
N N 
N N 
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Table A3.1.2a: Tests for stmcture of production technology for Japanese vessels less 
than 200 GRT in nortiiem area of the east coast tiina longline fishery. 
Test 
Unrestricted 
All dummy 
variables 
Aimual 
dummy 
variables 
Quarterly 
dummy 
variables 
All technolog> 
variables 
Input-Output 
Separability 
Overall 
Nonjointness 
Constant, Bjj 
Log 
like-
hood 
-2557.07 
-2611.77 
-2589.88 
-2575.34 
r 
-2599.54 
-2559.08 
-2565.83 
-2568.88 
No.of 
independent 
restrictions 
40 
25 
15 
20 
5 
10 
5 
Chi 
squares 
iy}) 
109.4 
65.62 
36.54 
621.8 
4.02 
17.52 
23.62 
Reject 
Y o r N ? 
1% 5% 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
N N 
N N 
Y Y 
Note: Likelihood ratio tests with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
independent restrictions. *Marlin are aggregated Striped, black and Blue Marlin . 
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Table A3.1.2b: Tests for stmcture of production technology for Japanese vessels 
greater than 200 GRT in northem area of the east coast tuna longline fishery. 
Test Log No. of Chi Reject 
like- independent squares Y or N ? 
hood restrictions (y}) 1% 5% 
Unrestricted -11317.6 
All dummy 
variables 
Annual 
dummy 
variables 
Quarterly 
dummy 
variables 
All technology 
variables 
Input-Output 
Separability 
Overall 
Nonjointness 
Constant, Bjj 
Nonjointness 1 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
YeUowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
-11466.0 
-11393.0 
-11383.2 
-11469.8 
-11321.5 
-11333.5 
-11336.1 
'or: 
-11323.5 
-11326.2 
-11325.4 
-11327.3 
-11322.9 
40 
25 
15 
20 
5 
10 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
296.8 
150.8 Y Y 
131.2 Y Y 
304.4 Y Y 
7.8 N N 
24.0 
37.0 
4.0 
9.4 
7.8 
11.6 
2.8 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
Y 
N 
Note: Likelihood ratio tests with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
independent restrictions. *Marlin are aggregated Stnped, Black and Blue Marlm. 
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Table A3.1.2c: Tests for stmcture of production technology for Japanese vessels less 
than 200 GRT in the southem area of the east coast tuna longline fishery. 
Test 
Unrestricted 
All dummy 
variables 
Annual 
dummy 
variables 
Quarterly 
dummy 
variables 
Log 
like-
hood 
-5863.50 
-5994.74 
-5920.86 
-5944.48 
All technology 
variables -5908.56 
Input-Output 
Separability 
Overall 
Nonjointness 
Constant, Bjj 
-5868.07 
-5878.33 
-5868.07 
Nonjointness for: 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
YeUowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
-5871.66 
-5873.12 
-5873.94 
-5872.31 
-5869.31 
No.of 
independent 
restrictions 
40 
25 
15 
20 
5 
10 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Chi 
squares 
(X2) 
262.48 
114.72 
161.96 
90.12 
9.14 
29.66 
31.62 
7.18 
10.10 
11.74 
8.48 
2.48 
Reject 
Y o r N ? 
1% 5% 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
. J J . . "'"* viv^ fei^ i^ o \ji 11S5CUU111 cqucii LO me numoer or 
independent restrictions *Marlin are aggregated Striped, Black and Blue Marlin. 
IS at a 10 % level of significance. 
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Table A3.1.2d: Tests for stmctiire of production technology for Japanese vessels 
greater than 200 GRT in the southem area of the east coast tuna longline fishery. 
Test 
Unrestricted 
All dummy 
variables 
Annual 
dummy 
variables 
Quarterly 
dummy 
variables 
Log No. of 
like- independent 
hood restrictions 
-18651.5 
-18888.7 
-18733.2 
-18908.6 
All technology 
variables -18788.4 
Input-Output 
Separability 
Overall 
Nonjointness 
Constant, Bjj 
Nonjointness 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
YeUowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
-18660.3 
-18671.5 
-18691.0 
for: 
-18662.1 
-18662.3 
-18659.3 
-18657.1 
-18653.0 
40 
25 
15 
20 
5 
10 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Chi 
squares 
639.6 
163.4 
514.2 
73.8 
17.6 
40.0 
81.0 
21.2 
20.6 
15.6 
11.2 
3.0 
Reject 
YorN? 
1% 5% 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
N Y 
N N 
Note: Likelihood ratio tests with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
independent restrictions. *Marlin are aggregated Striped, Black and Blue Marlm. 
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Table A3.1.4a: Allen partial elasticities of transformation ajj for the full estimated 
coefficients of the overall model. Note these are symmetric ajj = Ojj. 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
5.521* 
(3.86) 
-1.114 
(-1.29) 
-1.288** 
(-2.43) 
-0.645 
(-0.70) 
-0.536 
(-0.78) 
Bigeye 
-0.404 
(-0.40) 
1.672* 
(4.32) 
-1.854** 
(-2.16) 
-0.480 
(-0.84) 
Yellowfin 
0.014 
(0.04) 
-0.774 
(-1.26) 
0.725** 
(2.01) 
Swordfish 
6.466* 
(3.69) 
-3.022* 
(-3.78) 
Marlin 
2.661* 
(3.69) 
Note: * Statistically significant at 1%' ** Statistically significant at 5%. Elasticities 
calculated at sample mean. Assymptotic t ratios in parenthesis. 
Table A3.1.4b: Allen partial elasticities of transformation ajj for the full estimated 
coefficients of vessels < 200GRT in the northem fishery. Note that these are 
symmetric GJJ = CTJJ. 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
8.329 
(1.76) 
0.013 
(0.01) 
-3.548 
(-1.88) 
2.387 
(0.32) 
-0.416 
(-0.19) 
Bigeye 
4.743 
(0.51) 
2.895 
(1.45) 
-10.271 
(-1.04) 
-5.264 
(-1.88) 
Yellowfin 
0.453 
(0.45) 
2.909 
(0.94) 
-0.152 
(-0.15) 
Swordfish 
-4.948 
(-0.24) 
-3.967 
(-0.95) 
Marlin 
4.325* 
(2.56) 
Note: * Statistically significant at 1%' ** Statistically significant at 5%. Elasticities 
calculated at sample mean. Asymptotic t ratios in parenthesis. 
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Table A3 1 4c- Allen partial elasticities of transformation Ojj for the full estimated 
coefficients of vessels > 200GRT in the northem fishery. Note that these are 
symmetric CTij=c^ ji-
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
1.370 
(0.52) 
3.780 
(1.64) 
-0.743 
(-1.09) 
-1.83 
(-0.37) 
-0.082 
(-0.07) 
Bigeye 
-11.55* 
(-2.54) 
0.726 
(0.94) 
-1.09 
(-0.27) 
0.197 
(0.14) 
Yellowfin 
0.309 
(0.99) 
-2.132 
(-1.95) 
0.395 
(0.96) 
Swordfish 
24.65* 
(3.14) 
-2.722 
(-1.34) 
Marlin 
-0.025 
(-0.02) 
Note: * Statistically significant at 1%' Statistically significant at 5%. Elasticities 
calculated at sample mean. Asymptotic t ratios in parenthesis. 
Table A3.1.4d: Allen partial elasticities of transformation a« for the full estimated 
coefficients of vessels < 200 GRT in the southem fishery. Note that these are 
symmetric cyij=aji. 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
7.152** 
(2.52) 
-1.94 
(-1.35) 
0.134 
(0.09) 
-3.263 
(-1.60) 
0.711 
(0.48) 
Bigeye 
0.178 
(0.12) 
2.843* 
(2.68) 
-2.043 
(-1.71) 
0.958 
(0.79) 
Yellowfin 
-3.168** 
(-2.04) 
1.332 
(0.84) 
-0.363 
(-0.30) 
Swordfish 
2.113 
(0.92) 
-0.921 
(-0.63) 
Marlin 
0.776 
(0.41) 
Note: Statistically significant at !%> ** Statistically significant at 5%. Elasticities 
calculated at sample mean. Assymptotic t ratios in parenthesis. 
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Table A3.1.4e: Allen partial elasticities of transformation aj; for the full estimated 
coefficients of vessels > 200 GRT in the southem fishery. Note that these are 
symmetric (Tij=Oji. 
Albacore 
Bigeye 
Yellowfin 
Swordfish 
Marlin 
Albacore 
5.023* 
(3.63) 
-2.321* 
(-2.95) 
0.281 
(0.42) 
-2.266 
(-1.89) 
0.108 
(0.14) 
Bigeye 
0.674 
(0.75) 
1.992* 
(2.68) 
-1.901** 
(-2.28) 
0.431 
(0.59) 
Yellowfin 
-1.422** 
(-2.06) 
0.357 
(0.39) 
-0.049 
(-0.07) 
Swordfish 
3.115 
(1.76) 
-1.099 
(-1.07) 
Marlin 
1.373 
(1.17) 
Note: Statistically significant at 1%' Statistically significant at 5%. Elasticities 
calculated at sample mean. Assymptotic t ratios in parenthesis. 
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Tablt A3.2.1a: Statistical tests for the overall stmcture of the fishery. North versus 
south for the Japanese vessel six zone model. 
Test 
variable 
FuUy 
Restricted 
model 
Fisheries 
equal 
N & S 
All dummies 
equal N&S 
All Zones 
equal N & S 
Outer Zones 
> 200 nm 
equal N & S 
Inner Zones 
< 200 nm 
equal N & S 
Annual 
variables 
equal N & S 
Seasons 
equal 
N & S 
Like-
lihood 
-99981.1 
-99468.4 
-99541.2 
-99758.7 
-99894.1 
-99863.7 
-99612.9 
-99541.2 
Technology tests: 
Beta terms 
equal N & S 
as a group 
'^ ijN=fiijS 
i^N='^ iS 
'^ iiN=fiiiS 
-99468.4 
-99500.8 
-99489.5 
-99468.4 
No.of 
independent 
restrictions 
80 
65 
25 
15 
10 
25 
15 
20 
10 
5 
5 
Chi 
squares 
iy}) 
1025.4 
879.8 
536.3 
11A 
234.8 
291.6 
143.4 
145.6 
80.6 
22.6 
42.2 
Reject 
YorN? 
1% 5% 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
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Table A3.2.1b: Statistical tests for tonnage differences in the northem fisherv Tests 
compare Japanese vessels below and above 200 GRT for the six zone model. ' 
Test 
variable 
FuUy 
Restricted 
model 
Fisheries 
equal 
<200 & >200 
Equal over 
all dummies 
Equal over 
all zones 
Annual 
variables 
equal 
<200 & >200 
Seasons 
equal 
<200 & >200 
Like-
lihood 
-33528.9 
-33170.2 
-33238.9 
-33359.5 
-33271.6 
-333238.9 
Technology tests: 
Beta terms 
equal 
<200 & >200 
as a group 
^ij<200= 
fiij>200 
-33170.2 
-33195.0 
'5i<200=fii>200 
-33192.3 
^ii<200=fiii>200 
-33172.3 
Additional zonal tests 
Equal over 
zones >200nm 
Equal over 
zones <200nm 
-33488.0 
-33411.3 
No.of 
independent 
restrictions 
70 
65 
25 
25 
15 
20 
10 
5 
5 
10 
15 
Chi 
squares 
(X2) 
717.4 
550 
338.8 
175.8 
65.4 
137.4 
87.8 
5.4 
40.0 
81.8 
235.2 
Reject 
YorN? 
1% 5% 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
N N 
Y Y 
Y Y 
Y Y 
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Table A3 2 I c Statistical tests for tonnage differences in the southem fishery. Test 
compare Japanese vessels below and above 200 GRT for the six zone model. 
j ^ ^ Lik^: No.of Chi Reject 
variable lihood independent squares Jj"'^'.^ 
restrictions (%^ ) 1% 5% 
FuUy 
Restricted 
model -65289.2 
Fisheries 
equal 
<200&>200 -64977.0 
Equal over 
all dummies -64991.7 
Equal over 
all zones -65072.1 
Annual 
variables 
equal 
<200&>200 -65019.0 
Seasons 
equal 
<200&>200 -64991.7 
Technology tests: 
Beta terms 
equal 
<200 & >200 
as a group -64977.0 
6ij<200='5ij>200 
J J -94984.7 
fii<200='5i>200 
-64980.3 
Bii<200= 
fiii>200 
-64981.6 
Additional zonal tests 
Equal over 
zones >200nm -65162.5 
Equal over 
zones <200nm -65205.1 
70 
65 
25 
25 
15 
20 
10 
5 
5 
10 
15 
624.4 
595.0 
434.2 
106.2 
54.6 
29.4 
14.0 
9.2 
13.4 
253.4 
168.2 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
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Table A3.2.3a: Non-parametric examination of monotonicity in the six zone model. 
The Table shows the percentage of observations for which montonicity is satisfied for 
the Japanese vessel six zone models. 
Model No. of Albacore Bigeye Yellow Sword 
Observ- fin fish 
ations 
Marlin 
Overall 
North 
<200 GRT 
>200 GRT 
South 
<200 GRT 
>200 GRT 
3786 
216 
1127 
649 
2003 
100 
96 
100 
100 
98 
100 
100 
99.5 
100 
100 
98 
100 
100 
98 
99.5 
98 
90 
94 
99.7 
99.5 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Table A3.2.3b (i): Non-parametric examination of concavity in effort as seen in the 
retums to effort in the Japanese vessel six zone models. 
Model 
Overall 
model 
North 
< 200 GRT 
North 
>200 GRT 
South 
<200 GRT 
South 
>200 GRT 
Overall 
Dec. 
Const 
Const 
Const 
Dec. 
Retums to Effort 
No.of Species 
Diminishing Constant 
3 
5 
3 
3 
2 
Increasing 
2 
2 
2 
3 
341 
Table A3.2.3b (ii): Detailed examination of the signs of the Bi coefficients for each 
species in the Japanese vessel six zone models. 
Species 
Yellowfin Swordfish Marlin Model 
Overall 
model 
North 
< 200 GRT 
North 
>200 GRT 
South 
<200 GRT 
South 
>200 GRT 
Albacore 
0 
0 
+ 
0 
+ 
Bigeye 
-f-
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-1-
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Note : + means Bi is positive at the 5% level and 0 means not significantly different 
from zero at the 5% level. 
Table A3.2.3c: Test results for symmetry in the Japanese vessel six zone models. 
Model 
Overall model 
North < 200 GRT 
North >200 GRT 
South <200 GRT 
South >200 GRT 
Restricted 
Log 
Likelihood 
-99981.1 
-5662.62 
-27247.7 
-16402.3 
-48406.0 
Un restricted 
Log 
Likelihood 
-99911.4 
-5654.21 
-27201.7 
-16386.2 
-48352.7 
Test 
Statistic 
139.4 
16.82 
92.0 
32.2 
86.6 
Reject 
5% 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
? 
1% 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
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T hie A3 2 3d- System and ordinary R^ goodness of fit results for the system and 
estimated input'compensated supply equations for the Japanese vessel six zone model. 
Model No. of System* System Alb Beye Yfn Swf Mar 
Obs. Gen.R2 R2 
Overall 
North 
<200 GRT 
>200 GRT 
South 
<200 GRT 
>200 GRT 
3786 0.559 0.96 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.16 
216 0.250 0.99 0.47 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.24 
1127 0.587 0.96 0.16 0.07 0.24 0.15 0.17 
649 0.658 0.98 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.14 
2003 0.609 0.96 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.11 0.15 
Generalised R2, after Baxter and Cragg, (1970). 
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